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PREFACE
I N this volume are contained the annals of all thellluny campaigns of 1811, with the exception of
those of Suchet's Vnlcllcian expedition in the Inter
months of the yeal', which for reasons of space have
to be relegated to Volume V. [t ,,~"as impossible to
exceed the bulk of lH;o pages, and the operations on
the Mediterranean CO:lst of Spain can he dealt with
·separately without any grave breach of continuity in
the narrative, though this particular Valencian cam-
pnign nffected the general course of the WUI' till'
morc closely than Itlly other series of operations on
the Eastern side of the Peninsula, as I have been
cm'cflll to point out ill the concluding chapters of
Section XXIX.
The main interest of 1811, however, centres in the
operations of vVellington lLnd his opponent.·.;, Massena,
Soult, and MaI'mont. In the predolis yeul' the tide
of French conquest reached its high~water mark,
when Soult llppenred before the walls of Clldiz, and
Massena forced his way to the foot of the long chain
of redoubts that formed the Lines of 'fOrl'es Vedras,
Alreudy, before 1810 was over, Massena's baffled
army had fallen back a few miles, amI this first short
retreat to Santarem marked the commencement of
u never-ceasing ebb of the wave of conquest on the
vVestern side of the Peninsula. Matters went other~
wise on the Eastern coast in UHI, but nil Suchet's
campaigns were, after all, It side issue. The de-
cisive point lay not 'in Cntnlonia or Valencia, but in
Portugal.
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H'hen .I\lassena finally eVllcuated ])OItugal ill
l\Iarch 1811, forced out of his cnntonments by
",,,rellington's skilful use of the sword of famine, a
new stage in the Will' began, The French had lost
the advantage of the offensive, and were never to
regttin it on the 'Vestern theatre of wnr. All
through the remainder of 1811 it wns the British
general who dealt the stl'Okes, and the enemy who
had to pHrry them, The strokes were feeble, because
of ''''ellington's very limited resources, and for-the
most palt wel'e warded off, Though Ahneida fell
ill May, the siege of lladajo'l, in June, ~U1d the
blockade of Ciudnd Rodl'igo in August and Sep-
tember, wel'C both Lrought to all end by the con-
centration of French armies which \V"eUington was
too wenk to attack. But the masses of men which
Soult and :MlU'mont gathered on the Guadiana in
June, and Dorsenne llnd Marll10nt gathered on the
Agueda in September, had only been collected by
a dangel'Ous di<;gtll'1lisbing of' the whole of those
provinces of Spain which lay beneath the French
yoke. They could not remain long assembled, firstly
because they could not feed themselves, and secondly
. .
because of the peril to which their concentration
exposed the abandoned regions in their real', Hence,
in each case, the }l'rench commanders, satisfied with
huving parried 'Vellington's stroke for the moment,
refused to attack him, and dispersed their armies,
That the spirit of the offensive was lost on the
French side is sufficiently shown by the fact that
when their adversary stood. on the defensive upon the
CaY:l in JUlle, and at Alfll.yates in September, they
refused to assnil his positions.
\·Ve leave the allied llnd the J?rench nrmies at the
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end of the autumn campaign of 1fill still in this
state of equipoise. 'Vellington had made two SlIC-
cessive attempts to strike, and had failed, though
without any grave loss or disustcl', because the forces
opposed to him were still too great. His third stroke
in January 1812 was to be successful and decisive,
but its history belongs to Olll" next volume.
The main bulk of the -seven sections herewith
presented. consist'> of a narrative of the successive
phases of the long deadlock between "\iVeilingtoll
and his enemies along the Portuguese frontier: but
Lhave endeavoured to give as clear u narrative as I
can compile of all the side·mmpaigns of the year, in
r\ ndalusin.,.1\Iurcia,Estremadul':L, Galicin., the Asturias,
:1I1d Catalonia, and to show thei.' bearings on the
g-eneml history of the great Peninsular struggle.
[ must apologize for the long space of time-three
yenrs-that hits elapsed between the appearance of
the third and the fourth volumes of this work. But
it wus impossible to produce these sections till I had
taken two more voyages over the more importallt
fightillg·grOlmds of It:l,ll-one round Catalonia, the
other ~llong the line of Massena's retreat from Portu·
gal. it was only in the last days of September uno
that I was able to accomplish the h~tter journey. Tt
was made under the happiest conditions, fm- the
government of King Mmmel kindly lent me a motOI'-
car, and put at my disposition the services of Captnin
'l'eixeira Botelho, an admirable specialist on the
artillery side of the Peninsular War, Guided by
him, and accompanied by my fi-iend Mr. Rafael
Reynolds of Rarreil'o, I was able to study the topo-
graphyof Pombnl, Redinh:t, Condeixn, Casal Novo,
and Foz do Arouce, not to speak of many other
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picturesque spots of military interest. Hence my
survey of the main fighting-grounds of] 811 ha..>; been
fairly complete-I spent long days at Fuentes de
01101'0 and Albuera, walked all round lladajoz and
the field of the Gebora, and studied Tarragona and
other Catnlftll sites. Barrosa alone, I regret to say. 1
IHtye not been nble to visit.
1. have to offer grateful thanks to many possessors of
documents, who have been good enough to plncethem
at my disposition. The most impol'tnnt of nU were
the D'Ul'ban papers, lent to me by Mr. "V. S. l\L
D'Ul'b:m, of Newport House, near Exeter; the diury
and official correspondence of bis grandfather, Sir
llenjnmin I)'Urban, Bel'esford's Chief-of-the-staff'
during the Estremaduran campaigns of 1811, were
simply invaluable for the comprehension of those
operations. 1 had already acknowledged my in·
debtedness to the D'Urban papers in my narrative
of 1810; but in the following year, when lleresford
was acting as the leader of un independent anny, they
were even more important-as my constant references
to them in notes will show.
A new source of' high value came to my knowledge
last year, through the kindness of :l\fr. G. Sco\Tell, of
Hove, who placed in my hands the papcrs of his
grandfather, Major ScoveU, who acted in 1811-12-13
as 'Vellington's cipher-secretary. Not only was this
officer's personal diary of great use to me, but the file
of the intercepted French dispatches in cipher, with
the interpretation of them wOJ'ked out with infinite
pains, proved us valuable as it ,'..-us interesting. Many
of the originals, written on smull scraps of the thinnest
paper, aud folded into such minute shapes that they
could be sewed on to a buttoJl. 01' hidden in 11 COllt-
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seam, had evidently heen taken on the persons of
emissaries of the French genemls, who had been
captured by the guerrilleros, and had probably in
most cases cost the bearcrs thcir lives. The ciphers
were of two sorts: in the more complicated every
word WHS in cipher; in the less complicated only
names of persons and places and the numbers of
troops DJ' dates were disguised, the bulk of the dis-
putch being in plain French. In the key to these
lnst there were severnl hundred nrbitrnry numbers
used, lInd it was :Majol' Scovell's task to mnke out
from the context, or the repetition of the same figures
ill many documcnts, whut the individual numbers
meant. l3y the end of his researches he had identified
four~fifths of the names, and those which he had not
:Ill belonged to unimportant persons or places, infre-
quently mentioned.
.A much shorter but quite interesting file ofdiary and
letters placed at my disposal were those of Cornet
Frands Hall of the 14th Light Dragoons. They
practically covered only the year 1811, but were \'cl'y
full, and written in an animated descripti\'c style, very
different from that of many dry and short journals.
They contained by far the best account of the cnvahy
part of the fighting at Fuentes de Olioro thnt 1 ha\"c
ever seen, and I mn exceedingly obliged to the writer's
granddaughter :Miss E. G. Hall foJ' allowing me to
utilize them.
I am still occasionally using notes of ]8] 1 made
from two collections of unpublished letters, of which
1 hud occasion to speak in my last preface, those of
General Le Marchant. now in the hands of Sir Henry
Le Marchant of Chobham, and those of General.Tohn
"rilson belonging to COllummdel' Bel'tram Chambers
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U..K. '1'0 both of the courteous pOo';sessol"s of these
files of correspondence] owe my best thanks.
1 must mention, as iu previous volumes, much kind
help given me by those connected with the military
archives of Pari.... Madrid, and Lisbon. Once more
T must acknowledge the unfailing kindness of 1\'1.
'Martinien at the French War Ministry, who did so
much to make easy for me endless sem'ches through
the overtlowing cctrlOlls of its LibnU'y. At Madrid
Commulldant JUlm Arzadun of the A.rtillery .Museum
pl:wed much suggestive materinl at my disposal, ~U1d
found me one or two scarce bo.oks, while .Mlljor
Emilio l?iguera,'i at the '~Tl-\.I' Ministry seurched out
:md copied for me:L number of unpublished' morni.ng
states' of the various Spanish Armies. ] must lllso
recur to the name of Cnptuiu 'L'eixeira Botelho of the
Portuguese Artillery, my companion on the line of
IVI1LSSCIllL's l'etreat, who furnished me with n rich
rnine of iuforumtion in his unpublished snu.<fidios 11l1'1"f{
a Mstoria tilt .A.rtillteria Pori-ugueza.
Among my English helpers I must give :L specinl
word of thanks to Major .John Leslie, R.A., to whose
researches I owe all that T know about the British
Itltillery in the Peninsular ''''al'. His' Dicksoll
Papers' IU'e always at my elbow, and I owe him
pHrticular gmtitude for the A rtillery Appendix XXIV,
which he has been good enough to compile for me.
To the Hon. .John FOltescue, the historian of the
British A.rlTlY, whom we wel'e proud to welcome :\t
Oxford as Ford Lecturer this year, T am deeply
indebted for his answers to my queries on many dark
points, and most especially for 11is notes as to several
suppressed parts of the lVelli'llglon Correspondence.
.Mr. Ra.fhel Reynolds of lhl'l'eiro, who sh:U'cd in my
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September tollr of l::l:;t year, Iw'i obtained fur IIlC III
J ,ishon a number of rare Portuguese volumes. most
especinlly a complete set of.Marshal neresford's 01'dw.$
do Dia for the whole Peninsular \iVnr-an almost un-
procurable collection, containing every general order,
repOlt of a court martial. list of promotions, and
statistic:1I paper, which was issued to the Portuguese
Army, It is :tbsolute1y inv:duable for identifying
names lllld dates, ltnd settling (luestions of organiza-
tion. The Rev. Alexnnder Craufurd, grandson of the
tiunollscomml1nderot'theLight Division,hascontinued,
as in pl'edous years, to place his store of information
eOllcerning the campaigns of that hard fighting unit
lIt my disposal.
Lastly, the compiler of the index, a weltry t:\sk
executed under many difficulties, must receive my
hemtfelt thanks for mueh loving labour.
1 must apologize to renders for some occnsional dis-
crepmlCies in spelling which ml.lY be discovered ill the
text ~lIldmaps. They are mainly due to the fuct that all
along the }>ortugnese-Spanish frontier every town :llld
YiIlage is spelt differently by its own inhabitants
and by its close neighbours of the other nation:ility.
I find it impossible to avoid the occasional intl'l1sion
of It Portuguese spelling of It Spanish locality, and
vice versa, Matters <H'e made still more hnrd by the
fact that the spelling of local names in Portugal (less
so ill Spain) seems to have been much changed since
1811. It is difficult to avoid occasionally nn ttrchaic,
0)" on the other hand n too-modem, fonD tor n name.
These slight errors,or discrepancies between names
as spelled in the text and in the maps, were nearlyaU
caused by alterations between the received spelling of
1811, followed in the maps ~ used, and that of 1911,
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1 do lIot think that they will cause uny diHiculty to
the reader, who will not e.g. find it hard to recognize
that Foz do Arouce is the same as Foz de Arouce or
Casal Novo as Cuzul Novo.
In a few cases the critic may find a slight difference
in the numbers of troops, or of killed und wounded,
which arc given in the text and in the appendices. In
almost all cases this results from the fact that the official
totals quoted in the text turned out not to work out
in exact agreement with the detailed list of items in the
, morning states' or the complete <:asuult.y lists. These
errors, always triAing, could not be discovered till the
:u·jthmetic of' the appendices had been verified, some-
times when the text had already been printed off:
The most frequent discrepancies were found in com-
paring vVellington's totals of Portuguese strengths or
casualties with the detailed official figures. In all
instances the differences nre small, but the Appendices
must be taken to give the more exact numbers.
C. OMAN.
O""OIlIl :
hll!} I, 1911.
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SECTION XXIII
THE WINTER CAMPAIGN OF 1810-11
CHAPTER I
MASSENA AT SANTAUEM. THE DEADLOCK ON THE LOWER
TAGUS. DECEMBER 181O--JANUARY 1011
ON the lath of November. 1810, Massena had completed the
movement to the rear which he had commenccd on the 14th.
His army no longer threatened the Lines of Torres Vedras: he
had abandoned the offensive for the defensive. Concentrated in
the triangle Santarem-Punhete-Thomar, with his three corps
so disposed that a march of twenty miles would suffice to con-
centrate everyth.ing save outlying detachments, he wuited to see
whether his enemy would dare to attack him.; for he still hoped
for a battle in the open field, and was prepared to aceept its
chances. At Bussaco, so he reasoned, his defeat had been the
result of an over-bold attack on a strong position. The event
might go otherwise if he threw the responsibility of the ollimsive
oll'Vcllington. He had secured for himself an advantageous
fighting-ground: his left flank was protected by the formidable
entrenchments around Santarem ; his front was covered by the
rain-sodden "alley of the Rio Mayor, which during the winter
season could be crossed only at a few well-known points. His
right wing could not be turncd, unlcss his adversary were rendy
to push a. great force over villainous roads towards Alcallhede
and the upper course of the Rio Mayor. Alld if Wellington
should risk a large detachment in this direction, it might be
possible to burst out from Santarem, against the containing fOIl.-e
which he would be compelled to leave on the banks of the
Tagus, about Carta."{Q. and to beat it back towards the Lines
-n movement which would almost certainly bring back the
turning column from the North. For the English general could
not dare to leave Lishon exposed to the chances of a sudden
blow, when there was little but Portuguese militia left to occupy
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the long chain of defensive works from Alhandra to Torres
Vedras. For some weeks after his retreat to his Ilew position al
Suntarcm, 1\fusscntl lived in hopes that ""Vcllingtoll would either
deli,'er an attack all his well-protected front. or undertake the
dangerous turning movement towards his left.
No such chance was granted him. His adversary had weighed
all the arguments for and against the offensive, and had mude
up his mind to rely rather on his old weapon-starvation-thall
on force. In several of his December dispatches he sums up
the situation with perfect clearness; on the 2nd he wrote to
Lord Liverpool, 'It would still be impossible to make any
movement of importance upon the right flank of the enemy's
position at Sallturem without exposing some divisions of troops
to be insulated and eut off. The enemy having eOIJ(:cntrated
their army about Tones Novas, &e., I do not propose to make
any movement by which I incur the risk of involving the 11I'llly
in a general action, on ground less advantageous than that which
] had fixed upon to bring this contest to an issue [L e. the
Lines]. The enemy can be relieved from the difficulties of their
situation only by the occurrence of some misfortune to the allied
army, and I should forward their views by placing the fate of
the campaign on the result of a general action on gl'ound chosen
by them, and not 011 that selected by me. I therefore propose
to continue the operation of light detachments on their flanks
and rear, to confine them as much liS possible, but to engage in
uo serious affair 011 grouud all which the result can be at all
doubtful l .' At the end of the month he simply restates his
decision: •Having such an enemy to contend with, and knowing
(as I do) that there is no army in the Peninsula capable of eOll-
tending with the enemy, excepting that under Illy eommalld;
that there are no means of replacing any large losses I might
sustain; and that any success acquired by a large sacl'ifice of
Illell wonld be followed by disastrous consequence to the cause
of the allies, I have determined to persevere in the system which
has hitherto saved all, and whieh will, I hope, end in the defeat
of the enemy 1:.'
I Dillpafchell, vii. pp, 23-4, from Cartnxo, Deeemuer 2,
~ AJso to Lortl Liverpool, Cartaxo, Dl.'Cember 29,
1910J DISPOSITION OF WELLINGTON'S ARMY g
Accordingly Wellington's main army was kept for the three
winter months of December, January, and February almost pre-
cisely on the same ground on which it had been placed in the
last week of Noyember. The three Uritish cavalry brigades
formed a line in front of the whole, reaching from l)orto de
Mugem on tIle TSoO'US to SUo Jorl.O de Ribiem on the upper Rio
Mayor 1. The infulltry divisions (suvc the 2nd) were urmll/:,w
in successive lines of cantonment behind them, watching the
course of the Rio Mayor, while the reserves had retired as far as
the Lines of Torres Vedras. Practically the whole force could
be concentrated in a single march-or a march and a half at
most-in case Massena should take the improbable-but still
conceivable-step of sallying Qut f!"Om Santarem to resume the
offensive. 'When the first French reinforcements began to come
up-about the New Yenl' of 1810-11-such a sally seemed to
Wellington quite worth guul'dillg SotrUinst 2. The disposition of
the infantry was us follows: On the right, Ileal' the Tagus, lay
the Light Division, immediately in front of Santarem, quartered
in Vane and other villSo"es. On the left the front line was
formed by Pack's Portuguese, who lay at Almoster, on heights
overlooking the middle course of the ]lio Ma)'ol". In support of
the Light Division, but five miles to the rear, at Cartaxo nnd
other places, was the large and powerful 1st Division, 7,000
baJonets. The 4th Division lay at an equal dista.nce lx:hind
the Ist, at Azambuja and Aveirus dll, Cima. Behind Puck,oll
the inland or Leiria road. Picton and his Srd Division were
placed at Alcoentre. Their support was the 6th Division at
Torres Vedras ill the old Lines, seventeen miles to the rear, from
which a circuitous road led to Alcoentre. l~inally the newly-
fonned 6th Division was placed at the other end of the Lines,
but just outside them, nt AJemquer and Arruda, with Le Cor's
Portuguese di,·ision immediately behind, at Alhundl'o"
In all the main !\I'my consisted of about 48,000 men of all
1 De Grey's brigade at Valle, with the Ligllt Division; Allson's 011 tIle
left at Sio Joii.o; Blade'sat Porta de Mugem on the right, near the Tagus.
, Wellington to Li"el"pOOl, December 29.• Whatever may be l\Ias:sena's
opinion of his cllance of success ill an attack on tIle allied army, I ani
cODlinced that he will make it, if lie receives onlers from Paris, wJlatever
tIle amouut of tile reiuforcements sent to Ilim.' Ditpatche8, vii. p. 8~.
"~
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arms; but this did not compose the whole of Wellington's
available resources. He had transferred a considerable dctneh-
ment to the southern hank of the Taglls, to protect the Alemtejo
against any possible descent by the French. It will be remem-
bered that as eMly as the beginning of November 1 he had sent
across the river Fane's Portuguese cuvalry und ll. battalion of
Cal,:adores, who were directed to watch the road along the
further bank, to prevent any trifling force of French from cross-
ing in search of prO\'isions, and to keep open the communications
with Abrantes. As long as MassenR was threatening the Lines
of'l'orres Vedras. there was no dauger that he would throw allY-
thing more than a raiding party across the Tagus; he would
wallt every man for the great assault. But when the Marshal
gave up the offensive and retired to Suntarem, the aspect of
afiairs was changed; it was quite possible that, with his army in
a state of semi-starvation, he might ventnre to scnd a considcro
able detachment over the river, to gather tbe food which was
so llecessary to him. Nor was it unlikely that he might have
a still more cogent reason for invading the Alemtejo. If, as
''Vellingtoll thought probable 2, the army of Andalusia were to
be ordered up to assist the army of Portugal, it would be of
great importance for the latter to possess a footing on the left
bank of the Tagus, as the communication with Soult's troops
must certainly be made in this direction. Accordingly there
was good reason for securing the line ~f the river, and for coop-
ing up MUSSCUil in his limited sphere on its western bank. On
thc 19th-20th of November, Hill and the ~nd Division, attended
as usual by Hamilton's two }:Jortnguese brigades, and with the
13th Light Dragoons attached, crossed the Tagus in boats
a little to the north of Salvaterra, to reinforce Fane's detach-
ment. This was a serious force-10,OOO men-which Wellington
could ill spare, and he made elaborate arrangemcnts to enable it
to rcturn in haste, in thc evcnt of Masseua's once morc taking
the offcnsi\'c on the w~tern bank of the 'l'agus. 111e flotilla of
1 See vol. iii. p. 462.
~ The first hint of this occurs in a letter to Lord Liverpool, from
Cartaxo, Deeember 21, in wlLich Welli.ngtoll < thinks it not improbable
that a large part (if not the whole) of tile French army of Andalusia may
be illtroduced into t!J(l southern part of tlLis kingdom [Portugal).'
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gun-bonts and river craft, which had been guarding the rivel"
was to be kept ready at Alhnndra to bring back the 2nd Divi-
sion, at the first alarm of a movement of the French from San-
tnrern. Meanwhile Hill moved up the river and established his
head quarters at Chamusca, a little north of Santarem, from
which point he could both observe the main body of the French
and impede all)" attempt that they might make to cross the river,
Illld also could keep in touch with Abrantcs, and reinforce it,
supposing that Musscna showed any signs of molesting it. The
British brigades of tlle 2nd Di\'ision were distributed along the
river, William Stewart's at Pinheiros and Tramagal most to the
north, Hoghton's at Chamusca, Lumley's at Almeirim, exactly
facing Sulltnrem. Hamilton's two Portuguese brigades con-
tinued the line southward, Fonscca's brigade at Mugcm, Camp-
bell's at Salvatcrl'£\'" Fnne's fOUL' regimcnts of Portugucse
cavalry, and the British 13th Light Dragoons, were strung out
by squadrons along the whole front from the neighbourhood of
Abrantes to Almeirim, patrolling the river bank with unceasing
care I,
OU the 29th of November Hill was disubled by a se\'ere attack
of fevel', and the control of all the t.roops beyond the Tugus
devolved on his senior brigadier, William Stewart. ,"Vellillgton
only allowed tllis hard-fighting but somewhat too venturesome
officer to retain his very responsible command for a few weeks.
Troubled by Stewart's constant request.. to be allowed to make
offcnsivc mo\"ements against the Frcnch, which did not enter
into his own pluns 2, und dreading the consequenccs of his cnter-
prise, the Commander-in-Chief superseded him, by sending over
Beresford to take the charge of all the forces on the Alemtejo
bank of the 'l'agus (December 30). He would have preferred
to gi\"e the duty to Hill,· who had in the preceding summer
carried out a similar task with complete success, while he
watched Reynier from Castello Branco 3, But Hill's feller
1 These arrangements are taken fronl the unpublished diary of D'Urban,
tlle Quarter-Master-General of the Portuguese anny.
~ Wellington (December B) sarcastically thanks Stewart for sending him
plans for an attack 011 the enemy, but utterly scouts tllem, Di8patches,
\"ii. pp. 313-7.
s Sec pp. 26!l-79 of 1101. iii,
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linbrered on for muny weeks, and when he was convalescent the
medical men insisted that he must return to England for change
of air. This he did in Ji'ebruary, and we miss his familiar name
in the rceords of the Peninsular 'VUI' for a space of tIll·CC months,
till his reappearance at the f!"Ont in May.
Beresford therefore began, with the New Year, to exercise
a semi.independent command oyer the detached force beyond
the Tllgus, which he 'I'M to retain for ne/lrly six mouths. The
experiment of giving him this responsible duty was not alto-
gether a happy onc; and after his ullsuccessful operations in
EstremaUurn, and his ill·fought victory at Albucru, Wellington
withdrew him to other duties in Jnne, and om:e more hallded
over the troops south of the 'l'agus to the cautious yet capable
llands of Hill.
The main fon:c, meanwhile, fucL,] thc front of Masscna's army;
Beresford's detachment observed its left flank atong the Tagus.
But this was not all; \Vellington had also taken his precautions
to cast around the rear of the irregular parallelogram held by
the }'tench a screen of light troops, which effectually cut their
commnnications with Spain, and restricted, though they could
not altogether hinder, their marauding raids in search of pro-
visions. This screen was weakest beyond Abrantes, on the line
of the Zezere; but here the land was barren, and the enemy had
little 01' nothing to gain by plundcring excursions. The Castello
Branco country was only guarded by its own Ordenallya levy,
which was trifling in force, as the whole' corregedoria' from the
Zezere to the Elga had only 40,000 souls, and it Imd sent its
two militia regiments within the Lisbon lines. But, san:: in the
small upland plain about Castcllo Branco itself, there was prac-
tically neither population 1101' tillage. The less barren and
deserted mountain land between the Zey.cre und the MOlldego
was much more worth plundering, and was protected by the
militia brigade of John Wilson, who lay at Espinhal on the
Thomar-Coimbra road, with a foree of four battalions, which
ought to have numbered 8,000 men, but often shrank down to
1,500. For the militiamen, unpaid and ill-fed, deserted freely
during the winter season, and as their homes lay far northward,
by the Douro, it was not easy to gather thcm back to thcir
colours. But 'Vilson had always a sufficient llueleus about him
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to cheek any marauding party that fell short of a regiment, and
was a real restraint on the foragcrs of the 6th Corps, when
they pushed out from Ourcm or Tholllur to gather food. He
was only once seriously engaged, when, on December !!3rd.
General NIarcognet. with two battalions and a cavalry regiment,
came up against him, drove him out of Espiuhal after some
skirmishing, and pushed a reconnaissance as far as the Mondego,
of which we shall hear ill its due place.
Beyond Wilson to the west, the line of observation was taken
up by Tmnt's militia brigade, which lay at Coimbra, to which
town mallY of its fugitive inhabitant~ had by this time returm.."t1.
He had a larger force than "Vilson-seveu militia regiments,
whose strength varied from day to day but seldom fell below
3,000 men. With this irregular force he watched the line of
the lower Mondego, keeping pickets out some way to the
south of the river, as far as Lourilfal and Redinha. They werc
only once driven in, when on Dec. 6th-8th ouc of MOllt-
brun's dragoon regiments pushed up the high road, and verified
the fact that all the ptlSSaf,res of the lower Mondego, including
the bli.dge of Coimbra, were guarded.
The last link in the chain of detachments which Wellington
had cast around the French was lhe garrison of the sea.girt
fortress of Peniche, half-way between Lisbon and the mouth of
the !\fondego. It was held by the deputs of several infantry
regiments of the regular army, under General Blunt of the
Portuguese ser\'ice, not by any single organi7.ed unit. But
there were some ~,OOO or 3,000 recruits, more or less trained,
in the place, llnd the enterprising Major Feuwick, whom Blnnt
hhd put in charge of his outpost-line, kept large pickets out in
the direction of Caldas and Obidos, which frequently came in
contact with the raiding parties of the 8th Corps, and did them
much harm. Fenwick was mortally wounded in action near
Obidos on Dec. 4th I, but the forward position of these
outposts of the Pcniche garrison was maintained, and the
French could' never fomgc in the coastlund for It radius of some
I 1\hmtioncd in \\TIlllillglou's dispawll uf December 10 to Lord Liverpool,
but the date December 4 is ll.xoo by D'Urball'S diary. For exploits of
.Feawick in !\'ovcrnher IInd December sec 1'omkillsou's J)i(lT.lf, pp. 50
and 66.
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fifteen miles around that fortress, though they moved as they
pleased about Leiria and the deserted abbeys of Batalha and
Alcobll.\a. The Portuguese outposts at Cflldas were in close
and regular touch with Anson's cavalry pickets from SUo Joiio
de Ribiera on the Rio Mayor.
It will be seen therefore that the limited space in which
MnBsena's tlnny could seek its living was 1\ parallelogram,
bounded by the Tagus on the south, the lower Zezcl'e on the
east., the Ilio Mayor and the Alcoa (the rh'er of Alcobtl.}a) on the
west, and on the north by an irregular line drawn from Leiria
through Pombal to Cabu~os Ileur the Zezerc. Outside these
limits food could only be got by large detachments, moving
with all military precautions, and obliged to keep up a constant
rUllning fight with the Portuguese militiu. The profit from
such expeditions, whose march was necessarily very slow, was so
smaIJ that l\fasselHl sent out very few 01' them, since the peasantry
got 011' with their /locks into the hills, wbellcver thc first skirmish-
ing shots along the high road were heard. The sustenance of
the French WItS mainly obtained by harrying and re-harryillg
the area bounded by the limits stated ahovc, where they could
work their will without meeting with any resistance. There
was very little change in the cantonments of Masseua's army
during the three months of theil' stay between the Tagus and
the Zezcre. Of the :lnd Corps both divisions were in the Santarem
fortifications, holding the town and the banks of the Ilio Mayor
to the west of it. Close in tonch with the ~nd Corps came the
8th, with Cluusel's division in front line from 'l'remcs to Alcan-
hede amI Abralli1o, and Solign8.C's in second line at Torres Novas,
Pemes, and the adjacent villages, Both corps had their cavalry
brigades ont in front of them, alOllg the line of the Jlio Mayor.
Ney and the 6th Corps formed the general reserve of the army,
having Mcrmet's division at'l'homar(the :Marshal's head quarters),
and Marchand's at Golegao near the Tagus; Loison's, the third
division of the corps, was detached on the Zezcre, guarding
the bridge which had been established aeross that ri\'er at Pun-
hete, and watching the garrison of Abrantes. Its front post
was at MOlltalviio bcyond the Ze7.ere, only five miles from the
Portuguese fortress; its remaining battalions were ranged along
the river from PUllhete as far north as Domes. MOlltbrull and
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the cavalry reserve (less eel"tain squadrons lent to Loison), la.y
at Chlio-de-Mru;a.ns on the northern skirts of the plain of
Thomar; they had onc infantry regiment (lent by Ney) to
support them, at Cabiu;os, und their main duty wus to watch
and restrain Trant and Wilson, with whose advanced posts they
were always bickering.
The situation of the French army was remarkably c0tl!pact:
Ney'6 division at Golegao wns only one long march (eighteen
miles) behind Re)'uier; his second division ~t Thomar wos less
than two marchcs (twenty-six miles) behind JUlIOt. Only LoisOll
couid not have been brought up at short notice, supposiug
that Wellington had attacked the line of the Rio Mayor" If,
on the other band, an Anglo-Portuguese force had debouched
from Abrantes to attack Loison-no impossible plan, and one
that William Stewart had strenuously lWged Wellington to
adopt-the division at PUllhete could have bccn rcillforcctl from
Golegii.o and Thomar ill onc march, sin(.'e the formcr of these
places is about thirteen miles from the Zezere, aDd the latter
not more than ten.
1\fassena's dispositions, as can be seen at a glance, were purely
defensi\"e. They could not be otherwise, when his army had.
dwindled down by the beginning of December to 4..l},OOO efficient
sabres and bayonets, while his hospitals were encumbered by
8,000 or 9,000 sick. All that he aspired to do was to hold on
in the Santarem-Rio Mayor posilion, pinning his adversary
do,m to the neighbourhood of Lisbon, till he should be restored
to the power of taking the offensive once more, by the arrival of
reinforcements; his aid mnst come on one side from Soult and
the Army of Andalusia., 011 the other from Dronet's 9th Corps,
whose services had been promised to him by thc Elllllcl"or long
before the invasion of l'ortugal began. But down to the end
of the year he had not the slightest breath of information as to
whether this assistance was close at hand, or whether it had.,
perchance, not even begun to move in his direction. Since he
had cut himself loose from the frontier of Spain in September,
not a single dispatch had reached him, notcvCll nsecret emissary
had penetrated to his head quarters. For all that he knew
Napoleon might be dead, or engaged in a new war with some
continental enemy. It is an astonishing testimony to the
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efliciency of the screen of Portllgue~e OrdeJ1an~a and militia,
which Vlcllingtoll had cast round the French army. to find that
nothing had slipped through. And the Marshal's attempts
to send out.ncws of himself had been almost equally well foiled;
nIl his messengers had been intercepted save Foy, who (as it
will be remembered) had fof(.'Cd his way over the unfrcqucntcd
Estrada Nova road on October 31st I. And Fay had got through
to Ciudad ltodrigo because he had been given sllch a large escort
-600 men-that no mere gathering of local Ordcllan~·a could
stop him.
Massena. down to the cnd of December, did not know ill
the least whether Fay or any other of his emissaries had got
through. He had simply to wait till news should PClIctrute to
him. Meanwhile the one go\'crning preoccupation of his life
was to get food for his army, since if food tidied he must be
driven to the disastrous wintcr retreat, across flooc1l,.u strcam~
and between snow-clad mountains, to which Wellington hoped
to force him. The English general's forecast of the time which
would be rcquircd to starve out the French army was wrong by
some eight or nine weeks. He thought that they would have
consumed every possible morsel of food that could be scraped
together by December-as l\ ma.tter of fact they held out till
the end of February, in a state of constantly increasing priva-
tion. It seems that "Vellington underrated both the capacity
for endurance that the enemy would show, and still more the
re;ouI'{:cs which wcre lwailablc to him, Thc Portuguese govcrll-
ment had ordered the peasantry to destroy all food-stuff's that
they could not carry off, when the country-side was evacuated
in October, and the people retired within the Torres V<.'(/ras
lines. Ostensibly the decree had been carried out; but it was
impossible to induce these small cultivators to make away with
good food, the worst of crimes to the peasant's mind. The large
majority hid or buried, instead of buming, their stores, trusting
to recover what they had concealed when the French should
have departed. Many of the hiding-places were vcry ingenious
-in some cru;cs caves in the hills had been used, and their
1 'J1H! lIext mcsscugcr who got through wall Major CtI.SlIbiancu) who
started Oil January 21st with 400 men, ami safely reached Uoorigo. Sce
Fririon's JOllrlllU of the Oampm"gn of Portugal, p. 129.
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mouths plastered up with stones and earth. In others, pits or
silos had been dug in unlikely places, and carefully covered up,
or cellars had been filled, and their entrances bricked up and
concealed. The ingenuity that is bred by an empty stomach
soon set the French on the search for these hoards. When it
was once discovered that there was much hidden grain and
maize in the country, every llIUIl bCClune a food-hunter. Whole
villages were pulled down in the search for secret places in
their walls or 'under their floors. Partics scoured every ravine
or hillside where caves might lurk. We are told that onc
effective plan was for detachments to go about with full barrels
ill fields near houses, and to cast water all over the surface.
Where the liquid sank in suddenly, there wus a chance t1mt
a ailo lUl"ked below, and the spadc Of\:.ell turncd up a deposit
of hundreds of bushels. But more drastic methods than thcse
were soon devised. In the sort of no-man's·land between the
actnal cantonments of the French army and the outposts of
'Vilson, 'l'rant, and Blunt, the population had not entirely
disappeared. Though the large majority had retired, some of
the poorest or the most reckless had merely hidden themselves
in the hills for a week or two, Md came down cautiously when
thc l?rench had marched by towards Lisbon. A sprinkling of
miserable folk lived precariously in or near their usual abodes,
always ready to fly or to conceal themselves when a foraging
party was reported in the neighbourhood. Hence came the
horrid business that one French diarist calls the' chasse aux
hommes'.; it became a regular device for the marauders to
move by night, hide themselves, and watch for some unwary
pcusant. W"hcn he was sighted he was pursued and often
caught. He was then offered the choice between revealing the
hiding-places of himself and his neighbours, and a musket-ball
through the head. Generally he yielded, and the party went
back with their mules loaded with grain, or driving before
them some goats and oxen. Sometimes he was himself starving,
could reveal nothing, and was murdered. Wc are assurcd by
more than onc French narrator of these hateful times that it
was discovered that torture was more effective than the mere
fear of death. If the prisoner could or would discover nothing,
he was hung up for a few minutes, and then let down and oflered
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a second chance of life. Sometimes this led to revelations; if
not he WitS strung up again for good I, Torture by fire is also
said to have been employed all some occasions.
Naturally these atrocities were Dot practised under the eyes
of the officers commanding regular foraging parties 2. But WhCll
a company had dispersed ill search of plunder, the mell who were
separated in twos or threes without control acted with such
various degrees of brutality as suited themselves. Moreover,
there WM a floating scum of unlicensed IlllJIauders, who had left
their colours without leave, and were in no hurry to rejoin them.
These were responsible for the worst crimes: sometimes the)'
gathered together in bands of considerable strength, and it is
said that they were known to fire on regular foraging parties
who tried to arrest or restrain them 8, and that one troop, several
hundred strong, fought 0. desperate skirmish with 0. whole bat-
talion sent to hunt them down. But it was not thcsefricotcltrs,
as they were called, who were the sole offenders; many horrors
were perpetrated within the limits of the ClLntonments by the
auLhorized ndding companies. Guingret of the 39th, in Ney's
corps, mentions in hi!'! diary that he had seen such a detachment
return to camp, after having surprised a half-deserted village, with
a number of peasant girls, whom they sold to their comrades,
some for a couple of gold pieces, others for a pack-horse 4, and
assures us that rape was habitual when such a surprise had suc-
ceeded. It was in vain that Mass6Ia und the corps-eommandoo
issued general orders prohibiting miseondnd of any kind, and
even executed one or two offenders caughtjiagrante delicto. .For
the regimental officers, who depended on the individual efficiency
of their men in marauding for their daily food, were not too
Cllc,O'Cr to make inquiries as to what had passed outside their own
vision, and the soldier who brought home much booty was llot
t .For a description of this sce Lcmollllier-Delafoose's M"lIWire8, p. 90.
t '.Les doitachements se subd..ivisent Arnesure qu'ils s'eloignent: et il ell
resulte que les hommes isoUs des chefil se livrent atoute espece de rapines
et meme a des cruautes sur les pauvres paysans,' says Noel (p. 123).
" The 81:or)' of the mamuding sergeant (Marechal Chaudron' and llis
lIalld J gi"eu by Marhot (H. lIP. 413-19), is Jlrobablyexaggera.ted by tlmt
lively narrator-the scalc is too large. But tJlere was undoubtedly some
foundation for the tale; sce Lemonnier-Delafosse, Memoirer, p. 103.
• Guingret, pp. 124--6.
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too closely questioned as to the manner in which he had obtained
it. ·When a foraging party had turned over many bushels of
wheat or maho:e, or a hundred sheep, to the store of their bat·
talioll, it eould hardl,)' be expected that their colonel would
show his gratitude by inquiring whether the happy find had
been procured by torture or by simple murder.
Of the three corps which formed Massena's army, that of
Reynier, in the Santarem entrenchments, seems to have suffered
most, because it was concentrated on a narrow position, with no
tll1exhnusted conntry aronnd it, and with other troops immc~
diately in its rear, who had SlIcked dry the resources of thc plain
of Golegao. Its foraging parties had to go thirty miles away
before they had a chance of finding ground that had not been
already picked o\'er most carefull)' by the men of the 6th or the
8th Corps. Junot's men were a little better off; as they had
the Leiria-AJcob~a country immediately on their flank, and
could plunder there without molestation, unless they pressed in
too closely upon the outposts of Trant's or Blunt's detachments.
Nevertheless the 8th Corps lost more men by disease than either
of the others during this hard winter. It was composed to
a great extent of conscript battalions new to Spain, young and
unacclimatized, whose men died off like flies from cold, dysentery,
and rheumatism. Clause!'s division, which contained all these
raw units, sank from 6,700 to 4,000 mcn in the three months
that preceded the New Year, without having been engaged in
any serious fighting-a loss of forty per cent.; while the casc-
hardened troops of Reynier, who had been in the Peninsula since
1808, and had already gone through the privations of Soult's
marches to Cotunna and Oporto, only shrank from 17,000 to
12,000 bayonets in the same three months. Moreover, of the
5,000 lost by them, 2,000 wcre the casualtics of Bussaco, not
the victims of ,"Vellingtou'$ scheme of starvation. Ney's corps
and the camIry reserve were better off than either Junot's or
Reynier's troops, having at their disposition the fertile country
between Golegao, Thomar, and Ahrantes, where, at the com-
mencement of their sojourn, food WM to be got with compara-
tive ease-many fields of maize were still standing unreaped
when they first arrived, and it was 1I0t till after the New Year
of 1811 that they began to be seriously pinched, and to be
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driven far afield, up the valley of the Zezere and into the
mountains in the direction of Espillhul and Coimbra. The
6th Corps was still 18,000 strong out of its original 24,000 on
January 1st, und of the 6,000 missing, 2,000 represented Dussaco
casualties in actual fighting.
It must be confessed that the French army displayed splendid
fortitude and ingenuity ill maintaining itself 011 the Tugus so
long beyond the period of 'Wellington's estimate. That it did
not altogether dissolve, when it was Ih"ing from hand to mouth,
with a fifth or a quarter of the men habitually absent on
foraging expeditions, is surprising. Desertions to the allied
lines, save from the foreign battalions in Loison's and Solignac's
divisions, were very fare; the native French gave many recruits
to the maraudingfricoteura, but seldom passed over to the enemy.
The regimental.officers succeeded in organizing a regular system
by which the exploitation of the country-side was made as
effL"<..'tual as could be munaged. Thcy repaired and set going
tbe ruined mills, discovered and rebuilt the bakers' ovens of
every village and town, and in most cases organi7.ed regimental
food-reserves which made them independent of the genernl
commissariat 1, For there was little or nothing to be got from
head quarters. Shoes proved the greatest difficulty, but the
men learnt to make rude mocassins or I rivlins' of untanned
hide, which served fairly well, though they lIeeded constant
replacing 2. In some regiments a third of the men might be
seen wearing this primitive footgear. Another weak point was
ammunition-there had been no great consumpt.ion of it since
Bussaco, or the state of the army would have been perilous
indeed, since it had to depend on what it had originally brought
down from Spain in September. No more had been received, and
attempts to establish a powder factory at Santarem failed for
lack of saltpetre. If Masseua had been forced to tight two
or three general engagements, his stores would have been so
depleted that he would have had to abscond at once, lest the
army should be left without cartridges. Meanwhile he hung
on to his position, conscious that his power of endurance was
1 See Colonel N~l's accoUllt of IJis food-gettiug and !Jis storcs, SowJtllir,
mi/iluiru, pp. 128-9.
I See Lemollllic.r-Delafossc, SoulJelli7$, pp. 100-7.
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limited, but hoping at any moment to sce reinforccmcnts break
through from the north or the east, to refill his ranks and
bring him the needful convoys.
Of military operations, as opposed to mere raids by detach-
ments in search of food, hardly anything was undertaken by the
Army of Portngal down to the end of' the year. Between the
2flnd and the 29th of December, General Ferey, with five
battnlions find a cavalry regiment, carried out a useless excursion
beyond the Zezcre, into the desolate region of Castello Bram.'o
as far as Corti~ada; apparently he had been sent out because of
rumours that a French force was operating in this direction, and
he was told to get into touch with it. But these reports were
idle-they were tardy echoes of Gardanne's unhappy lllarch on
the Estrada. Nova I n full month before. The brigade returned,
wcaried and more thun bulf-starvcd, on the sc"ellth day, cqually
destitute of ncws and of the plunder that it had hopcd lo find ill
a hitherto untouched district. The only fruitful action, indeed,
which the French carried out in this month was the completion
of the great bridge-equipage at the mouth of the Zezere, which
Massena had ordered General EbIe to construct many weeks
back~. His object was to have at his disposition means for
crossing the Tagus, in case he should wish to invade the
.A1emtejo, or to co-operate with any fricndly troops that might
appear from that direction. Originally he had intended to
make Santarem his crossing-point, but, after some boats had
been built there, with immense difficulties owing to the entire
lack of appliances, he determined that the place was too near
thc British lines, and too much exposed to attacks by 'VeIling-
ton's rive'· flotilla. Obviously a serious attempt to cross the
'1'agus near Santarem, even if its initial staf,f'CS ~uc(,:ccded, und
the larger part of the army got over, would cxpose the rem'
divisiolls to almost certain destruction, since ,"Vellington l.."(luld
throw :30,000 men upon them within the next twelve hours.
There is no more certain way of ruining an army than to allow
it to be caught divided into two halves by a broad river spanned
by one or two precarions bridges. On the other hand, the
mouth of the Ze1.ere was very remote from 'Vellington's main
I See vo!' Hi. pp. 470-1. 2 See m1. iii. PII. 450-1.
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arUlY, and & crossing made opposite to it could only be opposed
by a pal'! of Dercsford's force, which was not very large, and was
~prcad along fifty miles of the ri\'cr front. Moreover, the corps
e.....ecuting the passage would not have any great danger on its
flank or rear, since there was only the Porhlguesc garrison of
Abralltcs to molest it. It was an additional t\dvantage that
a bridge-equipage at Punhcte could be kept in perfect safety
a mile or two up the Zezere, Qut of range of guns on the further
bunk of the Tugus, and could be floated down at the last
moment: while at Salltarcm the boats had to be stored on the
actual bank of the Tagus, exposed to attacks from the side of
the water by W'cllington's gun-boats. One effort to sink or fire
them by a bombardment and the use of Congrcvc rockets had
already been made 1.
Accordingly I\1assena resolved that if he made any attempt
to cross into the Alcmtejo, he would take Punhete and the
estuary of the Zezere as his starting-point. Here he established
his dockyard, and hither he transferred most of the busy workers
from Santarem. In the course of a month they got ready for
him the materials for tll'O bridges broad enough to span the
Tngus, ,besides ninety flat-bottomed boats. The mouth of the
Zezere was prou.>ctcd by u. number of batteries, to keep down
the fire of any guns that Beresford might bring up to sink the
bridges when they were being cast across.
These preparations did Dot long escape 'Wellington's notice;
he saw that the ground opposite Punhete was the most crucial
point in Beresford'slong fr0111;, and bade bim close up his troops
toward it. The detachment beyond the TagW:l was reinforced
by a Spanish brigade under Carlos de Espm1a. drawn from
La Romana's army, which was placed at Barca just opposite the
mouth of the Zezcre, with W"illinm Stewart's bribPU.dc of the
2nd Division close by at Santa Margarida, Tramagal, and Pin-
heiros. Three batteries were established on the '1'agus bank
opposite I'unhetc, and armed with six-pounders; but as these
were overmatched by the French guns across the water, nine-
pounders were requisitioned fl·om Lisbon 2. The rest of the
I See vol. Hi. p. 462.
• For detai1sl see D'Urban's diary, January 1, 4, and 5,1811. The
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2nd Division and Hamilton's two Portuguese brigades were to
be reM.y to march to support Carlos de Espana and Stewart at
the shortest notice. These dispositions weI'C sufficient to keep
Masscllll. quiet; he hud no renl intention of crossing the Tagus
unless he heard of Soult's approach from the direction of the
Alemtejo 1.
On that side all was tranquil-as indeed it was destined to
remain for many a week more. nut just at the end of the
month of December the isolation in which the Army of Portugal
bad so long been living at lust came to an end, and reinforce-
llIcnl:i and news were at last received, though lhe news was
disheartening and the reinforcements inadequate. On the 26th
the reconnoitring party under General Marcognet, which had
just beaten up 'Wilson's quarters at Espinhal, was surprised by
the appearance of a party of regular cavalry pushing towards
them on the road from Ponte de Murcella. The uniforms were
soon seen to be those of l"rench dragoons, and a joyful meeting
took place 2. The newcomers announced that they were the
advanced guard of Drouet's 9th Corps, which was pushing down
the valley of the Mondego in search of the Army of Portugal,
but had 110 exact knowledge of where it was to be found.
The 9th Corps, it will be remembered, was a promiscuous
assembly of some twenty newly-raised fourth battalions, belong-
ing to the regiments which were already in Spain. Eleven were
fractions of corps serving in Soult's Army of Andalusia, five of
regiments of Ney's 6th Corps, the rest of units under Ueynier's
and JUllot'S (:olllllland. Drouet had been originally ordered to
do 110 more thulI <.:onduct these battalions, which were little
better than a mass of drafts, to join the l'Cgiments to which they
belonged. They were di"'ided into two provisional divisions
under Generals ConrolL'{ and Claparede. Thrust, as it were,
into Spain without any regular organization, destitnte of bat-
talion transport, and with an improvised and insufficient staft~
French batteries on the first day shelled Carlus de EspaIia's cantonments
acrosg tlle river, but with no effect.
I So Fririon in llis CampagTle de Portugal, p. 120.
2 1111lre is a description of the meeting in the diary of Ne)"s aide-de-
camp Spriillgliu, who was in command of the Ilarty which actually met
D'ErlOll's dragOOllS, p. 400.
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they had made "ery slow progress since they crossed the
Pyrenees, mainly owing to difficulties of commissariat. \Vhen
Fay passed Salamanca on November 10th, the head of ClaparCde's
division had only just entered that city; the tail of the corps was
struggling up from Vallndolid and Burgos. It is not surprising,
therefore, to find that ClaparCde only reached the neighbourhood
of Almeida on the 15th of November, and that Drouet had not
concentrated his whole force at that place till December 14th.
He had about 16,000 men, having left three of his own bat.
talions to garrison Ciudad Uodrigo, and picked up instead the
remains of Gardanne's column, which had retreated on to the
Spanish frontier in such disorder at the end of the preceding'
month '. This detachment, by reason of its losses during its
disastrous flight, had been reduced to about 1,400 men fit for
:>ervice-about the same number that Drouet had left behind
him from his own corps. Drouet \vRS acting under stringent
orders from the Emperor to move forward at the earliest possible
momcnt 2, and opcn up communication with l\!assclla. His
original instructions had been to go no further forward than
Almeida himself, but to send a. column under Gardallne, 6,000
strong, to clear and keep open the way to U1C 'l'aglls. The
march and failure of Gardanne have been already related, and
Drouet saw that to carry out the Emperor's orders he must use
fL larger forcc. At thc SfiIllC timc his dispatches told him that
he must at all costs keep in touch with Almeida, and not
merely join IHas$lena and allow himself to be cut off from Spain 3.
Drouet's solution of the pl'oblcllI was Ulat with Conroux's
division and Gardanllc's detachment, some 8,000 men, he would
march down the'Mondego by Celotico and llontede Murcella, and
cut his way to join Massena, but that he would leave his second
division under Clllparede behind him, about Celorico and
Trancoso, to keep in touch with Almeida and maintain his com-
munications. This was about as much as could be done to carry
1 Soo vol. iii. p. 481.
I Napole<JD to Uerthier, November 3 and Novemher 20, Corre8fXJnriunce,
17,079 aDd 17,141.
3 < Qu'il rouvre a\'ec un gros corps les communicatiOIlS avec le prince
d'Efi.6ling, mais que je compte, dll reste, Sill' ea prudence de ne pas se
laisser conper d'Almeid1l..' Napoleon to Berthier, NOI'ember 20,
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out Napoleon's instructionSt which wcre cssentially impossible
to execute. For the Portuguese militia, with which the 9th
Corps had to deal, were, when properly managed, a very intan-
gible enemy, who could retire whenever a column passed, and
return to block the way when it had gone by. It is impossible
to sce how Drouct could hln'e kep~ open tlle whole road f!'Om
Almeida lo Thomar, without leaving all along the way a couple
of battalions, entrenched in a good position, at distances of
fifteen or twenty miles from each other, And if he had done
this, he would have had no force left at the moment when he
joined Massella. It was useless for Napoleon to tell him in one
breath to keep the road opcn from cnd to cnd, and in UIC nc-"{t
to forbid him to make any sUlall detachmenh 1. But the
Empel"Or neithel' fully understood the military' situation ill
Portugal, nor grasped the relative merits of its roads or the
relative resources of its various regions. In a dispatch sent out
to Massena on December 4th (but not delivered till :February)
he advised that Marshal to try to open his communications with
Spain by the awful mountain road from the Zezere by Cardigos
and Bclmollte to Gum·da, and at the same time to use the
desolate Castello Branco country' pour fauoe des vivres,' Ferey's
fruitless expedition up that very road and into that very region,
carried out a fortnight before the Emperor's dispatch was even
written, had sufficiently proved the futility of the suggestion.
nut to l'eturn to Drouet: he left Alll1eida on December 14th,
und crosscd. thc Con wiUI both his didsions and Gm·danne's
detachment, The only enemy near him was Sih'eira, who with
his six militia regiments and the reorganized !i!4th of the Line
(the absconding garrison of Almeida, which had eluded its forced
oath to i\1assena in the preceding autumn 2) was lying at
'l'rancoso. To that place the Portuguese gcneral had retired
(abandoning thc blockade of Almeida) WhCD the 9th Corps
arrived on the frontier. Of the other militia brigades of the
north Miller with four battalions was at Vizeu, 'l'rant with seven
at Coimbra; Baccelar, the Commander-in-Chief, lay at Oporta
with the small remainder.
Drouet, copying Massenll's first dispositions in the preceding
1 'n est done imporbnt qu'il ne fasse point de petits pacquets.' Ibid.
1 See val. iii. 11, 270.
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autumn, marched from Almcida in two columns; he himself
took the high road by Celorico; Claparede was sent along the
more difficult Illountnin route by'l'rancoso, which place Silveim
evacutltcd on his approach. At Celorico Drone! cut himsclfloose
from his lieutenant, who (in accordance with Napoleon's orders)
was to stay behind, to remain in touch with Almcida., and
(vain thoughl!) to keep open the communications. Taking
Conroux and Gardallue with him, he 1l1a1"ched south of the
Mondego, past Chamusca and Moita, as far as Ponte de l\lllrce1la,
which he reached on the 24th. He met with 110 opposition, for
Baccclar, anxious onl)' for Oporta, had told Silvcira to keep in
front of Claparede, and Miller to stay at Vi1.cu, but both to be
read,Y to fall back on Oporta if Dl"Ollct's advance lUnlcd out to
have that city as its objl.-'Ctive. Similarly Trout was to hold on
to Coimbra unless the French column took the' northern road,
in which cnsc he loo might be callctl back to 0rorto 1. Betwccn
Drouet, therefore, and Massena's army there was only le£\; the
weak brigade of John Wiloon at Espinhal, and this force hud
been driven out of its usuul position b)' l\:larcognet's flyiug
column on November 23rd, and had retired to Pcnacova
beyond the Mondego, below the heights of llussaco. On the
26th Drouct's adn1l1l.~ cavalry came into touch with Marcognet,
as has been already related, at Espinhal, just as the latter was
preparing to retire to Thomul', with the report that there was
nothing ~tirrjl1g in the north.
Thus Drouet's 8,000 men came into the sphere of Massena\
operations; but he did not at first seem to realize the fact. He
sent on Gardanne's det.aehment (which mostly belonged to the
2nd Corps) to join the Marshal, but halted Conroux's division at
Espinhal, and only went fonl'ard in person as far as Thomar,
where he stopped for two days cOllfening with Ney. Instead of
reporting himself to Massena, he merely sent on a dispatch, to
say that he had opened the communications, and was under
orders from the Emperor to keep them safe. With this purpose
he intended to return to the Mondego, and get back into touch
with Clapar&le. l\{assella was ill no lilllUll degree irritated at
this pretension of Drouet to act as all independent commander,
and sent him a peremptory order to come to head quarters to
I 'These dispositions are wven in D'Urooll's unpublished diary.
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make his report, and to send on Conroux's division from Espill-
hal to occupy Leiria. After some slight friction Drollet obeyed.
The communications with Almeida, re-esL.'l.blished for a moment,
were thus broken again after fOllr days, for John 'Vilson, the
instant that Conroux began to break up from Espinhal, came
boldly back towards that place, atl:.tu:ked lhe French l'Ctll'gtmrd
on Dc<:ember 30th, and, after doing it some little harm, blochd
the high-road to the north once more 1. Drouet Wng completely
cut off from Claparede, and his arrival brought no profit to
l\1a.ssGna beyond his 8,000 men and the moderate train of
ammunition which he had escorted. It was not with such
a reinforcement that the Marshal could hope to resllme the
offensivc. Indeed, as Wellington sagely remarked~, if nothing
more camc up to join him, his retreat looked more certain Imd
necessary than eyer.
While Dronet was on the march to Leiria, his lieutenant,
Claparede. the moment that he was no longer under his
superior's eye, had gone off on a bolrl and rathel' ha7.ardolls raid
of his own. Finding that Sil....eira·s militia were sticking closely
to his skirts, he resol....ed to make an attempt to surprise them
by a forced march. Concentrating at 'l'ran<:oso on December 30th,
he fell upon the enemy on the following day at Ponte do Abbade,
and routed them with a loss of 200 men. Sih'eira, notwithstand-
ing this check, adhered to his orders to k~p close to ClaparCde,
and retired no further than Villa da Ponte, some seyen miles
away. Dut the French general made n second sudden sally
from 'l'rnncoso on Janunry 11 th 3. bent the Portuguese much
more decisively, and pursued them I\S far as Lamego on the
Douro. Silveira crossed the river in great disorder on the 13th,
and the news of his defeat brought terror to Oporto. Baccelar
at once ordered not only the brigade from Vizeu (Miller was
just dead and no longer commanded it), hut Trant fmm
Coimbra, and Wilson from Pefil\Cova. to f.'l.ll back and join him.
, For \Vilsou's movements lluwe his letters to Trallt and D'Urbau of
January 3, I811-the one in D'Urban's cOrreSl)()llllel\ce, the otller in the
'I'rant papers lent me by Captain Chambers, ItN.
I Wellington to Hill, Dispatches, vii. p. 86, Dec. 30, 1810.
I Chaby, H. p. 2j2, gi\'e!l January 6th as the dnte of the combnt of Villa
da Ponte, but all the other authorities place it 011 the 11 th.
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They concentrated at Castro Daire, ten miles south of Lumcgo,
with tl. foree of 14,000 bayonets, whereupon Clapal'l..;]c, who had
only 6,000 men with him, began to fear that he would be cut
ofi' from Almeido. and isolated ill a dillicnlt position. He
evacuated Lamcgo aml rctul'lled to 'l'mncoso by furew murchc~
having accomplished nothing save the destruction of a few
hundred militia and the spreading of panic as fill' ns Oporto
(January 18th)1. Shortly uftcr he left Trallcoso and moved
southward to Celorico and GlIB.l'da 2, where he commanded tllC
two roads to the Tagus, yet was not too far from Almeida and
his base. But he wus still completely cut all' from l\{assenR, and
the Portuguese at once resumed their old positions around him
-'1'rallt returning to Coimbra, Wilson to Pel1acQvll,. on the
Mondego, while llaccelar with the reserves lay more to the rear,
at Suo Pedro do SuI on the Voubra. Claparl'<1e's movement
would have been dangerous for the allies if he had possessed
a heavier force, but 6,000 men were too few for n. serious marcll
on Oporto, and if the column hnd not retreated in haste it
would probably have suffered complete disaster.
The only use which Ma.~sella could make of ])rouet and the
division of Conroux was to cover more ground for fornghlg by
their means. When pIaccd at Leiria they much restricted the
activities of Blunt at l'eniche and 'lrant at Coimbra. who
could no longer push their advanccd posts so fur to the frOllt,
and had to <.-cde to the enemy all the land about the Soure and
Alcoa rivers. Here DrOllet collected enough food both to feed
himself and to give help to Ney; but the resources of the district
were, after all, limited, and within (t few weeks the lllen of the
9th Corps were living on the edge of daily starvation like their
fellows. The Army of Portugal had got no solid help from
this quarter. It remained to be seen whether they wonld obtain
better aid from the other side from which Masscna Imd hoped
to be reinforced-the Army of Andalusia.
1 According to Thiebault, then commnndhlg nt Salamanca, C1al)an!de's
rather wild excurgion was due to mere desire for plunder; he aCCUSes him
of lJaving raised, aud put into his private llllrse, great contributions at
l\loimeuto, Lumego, and ul!ler towns wllich lIe occupied for a few day8.
(Atemoir/!/f, iI,. <l22~3,)
~ Date uncerblin, IlCrlulps January 22, liS 'Velliugtoll knew lie was tIlCre
011 January 20,
SECTION XXIII: CHAPTER II
SOULTS EXl'.IWITJON INTO ESTHEMADUItA. JANUARY-
MARCU 1811. THE BArrU: OF THE GEBOHA AND THE
Eo'ALL OF BADAJQZ
IN his original scheme for the invasion of Portugal, Napoleon
had given no part to the Anny of Andalusia, judging that
Massenn, supported by the 9th Corps, wOllld be amply strong
enough to drive the English into the sea. It is not till the
29th of September that the imperial concspolldence begins to
show signs of a desire that Soult should do something to help
the Army of Portugal. But the assistance which was to be
given is defined, in the dispatch of that date, as no more than
a diversion to be made against Estremadura by Morlier and the
5th Corps, with the object of preventing La Homans. from
giving any aid to Wellington l • Soult is directed to see that
Mortier keeps the Spanish Army of Estremadura in check: he is
always to be on its heels, so that it will have no opportunity of
sending troops towards the Tagus. Nothing is said about
making a serious attack on Estremadura, or of threatening
Badajoz with a siege. On the 26th of October comes the next
allusion to this subject 2: the Emperor had learnt fmm the
English newspapers-lIlwu)'s his best source of intelligence-that
La ROlDillla wilh il large part of his forces has marchcd 011
Lisbon to join "rellillgtoll, and that hc has been ablc to do so
without molestation. That this should have happened was, he
thought, due to direct disobedience on Soult's part: thc Marshal
canDot have kept in touch with the cnemy. And he is directed
in vague terms to 'faire pousser sur La Uomana,' whatevcl'
exactly that may moon. An interpretation for the phrase,
I 'l1le Emperor 10 Berthier, September 29, no. }0,9G7 of tile (JOI7e1lP(J/l·
dante de Napo/(fon.
t Not in the Cdrrupondanct, hut in the form of a letter from Berthier
10 Soult, wlliell Soult answers at great length in his Dispatch from Seville
of December 1.
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however, turns up in the next imperial dispatch l_Mol'tier and
the 5th CorpR ought to have followed thl:! Spanish general
march for march, aud to havc presented thcmsclvc:> UIl the Lower
'l'agus in facc of Lisbon shortly after the arrival of La Homan!
in the })ortugllcse capital.
Soult had litUc difficulty ill pro\·itlg that this scheme was
absolutely impossible. It argued, indeed, a complete miscon-
ception of the situation in Estremadura and Andalusia. '1'0 talk
lightly of pushing Morticr and the 5th Corps, which comprised
at this moment just 13,000 men, right across Estremudura to the
mouth of the 'l'agus. •en talonnant La Romana,' was futile.
The Spanish General had gone ofr to join Wellington with some
7,000 or 8,000 men. But he had left behind him ill Eslremadura
two strong infantry divisions, those of l\1endizabal and Ballas-
teras, with 12,000 bayonets, 6,000 more infantry in garrison at
Budajoz, Olivenza, and Albuquerque, and the whole of his
cavalry, ~,500 sabres. In addition there were interposed between
l\fortier and the Taglls about 8,500 IJortuguese-a cavalry
bl'igude under Madden which had been lent to the· Spaniards,
and, near Badajoz, a regular infantry brigade at Elvas, and four
militia regiments, forming the garrisons of the last-named
place, of Campo Mayor, and of Jcrumenha. That is to say,
there lay before Mortier, after La Romana's departure, a field
army which, if concentrated, would make up 18,000 men, and ill
. uddition six fortresses containing garrisons amollnting to ] ],000
men more, and covering all the main strategical points of the
country. How could he have pursued La Uomana? If he had
follo\\-oo, he would have found himself at once involved in a
campaign against supel'ior forces ill a region studdl.>d. with
hostile strongholds. • On this frontier,' as Sotllt wrote to
llerthier, 'there al'e six fortified places-lladajoz, Olivenza,
Jcrumenha, Elvns., Campo Mayor, Albuqucrquc, in which thel'e
are at least 20,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry_ It is clear to
me that if I thrust a body of ] 0,000 men forward to the Tngus,
as his majesty has directed, that body would never n:ach its
1 'Le 5e Corps, au lieu de lIuivre 1... Homana, et llaT la Je mcnacer la
rive gauche du Tage viw-"is de Lisbonne (pour emllllcher les Anglais
J't....oir toutes lenTIl forces lIur b rive droite), s'est rellliti 1lOllteusement ~ur
8th·iIIe.' Corre8polldrJ.7lCf, no. 17,131.
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Mortier had in the 6th Corps 11,600 infantry, 1,200 cavalry, and about
700 artiller}' in his 7 batteries.
destination, and would be cut off and surrounded before I could
get up to its aid I.' This was indisputably correct; l\Iortier
might ha\'e be..'\ten Mendiy,ablll and Ballasteros in the open field,
if they chose to off'el- him battle; but if they preferred to con-
(.'Cntratc on Dadajoz or Elvus, aJl(I defied him from under the
shadow of those great fortresses, he could not ignorc them and
march by in pursuit of Ln RomanR. The momcnt that he ww;
past their positions, they would cut him off from Andalusia, and
he would find himself with their whole force at his back, and in
front of him anything that Wellington might have sent to the
south bank of the Tagus. In December this would have meant
14,000 men under Hill, at the New Year about 16,000 under
lleresford. As Soult truly said, the expedition would have been
encompassed, and probably destroyed, long before Massena
heard of its having got anywhcre neur him 2. Nevertheless the
• Soult to Herthicr, no. 24 in Appendix to JJclmu6, vol. i. p. 472.
t The total of the troops al'ailable against Mortier in December would
have been, giving net totals, with sick alld detached men all deducted:-
Spanillh.:
.8allasWros's Dilision
MClldizahal's Dil'isiOJl
Permsneut garri!lOtI of Badnjoz
.5 battalions left behind by La Romana at Albuquerque, Oli-
\'enll3, &c..
Carlos de Espailn's brignde 011 the Tagus near Abrnntes
Cavalry of the Army of Estremadurll
Artiller}'
Portugue81 :
Brigade of Line Rl'.giments, Nos.S and 17, at Elvas
Brigade of Cavalry uuder "Iadden, 3rd, 6th, 8th regiments
Hamilton's DiI'ision (with Hill), 2nd, 4th, 10th, 14tb Line
j'ortuguese Militia, 4 regiments, Heja, £\'01'8., Villa Viciosa,
J'ortalegre, ill Elvas, Jerllmenha, and Campo .Mayor .
5th Cll.)adores (with Hill)
Fnlle's Cavalry (with Hill), 1st, 4th, 7th, 10th regimellt!l
Artillery (4 batteries)
IJriti8h:
Hill's SC(:oru] Division
13th Light Dragoons
Artillery (3 batteries)
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Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Portugal was told to expect
this diyersion as a matter of certainty: in the dispatch that Fo)'
took back to him (dated Dec. 4) he was given the precise state-
ment that the 5th Corps was to be looked for somewhere in the
direction of Monta1vao and Villaflor. on the 'l'abIUS aUo\"e
Abrantes, at no distant date.
After having, as he thought, demonstrated to his master that
it would be useless to send Morticr illone, with 10,000 or U,OOO
men, to make an impossible dash at the Tagus, Soult made
allother propoSll.I. He would undertake not 1\ mere mid, but
the capture of Badojoz, the conquest of Esl;rcmadura, and the
destruction of the army of that province; hut he must take with
him a force much greater than the mere 5th Corps. 'The enter·
prise is a big onc. but ought to succeed-at least it will produce
l.\ happy uivcrsion in favour of thc imperial army in Portugal I:
It would call back La Romana from Lisbon, and possibly cause
Wellington to detach troops in his aid, Ilnd Mnssena would have
less in front of him ill consequence, and might resume the
offensive.
There was of course another course possible; Soult might
lmvc nmrched for Estrcmadura not with the 13,000 mcn of the
5th Corps alone, nor yet with the 20,000 men whom he actually
took thither in ,January, but with the greater part of the French
Army of Andalusia, 35,000 or 40,000 men, To do so he would
have hud to aoondon Granada, Malaga, and Jaen on the onc
side, and his hold on the Condado de Niebla and the west upon
the other. He might even possibly IllWC hud to rilisc the siege
of Ctldiz, though this is not quite certain. Many months after,
in the end of March, when all chance of the conquest of Portugal
was over, the Emperol' told him that this would have been his
proper COUl'sc, and read him an cJ,.'-po9t.j'aclo lecture on the
advantages that might have fonowed, if he had evacuated two-
thirds of his viceroyalty and taken an imposing force to sweep
across the Alemtejo and assail Lisbon f'!'Olll thc southeru side 2,
, Soult to Bertliier, December 1, lOW, frOIn Seville.
I TIlis dispatell of l\fal'c11 29 (Nap, Co.,.retp" no. 1i ,:;31), which must
havQ rcucllCll Soult about thlJ cno.! of Al!ril, wholl Masscna had long
retired to Spain, told him that be should lm\'e withdrawll all the 4th Corps
from Granada save the six IJolish battalions, and have drawn in GOdillOt'S
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But it must be remembered that in Deeember and January all
the ordeNl that were sent him directed him to move no more than
n small corps-in one dispatch the Emperor rolls it only 10,000
mCll. A supremc comnumder-in-chief present on the spot might
have SL'C1l his wa)' tu make the temporary sacrifice of the provinces
which had cost so lllany men to conquer and to hold, in order
that every u\'ailable man might be sent against Lisbon, and the
English might at last be expelled from the Peninsula. But
Soult was not such aoommander-in-chief; he was only one of the
many viceroys whom Napoleon preferred to a single omnipotent
lieutenant. Was it likely that hc would sncrifice half his
own territory, when no order to do so lay before him, in ordm'
that a colleague, sent on a separate task with forces no less than
his own, might have every possible advantage? Soult is often
blamed for not having seen that the crushing of Wellington's
army was the end to· which all others should have been sub-
ordinated, and that it would have been cheap in the end to
surrender half or three-quarters of Andalusia, and even to raise
the siege of Cadiz, in order to secure that point. He might have
replied that his lllaster was no less blind than himself: dispatch
after dispatch had ordered him to send a trifling detachment
towards the 'l'agus, lIot to mass every available Illan and lllllrch
on Lisbon, lcavillg Seville and the Cadiz lines exposetl to all
manner of dangers. He was primarily responsible for the re-
tention of the Andalusia that he had conq uered; it was for
the Emperor, not for himself, to order the evacuation of much
or all of that great realm. The Emperor gave no such direc-
tions: from September to January his whole series of dispatcllclI
spoke of nothing more than the movement of a moderate force;
those of January ~5th and February 6th approved of the course
which Soult had actually chosen, and took it for granted that
he would not move towards the TlLguS till he should have
captured Badajo7. I. It WllS lIot till March, whcn he began to
brigalle from Cordova, i. c. lmvc ab....udouCI} Ule whole castern Imlf of
Andalusia,umI ]lave tried to ]lold notlliug Illlt the siege lineR of ell/liz und
tile city of Seville. But tllis was ' wisdom after the event.' In December
Napoleon was Ilarlliug UpOll :& Ilivcrgion Wit]l 10,000 men to :Montah';'o
llnd ViIlaflor, not orllering the evacuation of the greater purt of AJU]lllusia.
1 January 25, Napoleon to Berthier, 'J1 est n(ocessaire d'ccrire all tlue
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see that all his arrangements were going wrong, and that his
scheme of times was erroneOIlS, that the Emperor began suddenly
to launch out into criticisms of Soult, und to complain that
• to try to hold every point at a moment of crisis leads to
possible disnster,' that· Seville, Uadajm:, aJld the Cadiz lines
were the only necessary things,' and that the Marshal ought
to have 30,000 men or more with him at Badajo1. instead of the
20,000 men whom he had actually taken thither 1. Ifso, why had
the orders not been given to that effect early in December, when
Napoleon had just learnt from Foy the state and positiollofthe
Army of Portugal, which had so long been hidden from him
behind 'Wellington's scl'(!en of Ordcnan0?
]f we seek deep enough, wc find the CRUse of all misdirectiollS
in the fact that the Emperor persisted in guiding the move-
ments of all his army from Paris, and would not appoint an
independent commander-in-chief of all the Spanish armies, who
should be able to issue orders that would be promptly obeyed
by every separate marshal or general in each province.
A moment's reflection shows that the data as to the details
of the situation in the ]leninsula, from which Napoleon had to
construct his scheme of operations, always came to him a month
late. And when he htl.d issued the dispatch which dealt with
the situation, it reached its destination after the interval of
another month, and had long ceased to have allY bearing 011 the
actual position of affairs. A single example of holV the system
worked may suffice. Massena started 1"oy for Paris, with his
great report on the state of the Army ofPortugal, on October 29.
Foy reached Paris and saw the Emperor on November 2fl and the
succeeding days. The detailed dispatches to Massena and Soult,
consequent 011 Fay's report, were not sent ofI' till December 4.
de Dalmatie fju'aprbJ la priSt dt Badajoz. il doit se porter sur le Tage, 11.1'00
son equipage de pont, et donner les moyens all prince d'Essliug d'assieger
et prendre AIJrll1l1i'8.' (Jorrt:lJJXJ1IdmlCti,llo. 17,2'1)5.
February 6, NalKlleoll to Bcrthicr, I Ecrivcz IOU due d'lstric (.8essicre8,
now commanding the new "Anny of the North") .•. que tOllt parait
prendre Wle couleur avuntageuse, que si lladajoz a ere pris dans le couraot
de Janvier, le due de Dalmatie u pu se porter sur le 'rage.' [Unfor-
tunately Badajoz liid not surrelllier tilll\1arcll11, aud Soult was extremely
lucky to get it so early.) &nupondunce, no, ]7,335.
I Napoleon to Berthier, March 29, Oorn&pOlldunce, DO. 11,531.
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On January 22nd Soull aclmowledges the receipt of the dispatch
of that date, along with that of two others dated November 28
and Dct.'ember 10, all of which arrived together, because the
guerrilleros of La MUllcha had stopped the posts between Madrid
and Seville for a full fortnight after the New Year', Of what
\'o.!ue to Soult on January 22 could he orders based on the COIl-
dition and projects of' Masscna on October flH? The data at the
base of the orders were three months old-while Soult had been
already for more than a month engnged on a campaign under-
taken 011 his OIVIl responsibility, withont any knowledge of the
exact re<Juirclllcnts of Massclltl., 01' of the intentions of the
Emperor.
The Estl-emaduran expedition of January-March 1811,
therefore, must be lookt.-d upon as the private scheme of the
Duke of Dalmatia 2, undertaken with the general obje<:t of
giving indirect assistance to Massena, because the last orders
that he had reeeived from Paris (those of October ~6), telling
him to gh·e di,·ect assistance, by sending Morlier to the 'l'agus,
were impossible of execution 3. Soult had two leading ideas
in his mind when he planned out his campaign. The first was
that he was going into a country thickly set with fortresses;
the second was that, when once the skirts of the Sierra Morenll
have been passed, Estrcmadura is u 'cavalry country,' u land
of heaths and of unenclosed tillage-fields of "ltst area. Accord-
ingly he intended to march with a very large force of cavalry,
and with a beavy siege-train. At Seyille he had at his dis-
position the greatest arsenal of Spain; but for many months
all that it produced had been going forward to Cadiz: no less
than ~90 pieces had been sent to arm the vast lines in front
of the blockaded city. Accordingly it took some time to get
ready the heavy guns, and to manufacture the tunrnuuitiOll
required for such a big business IlS the siege of the six fortresses,
I Soult to Herthier, from tile siege line!! in front of OHvenza, dated
January 22.
~ He call.s it 'la tlCtermination que j'avais prise sur de simple!! ads
indirccts.' To Bertllier, January 2.5.
l .For tile explanation of all this see Soult to Berthier, already quoted,
from Seville, December 1, acknowledging tiJe receipt of the imperial
orders of October 26th.
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small and great, into whose midst tIC was about to thrust him.
self. The personnel for the siege-train had also to be collected;
requisitions were sent, both to Victor at Cadiz and to Sebastiani
at Granadn~ to detach and send into Seville nearly all their
sappers, and the men of several companies of artillery. They
were also to send to the expeditionary force many regiments of
Cil\,alry. Mortier bad only two (lOth Hussars and 21st Chas-
seurs), which had sufficed when he was engaged in the heights of
the Sierra Mureua, but were insufficient when he was about to
descend into the plain of the Guaruana. Accordingly half the
cavalry of Victor's 1st Corps was called up-four regiments
(4th, 14th, 26th Dragoons, £nd Hussars), while Scbastiulli gal'C
up onc (27th Chasseurs); to these was added an experimental
Spanish cavalry regiment of I Juramentados' recently organized
at Seville. Only one infantry regiment was requisitioned, the
63rd Line, from Victor'~ 3rd Divi~ioll. Tbc puttillg together of
these resources gave a force in which the proportions of the
arms were very pecllliar-4,OOO cavalry, 2,000 artillery and
sappers, to only 13,500 infantry; the last, all save the above-
mentioned 63rd regiment, drawn from Mortier's 5th Corp,.
The orders for the concentration of the troops were issued early
in December, but owing to the time required for drawing in
units from Granada and Cadiz, and for the preparation of the
siege·train, it was not till the last day of the old year that the
Marshal took his departure from Seville.
The colleetion of a field army of 20,000 men, which was to
cut itself loose £loom Andalusia for a time, imposed some
tiresome problems all Soult. Since he had resolved not to
evacuate Granada or Malaga on the one hand, nor the posls
west of the Guadalquivir on the other, and since he was drawing
off the 5Lb. Corps, which hud hitherto provided for the safety of
Seville and found detachments for the Condado de Niebla, he
had to make provision for the filling of the gap left behind him.
Hence we find him calling upon Victor to spnrc men from in
front of Cadiz-a demand which the Duke of Belluno took very
ill-since he truly declared that he had no more troops in the
Ist Corps than sufficed to man the lines and to keep posts of
obsCIvation in his rear. The garrison of Cadiz was always
increasing, and included a strong nucleus of British troops.
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How could he face sorties, or disembarkations in his rear, if he
was cut down to a mere 18,000 men in place of the !t4,000 on
which he had hitherto reckoned? Nevertheless, he WllS forced
to provide a detachment to hold Xl"res, as a half-way house to
Seville, and to send out a cavalry regiment (9th Dragoons) al1d
one battalion west of the Gundalquivir. Similarly, the brigade
of Godinot in the kingdom of Cordovn I was required to find
a skeleton garrison for Seville, which was mised to a somewhat
higher figure, in appearance, by the doubtful aid of some •jura~
mentado' companies of Spaniards. and of the depOts and con~
valescents of the 5th Corps. The great city, with a turbulent
population of 100,000 souls, which formed the centre of his
viceroyalty, be<:ame at this time Soult's weakest point-he left
it so inadequately held that it was at the mercy of any con~
sidcrablc hostile force which might approach it~and such a
force wns ere long, as wc shall SL'C, to make its appearance.
Godinot had also to look after the insurgent bands of the
central Sierra Morena, who often blocked the post road to
Madrid. Sebastiani (save for the cavalry and artillery borrowed
from him) was left with his 4th Corps intact, and his duty was
unchanged-to watch the Spanish army of Mureia, and to
suppress the guerrilleros of the Sierra de Uonda and the eastern
coast-an unending task from which Soult thought that he
ought 110t to be distracted. Napoleon, wise after the event,
wrote in March that Soult should have left no more than the
Polish division of the 4th Corps in the direction of Gmnada,
amI have brought the remainder of it to strengthen or support
the troops at Seville and in the lines before Cadiz. In that
case the Poles would certainly have had to move westward also
ere long, since there were but 5,000 of them, and all Eastern
Andalusia would have had to be evacuated. But this idea had
never struck Soult as practicable, and Sebastiani's whole corps
was left in its old posts in the kingdom of Granada.
The invasion of Estremadum was ClI1Tied out in two columns
of about equal strength, which used the two main passes
between Western Andalusia and the "lIlley of the Guadiann.
1 Belonging to that division of the Army of the Centre under DessolIes
which Soult had borrowed for the conquest of Andalusia., and which King
Joseph, despite of ffially demands, could never get back.
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The right column under Latour-Maubourg took the route by
Guadalcanal, Llerena, and US!lo"l"e; it was composed of his own
regiments of dragoons from the Ist Corps, and of Girard's
infantry division of the 5th Corps, which latter had been
cantoned in Llerena since the autumn, and was now picked up
and taken forward by the cavalry. The left column, which was
accompanied both by Soult and by Mortier, was composed of
Briche's light cavulry and Gazall'g di\'jsioll of the 5th Corps. It
had to escort the slowly moving siege-train of 34 gUlls. which
(with the 60,000 kilos of powder belonging to it) was drawn
by 2,500 draught oxen, requisitioned along with their driven
from the province of Seville. This column took the route
ltonquillo, Sta Ollala, Monasterio, which, if less steep and
better made than the Llerena-Guadalcanalroad, is longer, and
ptlSSC:S through an cven morc desolate and rcsourcclcss country.
It was intended that the two columns should join at Los Santos
or Almendralejo, in the Estremaduran plain, and lay siege at
once to Bndajoz, the encmy's most formidablc stronghold. Its
fall, so Soult hoped, would lead to the easy conquest of the minor
fortresses.
But the two <:olumns did not meet with equal fortunc. 'i'lULt
commanded by Latour-Maubourg met practically no resistallre
in its first stages. On arriving at Usagre on January 3, it
found ill its front almost thc whole of the allied cllvalry ill Estre-
madura-Butron with 1,500 Spaniards, Madden with nearly
1,000 Portuguese. But this was merely a screen thrown out to
cover the retreat beyond the Guadiana of Mendizabal and the
division of Spanish inftUltry which had been cantolled ill this
region. That officer had been ordered by his chief, La Romans,
to break the bridge of .Merida, after retiring over it, and then
to attempt to hold the line of the Guadiana. He did neither;
precipitately marching on Mcrida, he passed through it in
great haste, bllt forgot to see that the bridge was duly de-
stroyed, and then retired along the north bank of the
Guadiant1. to Badajoz. Latour·Maubourg, according to his
directions, did not cross the river, but halted near Almcndralejo,
to wait for the other column, which was not forthcoming. Only
Soult himself and Brichc's light cavalry appeared at Zafra on
the 5th, and joined Latour·l\1auboul'g 011 the 6th of January.
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Gazan's infantry and the siege-train were far away, and unavail-
able for many a day. The plans of ,the left invading column
had miscarried. For when its head reached MOllasterio, at the
summit of the long pass, its mil, the siege-train, wns dragging
far behind. In the desolate stages about Ronquillo and Stn
Olalla it had met with tempestuous rains, as might have been
expected at the SCll.'!on. Many of the oxen died, the unwilling
Spalli~h drivers deserted wholesale, and there was much dclu.);
and considerable loss of vehicles. The train and its small
escort got completely separated from Gazan's infantry. At this
moment Soult's cavalry reported to him that a formidable
column of hostile infantry was lying a few !l1iles to the west of
Monasterio, on the bad cross-road to Calera, and was a.ppa~
rently moving round his flank, either to faU upon the belated
convoy or perhaps to make /l. dash at Seville.
This column WIlS the 5,000 infantry of DaJJlISteros, who, as it
chanced, had begun to march southward at the same moment
that Soult had started northward. Thc Spanish general had
jmt receivcd orders from Cadiz bidding him cut himsclf loose
from the Estremadurau army, and move into the Condado de
Nicbla, where he was to unite with the local levies under
Copons, drive out the weak French detachment there stationed,
and threaten Seville from the west if it should be practicable.
. These orders had been given, of course, before Soult's plan for
invading Estremadura was suspected at Cadiz. But though
unwise in themselves-it was not the time to deplete Estrema-
dura of troops-they had the effect of bringing Soult's great
manreU\Te to a standstill for some weeks. The Marshal deter-
mined that he must free his flank from this threatening force
before continuing his march, and ordered Mortier to atruck
Ballasteros without delay. This was done, hut the Spaniard,
after a running fight of two hours, retired to Fregenal, fifteen
miles further west, without suffering any serious harm
(January 4th). He was still in a position to threaten the rear
of the eollYoy. or to slip round the flank of the French column
towards Seville. Soult therefore resolved to go on with his
cavalry and join Latour-1'[ullbourg, but to drop Ga?an's infuntry
in the pusses, with the order to head off Ballasteros at all costs,
and to cover the siege-train in its journey across the mountains.
0.... 1<. 1.. D
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Gnzan therefore took post at FlIcntes de Loon, but soon heard
that Ballasteros had moved south again from Fregcllal towards
the Chanza river, and was apparently tryhlg to get round his
f1allk. Leaving a detachment to help the <..'ollVoy on its sIolI'
and toilsome route, Gazan resolved to pursue the Spanish
column and destroy it at all costs. This determination led
him into three weeks of desperate mountain-marching and semi.
starvation, at the worst season of the year. For BalIilStero~
who showed considerable skill in drawing his enemy 011, moved
ever south and west lowards the lower Guadiullu, and picked up
Capons's levies by the way. He at last turned to fight at
Villanueva de 105 Castillejos on January 24th. Gu:t,tln, who had
been joined meanwhile by the small French detachment inlhe
COlldado de Niebla, brought his enemy to action on the 25th.
The Asturian battalions which formed BaUasteros's division made
a creditable resistance, and when evicted from their position
retired across the GuadiauR to AIcoutim in Portugal, without
having suffered any overwhelming loss I. Gazan therefore
resolved to pursue them no further-indeed he had been drawn
down into one of the remotest corners of Spain to little pro6t,
and realized that Soult must be brought to n. standstill one
hundred miles away, for want of the 6,000 infantry who bad
now been executing their toilsome excursion in the mountains
for three weeks.
Accordingly, the French gencrol bade Remond, the commander
of the Niebla detachment, watch llaIlasteros, and himself returned
to Estremadurn by a most painful march through Puebla de
Guzmall, El Cerro. Fregenal, and Xercs de los Caballeros, He
reported his return to Soult at Valvel'de on February 3rd. His
services had been lost to his chief for a month all but two days,
a fact which had the gravest results on the general course of
the campaign of Estremadura 2.
1 r..ermiuly uot with the loss of 1,500 men as Gazan alleged, still less
with that of 3,000 lIS st.'Itcd by Nllpier.
2 By far the best account of this wild excursioll is to be found in
La. "lare's account of tllc Estremaduran Campaign of ]8]]-]2 (Paris,
1825), Toreiio exaggerates the losses of the Frenc]l, which canllot haIe
been lteal'Y, as Martinien's Lisle del 0.fficierlJ l'!dIJJ &c., SllOWS only two or
three casualties ill G:~II'B division,
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For the Duke of Dalmatia, when he had joincd Latour-Mau-
bourg on January 6th, found that he had at his disposition 4,000
cavalry hut only the 6,000 infantry oC Girard, while the siege-
train was still bl<x::keti in the passes by Monasterio. ViTith such
a force he did not like to beleaguer a place so large and so
hea,'ily garrisoned as Badajoz. Accordingly, he W9.$ forced to
abandon his original intention of forming its siege, and to think
of some lesser enterprise, morc suited to his strength. After
some hesitation, he detennillcd to attack the weak and old-
fashioned fortress of Oli\'enza, the southern most of all the
fortified places on the Spanish-Portnguese frontier. '1'0 cover
his movement he sent Briche's cavalry to :Mcrida, whicb t.hey
occupied on Jalluary 7th, almost without rcsisrol1l.:e, finding thc
bridge intact. From thcnce they sought for MClldizabul un the
north side of the Guadiana, and discovered that he had with-
drawn to Albllqucrqllc, twenty miles north of Badajoz. Mean-
while Latour-Maubourg with four dragoon regiments took post at
Albuera to watch the garrison of Badajoz, while Soult marcheti
with Girard's infantry and one cavalry regiment to attack
Oli\'enZtl, before whose walls he appeared on January 11th,
1811.
Olivenza ought neVel' to have been defended. For siuC<l its
cession by}}ortugal to Spain after Godoy's futile' War of the
Oranges' in 1801, it had been systematically neglected. The
breach made by the Spaniards at its siege ten years before had
never been properly repaired-only one-third of the masonry
had been replaced, and the rest of the gap had been merely
stopped with carth. It.':i one outlying work, n IUllctte 300 yards
ouly from its southcrn point, was lying in ruins Iind ulloccupieJ.
The circuit of its walls was about a mile, uut there wcre only
eighteen guns 1 to guard them. The garrison down to the 5th
of January had consisted of a single battalion left there by
La Romana, when he marched for Portugal in October. But
Mendizabal, apparently in inexcusable ignorance of the condition
of the place, had ordered a whole brigade of his infantry to
throw themselves into it when Soult began to press forward. He
sacrificed, in fact, ~,400 out of the 0,000 bayonets of his division
I Soult reports eighteen gUllS surrenderoo: but Herck says ill Ms
disp.1teh that only eight were ~rI'iceable.
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by bidding them shut themselves up in an utterly untenable
fortress 1. 'The governor, General Manuel Herck-an old Swiss
officer-was ailing and quite incapable; a man of resourc~
might have done something with the heavy garrison placed
under his orders, even though the walls were weak aud artillery
almost non-existent; but Herck disgraced himself.
"Then SOlllt' arrived in front of Olivenza on JtllUlO.r)' 11th,
his engineers illformltl him that the place, weak as it was, was
too strong to take by escala.de, but that a very few days of
regular buttedng would sullice to ruin it. Unfortunately for
him, there was as yet no heavy artillery at his disposition, but
only the divisional batteries of Girard's two brigades; the siege-
tmin was still stuck in the passes. However, the ontlying
lunette oppositc the south frout wus at once seized, and turned
into a battery for four field-guns, which opened their fire on the
next day. The old Spanish breach of' 180], obviollsly ready to
fall in 011 accoullt of it's rickety repairs, was visible ill the north.
west front, the bastion of San Pedro. Opposite this sites for
two more batteries were planned, and a first parallel opened.
'fhe trench-work went on almost unhindered by the Spaniards,
who showed but few guns and shot very badly, but under con·
siderable difficulties from the rainy weather. which was per-
petually flooding the lower parts of the lincs. But in tcn da)'s
approaclles were pushed right up to the edge of the counter-
scarp, and mines prepared to blow it in. The siege artillery
. began to arrivc on the 19th. in detachmcnts, and continued to
drop in for several days. On the 21st the batteries, being com·
pleted, were armed with the first 1fl-pounders that came up.
On the 9292nd the fire began, and at once proved most effective:
the bastion of San Pedro began to crumble in, and the old breach
of ]801 revealed itself, by the falling away of the rammed earth
which alone stopped it up. The arrangements for a storm had
not yet been commenced when the garrison hoisted the white
I The original garrison was Voluntarios de Navarra, 1,150 bayouet5
properly belonging to O'Donllcll'B dh'isioll, wllich was at Lisbon with
[..10 HOlllana. 'nlc reinforcements t1lfl)Wll in at the last moment were {nUT
battalions, 2,400 bayonets, fl'(llll tIle regiments l\Ieritlu, Truxillo, Rar-
bastro, and .l'+lollforte-the two former part of the original army of "'~stre­
matlura, tlle two latter part of DellJarque·s oltl army from tile north.
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flag. Mortier refused ull negotiations alld demtmdcd a surrendcl'
at discretion. This thc old governor hastened to concede,
coming out. jn pcrson at one of thc gates, und putt.ing t.he place
1\1. the disposit.ion of the French without further argument.!
Soult and l\:lortier entered next day, and 4,161 Spanish troops
marched out and laid down their arms before the 6,000 infantry
of Girard, who had formed the sole besieging force. The total
loss of the French during the siege was 15 killed and 40 wounded
-that of the besieged about ~oo. The figures are a sufficient
evidence of the disgraceful weakness of the defence.
When onc reflects what was done to hold the unfortified town
of Saragossa, and the mediaend enceinte of Qcronu, it is impos-
sible not to rcflect what a determined govcrnor might have
accomplished at Olivenza. The place was short of bruns, no
doubt-hut thc enemy was worse oft' till the last days of the
siege, since he had nothing but twelve light field-pieces until the
siege-train began to arrive. General Herck made no sorties to
disturb the works-though he had a superabundant garrison;
he made no serious attempt to retrench the bl'Cach, and he
surrendered actually ere the first summons had been sent in
before the storm. At the worst he might have tried to cut his
way out between thc French camps, which werc scattercd far
from each other, owing to thc cxtrcmcly small lIumbers of the
besieging army, who only counted three mcn to thc defcnders'
two. Altogether it was a disgraceful business. The place, no
doubt, ought never to have been held; but if held it might at
least havc been defended-which it practically was not.
Soult was placed in a new difficulty by the surrendcr of
Olivenr.8.. Though his siege-train had begun to come up, he
had llO news of Gur.an, und his in fall try 'I'M still 110 more than
a single division. He had to spare two battalions to escort thc
4,000 prisoucrs to Seville, ulld to put another in Olivellza us
garrison 2. This left him only ele\'en battalions-5,4S5 bayonets,
I Hem's miserable eJ1cl\lpatory disp.'\.tch may be found in C1mbr, il'.
pp. 200-1.
~ The regiment sent back with the prisoners was the 63rd, the one
bOITOwed from Victor: it had lIot been at the siege, but supporting
.Latour-Maubourg at Albuera. 11!e garrison left ill Oli\'enza WIIS oue
battalion of the 64th.
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to continue the clllllJ>llign, though he had the Cllormous force
of 4,000 cavalry at his disposition, and a siege-tmin that was
growing every day, as more belated pieces came up {mm the
rear. He might pwbably have waited for Guzan, for whom
messages had been vainly sent, if he had not received, 011 the
day that Olivenr.a fell, one more of llerthier's peremptOl"Y letters,
dated fl!l Dcecmbcr, in which he was told (ns usual) to send
the 5th Corps to join Massena on the Tagus without delay.
This letter cnme at an even more inappropriate moment than
usual, as GazIUl, with half that corps, was lost to sight in the
mountain of the Condado de Niebla, more than a hundred and
twenty miles away. Dut it was clear that something immediate
must be done, or the Emperor would be more discontcnted than
before; accordingly Soult resolved to take the very har,ardow
step of laying siege to lladajoz at once with the small infimtry
force at his disposition. For this movc would undoubtedly
provoke alarm at Lisbon, and lead 'Vellington to send otr
La Uomana's army to succour it, and perhaps some Allglo-
Portuguese troops also, so that thc mass opposed to :Masscn&
would be more or less weakened.
Accordingly on the 26th of' January SOlllt mArched against
Badajoz, which is only twelve miles north-west of Olivcnza, with
under 6,000 infantry, ten companies of artillery, and seven of
sappers, to ill\'est the southern side of Badnjoz, while Latour·
MauboUl'g, with six regiments of cavalry, crossed the Guaclillllll.
by a ford, and wcnt to blockade the place on its northern front.
Badajoz, though owning somc defccts, was still Cl. stronghold
of the first class, in far better order than most of the Peninsular
fortre<>ses. It belonged to that ordcr of places whose topography
forces a besieger to divide his (lrmy by a dangerous obstacle,
since it lies on a bl'oml river, with the town on one side and
1\ formidable ontwol'k 011 the other. Indeed the most st!ikillg
feature of Dadajoz, whether the tra\'cllcr approaches it from the
cast or the west, is the towering height of San Cristobal1
crowned by its fort, lying above the tl'anspontine suburb and
dominating the whole city. Any enemy who begins operations
against the place must take measures to blockade or to attack
this high-lying fort, which completely covers the bridge and its
tete·du-pont, and eftectiveJy protects ingress or egress to or frolU
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the place. But San Cristohal is not easy to blockade, since it is
the end-bluff of a vcry steep narrow range of hills. which run for
many miles to the north, and divide the country-side beyond the
Guadiana into two separate valleys. those of the Geborn and
the eayn, which are completely invisible from each other.
The city of lladajoz is built on an inclined plane, sloping down
from the Castle, which stands on a lofty hill with almost pre-
cipitolls grass slopes, at the north-east end of the place, down to
the river on the north and the plain on the south and west.
The castle-hill and Sail Crislobal between them form a sort of
gorge, through which the Guadiana, narrowed for a space, forces
its Wll)'. to broaden out again at the immensely long bridge
with its thirty-two arches and 640 yards of roadway. Below
the castle the Uivillus, a stagnant brook with hardly any current,
-the home of frOl:,'1I and the hunting-ground of the city storks,
-coasts around the walls, and finally dribbles into the river.
The front of the place from the river to the castle was composed
of eight regular bastions; along the river edge there lies nothing
more than a single solid wall without relief or indentations: but
this side of the place is wholly inaccessible owing to the water.
There are two outlyillg works, whieh cover heights so close into
t.he place tha.t it ill necessary to hold them, lest the cnemy Rhould
establish himself too Ilear the enceinte. Thesc arc the .Pieurintl
IUllette beyond the RiviUas, and the IUllch lllrgcr PIH·dnleras fort,
a • half-crowu-work,' opposite the SQuth point of the city, which
covers a well-marked hill that commands that low-lying part of
the place, and is a position impossible to concede to the besieger,
since it is only 250 yards from the nearest bastion. It was ill-
designed, having a "ery shallow ditch, and being incompletely
closed at its gorge by a mere. palisade. '/
The eight bastions which form the attackable part ot' the
enceinte of lb.dajoz have (they remain to-day just as they were
in 1811, for the plact:! has never been modernized) a height of
about thirty feet t f!'Om th~ bottom of the dilch to the rampart,
while the curtains between them arc somcwhat lower, about
twenty-two feet only. The ditch was broad, with t\ good
I Except the two nearest the river, San Vincente and San Jose, which
are a little lower.
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counterscarp ill masonry seven feet high; beyond it each bastion
was protected in front by a rather low and weak demi-hmc.
The garrison, not mure tlum enough for such an cxtcusil'e
place, consisted at the New Year of 4,100 mClI; hut Mendizabal
threw in two battalions more (1st and 2nd of the Second Regi-
ment of Seville) before he 'retired to the borders of Portllga~ ,..
that the figure had risen to 5,000 before Soult appearoo in front
of the walls. The go\"crnor was El very distinguished soldier,
General Rafael Menacho, who had served through the old
J.<~rench war of 1792-5, and had commanded n regiment al
Baylen. He was in the full vigour of middle age (forty-four
years old) and abounding in spirit, resolution, and initiative,
as all his movements sholl"ed down to the unhappy day of Jus
death.
Soult';;; engineers, after surveying the situation of Badajoz,
reported that undcr ordinary circumstances thc most profitable
front to attack would certainly be the western-that between
the J)ardaleras fort and the river; but at the same time they
decided that it had better be left alone. For the army was so
weak that it could not properly invest the whole city, and if
the north bank of the GnadianB. were left practically unoccupied,
as must necessarily be the ease, the Spaniards would be able to
seize the ground beyond the uridge-head, and cstaulish batteries
there, which would effectually enfilade the trenches which
would have to be constructed for approaching the west side of
the place. The castle and the nortlHast allgle of the town
were too high-lying to be chosen as the point of attack, and
the Rivillas and its boggy banks were better avoided. They
therefore advised that tlle OOUtll front should be chosen as the
objective, and that the first opcration taken ill hand shoulcl be
the capture of the Pardaleras fort, for that work appeared weak
and ill-planned, while its site would make the most ac.h'an·
tagoous of starting-point.~for breaching the enceinte of the to\\1l
itself. It wus the lIlost cOllllllunding grollnd cIos~ in to the
walls which could be discovered. Soult and Mortier concurred.
and placed the army in the best position fOr utilir.ing this
mcthod of attack. The camps of Giruro's division were placed
on and around two low hills, the Cerro de San ,Miguel on the
right of the Uivillas, nnd the Cerro del Viento on its left. Oll
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the fOrlnel· height, about 1,800 yards from the town, nothing
was done save the construction of a rough entrenchment-to
face the Picurina and restrict possible sallies-in which t1u-ee
small batteries were afterwards inserted. The Cerro del Viento.
which is about 1,~00 yards f!"Om the rardaleras, was to be the
real starting-point of the attack, and under its side the siege-
park Rnd engineers' camp were ClItablished. Two batteries in
front of it wel-e marked out and begWl on the first night of
'open tl'cnches' (Jalllll\ry ~-9), but it was not till tllC third night
(January 30-1) that the first parallel was commen<.w, on the
undulating ground to the west of the Ui\'iIlas. When the work
became visible next day, the governor directed a vigorous sortie
against it, composed of 800 men. The trenches were occupied
for a moment, but soon recovered by the French supports. A
small body of Spanish cavalry which had taken part in the AAlIy
rode right round the rear of the camp, and sabred the clteJ-de~
bataillon Cllzill, the chief engineer, and a uozen of his sappcCll
on the Ccrro del Viento. But the tolul loss of the besiegers
was only about seventy killed and woullucd, while the mell of
the sortie suffereu much more heavily, while they were being
driven back across the open ground towards the city. Their
commander, a Colonel Bll$S(!courl of the 1st H.egiment of Seville
-the corps which furnished the sallying force-was killed.
Next day the siege~\vorkswere so little injured that the a.rtillery
was able to put guns into the first batteries that had been markerl
out. Oil the first three days of February incessant and torrcntial
rains stopped further work-the whole of the first parallel Will)
inundated, and the flying bridge by \\'hich alone Scult could
communicate with Latour-Maubourg all the other side of the
Guadiana was washed away.
But despite of the rain February :3 was a day of joy for the
l"rench, for on it" morning Ga7An reported his IllTival at VIl.I-
verde, tell miles awny, and ut 3 o'clock his division of 6,000
meu ilIarched into camp ulld doublL.J. the force of the besieging
army. Their arrival was a piece of cl·uel ill-luck for the
Spaniards, for on that same afternoon, at dusk, Menacho sent
out a formidable sorlie of 1,500 men-all that he could safely
spare from the ramparts-who came out of the river-side gate
(Puerto de las Pa.lmas) a.nd stormed the first parallel, driving
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out the workers and the three companies of their covering party.
The Spaniards hud already filled up a considerable section of
the trench, when they were charged by two battnlions of Gar..m's
Ilcwly-arI'ived troops, and driven out again, before they had
finished their task. The serious nature of the attack may be
judged from the fact that the French lost 188 killed and
wounded-including eight officcrs-illl'cpelling it. If only oue
brigade of Girnrd had been in the Cerro del Viento camps,
instead of Ga7,t\1l's entire division, it is probable that the whole
first parallel and the batteries behind it would have been de.
strayed. While the damage was being repaired, on February-l"
Soult began to born bard the town from these batteries, but
with no good eRect. The result, indeed, was rathel' to the
profit of the Spaniards, for a great portion of thc civil popula-
tion fled at the first sign of bombardment, and escaped b)'
night down the Guudinna bank towards Elvlls. The provisions
left in their descrted houscs added appreciably to MeuacllO'l
storcs.
The work of extending the first parallel diagonally toward
the Pardaleras was still going 011, when, Oil February 5th, the
whole situation before Badajoz was changed by the appearance
in the neighbourhood of a Spanish army of succour. Even
before Soult bad started from Seville ut the New Year, Welling-
ton had been aware of the imminence of the invasion of
Estremadura, and had been consulting with his colleague La
Romanaus to the measures that it would be necessary to take l ,
As early as the !end of January L'\ Uomana had sent orders to
Mendi7.abal, to tell him that if the li'rcneh should cross the
Sierra Morcnu ill force, he was lo evacuate Southern Estl'cma-
dura, break the bridges of Medellin and Merida, and endeavour
to defend the line of the GlIadiann t. Hy later instrllctions
(Junutwy 8) i\{cndiz!lbal was directed to rctirc into tile Sierra
de San Mamoo if the enemy crossed the river above Badajol,
1 Wellingtou, DitpaICItu, vii. p. DB, uateu Jalluary 1st, to Charles Stuar'
reports tllat from Cauiz advices of December 23 lie is aware tllat a coa-
ceutration is takillg place at Seville, though Mendizabal knows nothing
of it.
I 'VelIington'a covering letwr to La Howana's disllatch is in lVeliiflgton
Dilpatche8, vii. p. 09.
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but to throw himself upon their rear, and to hang on to
them, if they crossed below, and seemed to be making for Elvas
ulld Portugal. On the 12th, VVcllillgton, heming that Soult
seemed to be heading towards Olivcnzn mther than :Mcl'idn,
conceived doubts as to whether he might 1I0t he intclldillg to
abamlon his communications with Seville, to leave the fortresses
behind him, and to march to the Tagus to co-operate with
i\{assCnll. upon the _t\.J.emtejo bank of that river. On the 14th
arrived the morc comfortable news that the :French had sat
down to beleaguer Olivcnza, a sure sign that they did not
propose to cut themselves loose from their ba.<;e and to join
hiassentl as a flying column. As a matter of fact, as we have
seen, Solllt, having been depri\'ed of Ga:r.an's assistance, was too
weak at this moment to dream of an incursion into rortugal,
and had attacked Qlivenza because he could find nothing else to
do for the present.
Accordingly, since the enemy had apparently settled down to
besiege the Estremndumn fortresses, "Vellington and La Uomana
determined to reinfOI'(:e Mendi7.aballlp to a strength whieh would
enable him to act as a serious check upon Soult, probably evell
to foil him completely. On January 14th La ROmatHI. ordered
Cnt·los de Espafia and his brigade of some 1,500 or 1,800 men,
from opposite Abrantcs, to join the slllall existing remnant of
the Army of Estremrulura I. On the 19th 2, the more important
resolve wns taken of sending the remainder of the Spanish troops
from the Lisbon lines on the same errand-they amounted to
about 6,000 men, the rest of La Carrera's division, and the whole
of that of Charles O'Donncll. Starting on the 20th they reached
:Montcmor 0 Novo on the ~4th-where they heard of the dis-
graceful cnpitlllation of Olivenza,-and Eh'as on the 29th. To
the same point CIlllle in Mendil'abal, who, with the remains of
his own infantry division-$Ollicthing over 8,000 men, and
lllltron's cavalry, had moved from his original post at Albu-
qucrqllc to Portalcgre 011 the Portuguese border, llud IlUd there
been joined by Carlos de Espai1a's brigade. Madden'!:! Portu-
guese cavalry had already moved back to Campo Mayor and
I Wellington, Ditpatchet, vii. 143.
, Ibid., vii. 165, where a letter to Henry Wellesley fh:es the resolve to
!lelld off these troops to (yesterday,' i.e. Jalluary Wth.
44 SQULT INVADES ESTllEMADURA
Elvas when Soult first undertook the siege of Olivcllza. By the
acclUDulation of l111these forces an army of about 11,000 infantl')'
and over 3,000 cavalry was put together t.
La Romall3. himself had intended to take charge of the
expedition, which uuder bis prudent leadership would probably
have achieved its desired end, and have held Soult completel}'
ill check. But he was prevented from starting with his troops
011 the ~Oth by an indisposition which was not judged to lxo
serious-a' spasm in the chest~,' apparently a prclimluury attack
of atlgillG pectoris. He appeared convalescent Oil the 2Jilnd, but
died suddenly of a recurrencc of the complaint early on the
afternoon of the 23111, after he had already sent fot'Wllrd hi.
secretary and staff' to prepare quarters for him on the waJ'
towards the army. His death was a real disaster to the caUSE
of the allies, for two main reasons. The first was that, unlike
most of his contemporaries in the Spanish service, he was aver)'
cautious general. who avoided risks and preferred to IIlUllCCUVre
rather than to fight, unless he had a. good chance of success.
His long marches and many retreats had won him the punning
nickname of the' Mal'quL'S de IllS Romerias '-the Marquis oi
Pilgrimages: but even a long' pilgrimage' is better than a
defeat, and he had never destroyed an army, like Cllcsta, Blake,
or Areizagu. The other reason which made him vuluable to the
allied cause was that, being a man of great tact and obliging
manners, he had wall \Vellington's personul regard, and alwap
lived on the best terms with him. Indeed, the Marquis was
the only Spanish general, save Castaiios, who never had any
difficulties with his English colleague; and it may be added that
I Viz. La Carrera (iucludirrg Carlos de F..sll3ib) noout 2,000 illfalltry.
Cllarles 0'Donne1l'8 division, • 5,000 "
Remains of Mendi1.abal's divisioll, which h:td
tllrown four b:lttaliolts into 01ivcma and two
into :B1Ulaju~ . 3,600
Butrou's cavalry, about, 2,500 cavalry.
i\laddell's Portuguese cavalry IJrigade 950"
Artillery 450 artillerr.
Total 14,000 ill "IL
Wellington calls the disease fspasms of the chest'; tlle Spallisb
authorities term it au aneurism.
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Wellington thought much more of his capacity than of that of
Castailos. whom he regarded as well-meaning but weak, He
wrote of him, in words that may be regarded as entirely genuine
and heartfelt, and which were not intended for Spanish eyes,
that he was the brightest ornament of the Spanish army, an
upright patriot, a strenuous llnd r.calolls defender of the cause of
European liberty, a loyal colleague, a useful councillor I,
That the Marquis was not a man of brilliant genius, nor
a. general of the first rank, is sufficiently evident from the
UCC-'UUllt of his cmnpaigtls, duly detailed in the fir:>t thn.'C volumes
of this work. But he had a very high and meritorious re<:ord;
of all the old nobles of Spain. he was the one who served his
country best in the day of her distress. His energy and deter-
mination were displayed in his romantic escape from Denmark
in 1808 2. Having once unsheathed his sword in the national
cause, he Ilever faltered or despaired even in the day of the
worst disaster. If his life had been spared he would have fought
on undismayed to the end of the war·, Though he became
involved in the unhappy disputes which preceded the fall of the
Supreme Junta, in the winter of 1809-10 3, and did not disdain
to aecept a colllmand from the illegal Seville goverumcut in the
JauU!~ry of the latter yew.'" hc was neither a 'oiClf-seeker Ilor
a frOlulcur. If his words or acts :,;ometimes appeared factious,
they were inspired by a genuine discoutent at the incapacity of
the ruling powers, not by n desire for self-advancement; and
there seems to be no evidence to connect him with the unwise
and autocratic proceedings of his brother Jose Caro in Valencia,
During the last year of his life he was discharging a. very
invidious task while he commnnded in Estremooura under the
conb:ol of the lnst regency, which treated him wit.h neglect and
regarded him with sllspicion. His dCl\th is said to have been
hasteued by scurrilous accusations made against his loyalty in
pamphlets and newspapers published at Cadiz~. which drove
I See especially Wellington to Liverpool, January 26th, in DiapatcMa,
vii. HI6-7. The corresponding letter to Mendizabal is less important,
because it is written to a Spanisll correspondent.
I Sce \'01. i. pp. 37]-4. 3 Sec vol. iii. IJIl. 6-7. • Ibid., 40.
& &le l\Tellingtoll, ./}Vl1mlchU, vii. p. ] Hi, for note as to Iibe1s1lUb1ished
by'" vagabond lIamed C;.!vO.'
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him to distraction, for he was a man of a sensitive disposition,
keenly affected by any criticism. Albuquerque, it will be
remembered, is said to have been helped towards his grave by
similar means I.
The death of Ln Romano., and the transfer at this same date
of Charles O'Donnell to another sphere of operations, caused
a general rearrangement of the commands in the Army of Estl'€-
madura. Mendizabal, as the sole Lielltenant·General in the
prOYillCC, succeeded to the pltlCC and responsibilities of the
'Marquis, but only as a provisional chief; the Regency, justly
doubting his abilities, nominated Castaiios as Captain-General.
Ullfortunately, as wc shall sec, the victor of Baylcll reacbed
Estremadura just in time to hear that his locum tenens had
destroyed the army, and left hardly a wreck of it behind him.
Meanwhile Mendimbal made oyer his own old division to a Major-
General Garcia, while that of Charles O'Dolluell fell to another
officer new to us, Major-General Jose Virnes. La Carrera
. became chief of the staff~ or practically second in command, and
his' \'llllguard division' passed to his old brigu.dier Carlos de
Espana.
As early as January 28th Soult had directed Latour-Maubourg
with four regiments of light cavalry to make a CCt:onno.issnnce
in the direction of the Portuguese frontier, and by this more·
ment had become aware that Mendi7.abo.l was at l'ortalegre,
with his own infantry llnd Butron's cavalry. It was no surprise
to the Marshal, therefore, to find, a week later, that a con·
siderable force was pressing in his posts on the north of the
Guadiana. The presence of Madden's Portuguese drogoons in
the advanced /:,ruard showetl that the enemy had been reinforced
Latour-Maubourg's cavalry-screen was driyen in without mucb
fighting, and the French general retired to Montijo, nine
miles up the river (February 5th-6th). That night Mendizabal's
arm)', nearly 15,000 strong, camped on the heights of SaD
Cristobal, and communicated wilh Badajoz freely, the blockade
being broken so far as the northern bank of the Guadiallll
was concerned.
Wellington alld La Romana, when the return of the Spanish
troops from Lisbon to Estremadnra was ordered, had settled
I Scc \'01. iii. p. 32.5.
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upon a regular plan of campaign I, which had been communi~
cated to Mcndizabal. It required some slight modification when
the fall of Olivenza became known, and when Soult's intention
to besiege Badajoz declared itself. But in its essentials it was
well applicable to the situation of affldrs upon Febrnary 6th.
Afl:cr a solcmn warning to the Spanish generals that the Army
of EstremadurLL is 'the Inst body of troops which their country
possesses,' and must not be risked in dangerous operations, the
memorandum suggests (1) that an entrenched camp capable of
holding the entire army should be prepared on the heights
which lie between Campo Mayor and Budajoz, and which end
in the high bluff of San Cristobal above the latter town.
(~) That if possible an attempt should be made to break the
bridges of Medellin and Merida, SO M to restrict the French
to the southern bllllk of the Gllooiallll. (3) That the Regency
should be Mkcd to send back Bnllasteros's division to join thc
Army of Estremooura, and (4) that the bridge of boats in store
at Badajoz should, if possiblc, be floated down to JCl'uillcnha, to
give the Portuguese garrison of Eh'us the power of crO&ling the
Guadiana below Badajoz. The last suggestion was impracticable,
because the French, when the dispatch reached Mendizabal,
were so close to the river that the bridge could not have been
transferred. The other three suggestions were all valuable, but
none of them were carried out-least of all the most important
of them, that which prescribed the entrenching of the San
Cristobal heights, and thcir occupation by the whole of the
Spanish army.
Mcndiw.bal had a plan of his own-he resolvoo. not to fortify
himself on the height<; beyond the river, us \Vellington suggested,
but to throw a great part of his infantry into Badajoz, and make
with them a grand sortie against the :f'rellch lines. The bulk of
his cavalry remain(!d b(!low San Cristobal, and had a skirmish
of evil omen with Latonr-Mauboul'g, who drove them in with
ease, and pursued them beyond the Gebora to the foot of the
heights. But Madden's Portuguese horse filed into town across
the bridge, to join in the sally of the infantry.
I TIlis is <Memorandum to tlLO Marquis of La Homana,' to bo fOlllld in
nrellington, J)i8putC~tr, vii. ](;3, with date January 20, tllrce tlaya before
that of the death of the l\Iarlplis.
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At three o'clock on the afternoon of the 7th of l?ebruary the
sortie was made. While Madden's dr8.0ooons and a small infantry
support threatened the left of the French lines, without closing,
a large force composed of all Carlos de Espaiia's 'vauguard divi.
sion,' with picked battalions from the others, delh'ered a ~igoroUl
-indeed a desperate-assault upon Soull's right, the entrench·
ments on the hill of Sail Miguel. ~11ere were apparently four
columns, each of two battalions, and making 5,000 men; they
mine out from the 'l'Tinidad gate, drew up under the wing of the
Pieurinu IUllettc, und then marched straight at the French camp,
They pierced the line of entrenchment<; ill their first rush, swept
away the guard of the trenches, carried the three butteries
which were inserted in them, and then became engaged in a nertc
fight with Ilhillipon's brigade of Girarcl's division, the troops
encamped behind this part of the lines, Mortier, who was on
the other /lank, detecting that the movements in front of him
were only a demonstration, promptly sellt several battalions
eastward to succour the threatened point. These fell upon the
Spaniards' flank, and threatened 00 ent them olt'from their retreat
into the fortress, whereupon Carlos de Espm1a, who was slightlJ
wounded, ordered a retreat, finding that forces equal to his own had
IlOW bC{;lI conccntrated against him I, His troops su/l~red l:ievcrel}'
in fightiug their way back into Badajoz-their loss was about 650
men; that of the French, whose front line had bccn vcr)' severely
handled, came to about 400. But the besieged (:ouId spare the
larger number belter Hmn the be;;iel:.~rs the smaller, since they
had the whole army of succour to draw upon, while Soult had no
reserves nearer than Seville. It is hard 00 sec why l\fendizaba~
if he was resolved upon a sortie, did not double the force engaged
in it, as he might easily have done without depleting any part of
I The J."'rench put into actiou six battalions of the 34th and 40th of
Phillipou's brigade [two ill trench-guards, four in reserves), and one
each of the 28th Uger, 64th, 88th, and l00th. 'nle total force of th~
was, according' to Belmas's figures, well over 6,000. Carlos de Espaih
hat! apparontly six lmualiolls of Ilis own, /lnd t\l'O fir tllrl..'6 more from
the otlll:r tlivisiollS, I'cr)' mueh the same force ill merc numhers. Bul
quality hUll also to iJc taken into cOllsideration. La Mure givcs !lIe
.Freuch loss as G officers aud 46 mell killed, 25 officers aud 337 men
lI'ounded.
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the enceinte. For, counting the garrison, he had 15,000 infantry_
o.lal'ger number lho.n lhe French could dispose of. To send ant
5,000 only sccms to have becn u half-mcusure, which ensured
ultimaw failure whcll thc besiegers should have drawn together 1.
The fighting of CurIos de Espaiia'll men was most crooituble, but
there were 1I0t enough of them.
On the next day but onc Mendizabal withdrew from Badajoz
the divisions of Carlos de Espmia and Virues, and part of that
of Garcia 2, leaving the original garrison strengthened by the
remainder of the last~named unit up to a force of 7,000 men.
The field army retired across the river, and encamped on the
strong position of the heights of San Cristobal, its right wing
resting on the fort, while the remainder of its camps lay along
the reverse slope of the range for a distnnce of a mile ami a half.
There were ::Iome 9,000 infantry 011 the position, and the 3,000
horse of DutrulI und Mtlddcll were encamped behind it in the
plain of the Caya. By some inconceivable folly Mcnuizabal
made no attempt to use tins It\rge force of cavalry, winch he should
have sent forward to seize and hold the valley of the Gebora, in
front of his position. All beyond that stream, which flows at the
very foot of the San Cristobal heights, was abandoned to Latour-
Maubourg. It seems certain that the French cavalry general
could have been driven to a respectful distance if a force of all
arms had been sent against him, for he had 011 the north of the
Glladiann only five regiments of horse and not a. single battalion
of infantry. Bnt the Spnniard allowed himself to be cooped lip
Oll the hill, and kept no guard of cavalry fur out in the pluin to
shield his front and report the motions of the enemy. 'Vhat
WlL!l worse, he made no attempt to entrench the long hillside,
though this was a point on whieh \Vellingtoll and La. llomana
had given very clear and definite instructions. The position was
strong, but as no care was taken to keep the enemy at a distance,
it was always possible that he might make a sudden dash at it,
and the Spanish army-scattered in its camps-would require
time to take up its ground and form its fighting-line.
I This remark, a very jllilt one, is made by Arteche ill his great History,
ix. p. 103.
I Valladolid, Osuna, Zafra, and La Serena now became part of the
garrison, with a. strength of about 2,000 bayonets.
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For some days tUter the sortie, however, Slu]t paid little
l\ttentiOll to Melldizabul, !\lId concentrated all his efforts agaiust
the fortress. Having completed the first parallel, and establi6hcd
~\'eml lIew battCl·ics ill it, he pl'oceL'<i.cd with his ope.ratiun.
against the Pwxlulcra.s fort. His pUll! wus vcry during-not 10
!lay hazardous-for 011 the afternoon of the 11th of .February,
when the work was much battered but still quite defem;iblc, ht
detennined to try to capture it by escalade. At dusk two column~
making about 500 men, issued from the trenches and dashed at
the Pardaleras: the left-hand column coasting round its f111l1k
made for the gorge, which was; only defended by SI. row ofp.·liiMdes.
'rhesc wcre so weak that they were broken down 01' hewn to pieres
by the assailunts without IJlllch di(Jjculty. At tlle sallle time tbe
right eolullln, which had CIlWl'LU the ditch, found an open postern
into which it made its way. Attacked on two sides, the garrison
evacuated the work, and fled into the city, leaving 60 men killed
or prisoners behind them. The French, who had lost onlJ
4 killed and 32 wounded in this reckless venture, established
themselves in the Pardaleras. Dut the govemor turned against
the forl all the guns of the next two bastions, find the CIlPto~
hud tu burrow and lie low, till on the night of the 12th-13tJl
0. trench was run out from the first parallel, which g~\\'e safe
ingress and egress. During the intervening day the besiegen
lost more men in holding the work than they bad in stonlliog
itl, and the Purdalel'as, close thongh it was to the walls, prond
to be ground from which it was most difficult to push forward
while the ani lIery fire of the town was llllSllbdlled. '1'0 transform
the open gorge in its renr inw a base for new approaches wru
a ~ow (UId expensive business, alld the siege mude II much lC>'!
rapid progre:;s than had bt..'Cll hoped.
Meanwhile Soult resolved to make a blow at Mendizabal and
his field army, which was visible day after day encamped on the
Sail Cristobal heights, in a position imposing but unforlified and
ill-watched. The Marshal had intended to cross the Guw:liuns
and deli ver his attuck even before the Pardaleras WlliS tl.lkCll, but
much mill was falling, and the river hlld overflowed its buuks,.IO
that access to the point where the French .Bying-bridge had lJccn
1 3 officel'S and 48 men killed and wouuded according to La Mare, S/iff
dtJ Blldujr)'z, p. 68.
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established, a mile above Badajoz, was difficult. Moreover the
Geoora was a180 in flood, and reported to be unfordable, though
usually a slender stream. The 0I11y thing which the Man,ha!
was able lo do between Lhe lUh and the 18th of FcbrunJ'Y \\'3.';
to shell the lICILrCr cud of the heights of Sun Cril;tobul from the
butteries in his right attack, with the objc<.:t of inducing the
Sp.'lllish battalions there encamped to move further from the
protection of the fort, which effectually co\'cred their right
Hank. On I'ebruary 13th this plan was seen to have been effectiye:
the Spaniards had withdrawn from the neighbourhood, and had
left half a mile lUlOCCUpied bL'twccn San Cristohal (1.1.\(1 their new
camp.
On the afternoon of the 18th it was reported to Soult that both
the ci vers had fallen, and that the Gebora had again become
fordable. He made 110 dela:y, and at dusk his striking. force began
to cross the Guadialla-the operation was slow, since only two
/lying-bridges and u. few river-boats were tl\'uilable. But ut daWII
nine butl:tl.liollS 1, three squadrollS, uud two batteries were 011 the
north bank, whilc Latour.Maubourg had come up from his
usual post at Montijo with six cavalry regiments more. The
whole force assembled in the angle between the Guadiana and
the Gebora amounted to no more than 4,500 infantry 2 and
2,500 horse, with twelve gUllS, a total so much below Mendi7.abal's
9,000 infantry and 3,000 rovalry that the adventure seemed most
hU7.urdous. But forttmc often favours the UUdllcioWi, and 011 this
day Smut chanced on the unexpected luck of a very fOo""SY
morning. He was practically able to surprise the enemy, for the
first warning that a battle was at hand only came to l\1clldi7.abal
when, shortly after dall'lI, his picket at the broken bridge of
the Gebora-a short mile or so in front of the heights-was
driven in by masses of French infantry. At the same moment
a tumult broke outon his left rear: the 2nd Hussars, scnt on by
Latour-Maubourg to di1;(:over und turn the Spanish northern
flank, had been able to mowlt the heights unseen and unopposed,
by making a long detour, and rode unexpectedly into the camp
I '11Jree battalions each of the 34th, 68th, and lOOth Line.
S Thirteen squadrons of the 4th, 14th, and 26th Dragoons, tlie 2nd and
10th Hussars, the 21st and 27th Cllasseurs, alld tlle Spanish liglit cavalry
regiment or Juramentados.
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of onc of CarlOI'; de &pana's regiments. l\Jcndizabal's troopa
flew to arms, Ilnd began hastily to Iorm their line upon tht
heights, but they had liD time to get into good order, 1'01' th!
enemy was upon them within a few minutes.
Marticr, to whom Soult had committed the conduct of lilt
battle, showed great tactical skill. On reaching the line of t~
Gebora, infantry and cavalry poured across it without a
moment's delay; all the three fords of which the I"rench knew
proved to be practicable, though on the sontherllffiost one, llelll
the bridge, the infantry had to CI"OSS with the chilly water up
to their waists. The order of battle was \'cry simple: the right
wing, composed of the whole of the cavalry, was to pass by tilt
most northern foro and ascend the hcight.~ beyond the Spanisl:
left. Arrived at the crest, onc brigade was to push along it
and fall on the flank of the hostile line, while the other descendlli
into the valley of the Cayn, and charged into the SpanisIJ
camps, so placing itself directly in Mendizabal's rear. Of l~
infantry three battalions (the lOOth regiment) were to ascend
the hillside in the gap between the fort of San Cristobal and
the nC£Lrcst Spanish camp, II gap which had bccn caused (as it
will be remembered) by the withdrawal of the Spaniards from
the southernmost heights under the stress of bombardment si1
days before. This <,'olumn was to risk the fire of the fort.
which it had to disregard, and fall on the hostile flank. MeaD'
while the centre-very weak and composed only of six battaliolll
of infantry (34th and 88th regiments)-was to attack the Spanilb
front, when the two tnrning lIlo\'ements were well developed.
The San Cristobal heights m'c II most formidable position, tll'~
miles of smooth steep slopes with an altitude of 9l50-300 reet.
overlooking the whole plain of the Gebol'il. and wiLh hardly all)'
'dead ground' in their sides. They forlll an excellent glacis fO!
an army in po,;ition ready to defend itself by it~ fire, for t!'~
IlSsailtmt must COllle up the hill at a slow pace and utterl!
exposed. Cavalry could only climb at a walk, and with diJIi·
culty; but Mortier had sent all his horse inl' to the north, whl'l't
they usccnded, und partly cl'OSs<:d, the tange at its lowest point
beyond the extreme flank of the enemy. Just at this momro;
the fog rose, a.nd cverythillg became \'isible. Du gaining the
heights unoppoged, Briche's light cavalry formed up acru;
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them, and commcnced to move along the summit towards the
Spanish left wing, while Latour·Maubourg, with three dragoon
regiments, desccnded the re\'erse slope and moved towards the
hostile camp, in front of which Butron's Spanish horse and
Madden's Portuguese could be seen hastily arraying their
squadrons.
It may be said that the battle of the Gebora was lost almost
before a shot had be<;n fired, for on seeing themselves threatened
in flank and about to be charged by Latour.Maubourg, the
Spanish and IJortuguese horse broke in the most disgraceful
style, disregarding the orders of their commanders, and went 0/1"
in a disorderly mass acl'os.<; the plain of thc Caya, towards Elv3S
and Campo Mayor. They outnumbered the enemy, and could
Mve saved thc day if they had fought even a bad and lUlsuccess-
fill action, so as"to detain the French dragoons fOl' SI. single hour.
But the cu.vmry of t.he Army of EsLremadura hud 11 bad reputll-
tion-they were the old squadrons of Medellin and Arzobispo,
of whieh \Vellington preserved weh an evil memory, 1\nd
Maddcn's Portuguese this day behaved no better 1. Theyescu.pcd
almost without loss, for L\tollr-Maubourg let them fly, und LUrJlcd
at OIJ(.."C llb""inst the flunk nnd rear of Mcndiwhu1'6 infantry.
The combat on the southern part of the heights hlld not yet
assumoo a desperate aspect. Though the column which was
formed by the lOOth regiment had got up the hillside under the
fort of San Cristobal, and had penetrated into the gap between
that work and its extreme left, the Spanish infantry was still
holding its own. The fog having deared, they were able to
estimate the smallness of the number of the hostile infantry,
and stood to fight without showing any signs of failing. Dllt
the fusiladc was only just beginning all along the hillside whcn
the victorious J'rench cavalry came into action. Briehe's light
horse camc galloping along thc crest of the heights, while
Latour-:Maubourg's dn'b"{lOI1S were visible in the plain behind,
well to the rear of the Spanish line. i\Iendii'.abal, horrified at
the sight, ordered his mcn to form squares, not as usual by
battalions, bllt vast divisional squares, each formed of many
regiments, and with artillcry in t.heir angles. If the French
Cll\'alry alone had bccn pre::;cnt, it is possible that in lids forma·
I See his pathetic letter in Wellington, Supplemelltnrg Disp., yii. p. 67.
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tion the Spaniards might have san~d themselves. But I\:[ortier',
infantry was also lip, and well engaged in bickering with Mendi.
zabnl's men. 111c squares, when formed with somc difficult}"
found themselves exposed to it heavy fire of musketry from the
front at the same Ilioment that the cavalry blow was deliYerffi
Oil their flank. llriche's husM.rs penetrated without much difli.
culty tlu'ough battalions already shaken by the volleys of t11f
French infantry. First the northern and soon afterwards the
southern square was ridden through from the flank and broken.
The disaslcr that followed was complete: some of the SpaniEh
regiments dispersed, mallY laid down tllCir UflllS in despair, a
limited number clubbed together in heav), masses and foughl
their way out of the press towards the plain of the Cayn and the
frontier of PortllgnJ. Geneml Virues and three brigadiers were
hlkclI prisoners, with at least half of the army. Mendizabal
and two other generals, La Cancra and Carlos de Espal1a, got
away, under cover of the battalions which forced their paSSllg11
through toward the west. In all about 2,500 infantry escapt'l1 into
Badajoz 1, and a somewhat smaller number towards l>ortugal~.
The rest were destroyed-only 800 or 900 had been killed or
wouuded, but full 4,000 were taken pri80llers, along with gel"en·
teen glills-the entire artillery of the army-and six standard.;,
Tile French loss, thongh under-estimated by Soult in his dispatch
at the ridiculous figure of SO killed and 140 wounded, was in
truth very slllull-not ·exceeding 403 ill all. It fell almost
entirely on the cavalry-who had done practically the whole t:1.
the work. The regimental returns show that only four officers
in the infantry were killed or wounded, to thirlccn in the 1lI0UIlted
arm. In proportion this battle was 1I10re dis!\Strous to the
vanquished and less costly to the victors than even l\1edellin or
I The statement that ouly a few men escaped ioto lladajoz is disprol'td
by the figures of the Burrender-rolls of March 11th, which show 1,lrd
mell of La Carrera's division, 554 of Virues's division, and !:I!)5 of battaliolll
of Garcia's division whic11 had llot been told off to tlle regular garriHlIl,~
l:lying tlowu their [mus.
t There escaped into Portugal, beside the t'owalry, thc greater part rJ
the regimellts l.a. Union from Garcia.'s divisioll, Rey llull j)riJlcesa frow
that of Virues, Vittoria from that of 1-'1 Carrera, and fragments of Zamol;l,
antllst of .Barceloua. The whole, reorganized into new battalions, mM!
a weak brigade of 1,800 mcn undcr Carlos de ESp.liia in April.
.,
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Ocai'ia. It is difficult to wTite with patience of the culpable
negligence! of Mcndimbal, in allowing himself to be surprised in
such It position, when he was amply provided with cavalry, or of
the conduct of the Spanish und l)ortugucse horse ill abandoning
their infantry without striking a single blow, when even a show
of resistance might at least have given their comrades time to
save themselves. For the battalions on the heights could have
escaped into Badajoz, or e\"en have retreated along the Guadiana
without desperate loss, if they bad been granted an hour's
respite: while if the .French cavalry could have been detained
till the infantry battle on the heights was decided, it is quite
clear that Mendi7,abal in his splendid fighting position, and with
double numbe.rs, could have held his own and driven oil' the
attack of the nille batWiolls of Mortier.
The Army of Estremudura having been practically destroyed,
-the demoralized remnant of 4,000 horse and foot which
escaped into Portugal counted for nothing,-Soult could at last
besiege Hadajoz from both sides of the river, and reckon on being.
undisturbed in his operations. He left three battalions,
a buttery, and fivc regiments of Montbrun's cavalry on the north
bank, to ill\"cst the forl of Sail Cdstobal, and returned, with
the rest of the force tlmt Imd won the battle, to his lines. There
was still much to be done, for the governor Menacho was re'so-
lute, and the garrison had been raised to over 8,000 men by the
influx of Meudizabal's fugitives. The siege was destined to last
three weeks longer, and might have been prolonged to a far
greater dllmtion if Menacho had not been killed on March 4;
as long as he livcd the defence was vigorous and hOlloul"Uble.
11lough Soult could conccntratc 1\11 his attcntion on the
approaches towards the curtain between the bastions of Santiago
and Sail Juan, they did not progress very rapidly. Menacho
brought up all the artillery that could be readily moved on the
threatened front, and continued to pound the ruins of the
})aroaleras and the trenches leading up to it. It \\"as only on
the night of the! 24th February that a battery was at lnst com-
pleted under the right flunk of the fort, ami another \lllder its
left, to keep down the fire of the defenders. Nor WtlS it till the
9l8th of the SHme month and the 1st of :Murch Umt the zig-zags
began to creep lonvt\l'rl fmlll the second punillcl to\\"l\l"ds the
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body of the place. On the 2nd of March the approaches reachEd
the demi-lune outside the bastion of San .Juan, and the french
L"Ould look down into the ditch, but the)' found the countcrscarp
in good order, and the palisades intact. On the Srd they corn·
menced mining, with the object of blowing in the counterscarp
and filling the ditch. But their work WlLS stopped by El. vigorom
sortie, the last which Menacho sent out. A small column of
Spaniards passed out of the left bastion, sei;.·.ed and demolishoo
the advanced trenches, and spiked the twelve guns which armoo
the two nearest batteries. The progl"eSS of the besiegers Ifas
checked for it day-but at a disastrous cost, for the governor
himself, while watching theeftect of the sortie from the ramparts,
was killed by a chance shot. I-lis place was taken by the senio:
brigadier in the place, Jose Imaz, it mun of desponding heart
and utterly lacking in energy. It was a thousand pities tha~
when the rout of the Gebora took place, neither La Carrera nor
Carlos de Espaiia had beell driven back into Dadajoz, for both
these officers were men of desperate resolution, who would ban
played out a losing game to the last moment with stubborn
courage. The French narratives note that from the moment of
Meuueho's death the defence slackened; it became purtly pussil'r,
and was no longer conducted with common skill. No more
sorties were made, and there seemed to be a lack of ingenuity in
the measures taken to resist the completion of the approaches!.
All that WillS done was to keep up a hot fire on the head of the
l?rench sap, and to replace one disabled gun by another upon
the walls.
all the 4th of March the be;iegcrs had lodged themsehts
solidly ill the dcmi-lune of the bastion of San Juan, and hIld
commenced on the very edge of the ditch a battery fOf six hea\1
guns (M-pouuders), which wefe to work upon the curtain between
San Juan and Santiago, the place selcctt...J. for the breaching,
I 'Depuis la mort du Gelll!ral Menacbo l'enllemi :wait epronl'e UD eertain
decouragemellt, dout l'clfet se faisait couuaitre par I'absellce de cette fGrtt
morale qui fait agir loo hommes et qui donne le mouvemeut et la \'igueur.
11 n'osa plus nons attaqner clans nos batteries, clans nos tranchees, afill dt
detrnire en CJuellJnes lllOIl\cn!.S I'lenvre d'ull jour. 1I11C profita pas DlI3
moyells de chic311e et des subtilitClI qne la necessitti et l'industrie foot
inventer.' La Mafe, p. OB.
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On the 5th the embrasures were CQmplctcd, on the 7th the guns
were got into position, on the 8th thc coullterscarp was blown
in by a mine, lInd the batter)' began to play upon the walls at
a distance of only sixty yards. Though the besieged kept np
a terrible fire upon it, and killed many gunners, its effect was
all that the French had desired. The ramparts began to
crumble, and on the morning of the 10th there was a breach
sevcnty feet wide ill the curtain, llClLr the bastion of Salltil\,"O,
while the ditch was half filled with debris. The engineers pm-
llounced that an assault WOJj practicable, though another lluy's
fire would be desirable to finish the business. The Spanish guns
on the front attacked were all silenced, but from the flanking
bastions a fire was still kept up, which would obviously be vcr),
murderous to the storming columns. It was clear that it wonld
be better to subdue it, and to batter the breach into an el\Sier
slope, before the assault should be delivered.
Soult, howe\'er, was. lIllxious la prCSli matters, fOl' he had
re<:eivcd 011 the 8th two pieces of lIews which completely chung(..J.
the :;tmtcgical situatioll. The first WiIs that Ma&;cna had given
orders for the emcuatioll of SUlltarem and his other positions
on the Tagus five days before, and hud already commenced his
retreat towards the north. There was no longer any chanee of
joining the Army of Portugal and attacking Wellington. Indeed,
it was probable that the English general would find himself free
to make a large detachment against the be~iegers of Badajoz,
and that, if the town should not fnll within the ncxt ten days,
Bcrcsford's 15,000 lllell from the south bank of the Tag-us would
appear at Elvas or Campo Mayor, ready to attack the ~icge-lines
in the rear. And Soult from his c.xperiences of 1809 .....as quite
aware that to meet an Anglo·Portuguese army would not be
a business like that of the GeOOra.
But this was not all, News of the most disquieting kind had
just arri\'e<1 from Andalusia, Victor reported fmlll in front of
Cadiz that a large expeditionary force, comprising an English
division, had landed o.t Algesirns and Tarifa on February 25th-
26lh, bad moved into the inlaud, aud was evidellH>' about to attack
his siege-lines from the rear. He expressed grave doubts as to
the situation. Daricau, the Go\'crnor of Seville, had eyen a
worse report to IIlake: the ro\,jng di\,jsioll of Ballastcros, which
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had been driven into Portugal by Ga7.an 011 January ~5th, had
recrossed the Spanish frontier the moment that it<! pursuers had
retired, had invaded the Condado de Niebla., and had inflicted
a severe defeat Oil Remond, whose small eorps had been left to
cover that region, on the Rio Tinto (March 2nd). Daricau
reported that the Spaniards were marching on Seville, and that,
after leaving a skeleton garrison of convalescent<! and Jllra·
11IentudOJ in the city, he was moving out with a field force of
no more than 1,600 bayonets to rally 1l.emond's men,and fight at
San Lucar la Mayor for the proLect.ion of the capital of AndalllsilL
Ballusteros wus belic\'cd to havc a cOllsidcruble force, ami the
result was doubtful.
On the moming of the 10th of March, therefore, Soult was in
no small distress concerning the fate of Darican and Victor, "'Me
lwot dispatches were now six or seven days old, and who might
have suffered disasters, for all that he knew, since those dis·
patches were written. If modern methods of communicntion hAd
existed in 1811, he would have known already that Victor had
suffered a complete and bloody defeat at Barrosa on March 5th.
He was therefore prepared to take great risks at Badajoz, iD
order to have hif> army free at any cost for the succour of
Andulusia. Morticr was ordered to get ull reudy for a storm
during the (,,'ourse of the afternoon, but meanwhile, when a few
hours' battering after dawn hud somewhat improved the slope of
the breach, a pa?·lementah·e WlIS sent into Dadajoz at 9 8.m. to
summon IlIlnz to capitulate. The letter which he bore \\/15
couched in such c1ttboratc terms of politeness, complilllcntillg
the Spaniards all their long and gallant resistance, and intimating
that the most honourable terms would be granted, that the
governor should have i:luSI~ted that Soult WI\S 1I0t sure of his
ground. But to It man cowed in spirit and weighed down by
a responsibility too great fOI· him, such hints were useless. llUaz
summoned a council of war, the regillar refuge of' weak COOl'
mandefliJ uud called into it a veritable crowd of (:ouncillors, not
only the three generals and four brigadiers present in the city,
the chief engineer, and two artillery officers, but nearly a score
of lientenant-colollcls and majors commAnding all the battalion..
reprcscnted in the garrison. Unfortunately the ellbrilleer colone~
.'Julian Alvo, who led oft' the discussion, was the most downhcartetl
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man of all: he reported that the breach was from thirty to
thirty-two ells (varaa) broad, and accessible, as it had an angle
of forty-five to fifty degrees i that there had been great difficulty
in throwing up retrenchments and inner defences behind it,
bemllse at this point the ground-level of the streets of thc town
was much lower than that of the ramparts. He pointed out
that to garrison the whole enceinte with a minimum force would
absorb 5,000 men, which would leave only 2,000 to defend
the breach. 'As to the number and morale of the troops, the
regimcntal officers would be able to speak with Letter kuowledge
than himself.' But he held that if the first assault were repulsed,
the fall of the town would only be delayed two or three days.
If there were evidence that thc plucc might be relieved from
outside within that timc, it was proper to resist to tJlC last. If
not, be thought that the heroic garrison and the cify ought not
to be sacrificed. For they had fully done their duty, and Badajo7.
as n fortress was full of defects 1.
Twclve colonels und majors gnve theit· opinions in almost the
same terms as the engineer, many repeating his actuul phrases,
some adding that the rank and file were demoralized 2, others
that they were few in number [they actually were only 1,800
less than the infantry of the besieging force]. On the other
hand, the commanding artillery orriccr, Joaquin Caamano, set
forth a ....ery differcnt case. 'The enemy has not yet subdued
the fire of the place; the bastions flanking the breach are
intact, And have their guns in order; the breach itself has been
mined, and a parapet behind it has been thrown up during the
last night; in spite of the arguments of the commander of the
engineers the assault ought to be resisted, or as an alternati ....e
the garrison ought to try to cut its way out by the north bank,
towards Elvll.8 or Campo Mayor.' Canmano was supported by
the vote ofanother artilleryman, the Portuguese Joiio de Meno,
comlllandiug a company whieh Bcresford had ~Cllt into the city
1 l~or all these interesting details see the verbatim report or the
Council or War in the Appendix to Artec1le, vii. pp. 644-7.
2 'Hallarse la guarnicion en ulLa total decadeneia' (opinioll of Col.
Ponce de Leon of 1st Barcelona). The garrison'!lo es de la primera
classe en general' (opinion of Col. Zamora of tIle Zafra regiment). 'El
wldado, eansado l·a de la mnclm fatiga, tratarla de s."l.lvane' (opinion of
Col. I-Iernandell of the i\lajon::a regiment).
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in the preceding year 1, and tll'O major-generals, Garcia and
l\{ancio.
Then came the oddest part of the proceedings. The GO\'ernor
gave as his opinion that' though all ioner line of defencc has
not been contrived, and though very few guns still remain
serviceable in the bastions of Santiago, San Jose, and San Juan,
and though we have no Succour for sustaining the assault, I
think we should defend the place with valour and constancy to
our last breath.' After which he at once (:ommenced negotia-
tions with the French park'l/lcnlairc, iu direct c.:olltradiction to
his own vote! Apparently he thought that thirteen votes for
surrender against four for resistance among his cOUllci Hors
covered his ignominy. The worst purt of his conduct was that
he was aware that an army of succour was on the march to help
him. 1"01' Badajm: had semaphore communication with ElvllS,
and on the preceding day the Portuguese General Leite had
telegraphed to him, b)' Wellington's orders, that Beresford had
been detached with two divisions to hasten to his aid on
March 8th 2. Ai; a matter of fact, lleresford's movement into
I See Soriano da Luz, Hi. 337-8.
a D'Urb.,I\ (lleresford's c11ief of t110 St.1ff) has in 11is diary under
i\larch 8th; 'At 3 o'clock the Marshal crossed the river (J'aglts) at Torres
Novas and had an interview with Lord Wellingtou. The immediate relief
of Badajoz, whose danger becomes imminent, has heen judged desirable,
this to be done with the 2nd and 4th Dil'isions. The Marshal returned
at 8. Orders seut to PUllllete to throw tho hridge of boats over thll
Tagus at Tllncos for the re-passage of General Stewart (2nd Division) and
the passnge of General Cole (4th Division). 'loe troolls still on the south
bank of the TagllS are thrown into march npon Portalegre [near Elvas).
Orders to Mr. Ogilvie, the commissary, to take measures for supplies
southward. General Monacho's last sail)', in which he is unfortunately
killed,lmB probubly 8<l.Vcd the place by gaining of time, even if but for
a few additional days.' On the evening of the !lth March tlle movement
was stopped, on a false rumonr that Ma3S~ua was offering battle near
Thomar, but news of it had been sent to General Leite at Elvas, who passed
it by semaphore from Fort La Lippe to San Cristobal, which safoly received
it. It was not till tlle 12th tllat tho 2nd Division was ordered to Crato ill
the Alemtejo, and lleresford reached Porta1cgre 0111)' on the 20th, nine
days after Budajol': fell. Wellillgtoll says (Di8patclWIf, vii. 360-1) 'the
Governor surrendered on the day after.he received my assurances that he
should be relieved, and my entreaty to hold out till the last moment.'
Cf. ibid., 367.
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Estremadurtl. was retarded, and his corps did 1I0t move ofl'
for some dt\ys later, but Imaz did lIot know this, and he was
certainly guilty of concealing from his officers that prompt
succour had been promised, and was actually upon its way.
'fhe whole responsibility for the surrender falls on him, because
he allowed Alvo, and the other voters for capitulation, to pl'odnce
Ilncontrndicted the smtemcnt that no relief was probable. while
he knew himself that it had been promised. It is impossible
to deny that this was pusillanimity reaching into and over the
border of treason.
After making some foolish hagglings for eighteenth-century
ceremonial of' honour-the garrison was to march out by the
breach, drums beating, with two cannons at its head, with
lighted matches, &c.-Imaz surrendered at 3 o'clock in the after-
noon, and the lofty San Cristobal and the bridge-head fort were
occupied by the li'rench before dusk. Next day the troops came
forth, not by the breach, because it was fonnel impossible to
scramble down it, but by the Trinidndgnte, amllniJ down their
arms 1. They numbered 7,880 men, and there were 1,100 sick
and wounded in the hospitals; the total loss in the town during
the siege had been 1,851 casualties, almost the same as that of
the French, which came to jusl; under 2,000. Dut the 800 killed
and wounded, and 4,000 prisoners of the Gebom lUusl;, of course,
Le added to the balam:e.
. Badajoz was found by the victors to contain rations for
8,000 men sufficient to last for over a month, more than 150
serviceable cannon, 80,000 lb. of powder, 300,000 infantry car-
tridg~s, and two bridge <.'<)uipages. There is not the slightest
doubt that if Menaeho had lived the place would have held out
till it was relieved by lleresford. For the latter, who was finally
ordered to move to its relief on March l~th, wOllld have reached
its neighbom'hood on the 18th, if he had nol; been checked on
thc first day of his start by the news that the city had fallen 2.
1 Arteche (ix. 229) says tlmt they used the breach, but La. i\larc,an eye-
witness, says that the Triuidad gate was the point of e....:it. Soriano da LUll,
using some Portuguese source unknown to me, says tlll,t only some Spo.'Inish
8al'lJeTl:! came down the bre.1ch slol}C, aud tl,e}' with difficulty.
, This WII3 kllown to "\\TcllillgWn IUld Beresford 011 the 14th, or the
uight of tile 13th, llS is shown by·Welliugtou, lJi8pa/fJhu, vii. p. 359.
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After the need for hurry had been removed by this disheartening
intelligence, he moved slowly, but was in front of Campo ~fayor,
less lllall ten llIile~ from BaJajoz, on the 24th,
There is hardly ever all excuse for a govel'nor who surrenders
without haviJlg withstood at lea-st one assault, and Napoleon laid
down the general nl1e that allY officer so doing should be sent
before a court martial, Il1IUZ with his large garrison, his immense
artillery resources, and his certainty of being relieved in ten days
was least of all men in a condition to plead jllsti/lcatioll. It is
only nc<:cssary to compare him with Alvul'cz at Gerona, who
with a smaller garrison and a far weaker fortress held out for
three months, after not onc but three large breaches had been
made in his weak mediaeval enceinte. The n~ctellcy "ery pro~
pcrly ordered Imaz to be put 011 his trial, but the proceedings,
which only commenced when the :French liberated him, dragged
on interminably, and had not come to an end when the war
ceased ill 1814. If cvcr there was a case where un example in
the style of Admiral Byllg, pour l:71courager ks ulttres, could
ha"c been rightfully made, this was onc.
Sonlt, relieved from desperate anxiet)' by !maz's surrender,
had no othcr thought than to l'cturu as quickly as possible to
Andalusia, Leaving Mortier at Badajoz with sixteen battalions
and fi\'e regiments of cavalry, about 11,000 men, he started back
for Seville on the thil'd day ai'tcr the capitulation, taking with
him two regiments of dragoons and the bulk of Gazan's division 1.
As he marched hc was in fear that any hour might bring the
news that Daricau had lost Seville, or that Victor had been
fo1'(:OO to abandon the siege of Cndiz, fOl" the report of the
bloody defeat of Barrosa (March 5) had reached him on the
Uth of March, and heightened his anxiety. But he reached
Seville on March 20th, to find that thc situation might yet be
saved, and that Andalusia Wll.'l still his own.
His achievements during the two months of his Estremadm'all
campaign had indeed been splendid. W"ith an arlllY not exceed-
ing flO,OOO men, and operating in the WOrst of weathcr, he had
taken two fortresses, won a battle in the open field, and cap-
1 Less two battalions left in Bad,~oz as garrison, and tlle l00th of the
Lin8 also left with l\Jortier.
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tured 16,000 prisoners. The Spanish Army of Estremadura,
which had seemed so powerful at the commencement of his cam-
paign, was almost extm·minated, and the frontier of Portugal Wil!;
laid open. Soult had redeemed his promise to llIake 11. power-
ful diversion in favour of :Masscna, IUHl it is hard to liCe how he
could have done more. For he could not have moved to the
Tagus before Badajoz fell, and (thanks to the courage of
:Mcnacho) that city had held out till eight days after the date
Oil which l\fassena ordcred the Army of Portugal to L'OlllmClICC
il:ii rctreat to the north. Wellington's plan of starvation had,
after all, achieved its effect, and Massena had been driven out of
his position before SouJt was ill a position t!J come to his aid.
Even if Massena had stayed n little longer at Sflntarem, it
seems hard to belicve that Soult could have joined him, COll~
sidering that Elvas. a place stronger than &dujoz, was in hi:;
front, illId that the news from Andalusia spelt utter ruin
unless he should return to save it. He must have done so,
even jf on Mm·ch 11 the Army of Portugal had still been in
its old position.
SECTION :XXIII: CHAPTER III
MASSENA'S LAST WEEKS AT SANTAllEl\1
JANUARY-MARCH 1811
AFTRR the nrriml of DrOllct and his division of the 9th Corps
at Leiria in the early days of the New Year, there was no serious
movement of any part of the I''rcnch or the British armies for
SOllle weeks. The weather was bad, and the troops on both sides
remained in their cantonments, save such of the French as were
detailed for the perpetual marauding parties up the line of the
ZCZCI"C or in the southern slopes of the Sera-a do. Estl'clln by which
alone the army was kept alive. The ranks of l\{usscuu's battalions
continued to grow thinnCI', but not at such a rate as in November
and December-tor the weakly men had nlrclldy been weeded
out by the drcudfullllortality of the preceding period. }:>rovisiollS
had daily to be sought further and further afield, but they were
not wholly exhausted. The Marshal waited anxiously for further
ncws from Paris, and for tidings that thc Army of Andalusia was
coming to his aid. But after thc arrival of Drouet's column uo
further information got through for fhe weeks, for Wilson and
Trant were blocking the northern roads with their militia aseffec-
tunUy us in the time before the 9th Corps stllrtoo from Almeida.
Wellington, for his part, was waiting for his great scheme uf
starvation to work out to its logical end. He had, as has already
been observed, somewhat underrated the time fOL' which the
French would be able to live on the resources of the eountr)' that
he dominated. More than once in December and January he
thought that he had detected the signs of a coming retreat, and
had been disappointed 1. 'l1le ellClUY still remained in his old
• I I find in D'Urban's diary under January 13: (Concurring testimony
of deeerters, &c., announces some general movement on the part of the
enemy. Lord 'V. inclillllS to im.'lgino that this will he a retre.'Lt, ami that
the retre:.lt will he by tile Mondego; to tllis IJC is inc1illCol by Clapart!de
being ordered to take post at Guarda. But I hlWC my doubts if anything
like retreat has yet entered the head of MassE!na.' This is borne out by
Wellington to Beresford of same day. (Di8JXJtchu, vii. 138.)
1811] WELLINGTON AND THE PERCEVAL MI~ISTRY 65
cantonments, and nothing more than petty movements of l:imall
units had taken place. This anxiolls waiting WM, us might
have been expected, trying to 'Vcllington's tcmper. He was not
shakcn in his belief that bc had made the right decision, but it
was exasperating to see the deadlock on the Tagns continuing
far beyond his expectations, and the Estremaduran campaign
developing behind his back. During the long weeks of tension
thc drain on his mind vented itself in criticism, reasonable and
unreasonable, of the authoritics with whom he had to work-
the British and Portuguese Govel'llmcnts.
The administration of Spencer l'erceval had done its best to
maintain the war and to support its genet'lI,l, under great diffi·
culties. It had not shrunk from Illaking financial exertions of
the most unprecedented kind in order to keep up the war ill
Portugal. As Lord Liverpool pointed out to 'Vellington \ the
army in the .Peninsula had cost £!!,778,796 in 1808, £2,639,764
ill 1809; in 1810 the sum asked for had risen to £6,061,235-
morc than double the total of either of the preceding years.
And this did not include either ordnancc stores, supplies sent out
in kind, or the hire of transports, which were calculated to make
out £fl,OOO,OOO more. The Government had provided these
sums in face of a bitter and carping opposition on the part of
thc 'Whigs, and despite of lllucl) lukclVarlllllcss among thcir own
followers, of whom many considered that the limit of reasonable
expense had been reached. As Lord Liverpool obsened, the
increase of the Portuguese subsidy, and the taking into British
pay of the larger half of the Portuguese army, had been 'carried
by a small and unwilling majority 2.' The Government had
driven the money bills through the House of Commons only by
smart cracking of the whip of party loyalty. They had pro-
mised Wellington that his army should be increased by 14,000
men durblg the course of the winter, nnd the promise was in the
course of fulfilment. Many regiments had ah-cady arrived; all
were to reach the Tagus before March was out. This had been
done in a time of dire distress to the Tory party. George III
had been prostrated by his last attack of insanity, which was
destined to be permanen~ in October 1810. As it became
I Lord Liverpool to Wellingtoll, .February 20, 1811.
~ Lord Liverpool to Wellingtoil, September 20, lino.
OMA:t. 1'" F
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certain that his recovery W{l.'I not to be looked for, the appoint_
ment of the Prince of Wales as Regent was the obvious and
necessary corollary. But the Prince was still reckoned a Whig,
and it W/lS believed with reason that his first net on coming into
power would be to dismiss the Perceval Ministry, and to call
upon Grey, Grenville, and Sheridan to form an administration.
The Tories all through the winter thought that they were
destined to immediate expulsion from office, and hud before
them a long strife with the Crowl1. It was only at the beginning
ofFebrllary1811 that the youngerGeorge, who had taken the oath
as Regent on the 6th of that month, announced, to the general
surprise of the nation, that he had no iutention of dismissing
the Ministry, and was prepared to work with them. p,ereeval
and Liverpool, during the three preceding month>:;, were doing
their best for the army ill Portugal while they belicved that a
political disastel' was hanging over their heads, They did not
yet realize that the Prince's Whig principles had worn thin of
late, and that he was tired of t11e dictatorial manners which
Grey and Greuville had adopted towards him.
It is terrible to contemplate thc results which might have
followed had the Whigs come into office at this juncture, They
were pledged to the theory that the Pcninsular War was hopeless
and ought to be abandoncd, Grey and Grenvillc had stah.'d that
Wellington was a failure; they had dcnied that 'l'alavera was a
victory. llrougham had summarized the feelings of the part}'
in n savage [lttac!.: upon both Govel'llment and gcneml in the
Edinburgh Review. At this very moment-February 1811-
Ponsonby, the leader of the opposition in the House of Com-
mOlls, was preaching that' Frallce cannot be prevented from
overnmning Spain by continuing a war ill Portugal, ... so
that neither in Spain or Portugal has anything happened that
can give reason to believe that the war will ever tenninate to our
advantage 1.' Freemantle, another leadel~, maintained that
'Bonaparte, having conquered the rest of the Continent, must
also conquer the lleninsulu, because he has greater numbers to
bring up after every defeat, and therefore defeat of one of his
armies was vain 2.' Every Whig journal was prophesyiJlg the
I Jbusard for 1811, \'01. xi:\;, 397. t l'!umer Ward's Dim'!!, i. 406,
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llXpulsioll of Wellington from Portugal within a few weeks,
as indeed they had been doing ever sincc OctolX!l' 1809.
All honour, therefore, is due to the statesmen who continued
in the midst of all their own troubles, constitutional and finan-
cial, to give a steady support to Wellington, and to redeem the
pledges which they had made to him. When Napier in his
grea.t histor)' declares thnt the Ministry betrnyed Wellington,
that' Pcrccvnl had neither the wisdom to support nor the man-
liness to put an end to the war in the Peninsula; his crooked
contemptible policy was shown by withholding what was necessary
to continue the contest and throwing upon the General the
reilpOllsibility offnilure,' he is merely venting the malignant folly
of the Whigs of his day, which ought to have been forgotten
by the time that he took his pen in hand, long after the war was
over,
It is unfortunately true that Wellington, in the stress of wait·
ing hours during the winter of 1810-11, used quenllolls and
ClLptious language concerning his supporters at home, The
main point of his complaint was that he was not supplied rapidly
enough with specie, that bills were sent him when he wanted
dollars or guineas, and that 80 the pay of the army was falling
into arrears. The fact was deplorable; but on a consideration of
the condition of the English monetary system at this dnte it is
hw'l1 to sce how the difficulty could have been avoided. Since
the suspension of the coinage of guineas in 1797, and the intro-
duction of an almost unlimited issue of bank-notes, gold had
gradually become an almost invisible commodity in Great
Britain 1. The guinea, when seen, commanded an ever-increasing
premium; by 1809 it was worth £1 5a" or more, in paper.
British silver was equally deficicnt; there had been none (.'Oined
at the Mint since 1787, alld the internal trade of the country was
being transacted with difficulty, by means of Spanish dollars or
half·dollars stamped with the king's head, or by local tokens
struck by banks and corporations, which only served in the
immediate neighbourhood of their place of issue 2. The Bunk of
I Note that l'ercel'1I1 and Liverpool inherited the paper currency of PiU,
lInd were not reaponsihle for its creation.
~ For some curioU!l anecdotes as to the dearth of silver change see Lord'
Folkestone's speech quoted ill Yonge's Life of L()rd Liloerpool, i. 368.
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England dollur, the only coin which circulated gCllcl·ally. passed
for 5s., though it had only the value of 48, td. in its weight of
kilver. ""hen Great nritain could find no specie for its own
internal business, the Government wns required to send enormous
remittances in cash tu the Peninsula, bt.'C8,use nll traJlSl;l,.l.1ions
therein were made in silver 01' gold, and English paper wa~
not negotiable 1. That the coin was sent at all seems marvellous,
rather than that it \\'o.s sent late and in immfficicnt quantities,
The worst time of all was in the earl)' spring of 1811, when
there was a se\'ere commercial crisis at home, and the Govern-
ment was issuing exchequer bills, to the amount of .£6,000,000,
as nn advance to merchants and manufaetlu-Cts to stave off
general bankruptcy in London 2.
It was certainly an unhappy thing that Wellington could look
upon the whole situation as one in which •the GoVel1.1nlClll
chooses la undertake large services, and not to supply us witli
sufficient pecuniary means 3,' and could write that the presenf
ministers complained so much of the expense of the war, that he
considered it not impossible that the army might be recalled
bag and baggage-a remark made not in February but ill March,
when Massellft had actually retreated from the Tagus·, This
rather unjustifiable com}llaint was probably the dire.ct result of
Lord Liverpool's lettel' of Febl'ull.fY 20, in which he had set forth
at length the enormous burden of the war, and c.....pressed his
doubts as to whether the augmentation of the :Peninsular army
by 14,000 men, for which he had just provided, could be perma·
nently kept up v. He suggested that when the' present crisis'
I 'Howcan you expect that we ean buy specie here [London] with the
exchange 30 per cent. against us, and guineas selling at 26 sllilliugs?'
Huskisson to Wellington (private), 10tll July, 1BOO. Welliug/ml NSS., see
Mr. Fortescue's Hri/ifh Slu/ennen of/he Gua/ Wm', 11. 254.
~ For notes on this~ Walpole's Life of l J&l"Ctf](ll, ii, pp. 207-8.
~ To Charles Stuart, mk/Xltches, vii. p, 462•
• To Admiral Berkeley, Dispatchu, vii. p.416,
& 'TIle recent augmentation of rour foree must be considered as made
witll reference to the present exigency.• , . 'Ye are very anxious, oot
with a view of d13lldoniug, bl!t for HIe !HU1KlSC of mainuliuillg tile contest
in the Peninsula for an indefinite time, tllat when the present crisis shall
appear to be over, you should sellll home the cxcess of )'our forcc, after
keeping 30,000 effective rank and file for j'ortugal, and a sufficicnt
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(i. e. Masseua's pl'esence at the gates of Lisbon) had come to all
cud, the army should send home some of its less effecth·e regi-
ments, and that the ideal of SO,OOO effective rank and file (not
including the garrison of Cadiz) would probably have to be kept
in miud. But long before the dispatch of February ~O
Wellington thought that he had detected an intention all
Liverpool's part to bring the whole Peninsular ""Var to nil end,
011 financial grounds, and wrote moot bitterly to his kinsman
Pole, accusing the Secretary of State of being half-hearted, and
showing a deep-rooted distrust of his influence in the Cabinet '.
All this was forgotten when the firmness of the Ministry in
support of the war bccameevident, and in later years Wellington
wrote to acknowledge in the most handsome style the support
that he had received from the Perceval administration 2.
Daring all these weeks of waiting 'Vellington was also
Lroubled by problems with regard to the internal state ofPortugal.
Two main sources of worry can be tra<''ed in his correspondence.
The first was the inefficiency of the Portuguese commissariat,
which bid fair to cause absolute starvation among those brigades
of the national army which were not incorporated with British
divisiuns und supplied. from the British glores. Slow and irregular
garrison for Cadi.,;, selecting of course those regiments to be scnt home
which arc least efficient, 1111« conscrlucntly Icast fitl.ct1 for activc service.'
I Mr, Fortcseuc writes: 'This was unfair, Pcrccval l\lld Liverpool
had deliberately turned Ulcir backs IlpolL Pitt's old poliey of spasmodic
efforts all ol'er the world, in favour of a steady and persistent feeding of
the Ivar in onequarter-thePeuinsuln, Wellington)limself had approved
the change in his letten of 1810, had named the amowlt of mOlley that
he wanted, and fixed the figure of the reinforcements that he asked. But
ill 1811 he never ceased to ask for mOl'e mell and more money, till Liver-
pool was obliged to remind bim vefY genUr, that he was going far beyond
his own estimates.' lie had got to the stage of writing that GOl'ernment
h-wing embarked on the contest, and cbosen the best officeL' they could
find, mllst gin... him the largest army they couM collect, and reinforce it to
the utmost, without asking llreciscly how mally mOll were want.ed, all,1
for wllat precise objects. It Wa.!! Mr. Fortescue who illtlic,1ted to me two
itllportLlIt passages auout l ...iverIKtOlwhic!l arc omitted from the printed
\'en;iOll onVollington'sletwrs to 1'010 of Jalluary 11 and March 31, 1811,
ill SupplemCTdar!J DillpatcM8, vii, 1'11, 40-3 aud 93.
~ !:iec especially \Velling1(lu to Dudloy Perceval (the premier's sou),
June 6th, 1835, a protest IlglI,inst Napicr's wild misrepresentations.
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forwarding of provisions to the corps statioued in advanced or
remote positions led to a dreadful increase in the llllmberol'sick.
"re find Wellington complaining that regiments which had
l,S!OO men ill line at Bussa.oo eould only show 1,000 or 900 under
arms in l.<~ebrLlary, although they had received considerable drafts
from their depOts at mid-winter. D'Udmu's daily notes bear
out the statements of the Commander-in-Chicf. Hc u..sscrts with
indignation that by •the "many of <:ommissaries,' the same
quantity of flour which provided 15i rations for the British
soldier was returned us having given only 9 to the Portllgnese-
the bnluuec having been embezzled. Allowances, of <:oun;e, must
be made for the difficulties of a government of whose territory
a good third ,had been depopulated by the orders of Wellington,
llullhe.lrouble does 1I0t sccm to have been w much lhe llcluo.l
want of food~stuff's at head quarters l_great qualltitie~ were &'Ot
from the Alemtejo and the north-as the inefficiency ofdistrihll~
HOll, which left outlying brigades sometimes foodless for two or
three days at a time. Clothing and shoes were also very slow ill
arriving at the front. At the bottom the caUi!e of all this
inefficiency was probably (as Wellington obi!ervel in one letter2)
the want of money to keep up all adequate trallsport scrvi~ and
it might be pleaded that in the distressful condition of the
country the deficit was no fault of the government, but unavoid·
able. Wellington's view was that with greater economy in civil
cxpenses, lUld morc careful supervision of comllli~sariesund con-
tractors, there was mOlley enough to pay for allnc(."CSsary military
objects. He was probably right, but thel"C is small wonder if
u provisional go\'crnment like the Regency found it hard to
introduce administrative reforms in the midst of a crisis, and with
the enemy almost at the gates of the capital. After all, the
effort which J'ortugal had made was splendid, und the whole
nation had nccepk-d thc uwfulllct:cssity of the depopulation of its
central provinces with a loyalty that was surprising, if we COIl-
sider the magnitude of the sacrifice,
There was, however, t\. ~mall minority of traitors sLill lcft ill
1 See Wellington to Deresford from Cartaxo,lo'elJruary 12. (Dkpalcha,
vii. 263.)
I Ibid, 'TllC cause of the state of deficicncy is the 01« want of mOllo)'
to par for cat'rill.ge,'
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Portugal, and their intrigues seem to have given 'Wellington
much conceMl, not because there was any danger from their
personal action, but because they conveyed to Mll,sscna the
intelligence W:I to the condition of affairs in Lisbon. and in
Europe at large, which he could not obtain in any other way.
owing to the strict blockade kept up around his rear. On the
blOt day of the old year four ofticen;, two colonels and two
majofli, had fk..J. out of Lisbon and joined the French I, They
were all men who hOO quarrelled with Bcresford, and deserted
ill re\'enge: but that four field officers could turn traitors at ollce
\I'as a most distressing sign. \l\Tellillgton had fears of a general
plot llbraillst the English, alld was inclined to !lnsped the Bishop
of Oporta and President Sousa of knowing more about it than
befitted members of the negeney. He was apparently mistaken,
thongh their petuhmcc and intermitlent protest.'! against all his
ucliollS SL'CUlCd lo him to ju:stify IlllY doubts. But minor persons
ill Lisbon, old fri,ends of Alorna and his }~r!mcophil policy, had
contrived to open up communication with the renegade
General Pamplona., and to send him newspapers, reports of the
llIm·ement of troops, and other mis<.-ellaneous information, using
us tlu:ir inLcrmediaries slllugglers, who passed the lines at night
to sell coffee, sugar, and other luxuries to the French 2. For
there was a ready market for such things in the army of :\:Iassena.
Fortunately this illicit correspondence was of little importance,
since there was 110 solid part)' in Portugal in fEl\"our of Napoleoll,
u..lld the information cOllveyed by newspapers as to aflrurs ill
Lisbon was not, at this time, at al1 elleouraging to the Frelleh;
while that as to events in England or remote parts of Spain was
too old in date to be of any groot profit to them.
Meanwhile Wellington regarded his position us secure for
lhe moment. The Army of Portugal, even ufter Drouet's
urrival, was too weak to attack him. Soult's movement
from Andalusia at first caused him some uneasiness, for he
I Their names, San i\Ii~el, LouIe, Candido Xavier, ami Jlfanuel ,le
Ca&tro, are given by .'ririOll (i\f~Il[l'e aide-de-camp) in his diary. Major
Leslie Lells me that 110 canllot identify tl,em in tl,o Porluguese army-liet
of IH10, and thillks that two of them at least were only Orilenall<;a officers.
~ For details as to all thh~ sco \Vcllington to Charles St'l3l't, Fehruary 10.
(Dispatche8, vii. 237-8.)
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had conceived a notion that the expedition from Andalusia,
leaving Badnjoz and Elvas on its left, and ignoring the Spani;;h
AI"I11Y of Estremooum, might be intending to march by Merida
and Truxillo to .Almaraz, and from thcllce to join Mnsscna by
the circuitous route through Coria and Cnst-e1Io Branco 1. He
was reassured as to this possibility when the news came that
Solllt, linable to undertake anything bold so long as Gazan had
not joined him, had sut down to hcsiege Oli vcnZll on J anunry 1] th.
If the Marshal intended to take all the Estremadurall fortresses
before moving on, occupation could he found for him for many
a week, and when La Romllna's two di visions had been sent to
join MClldimhal on JtlllUllry fZ2, W cUington imagiJl(xl tlmt he
might regard the situation 011 this side as secure. It will be
remembcl"Cd that he gave Mendizabal elaborate advice as to
the collrse that he was to pursue, and he wasjustitied in believing
that if that advice was followed Badajoz lVould never fall, and
Soult for the moment would be<:ome an almost negligible
quantity.
There was always the chance, however, that Soult might turn
against the Alcllltcjo after all, and tlmt Masscua might make a
desperate effort to eross the Tagus and join him. Hence
Wellillgton spent much thought in devising means to pre\'cllt
this danger from coming into being. Bercsford received elaborate
ordcrs as to thc conduct that he was to pursue, with his corps
SQuth of the Tagus, in ease :MassClla attempted a passage, or
Soult appeared before Elvas. In the latter case the :Frencll
would be fought by an army composed of Mendizahal's Estre-
madurulls, Beresford'i! corps, and the hrigadc of Portuguese line
u'Oops in Elvas, a mass of over 30,000 men. This force ought
to sufficc, but if the worst came, and a defeat were sufH~recl, the
army south of the Tagus would try to defend first the passages
1 This fear is expressoo in a letter to Charles Stllart dated January Hi
(lMpubj/UJJI, vii. 147), 011 the news tlmt Morticr's camlry had scizC<.l the
hridb'"C of i\lcriua_ 'The J!a8.~e ef the TlI.gus by i\lorlier remol'cs to
a distant period the danger of Alcmt.ejo; but it shows that we may be
attacked at an early period in our positions. For Mortier, supposing him
to march by Almaraz, can be On the Zezerc in the first days of February,
and I think it possible that the battle for the possessioll of this countrr,
and probably t110 fate of tbe l'eninsu]a, will bcfollgilt ill less than a month
from this time,'
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of the Zalas river (or the Bclleyentc river as Welliugton usually
calls it), then those of the AlmallSor, and lastly the line across
the neck of the Setubal peninsula, opposite Lisbon, where there
WM a !lhart front of ten mile~ from Setubal itself (which wa..;
fortified) past the eastle of Plllmella to Moita on the Tagw.
estuary. But behiud this again was the ~trongt'St dcfclwi vc
position of all, a Lines of Tort'es Vedras on a small scale 1. 'l'he
works erected here were an afterthought: the}' had formed no
part of the original scheme for the fortification of Lisbon, but
when it hud been proved to Wellington that batteries on the
Heights of Almada, bc)'ond the brood Tllgus mouth, might
illcommodc the shipping in the harbour, and pos:oibly the town
itself [the range was 2,300 yards], he had ordered, early ill
December, that the Portuguese labourers set free from work
011 the old lines by Massena's departure should be trans-
ferred to the Almada front 2. Here a line of 8,000 yards
frolll ljea to sea was marked out, aud strengthened with nu
less than seventeen closed redoubts, connected by a covcrl.od
way. Eighty-six guns were allotted to them, and their defence
was tu be given over to the marines of the fleet, and the
local militia and trained Ordenan~a (Atiradorcs lulcionaeJ)
of Lisbon. It was calculated that Bcresford would find n gar-
rison of 7,500 men already placed in these forts if he were ever
forced back on to them. It seemed impossible that such ashorl
front, so ~trongly held, could ever be broken through. _
But all this was a precaution designed to face a very unlikely
-if a possible-situation of affairs. It was much more probable
that Mus.-;cuu. would try to ptl.S::I the Tugus highcl' up, than that
Soult would fight his way to its mouth acroSll the Alcmtejo, and
every precaution was taken to gi ve Massena a hot reception if he
should make the attempt. It was clear that his starting-point
for such an enterprise mllst be Pllnhete and the mouth of' the
ZC7.crc, for there were collected the ninety boats and the materials
for thc flooting bridges which had been created by thc enel'gy of
General EblC. At. Sautarcm, the other plaee where :UIDlSCntl
I All tIlls may be found in Wellington's dispatch of January 12, 1611,
where he details the successive pooitioll& which BeresfOl'd must try to lLOld.
~ For a description of this front see JOlleB, Line' of TOl'n, Vedra6,
(Ill. 43-5.
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had boats, the stock of them was known to be too small for
a passage in force. Beresford, it will be remembered, had already
established batteries which commanded the mouth of the Ze1.ere,
und had several times stopped small e.xplomtiolls by the French
boats. Only on one occasion did a few succeed in running past
down-stream. On the whole it was considered unlikely that
Masseull would attempt such a serious nmlter t\S the crossing of
the Tagus opposite Punhete. D'Urball, Beresford's chief of the
staft~ reported' It is altogether impmbable that he will commit
himself, wucss in combination with the army urriving from the
south. The stream is very rapid. The boats cannot return
to the original point of embarkation for a second load of
men, Ilor to the second point for a third load, but must cross
at each time to a point lower down, owing to the current.
This must und will occasion great disunion and scattering among
the parts of' the division who first pass, all the more because they
will be vigorously opposed from thc beginning. It appears to
me that 110 attempt of the kind can succeed. The Zczere·mouth
alone is their ploce d'arllles, and leaYe<; little else for us to watch;
hcm:e arise~ for them a difficulty of llccomplishing this enterprise
that would appear almost unsurmountable.' I It is most interest-
ing to compare this judgement from the English side with the
discussion of the problem by thc Frcnch gcncrab, which followcd
a few days later, and with which we shall presently have to
deal 2.
Meanwhile both parties wcre decidedly nervous as to the
possible movements of their adversaries. If 'Wellington some-
times thought that i\1assenfl. might make all attempt to eross the
Tagus, MilSScnn was very reasonably suspicious tllllt Wellington
might make a surprise-attack upon Juuot's L"Orps along the up~r
ll.io Mayor, and try to cut it off, before it could be succoured by
Ney from Thomar nlld Golegu.o. This suspicion led to the onl)'
skirmish that marked the month of Jnnuary. On the 19th the
Marshal ordered Junot to make a ret.:Qnnaissance in force beyond
the river, along the 1"\Jcoentre road, to see whether a rnmour
that an "English division hud been brought up behind Puck's
l From a long note by D'Urban ill his unpublished dial)', dated
January 22, 1811.
~ Sce pp. i7-0.
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Portuh'1.l.cse outposts were true. The Duke of Abralltes conducted
the afl-'air himself, at the head of S,OOO infantry of Cll\Usel'll
division and 500 horse, He pressed in the cavalry screen in front
of Pack, coush.1:ing of a squadron of the 1st Hussars of the
King's Germau Legioll, and occupied the village of Rio Mayor,
from which he drove out two Portuguese companies, Disc,'O\'er-
iug llothing in reserve save l}ack's brigade, drawn up for
resistance on the heights to the rear, and noting no red-coated
lmHalions, the Frcnch withdrew after a little skirmishing, and
returned to their lines. During this trifling affair JUllot received
a painful but not dangerous wound from the carbine of a hussar
'"cdctte, The ball struck him on the side of the nose, broke. the
honc there, and lodged in his cheek; hut it was extracted with
!l0 difiiculty, and he was able to resume COllllllUlld of hi.s curps
witllin t\ few days 1. Nothing further occurn.>tl 011 this front till
l"ebrunry 10, when the English cavalry paid a return visit to the
French outlying picket east of the Rio Mayor, drove it in, and
retired with an officer and ten men prisoners.
On February 5th the third and final period of Massena's smy
Oll the Tag-us lllay be said to 11Iwe bcguu, with tlIe !\rrhal of tllC
IlLSt ordcrs from Paris which he ~'as destined to receive. He had
beenlllore than a month without allY official intelligence of what
was going Oil behind him, the latest dispatches to hand having
been those brought by Drouet at the end of the old year. But
Gcneral Fo)' now appeared with the orders which the Emperor
had issued OIl December 22nd. He had cut his way from Ciudud
Hodrigo across the eastern mountains, and along the Estrada
Nova, at the head of a columu of 1,800 men, mostly composed
of drafts belonging to the 2nd Corps, which he had fOWld waiting
011 the Spanish frontier. The rains had been continuous, the
baducss of the road was notorious, aud Colonel Gm.nt with
a small part)' of local Ordenanva hung about the route of the
l'Olumn for the last five days of its march, and slew or captured
lllore than a hundred stragglers. The total loss b)' fatigue and
sickness was much greater 2.
I The best aCCOllllt of this recolllHlissauce is in t1w Jourual of Sl'riiuglin,
I'll. 462-3.
1 There is a goOtl nccount of tJtis lII&rcll by Foy ill his Vie Militai,"t!,
ctl. Girod tie I'Aiu, PIJ. 12i-R
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The orders brought by Fa)' were not particularly comforting
to Massena. He wa.'! bidden to hold on to his position till he
had received suc<:our from the Army of the South, and also from
the Army of the Centre. Mortier\; (:orps, as he had already been
assured, would at some not-distant date make its appearance ou
the Tagus, in the direction of Montalviio and Villaflor. A column
from the Army of the Centre 'I'M to advllJ1CC to Plusencia, and
commwlicatc with the Marshal via Coria and Castello Brnnco,
He was not expected to take the offensive till he should have
received these reinforcements, but he must u<;c Drouet's troops to
keep opcn commtmication:; with Almeidu, lmd 'regularize' the
war. There Will; no order for him to cross the Tagus into the
Alemtejo in search of Mortier: it was Mortier who was to come
to him. Practicully all thi.~ amounted to a command to wait
and endure-the initiativl:: was to collie frolll oubiidc, with the
arrival of reinforcements from the south and east. 'L'empereur
appe1ait son armee ,\ une lutte de fatigue et de perseverance,'
M Foy commcnted.
But this ',strife oftoil and perseverance' had ah·ea.dy been going
on since November, the dispatch was forty-four days old when
it reached Massenu., and the co-operution by the Armies of the
South and Centre, which it promised, showl,>d no signs of coming
to pass. Asa matter of fltCt, when 1"0), arrived, Mqrtier's divisions
were absorbed in the siege of Bndajoz, and Soull:, with Mcndi-
znbal upon his' hands, could have moved neither a detachment
nor the whole 5th Corps to the 'l'ngns. The promised assistance
from the Army of the Centre, Il. mere column of 5,000 men under
Lahoussayc, had n.dvanced first to Truxillo tmd then tu Plascncia,
as was promised, but had turned back for want of provisions long
before reaching the Portuguese fi·ontieI'. Massena pushed several
reeollllllissances towards the upper 'l'agus, in the hope of getting
information as to the appearance of friendly troops 011 either
side of the river, but could lenrn nothing. He says that he
judged fl'om the tranquillit)' llholl'lI by the English iSOuLh of the
Tagus that there could be no French force Ileal' enough to cause
them disquietude. Meanwhile the power of the Army of Portu-
gul tu live by pluuderillg the l:ountry-sidc was lK::ing reduced
every day. The distance at which food had to be sought was
e\'er increasing, and the loss suffered by the parties which were
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eut oH' while raiding was growing daily more serious. The
Ilumber of prisoners taken by the British cavalry on JllIlOt'1l
flank ffild Drollct's front amounted to sevcral hundrcds in
January and February 1. Many more were destroyed by the
Ordenanlfa, who were goaded to ferocious activity by the ever-
growing cruelty of the marauders, and dogged every expedition
thllt set out with an ever-increasing skill. The}' avoided the
main bodies, but trapped and shot small parties that strayed
more than a few hWldrcd yards from the column, with patient
persistence.
After waiting for a fortnight after the arrival of li'oy and
the imperial dispatches, ffild learning nothing of auyapproach
of the long-promised. troops of Morticc, Masseua assembk"l1
the corps leaders and certain other generals at Golegao on
F'ebmary 19th, at a meeting which he carefully refrained from
caUing a council of war. That he should do so was ill itself
a sign of f1ngging confidence, he had shown himself very auto-
cratic hitherto, and had asked the lL(h·icc of none of his lieu-
tenants. Now he regarded the situation as so desperate that he
thought that he must either give up the game and retreat from
the TngllS, or risk an attack on the allied forces south of that
rh'er, with the object of crossing iuto the Alemtejo Rud going
off' to jail} Soult. His own mind was practically lI1ade up in
favour of the former alternative; but he knew that if he took
it without consulting his lieutenants, they would probably report
him to the Emperor as having despaired before all was lost.
The couneil of war was really called for the purpose of arguing
them down, and committing them to the policy of retreat~, so
1 Fol' details of t1ll8 see the Dial'Y of Tomkin80n of the 16tl1 Light
DragooDs, His own regiment alone brought ill 82 prisOllers between
January l!) and February 23. There were some very fine feats of anns
on a small scale in tllill outpost fighting, notably a capture made by
Lieutenant Dillhop on January 19th, when with six men he charged twenty
cliaaseurs, and took eiglit with twelve horses.
I The best account of this council of war is Foy's (in his Vie Mililaire,
pp. 129-32), which is contemporary. It differs largely from Koch's
narrative in llill Vie de MtuttJlfl. It is quite cOlll'incing when compared
with Ma!l86na's expla11atory dispatch to Dertllier of Marcll (lth, which
sets forth Ilis own arguments for the retreat. Tlley are the same
which Foy attrilnrtes to him in the·precis of the meeting of February 16th.
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that they should not be uhlc to protest against it at fl later
date.
The three col'ps-oomml\l1dcNI Cl\1TIe to the meeting each with
a scheme of his own to develop. Ncy proposed to pilSS the
Tagus by force, with the whole army. to abandon Portugal for
the moment, and to join Solllt. The united armies should
establish thelllsclves Oil the Gundialltl., complete the conquest of
&tremadura. and then, after calling in all possible reinforce-
ments, take in hand the illvWlion of the Alemtejo, and an attack
011 Lisbon from the fiOuth. Junot hotly combated this scheme:
to pass into the Alemtejo llleant the surrendel' of all Portugal to
Wellington, who would chase the 9th Corps out of the Reil's.; it
would be 'giving up the whole game.' He wished to establish
a bridge-head Oil the other side of the Tagus. but not to send the
whole army across, merely to occupy it with a strong detach-
ment, and then to wait for Mortjer's promised appearance.
Reynier's scheme was a variant. of Junot's, but infinitely more
dangerous, for he was a general of second-rate capacity. He
would throw one corps across the Tagns, to scour the Alemtejo
for provisions, und to try to find Morticr. '111e other two should
hold on at Santarem, in the entrenched positions which had
already checked Wellington for three months. The English
general, he said, was timid, and would never dare to assault these
formidable works, e"en in the absence of one-third of the army.
Massena had no difficulty in demolishing this last proposal.
The passage of the Tugus would be a dangerous and difficult
operation in face of an enemy who was upon the alert, who had
fortified all the olH'ious landing-places on the opposite bank, and
who was known to have established a perfeet s)'stem of Ilignals
llnd (.'OIllIllWlieutiOIlS. It might vcry probably end in a bloOdy
repulse. But granting that it succeeded, and that a corps of
15,000 men got over into the Alemtejo, victory \\"Ollld have con-
sequences more disastrous thau failure. For 'IVellington would
fall upon the two corps left north of the Tagus with his main
force, perhap.'l 60,000 men; and when ~parated from the t1"00PS
detached in the Alemtcjo the Army of Portugal would have onl),
30,000 in line. 'N'est-il pas :\ craindre que cette portion de
,l'armee, scpaTee de l'autre, ne soit attaqllee, battne, (Jetruite, par
un enllellli it qui, pour nous faire beaueoup de mal, il ne manqu.e
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que de le vOluoir?' This was absolutely irrefutable logic;
nothing could be more insane than Reynier's proposal to separate
the French army into two parts by the broad stream of the
'l'ngus. "'ellington could have destroyed with ease the two-thirds
of it left nort.h of the river, unless that portion should be ready
to cl'ucuatc all else that it held and shut itself up to be besieged
in Santarem-the only possible eClltrc of resistance. But to be
shut up in Santarem meant starvation on a worse scale than had
been hitherto endured. For the army, losing its old broad
foraging-ground, would be con.lpelled to live entirely upon what
might be sent it from the northern Alemtejo by the detached
eorps; and that region Wl\S known to be barren and thinly
peopled, and had probably already been strippe<l of its resources
by 'Wellington's orders. (As a matter of fact sueh orders. had
been issued. some time back.) 'Faut·il pour un illteretsi modique
que celui de manger un mois clans l'Alemtejo risquerunepareille
operation?' asked the Marshal. And allY dispassionate judge
must decide that his question could onl)' be answered in the
llegative. Ney's pl'oposul, to tuke the whole !muy "cross the
Tagns into the Alemtejo, WW:l not quite so easy to dispose of.
BLIt there stood against its first necessary preliminary-the
passage of the river-the same objections that were I'egistered
agaillSt H.eynier's plan. The pns.-mge might end in a repulse,
and the position of the army would be very bad if, having COll-
ccntrated at Punhete (or at Santarem) for the crossiug, it found
itself encirded by all Wellington's fol"t-cs, which would march in
upon it the moment that .Ney's und J unot's corps were withdrawn
from their present cantonments. The Marshal disliked the idea
of having to fight no battle, with the Tagns at his hack, and all
his possible lines of retreat intereepted 1, Oragain, the crossing
might suu.'eed, so far as the throwing of a vanguard across to the
Alemtejo bank went. But Wellington would dose in upon the
army while it was actually passing, and might easily destroy its
rearguard, or even its larger half, by attacking when the rest
I 'HientOt viendrait le moment ou Oil serait foree de se jeter sur l'une
ou sur l'autre rive; et alors on pourrait trOU"er les tetes-de-pont entouries
par une contrevallation de rennemi, ou biell l'armee se verrait foreee ~i
r~evoir bataille avec un fleuve au dos, en voulant se porter sur la rive
droite.' Massellll W Berthier, Mare1\ 0.
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was across the water, and unable to retUMl with sufficient
promptness.
If the army were so lucky as to get off entire into the barren
Alcmtcjo, and to unite with the 5th Corps on the Gnndiana,
'Wellington, as JUllot hOO pointed ont, would hu\'c a fn.'C hand
in northern and central Portugal, and would sweep Claparede
out of it, while he need not be f;eriOllSly alarmed at any attack 011
Lisbon from the south of the Tagus, for the city WM covcl-ed by
the Alnnula lines 1 and could not be harassed from this quarter.
Meanwhile the Army of Portugal would be cut ofI:' from all the
supplies and reil1forcemenl'l which were accumulating for it on
the frontier of Spllin, at Ciudad llodrigo and Salamanca; 'it
would be going off to a distance from its reallinc of opcratiollS
and of communications,'
Massena then came to the point; having argned down the
schemes of Reynier and Ney, he developed his own determination,
whieh was to hold on for the few days more that seemed possible.
The maraudingopcrations that fed the army were rapidly growing
less productive, and the moment WM approaching when the daily
plunder would no longer meet the daily consumption, and then,
in case the long-expected Soult did not appear, the army mllst
retire on to the line of the Mondego 2. There, in a country (.'Om-
paratively undamaged, Masseua hoped to hold out some fifty or
sixty days at the least; the whole 9th Corps would be available
for opening and maintaining the oommllnications with Almeida
and Cindad Uodrigo, and reinforcements and stores would easily
be brought fonn\rd 3. But no further off'ellsi"e movements eould
be contemplated; the army was exhausted and needed along rest:
in the end it would pl'Ooobly have to retire within the borders of
Spain-perhaps to Alcantara 011 the Tagus, ~rhaps into Lean.
Ney and RCYllier seem to have retired from the conference
I It is intercsting to sec from lHasscna's dispatch of Mareh 0 that he WIIS
awaTC of the existence both of the SctUballlJl(1 tlle AlmaulI fortiliClltioll9.
~ Fay, present at the council, wherc he was asked to l:omment on the
Emperor's last orders, which lLe had brougllt himself, renders Mass~na's
decision ill his diary as: 'Que (aut-il donc faire? Tenir ici lc!,lus long-
temps que nOlls pourrolls: voir d'ici la ce qui se passera dans I'Alemtejo:
Imis, si rien n'cst change, 1I0US transporler sur le l\.IOllllcgo, en Ini~nt
un corps d'nrlllee it la rive gauche Utl ootte rivicre.' [Vie NiJitll.ire, V. 131.]
3 This comes from J\1assena's uispawb to llerthier_of i\l;m:h 6th.
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rnther talked down than cOIlyilleOO, and the latter scnt ill to his
COIlIUlt111dcr~ill-Chief t\ S01"t of protest, taking the form of u
precis of the meeting, in which the arguments used and the
result arrived at were so misrepresented that Massena caused
a formal document to be drawn up and signed by five other
brcncrals prcscnt at the cOilllCil, in which it was declared till!
the precis WM wholly illcorrt,.'(.'t. Appurcutly Rcynicr hud
intended to get his protest to the Emperor's hands, in order to
free himself from allY responsibility in appro\'illg a retreat
which he thought that his master would condemn 1.
The few \\'(.'Cks for whidl the Al"IllY of' Portugal rcluined its
position ufter the conference at Golcb"l1.o, were spent by all its
units as a mere period of preparation for the retreat, for the
J:,1Cllerals had long made up their minds that Soult would never
nppear on the Tagus. They seem evcn to have thought that he
might havc retired from Estremaduru, for the distaut tlnUlder
of the bombardment of Badajoz, which had been audible at
Punhete during the first half of February, seemed to have
L'eaSeCI. TIns must have been due to some change of atmospheric
conditions, for it was going on with redoubled energy in the last
days ot' the mouth. But Massena and his lieutenants argued
Ultl.t cither tile siege had been raised, or else Soult hud takcll
the pltlcc, [md yet was not marching to the Tllbrtls. They seem
to have regarded his doings as a negligible quantity, when
coming to their final resolve.
During the last days of' :Februaryall the corps received pre-
liminary orders, which could have 110 other meaning than that
u. retrcut Iwd been decided UpOIl. The di visions were orderL>{(
to'send their parks and heavy baggage to the rear, and the
divisional batteries were told to complete as many gun·teams
with good serviceable horses as was possible, by destroying
caissons, and drafting their animals Oil to the guns. In some
cuses batteries had to be r(.'<iuccd to tlu·L'C or four pieces, evcn
when hulf the ctlllisollS Iwd beCl! burnt. The BUl Corps
destroyed fifty-one caissons on the !i!4th-21th February, yet still
could find only four horses each for those remaining, including
animals that were sick or barely fit for ser\'ice:!. But the
I I-or details as to this see Foy's narrative quoted above.
~ Journal of Noel of the Artillery of ~e 8th Corps, p. 137.
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transport of food was even more important than that of artillcry
material; in the central magazine!! there was gathered toJ:,rether
some fiftecn days' of biscuit for the whole army, the flour for
which had been procured with the greatest difficulty in small
quantities, and had. been hoarded to the lust. Tins was issued
to the regiments, with stringent orders not to use it till the
:u..iual retreat began. Some units were lID pressed by stanatioll
thut they begun to cousume it, and ultimately stal'b..-d with only
eight or ten days consumption in their packs or on their wam,rons.
The whole of the transport was iu a deplorable state j if the
cavalry and artillery had lost 5,088 hol'SCtl since November, the
train had been depleted of draught-beasts in a still greater
proportion, since they were both weaker to start with, and leIls
carefully kept. Some regiments had no longer any hones
attached to them, and could only show a few pack-mules and
asses, quite insufficient for carrying their reserve ammunition
Ilud food 1.. Two things wcre certain-the onc that if the army
could not pick up provisions Oll the way by martludiug, it would
ultimately have to retire to its base within the frontiers of
Spain. And no food could be collected for some days, since the
first five stages of the retreat would be through a rcgion alretldy
stripped bare. The second was that the ammunition might
suffice for one general engagement, supposing that there \\'ll~
heavy fighting during the retreat, but that it would hardl)' be
able to serve for two,
On March Std MasscnR issued the orders which marked his
determination to retreat ul OIl(:C. Ney was directed to march on
the next day from ThomuI, with Mm'chand's division and SOllJ~
cavalry, and join Drouet at Leiria in the rear-they were ulti-
mately to be the covering force of the retiring army. On the
5th Reynicr was directed to send buck his first division (Mcrlc)
from Santarem towards the rear, while the second division
(Heudclct) continued to hold the old lines. On this same day
Ncy's IicL"OIld divisioll (Mermet) evacuated 'rorres Novll.S, and
marched northward to Ourem near Leiria, while one of Junot's
divisions (Solignac) massed itself at Pernes, to await the arrival
01" the other (Clauscl), which was to hold the outposts till the
I .For general statements a8 to the miserable state of tlle material
of the army see Masslna.'8 dispatch to Berthier of ~larcll 6, 1811.
,
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last moment. This was the critical day of the concentration, for
of the eight divisions forming the Army of Portugal five had
started off, lelwing t.hree (Heudelet at. Sallta.rcm, Clausel on the
Rio Mayor, LoisOll at Plmhcte) to hold the old po;;itions. If
Wellington had attacked in force on the 5th, it seems certain
that he mllst have destroyed these covering forces, which in their
scattered position could not possibly haw'! held their ground.
But the British general, as wc shall see, was engaged in a scheme
of hi~ OWIl. and did not at first detect the full meauillg of the
'French movements.
For Wellington at this moment was busy in developing an
encircling attack on the whole of' the French positions, and it
was not yet ready 2, On February23rd he had made lip his mind
to strike the moment that a large body of reinforcemcnts, ll1rcady
overdue from England and the Mediterralleun, should have
arri\·ed. The plan was that the main army, while holding
Heynier in check at Salltarem with one or two divisions, ·should
attack Jnnot on the Rio Mayor with the bulk of its force. At
the sallle time Bercsford, drawing his l:orps to the north of the
Tagus by the boat-bridge at Abrantes, was to fall upon LoisOll
at Punhete, and (as it was hoped) thus distract Ney, whose duty
would be divided between the succouring of Junot and that of
the division on the Ze7.ere. Unt, even if he turned most of the
reservcs in the direction of the Rio Mayor, thc long distancc
I 'I1Jis plan comes out ill full ill tll6 diary of Beresfonl's Cliief of tllO
Staff. D'Urban writes under tllB 23rd February: 'The Marshal tells me
that Lord 'Vellillgton means to attack, and hie (Bcresford's) OWll share is
that he must turu and force tllll French left:, wllcn the reinforcemeuts
SllllUld arrivc, SOllle of tllem ure lllrcady on their Illllrch lip from Lisbon,
On their arri}'ul Lord Wellingtoll will attack tile Frendl right, all the
Ilio "'ayor, while Marshal Beresford Cr08WS the'ragus lit Abrallte8, IInd
attacks Ule force Oil the Zczere at the SlIJIlC time. Orders to inquire how
far, iu attacking the corps at PUllhete, Amoreira can be turued, and the
beight9 of .\lontalviio gained, with consequent advantage of ground in
COIning 011 the enemy upon the Zezere.' The local reports were prepared
by D'Urban on the 25th. The only allusion.to the plan ill the WelliogWn
dispatches is in the 1"\.st paragraph of the letter to Lord LiI·erpool of
Februar}' 2{Jrd, in which the phrase occurs, '1 cannot venture to detach
troops [to EstremaduraJeven after the reinforcements shall arrive: !lnll
if tho weather should hold np a little I must tr)' something else-of greater
c.~tellt but more doubtful result.'
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would prevent them from arriving in time. JUlJot would almost
certainly be overwhelmed by superior lIumbers, while Ucynicr
was being' contllilled,' and while Ney's l:olumns wcrt.' still far oft:
l'reparations and reconnaissances in view of this great attack
bel:,1fill to be made, but the reinforcements were slow to arrh'e.
Six thousand men were due, mainly the troops which afterwurili
formed the 7th Diyision and the second British brigade of the
6th. Bnt 011 March 1 only the Cliasaeurs BI'Uantl'iquca from
Cudiz, and halfof the 51st had yet IUlllled 1, Of the other expected
regiments the bulk turned up in Lisbon harbour on the 4th-
6th March, viz. the 2nd, 85th, lj36th. ~/52nd, hut the light
infantry b!igadc of the King's German Legion did not come ill
till the !!lst of the same month. It wa:; ulldoubtedly the acci-
dental delay of a few days in the arrival of these seven battaliolls
that caused Wellington to hold back; if MnssClla had postponed
his move for a week more, all would have been in line save the
two belated German battalions, and the attack would have been
delivered about the lOth-Iflth of Mnrch.
Set on the carrying out of his OW11 plan, which <:ould not begin
to work for a few days more, Wellington was evidently not
fully prepared for the suddenness of Masscnl\'s retreat. On the
4th of March, the tlay when Ne)"s corps began to file to the rear,
he wrote to Beresford, • I think it likely that the enemy is about
sollle move, but have been so frequently disappointed that it is
impossible to be certain. There is 110 alteration whatever ill
their front,' This was true, for Junot and Reynicr had not
moved on a mall upou the 4th. On the next-the critical-day
he himself Illade n survey of Reyuicr's lines in front of Sallhlrclll,
found them still manned by Heudc1et's division, but thought
that he could detect that the artillery in the French works was
less numerous than 011 the previous day. There were no howitzers
in the great work aeross the high road, but only what appeared
to be pieces of small calibre. He could lIot perceive gUlls allY
1 Tile Chalilleur8 Brilmmiquu had landed very early ill February, aud
& wing of the 51st 011 the 25th of tbatmOllth. But tlw bulk of tile traus-
lKlrt t1ectfrom t:ugland olllywas reported at the Tagus mouth on !\larch 4th,
alld began to land men next day-the critical day of Masseua's retreat.
The ships with the Germaulight bligade had sailed late/and came ill even
later in proportion.
1811] WELLINGTON RECONNOITRES SANTAREM 85
longer upon the main heighb in front of SantArem; bUIlhes
seemed to have been laid to cover the stations which they had
occupied. But the outposts were the same, and he did not
observe allY other change on the heights, excepting that all the
troops visible upon them were fully accoutred. He concluded
that no general movement of Reynier's corps had taken place.
'It is probable that baggage and heavy artillery may have been
sent ofl~ but the effective part of the army stillremllins in posi-
tion.' There wu-'> no obvious alteration visible along J unot's front,
where Clausel was that day holding all the;outposts, Soligllac
having marched back to Pernes.
If Wellington had attacked at once that day, with the troops
that were np in his front line, the Light Division and the Ist
Division, ill front of Salltarem, while demonstrating with Pack's
Portuguese and the cavalry brigades along ,the Rio Mayor to
detain Clausel, it is probable that he might have made great
luwoc of Heudelet's division, which was holding a front too
long for its strength, and had no supports, since the rest of the
flnd Corps was a march to the rear by now. But he WB.'> still
thinking of his own plan; the fleet, with the bulk of the expected
battalions, was reported at the mouth of the 'l'agus, and one
regiment had actually landed. Wherefore he wrote to Beresford,
•the reinforcement'> have arrived, and we shall be able in a few
da)'s to attack the enemy, if he retains this position, or possibly
to atlaek him in any other which he may lake np.' Meanwhile
the rear divisions of the army were ordered to close in; on the
evening of March 5th Cole (4th Di \'isioll) was brought up to
Cartaxo, while ~ampbell (6th Division) moved out from the old
lines to A~.amhuja, which Cole had left. The 3rd Division wu-'>
omered up from Alcoentre to join Pack's Portuguese on t.he Rio
Mayor. Dcresford wasdireded to bring the ~nd Division aeras;;
the TagllS ut Ahrantes, and to attack the French on the Zezerc
(Loison's division) the moment that he saw any signs of their
heing about to move off~.
But all this was too late: the only chance of destroying
Mnssena's rearguard would !w,.Ye been to have attacked 011 the
I Most of these orders will be found ill the early (6 a.m.) {lispatch of
llarch 6th to BeresIord. The rest are mentioned as Il:lving been ordered
to ta\(e place OIl the 6tll in tIle dispatch to Beresford of the Gth.
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morning of'the 5th with the troops that were already 011 the spot.
And this Wellington would not do~ because he thought that
Reyniel' and JUllot were still in position' with the effective part
of the army.' On the following morning it wus too late:
Heudelet had evacuated Santarem, and Clause} the line of the
Rio 1\111.)'01', after dusk; and each having made 1\ IOllg night-
march, the one was at Pantc de Almondn near Goleg.10, the
other near Torres Novas, before nOOIl on the 6th. Hcudclet hOO
blown up the bridge of Alviella, Clausel that of Pernes, to detain
the pursuers. The enemy had gained 11 full march upon the
British in this direction. On the other flank Beresford brought
the ~Ild Division over the Tagus on the 6th, but finding that
J....oison had made no movement had not attacked him, his orders
being to fall on only whcn hc saw the enemy break up from his
positions.
On the early morning of the same day Wellington had found
that Santarem was empty and occupied it. The Light Division
and Pack were sent ill pursuit of JUllot, and reachooPernes: the
1st DiYision followed Ueynier, and had the head of' its column at
the brokcn bridgc of the Alvicllu by the aftcmoon. The 4th
and 6th Divisions, coming up from the rear, entered Santarem,
while the 3rd Division reached the line of the Hio Mayor and
followC(l the Light Division. Tbe 5th Division Md Cumpbell's
Portuguese were still far to the rear. On this day Wellington
made up his mind, from the signs before him, that Massena was
in full march for Coimbra and the north, and did not inten<j
to fight a battle 1. The only puzzling sign was that Loison's
division still remained stationary on the Zezere. Was it even
1IOW possible that the other corps were going t,o join him for all
attack Oil Abralltes, an attempt to <-TOSS the Tagus near it, or
a retreat into Spain via the Castello Branco road? This was
not likely: for if such had been Massena's p18.l1, Ney would have
arrived to join Inison already, and they would have cOllllllcnct..'<i
their movement beyond the Zezere. 'Vellington, howe,'er, did
not feel quite certain n~ to what was the French scheme till
Loison burnt his OOI\ts und bridges 011 the night of the 6th-7th,
and moved off towards Thomur, in the same direction as the
rest of the French army. It i>i clear that ifBere>iford had been
, See-Wellington to lleresford, wpulchu, vii. 1'. 344.
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ordered to full upon LoiflOll in force upon the afternoon of the
6th, he might have done him much harm, for there lay upon the
ZezeTe only a singh~ French infantry division and it cavalry bri·
gade, while llerestord had at Abrantes, beside the garrison, an
English und a Portuguese division of infantry, and liS much
cavalry at least I\S Loison possessed.
On the 7th Ney and Drouet were halted at Leiria to cover
the arrival of the rest of the army. Reynier marched from
Golegao to Thomar; JUHot from Torrcs Novas to Chiio de
M/lliI111S; Loison wns at dawn close to Thomar, after it night
march, leaving his boats and bridges blazing behind him us
a beacon for Beresford's benefit. It was clear that the French
were all making for the Coimbra roads, and had no designs west
of the Zezere. The English cavalry, following on the heels of
both Reynier'8 and ,Ttlnot'f\ collllnns, informed Wellington that
the enemy was apparently about tu use both roads towards the
Mundego, that by Leiria and l'ombal, and that by ChUo de
l\fa}fms and Anciiio. The British general expressed some sur·
prise at this, remarkhlg in a letter to Beresfol'd that the
latter road was so bad that he m1llTelled that everything had not
gone by the infiuitely superior Leiria chaussee, the main road to
the north 1. Meanwhile, of his own troops Bcrcsford had crossed
the Zczcrc, but did not :reach Thumar; Nightingale's brigade
of the 1st Division moved on from the bridge of the Alviella
to Atalaya beyond Golegao, the Light Division from Pernes
advanced to Arga and La Marosaon the Torres Novas-'l'homar
rood. The 4th and 6th Divisions rel1ched Golcgao in the after-
noon. But heuring of Ncy's and Drouet's concentration at
Leiria, and doubtful whether he would not find that the rest
of the enemy was about to take shelter behind them, Wellington
resolved not. to push any more troops in the 'l'homar direction,
but to keep a large mass npon the Santarem~I..eiria-Coimbrn.
Mad. The bulk of the 1st Division (all save Nightingale's
bl'igade) and the 3rd Division wcre halted ut A1cullhedc und
Pernes, amI thither too the 5th Division and the Portugul!se
brigades from the rear were directed. It must be confessed
that this was not it very rapid or vigorous pursuit: 'Vellillgton
was waiting on the enemy's movements, rather than forcing
I \\rellington to Beresford, Di'fJ<ltcht', vii. p. 34.G.
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them to take such directions as best suited himself. But it
must be remembered that he had been compelled to advance
ere yet his own prepu.rations were made, four or five dn)'s before
he had intended to make his great concentric attack, and two
factors were ngainst him. The first was the eternal food·
problem; the divisions had marched unexpectedl)'. with :;luch
lmpplies as they had in hand; they were unable to get anything
from the country, which the French had stripped bare during
the last three mouths. The rations for them were being brought
up from the rear, but if they outma.rched them they lllust starve;
hence there were reasons against hurry. The second cause of
delay was that Wellington wished to have his whole army in
hand, if the ellemy should turn and show fight, and lhc divisiollS
which had started from the Torres Yedras 'Lines 011 the first
notice of Massena's deparlure on lhe 5lh were still far to the
rear, viz, the 5lh and the Portuguese battalions which had once
been Le Cor's and was now under Campbell. The new 7th
Division, which had just landed, had 110t yet commenced ib
march fmm Lisbon.
The asJX'Ct of the region through which the army WlIS march-
ing was piteous in the extreme. Santarem town was a wreck,
• the houses torn and dilapidated, the streets strewll with house-
hold furnitme half-burnt and destroyed, many streets quite im-
passable with filth and rubbish, with an o<..'CflSional mall, horse,
or donkey rotting, and (:orrupting the air with pestilential
vapours: a few miserable inhabitants like living skeletons 1.' The
countryside was WOI'SC-cott:agelS burnt and unroofed, and
corpses of murdered peasants, some fresh, some mere heaps of
bones, lying in every ravine. The stlt\'ivors were just emerging
from woods 01' envel'ns to cut np the French sick and stragglers.
A single quotation may suffice to give some idea of the wayside
sights of this distressing march., It comes from a Srd Division
chroniclet·, who is descl'ibing the villfLoO"<! of' Porto de Mos, south
of Leiria: 'When we entered the place, there was a large con-
vent fronting us, which, as well as many of the houses, had been
set on fire by the French. I never before witnessed such destruc-
tion: floors torn up, boos cut in pi{.'{:cs, thcir contents thrown
about intermixed with kitchen utensils, broken mirrors, china, &c.
I l\Iemoil'il of George SimmOIlS of the !:15th, )). 137.
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There was a large fire in the chapel, on which had been heaped
broken pieces of the altar) wooden images, picture frames, and
the ornamental woodwork of the organ. Searching for a clean
place to put down bags of bir;cuit, we found a door leading to
fl. chnmber apart from the chapel. It wus quite dark, so I took
up a burning piece of wood to inspect it. It was full of half·
consumed human bodies, some lying, others kneeling or leaning
against the walls. The floor was covered with ashes, in many
places still red~hot. Such an appalling sight I have never wit~
nesscd. Of those who had stink on the floor nothing remained
but bones; those who were ill a kneeling or standing posture
were only partially consumed. The expression of their scorched
faces was horrible beyond description. In a bag lying at the
upper end of the apartment was the dead body of'a young child,
who had been strangled; the cord used wus still tight about its
little neck I,'
It was on the morning that followed his arrival at Torres
Noms (March 8th) that Wellington, encouraged by the reports
of his cavalry scouts, to the effect that the French were marching
day and night, and showed no wish to fight, issued the orders
already alluded to in a previous dw.ptcr, which bade Bcresford
turn back the 2nd Division, and march with it and the 4th to
the relief of Badajoz 2.. The report of Menacho's death and of
the rapid adwl.llce of the French siege-works had just reachL'<.l
him. Beresford was to take with him Hamilton's Portuguese
di"isiou, which had not yet passed the Tagus, and De Grey's
cavalry brigade. The boat-bridge at Abrantes was floated down
to 'l'nllcos near PlInhetc, in order to &aye the Qnd and 4t.h
Divisions some miles of march in their journey to theAlcmtejo.
These troops turned back, and were nearing Tam.'os on the
following day, when they received orders to halt. The French,
so the advanced cavalry reported, after marching hitherto day
, "'rom the Memoirs of Donaldsou of the 94th) p. 104. Passing through
}'orto de 1\1os on September 29, 1910, I thought that 1 would trr to dis_
wverwhether any memory oftMs horrid tragedy survived. The sacristau,
of whom I made inquiries, at once took me to a ruined dlamber to tlle left
of the cllllI'ch) au(l told me tllat 200 people had been bumed tlu)re in the
< time of tbe French: A new sacristy had been built to replace it ill
J8H, the chamber being held u.ccursed.
, See Challwr I1 ahove, p_ 60, (l1ll1 "Tellington, Dispatches, vii. 350-1.
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and night, had come to a stand at Pombal, north of Leiria,
where Ney, Junot, and Dronet were now all massed. Thollgh
Reynier was said to have taken another road, that by Espinhal,
'Wellington was not sure that MnsseuR did not intend to fight, and
if so, he wished to have the 4th Division with him, and De Grey's
heavy dragoons. • In this case it is desirable,' he writes, • thnt
] should bell little stronger, and as Bndajoz is not yet pressed ...
I have sent to Cole to desire that his division and the dragoons
march to-morrow for Cacharia. I shall then be as strong as the
enemy, or very nearly.' The flnd Division was to halt and wait
further orders. It was not till the Uth that it was let loose,
and told to resume it..<; march to the Alemtejo: Cole and De Gre}'
were not sent hack from the main army till the 16th. Mean-
while Badajoz, as we have already seen, fell by Imaz's pusil-
lanimityon March 10-11. datc too enrly for Beresford to have
saved it, even if hc had continued the march originally prescribed
to him on the 8th of that month.
Uefore Wellington sent all their southward journey the three
divisions which were to form the future Army of Estremadura,
stirring events had begun to occur ou the Leiria-Coimbra. road,
and the general course of Massena's retreat had already been
settled.
SECTTON XXIII: CHAPTER IV
EVENTS IN THE SOUTH OV SI'AIK. THE DA'rTLE
OF RARROSA
IN the second chapter of this volume we dealt with Soult's
expedition to Estremadura and its results. but hnd to defer
for later consideration the events which bronght him back
in ho.stc to Andalusia the moment that BudlljOZ had fallen
(March l~th). These lUust now be e.'Cplained.
When his 20,000 men, collected from all the three corps which
formed the Army of the South, set out on the last day of the
old yoor 1810, Soult left behind him three problems, each of
which (us he was well aware) might assullle a dungerous nsJX'Ct
at any moment. 'Vc have already indicated their character 1,
Would Victor, with 19,000 men left to him for the blockade of
Cadiz, be able to hold with secmity the immense semicircle of
lines and batteries which threatened the island stronghold of the
Cort.cs? '''ould the provisional garrison which had been
patched up for Se\'ille prove strong enough to defend that
capital and its arsenals against any possible attack of roving
Spanish detachments, from the mountains of the west and
south? Would Sebastiani and the 4th Corps be able to beat
back any attempt by the Army of Mureia to trespass upon the
limits of the broad and rugged prov.ince of Granada? '\fe muy
mId that it was conceivable that all tbese three problems might
demand a simultaneous solution. For if all the Spanish forces
had been gnided by a single capable brain, nothing would have
been more obvious to conceive thnn a plan for setting them All
to work at once. If a sortie from Cadiz were taken ill llUnd, it
would have the best ChiU1CC of success supposing that Schastialli
were to be distracted by an invasion of Grallrula, and Seville
threatened b.y any force that could be collected in the Condada
de Niebla, or the mountains above HOllda.
J See pp. 57-8 above.
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Soult, as Napoleon pointed out to him two months later',
had committed B. considerable fault by not putting all the divi.
.'lions left behind in Andalusia under a single colIlllll.Uulel', respon-
sible for all parts of the kingdom alike, Victor was given no
authority over Sebastiani, nor even over Daricau, who had been
left as governor of Seville, or Godinot, whose depleted division
occupied the province of Cordova. Napoleon, alwllYs silspicious
of Soult, accused him of having neglected this precaution because
he was jealous of Victor, and would not make him as great
as himself 2, Whether this was so or not, it is at filly rate
clear that the position was made much more dangerous by the
fact that each of the three problems Ilamed above would be pre-
sented to a difl-erent commander, who would be prone to think
of his own troubles alone, and to neglect those of his colleagues,
If all three dangers became threatening ·at the same moment,
each general would regard his own as the most important, and
bestow comparatively little care on those which menaced the
others, As a matter of fact, Victor was almost destroyed,
because Sebastillni did not come to his help, when the sally froll1
Cadi1. took place early in March; and Seville WM in serious
danger a few days later, because there was no one who could
order Godinot to march to its aid from Cordova without delay,
Soult wns fully awnre of nU the possible perils of his abscllcc.
Apparentl.y he thought Sebastiani was in the greater danger,
for he requisitioned only a few cavalry Rlld artillery from the
4th Corps, and left it practically intact to defend the province
of Granada against the Army of Mureia. As to Seville, he
considered that it could only be endangered by Ballasteros, and
for that reason did his best to desb-oy that genem.l's division, by
cfl.lIsing GaUlI1 to hunt it as far as the borders of Portugal-n
diversion which nearly wreCked the Estremaduran expedition (or
I COrNJl<pfmdlwce, no. 17,r,31. 'Le siege de Cadix I\'numit pas count
les. ehances qu'it \-ient de courir si, CIl plIrttmt pour I'F:str~mll.tlureJ le
tlue tie Dalmatie avait mis le corps du gllneral Scbastiani et la dil'igioll
Godinot sous les ordres flu l\1arechal due de Hellune [Victor] . , . i1
aurait alors eu trois fois plus de troupes qu'it n'en aurait fallu.'
t 'Soult vient de me faire une gramle sottise: il al1rait dll hisser a
Victor le commandemellt de toutes les troupes d'Amlalullsie. 11 ne I'a
vas fait, de peur Ilue Villtor ne filt aussi graml que lui.' foy's interviell'
with Napoleon in his Vie MiJilaire, p. 140.
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lack of infantry I, 'Vhcn GI\ZI1Il had driven llallastcros over
the Guadiaua, after the action of Cnstillcjos (JwlUllry 25), the
Marshal thought that the Spaniard was out of the glUllC, and
110 longer in a position to do harm-in which he erred, for
this irrepressible enemy was back ill Andalusia within a few
1Vt.'eks, and WM actually threatening Seville early in March.
But the greatest danger was really on the side of Cadiy,.
where Victor, deprived of nearl)' all his cavalry and one regimellt
of' infantry for the Estremaduran expedition, had also to furnish
outl)·jng detachmcnts-agarrison for Xeres and the column with
which General Remond was operating in the Condado de Nicblu,
far to the west 2, He had only 19,000 lUen left for the defence
of the Lines, of which a considerable pl'Oportion consisted of
artillery, sappers, and marine troops, needed for the siege but
useless for a fight in the open, if the enemy should make a sally
by sea agaiust his rear. The Duke of Bellullo WW:l anxious, alld
rightly so: for the nearest possible succours were Sebastiani's
troops in Granada and Malaga, many marches away, while the
garrison of Cadiz was very strong. and indeed outnumbered his
own force. At the beginning of February it comprised, including
the urban militia, nearly ~O,OOO Spanish troops; Copons had
just been withdrawn from the west to join it. There was also an
Anglo-Portuguese division. General Graham had been left u.
oonsidcroblc force, even ufter 'Vellingtoll withdrew certain regi~
ments to join ill the defence of the Lilies of Torres VL'<1rW:l. Hc
had two composite battalious of the Guards, the 2j4ith, 2j67th,
!lj87th, a half battalion of the 2j95th, the two battalions of the
20th Portuguese, and a provisional battalion of German recruits; a,
as also two squadrons of the 2nd Hussars of the King's GerulIl.Il
Legion, and two field batteries. The whole alllounted to between
5,000 and 6,000 men. It is curious to note that Napoleon, in
the dispatch by which he spurred Soult on to his Estremaduran
expedition, assured him' that there had never been morc than
three English regiments ut Cadiz, and Lhat they had all gone La
Lisbon,' so that the hIe of L..'01l and city were onl)' uefended
I :see above, I'. 33. 2~ aOOI'e, 1" 31.
I WJIOUl Welliugl.ou (iu his dispat.ell to Grah3J1l of De<:emoor 31) calls
r the Germau deserters'>-they haviug beeu maiuly men who had abscouded
from the Frellch armies.
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by • ten thousand unhappy Spaniards without resolution or power
to resist I.' \Vhen the Emperor's directions were based upon
inforlllation so utterly incorrect os this, it WllS hard for his
generals to satisfy him!
Within a few days of the withdrawal of the detachment taken
by Soult from Victor, the news came to Cadiz that the ht
Corps had been wco.kcnoo: uud when the destinution of the
expedition Wl\S known. it seemL.u probable that 110 reserves had
been left at Seville on which the besieging force could count.
The idea of an attack on Victor was at once broached by the
Regency, and acceptL't1 by Gellcml Graham; after some discus-
sion, it was considered best not to assail the lines by a disem-
barkation from the Isle of Leon, but to land lliI large a force a~
could be spared in the rear of the enemy, nt Tarifa, AIgcsiras,
or wmc other point of Southern Amlalusia which was in the
lin~lds of the Allies. Such n mO\'Cmellt, if properly conduded,
would compel Vieto!' to dmw backward, in order to hold oft'tlle
Allies from the Lincs. He would have to fight at some tliswncc
inland, leaying a minimum garrison to protect his forts antI
batteries, &nd it was proposed that the fleet and the troops left
ill Cudiz should fnllllpoU them during his enforced absence.
The execution of this plan WWl deferred. for SOllle weeb,
partly beca.use of the difficulty of providing transport by sea for a
large c--xpeditionary force, partly becanse Ga7.an was unexpectedly
drawn back into Andalusia by llallnst;eros's divisioll, and was at
the end of January in a positioll from which he might easily
have reinforced Victor. 'Vhen he had gone off to Estremooura,
in the wake of Soult, the pmblem becll.Ine ~illlplcr. After draw-
ing back Capons's division from the Collclado de Niebla to Cadiz
(as has already been mentioned), the Regency found themselves
able to provide 8,000 men tor embarkation, while leaying 7,000
regulars mid the urban militia to hold Cudiz. Gruham was ready
to join ill, with all his troo~ save the battalion companies of the
!/47th and the Wth IJortuguesc. and the doubtfully effective
German battaJion, which were to remaiu behind, for he did !lot
wish to withdraw the whole British for<:c 4'0111 Cndizat Ollce. But
he procured the aid of an almost equivalent number of bayoneb
frolll an external source: he wrote to General Campbell, COlll-
I CorrupolldullC<!,1I0. 17,131.
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manding at GibraltAr, begging him to spare reinforcements from
the garrisoll of that fortress and of the minor stronghold of
'l'arifa, at the extreme southern point of Europe, which WAA then
maintained lIS Il sort of dcpendency of Gibraltar. Campbell
ea","erly consented to take part in the plan and promiS<.-'t1 to lend
1,000 infantry. This assistance would bring npthe British con·
til.lgent to 5,000 men. The Spaniards were also to collect some
small reinforcements: there wo.~ an irregular force under General
Bcguincs operating in the RonM mountains, and basing itselfon
Gibraltar. It was ordered to joill the expedition when it should
come to land, and (as wc shall see) actually did so, with a force
of three battalions or 1,600 men. The total of the troops whom
it was proposed to collect amonnted, therefore, 009,600 Spaniards
HUrl 5,000 British, u force almost equal in numbers to Victor'~
depIcted corps. But it was clear that the Marshal. would have
to leave SOllle sort of a garrison in the Lines before Cadiz, and
that the Allies would have a numerical superiority, if they
could force on a fight at a distance from the sea and the French
\mo.
One cardinal mistake was made in planning the c-..-:peditioll.
Its command was to be entrusted to General Manue1 La. Pei1a,
then the senior officer in Cadiz, a man with a talent for plausible
talking and diplomacy, but one who had already shown himsclf
n. scll1sh collcngne and a disloyal subordinate. This was the
w.mc llIlIll who ill 1808, Ilcarly three years buck, had sllcrificed his
chief Cu.stailos at the disastrous battle of Tudela 1, by refusing to
march to the sound of the guns, and securing a safe retreat for
himself and his 10,000 men, while the main army was being
crushed, only fonr miles away, by 1>'larshal Lanlle>i. Thongh
not jXTSOually a coward, he was a shirker of responsibilities, and
incapable of a swift lUul heroic decision. He was ambitious
enough to aspire to and intrigue for a post of importance, but
collapsed when it became necessary to discharge its duties. Hc
treated Graham in 1811 precisely as he had treated Castaiios in
1808, and it was not his fault that the sa.lly f!"Om Cadiz failed to
cud in II disaster 2. The English lieutcnuut-genernl hu.d dis-
I See vo!. i. l'P. 442-3.
~ &1Jepcler, the l'russian officer in Spanish sen'icc, wIluse notes on all
ti,e Cadi:ti nlfllirll are SO important, owing to his h:l\'illg serl"lll1 through
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cl'etional'Y authority frolll his Government to refuse to act ill
allY joint expedition ofwhich he wa:,; not gi \'Cll the COllUllUlld. But
anxious to bring matters to a head, and deceived by La Pei'la's
mild plausibility, he conscnted to take the second place, 011 the
groluld that the SpulIiurd contributed the larger body of troops
to the enterprise.
If Graham himself had headed the united force., it is certain
that the siege of Cudiz would huve been ruiscd for the moment,
though what would have followed that success no IlIUIl can say,
tor it would have brought about such It convnIsion in Andalusia,
lUld such a <:ollcclllratioll of the French troops, that the whole
of the conditions of the war in the south would have been
altered. Graham had all the qualiticil which La Pcfia lacked--
indomitable resolution, swift decisioll,a good eye for topography,
the power of inspiring enthusialltic confideuce in his troops. He
was no mere professional soldier, but a crusader with a mission;
indeed his personal history is one ot' extraordinary interest. When
the French Revolution broke out he w!!:; u civiliulI of mature years,
a "Vhig Member of Parliament, aged fOlty-four, mainly known as
a great sportsman 1 and a bold cross-country rider. Yet l:crtainly
if the war of 1793 hOO not come to ptu;s, he would only be
remembered 1I0W as the husband of that beautiful .Mrs. Graham
whose portrait is one of Gainsborough's best-known masterpieces.
Driven to the Riviera in 1792 by the failing health of his
wife, who died at Hyeres, Graham was an eye-witncss of the
outbt'Cltk of violence and blind rage in France which followed
Brunswick's invasion. He himself WIIS nrrestcd-his wife's coffin
was torn open by a mob which insisted that he was smuggling
'ar1l1s for aristocrats' therein. I-le narrowly escaped with his
life, and returned to England <:ollvincL'(l that the French had
tlwm uuder Ulake and Ln l'dia, says tIlU.t thc lat!.cr",lIS geucmlly nllowcd
to be incompetent-he was a regular old woman. He tells all ilIustrath'e
ILllecdote, of IL gllcrrillcro chief who came to concert a bold plan with the
general, and went away at ouce, saying, 'Can 1 IlOpe to get allYthing out
of a.u officer who, as 1 find, is called "DOmHl. l'I1anuela" by everyone
about him?' Sc1lcpolel', Geschicllte der &Jltm"CIl~'11 MfJIlurc/lic, i. 134. La
Pcl1a. had kept his place, despite of Ilis Tudcla fiaileo, tltrougll family aud
,awll illtriglles-he is sail! to Ilal'e Lecn the' tame cat' of certain gre.,t
ladies of the patriotic party.
I He played ill the first l'ecortled cricket match ill Scotland ill 1735.
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become a nation of wild bensts, lUMtes lmmani gellcrw. 'I had.
once deprecak>cl,' he wrote at the time, • the hostile interference
of Britain in the internal affairs of France, but what I have seen
in my journey through that country makes me consider that war
with her has become just and Ilecessary in self-defence of our
constitution I.' Widowed und childless, he tbought it his duty
to go to the front ut ouce, despite of his fort)'-folll" years and his
Itu:k of military training. He devoted all his avuilablc fWlds to
the raising, in his own cOllnty. of the 90th Foot, the' Pcrthshirc
volunteers,' of which he became the honorary colonel. He could
not take command of the corps, because he had no substantive
military rank, but he could not keep at home. He went out to
the Mcditerl"O,nCtUl us a sort of VO!UllU,-el' nide-de-camp to Lord
Mulgravc, and afterwards, being found useful owing to his gift
of languages-he knew not only Italian but German, a rare
accomplishment in those days-he was entrusted with a special
mission to the Austrian army of IW)'. He served through all
the disasters of Beaulieu and Wurmser, starved in )1nnttla, and
froze in the Tyrolese Alps.
]'rom that time onward we find him wherever there was
fighting against the French to be done--in Sicily, Minorca,
Malta, Egypt, Portugal. So great were bis services that,
contrR.ry to all "Var Office rules, his honomry colonelship WI\S
changed to a regular commission on the $taff~ and ill 1808-9
he »ervcd first us the British attache with Casw.ilos's army, and
later as one of Sir John Moore's aides-de-camp. In reward for
brilliant service iu the Corunna campaign he was given in 1810
the command of the British force at Cadiz. And so it came
about that this ·Whig Member of Parliament, who had COIll-
menced soldicring at forty~four(like OH vcr CrolllwelI and J utill!'
Caesar), was at »ixty-two leading u British division in the field.
He had an iron frame 2, and his spirit was as firm as his body-
the crusade had to be fought out to the end, though the ellemy
was nolV the Corsican Tyrant, not the Atheist Republic against
which he had first drawn his sword. It was in keeping with all
1 See his diary, quoted in Delavo)'e's Lif.: cif lArd. LYrlcdoch, p. 32.
I Graham survived &rrOiia for thirty years, lived to be ninety-six, and
after '\'aterloo founded the Ullited Service Club, 118 a place of rendc-I.vous
for his old l'cninsular comrades, who looked upon llim as a kind of father.
(I....N. U I[
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his previous ClU'eel' that he consentetl to take the secoud place ill
the Tal'ifa expedition; to get the army started was essential-
his personal position counted fOl' nothing with him, Bcfore
a month was out he had good reason to regret that he had been
50 self-denying.
After llltlUy tiresolUe delays 1 the English contingent sailed
from Cadiz on February felst, but met with such fierce west
winds, when it neared Cape Trafalgar, that the COJ1voycollld not
make the difficult harbour of Tarifa, and was blown pu..st it into
Gibraltar Bay, where Graham landed on the 23rd at Algesiras.
Hcre he found waiting for him a 'flank battalion' of 536
bayonet;, which General Campbcll lmd made up for him out
of the six flank companies of the l/9th, 1/28th, and !¥82nd.
l'l'Om Algcsirns the troops marched on the 24th to 'l'arifa,
where they picked up another reinforcement provided by Camp-
bell, the eight battalion companies of the 1/28th, which had
been doing garrison duty in that little fortress-460 men in all.
Having now just 5,196 men, Grahalll divided the infantry into
two brigades. The first under General Dilkes numbered 1,900
bayoncts: it was composed of the. two composite battaliOllS of
the Guards, tOhrether with the flank battalion from Gibraltar
and two companies of the 95th ltitles. The second brigade,
under Colonel 'Vhcatley, had 2,683 bayonets, and consisted of
the l/2Sth, 2j61th, ft/87th, und ullothcr 'flank battalion' under
Colonel llarnard, composed of the two light companies of the
20th Portuguese (the only troops of that nation which served
ill the CXIX-'(}itioll), those of the 2/47th, with four more <.:ompunies
of the 95th Rifles. There were only 206 cavalry-two squadrons
of the 2nd Hussars of the King's German Legion-and tell guns
under Major DunCRn.
I The delays in the start caused all unexpected conjunction in the
mountains of tlle soutb. Deguiues and his roving brigadc, warned to be
ready to join ill the campaign by the 23rd, came down from tile ROlllb
mOllllulins in search of tllC army, advanced Ill> far as MOIliua Siduuia, 'uul
skirmishetl thcre with Vietor's flank gunnl, two battalions umlCT General
C~c, which were alwa)'s kept watching the mountloins (Marcll 25).
!katen olf, !kguines retired to his usual haunts, and waited for signs of
the expedition. His premature attack-premature through no fault of
his Oll'n-called Victor's atteution to his rear, and caused him to fortify
Medina Sidonia, and to reinforce Cassagne with three battalions and
a e:walr)' rcgiment.
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The Spanish contingent had sailed three days after Graham,
had met with the same rough weather, and had been much
beaten about. Dut the troops began to arrive at 'l'arifa on the
~6th. and were all ashore Oil the 27th. La. PClla assumed
command, was all politeness, and made over to Graham two
ullbrigaded battalions of his own, to bring up the force of the
two smallllritish brigades to a higher figure 1. The rest of his
troops were orgalli:r.ed in two divisions under Lardi7.abal and the
Prince of Allglonu, the first five, the st,.'Colld six battalions
strong 2 ; he had brought fourteen guns, and four squadrons of
horse under an English colonel in the Spanish service, Samuel
Whittingham, an officer who did not add to his laurels during
this expedition.
On arriving at the b.oidgc of Faeinlls lLnd the village of
Bololliu., ten mil~ ouwide Tarifu, La Peiia had tu make up his
mind whether he would march against the rear of the French
lines before Cadiz by the track nearer to the coast, which
passes through Vejer de la }~rontera, Conil, and Chiclana, or by
the inland road through the mountains, which runs past Casas
Viejas to Medina Sidonia. The two roads at their bifurcation
are separated by thc long lagoon of Lt Janda, a very shallow
sheet of water, scven miles long, which nearly drk>s up in
summer, but wa.s at this moment full to overtiowing from spring
rains:':. To take the inland route across the mountains was by
far the better course. The road was not good, but if the Allies
could reach Medina Sidonia. with their army intact, Victor
l These battalions were, I believe, Ciudad Real and 4th WaHoon
Guards.
1 As the names of tlle Spanish battalions engaged in this expedition
hal'C never before been colleeted, it may be wortll while to mention here
that tIley were-Lardizabal's division: Campomayor, CarmODa, Mureia
(2 harts.), Canarias; Anglona's divisioll: Africa (2 batts.), Siguenza,
Cantabria (2 batts.), Voluntari08 de Valencia.
1 I do not know these roads, nor the field of Barrosa, but Colonel
Churcher, of tIle Royallrish I"usiliars, WllO is well acquainted with tllcm,
tells me that the track (five miles inland from t]le coast) marked on the
Britisll staff map of 1010, from Bolonia to Vejer, is no proper road at all,
and unfit for wheeled traffie to this day; while the 'Carifa-Medina Sidouia
road is bad, but can carry vehicles. He tells me that he ]Ias actually
crossed the L.1{;Un3 de la Jancla at its centre in dry weather, so shallow
does it become.
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would be forced to come out and attack them, at 11 great
distance from his Lines. l,'or it would be practically impossible
for the Marshal to allow La Peiia and Graham to establish
themselves at Medina, in the rear of his head quarters, and
backed by the Sierra de Jerez, from whose skirts they could
send out as Illuny detachments as they pleased, to cut the com-
munic.'t~tion between Seville und the Lincs. There was little
danger of being taken in the rear by troops sent by the distant
Sebastiani, whose nearest forces were at .Marbella, eighty miles
away, and whose attention was at tlus moment fully taken up
by the local guerrilleros, who had been turned loose on him.
Indeed, Sebastiani for some time thought that the expedition
was directed against himself, and was preparing to concentrate
and take the defensive. The only drawbacks to the Medina
Sidonia route were there would be no chance of communicating
along it with the garrison of CtLdiz, and that the question
of provisions might grow serious if the campaign were pro-
tracted, for the region was barren and the army ill provided with
transport. But a few days would :;ettle the afliJ.ir-Victor would
be compelled to come out at once and light, with every 1I11U1
that he could bring, and while he was engaged at Medina, there
would be nothing to prevent the 7,000 Spaniards in Cadiz from
crossing the harbour and destroying the ill-garrisoned Lines.
This in itself, even if the Allies failed to hold back the Marshal,
would have an immense effect nIl over Andalusia 1.
LP. refia originally intended to take the right-hand road, and
ordered Beguines, who was lIOW ill the high hills to the east,
about Ximena, to join him with his roving brigade at Casus
Viejas. The column left Facinas late in the evening, for La. Pelia
had a great amI misplaced belief in night marches, by which he
alwa)'s hoped to gain time on the enemy, since his moves could
not be discovered or reported till the next morning. He over-
looked the corresponding disadvantage of the extreme slowness
of progress over bad roads in rugged country, the very real
danger that the troops (or some of them) might miss their way
in the dark, Ilnd the iucvitnblc fatigue to the men from losing
their proper hours of sleep. Graham's laconic diary shows hOIf
1 There is a good note on tIle pr08 and COIlS of the two routes iu
~chepclcr, i. 161.
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this worked out. 'Marched in the evening, very tedious from
filing across water (the stream which fills the head of the lagoon
of La Janda) and other difficulties. Misled by the guides on
quitting the Cortigo de la .Jands. (farm at the head of the
lagoon): the cOllnter~IlHtrchmnde a most fatiguing night. . . .
It was twelve noon before the troops hulted, having been nine-
tccn hours under arms.'
The troops of Lardizabal, at the hend of the column, had
reached Casas Viejas in the morning, but the English division
in the rear of the army had got no further than the northern
end of the lagoon, some tbirtcen miles from their starting-place
at Pucnte de Facinas. There was a violent east wind, the
night bad been very cold, and the men were much fatigued.
Lnrdi7.tl.bal on reaching Casas Viejas had found the convent,
which was the only solid building there, occupied by a French
post, two companies sent out by Gilneral Cassagne from Medina
Sidonia to watch the high-road. Thinking at first that he wa.~
only about to be worried by guerrilleros, the French captain shut
himself up behind his barricades, iustead of retreating at ollce.
When he found out his mistake, and saw that a whole army was
about him, it was too late to get off without loss. .u, Pena
ordered that the convent should be left alone, as he did not
wish to waste time in battering and storming it. The whole of"
his troops hud come lip, including the roving force of 1,600 men
from the hills under Beguines, when the French unwisely made
a bolt eastward, in the hope of escaping. The little column was
pursued and cut up by l\ squndron of Busche's German Hussars,
many being killed and captured. From the prisoners and
Dcguines's scouts Lt. Pefia lefl.rnt that Medina Sidonia wn.s (con~
trary to his expectation) held by a serious force of Frcnch-
Cassagne's· detAchment being now composed of five battalions of
infantry, a battery, and a cavalry regiment, about 3,000 men.
The walls had been repaired, it was said, and the place was in
a state of defence.
The Spanish geneml should have rejoiced to learn that Victor
had sent an appreciable part of his army so far afield-fifteen
miles from Chiclana-ftlld by advancing he could have forced
the Marshal to come to this distance from his lines in order to
support Cassugne. A battle would no doubt have fo11owOO-
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but it WM for a battle thnt the army had ~ailed to 'l'arifa.
And by drawing Victor's whole fighting force so far awu)' from
Cadiz, La Pel1a would haye given n. unique opporttl,Tlit}· to the
garrison to come out and destroy the ~icgc-works. MeAnwhile,
if the French lost the battle they would be annihilated, being
off their line of retreat; if they WOIl it, they would return to
find the greater part of the sicge-works destroyed.
But this was not the line of thought that guided La Peiia;
he was, as his previous record showed, n. shirker of responsi·
bilities, und the prospect of a battle on the morrow, or the day
after, seems to have paralysed him. To everyone's surprise he
gave orders that the army, waiting till dusk had come on,
should leave the Medina roRd, and murch across country by
a bad bridle-path to Vejer, on the other route from'l'arifa to
Cadiz. Graham protested against a second night "march, after
the experience of the first, and rightly, for news came in ere
night that the road along the north side of the Daroote river,
which La Peiia had intended to use, was absolutely under water
from inundations. La PClia therefore consented to wait till the
next morning (March 3rd) and to use anotller country road, that
between the north cnd of the La Janua Iil{,TQOIl and the river
into which it falls. The army marched at 8 0'clock-Lardi7Abal
as before in front, the English division in the rear. Dut on
reaching the intended crossing.placc, it was found that this roud,
like that north of the river, was flooded, the lagoon having over-
flowed at it'! northern end, and joined itself in one shallow shett
of water to the Barbale. Grahalll, 011 arriving at the ptlSsoge,
found the Spaniards halted at the edge of the flood, and appo-
rently at a nonplus. The energetic old man took the business
out of La PClia's hands-he and his stafl' rode into the water,
and sought personally for the track of the submerged causeway,
which they fortunately found to be nowhere more than three
feet under the surface of the flood. He placed men along the
track at inwnals, to guide those who should follow, and sat 011
his horse in the middle of the ford encouraging the troops as
they marched past him. • I set the example of going into the
water,' he remarks in his diary, •which was followed by Lacy,
the Prince of Anglona, and others. The passage lasted three
hours, and would have takcn double that time but for the
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exertions made to force the men to keep the files connected.'
It was 12 o'clock at night bcfOl'e the army reached Vejer-
having taken fifteen hours to cover ten miles, owing to the
delays at the inundation. Every onc was wet through and much
fatigned, for the weather was still very cold.
It remained to be seen what the ellemy would make of thifl
move; a squadron ofFrench dragoons had bceu fmmd ill Vcjer by
the advanced guard, and driven out, so that it was certflin that
Victor would get prompt news that at any rate some part of
the allied army had now appeared. on the western road. The
l\[arshal, as a matter of fact, was puzzk-d. On the night of the
flnd he had heard from Cassagnc that the enemy was in force
011 the Medina Sidonia road, and had cut tip the post at Casas
Viejas. He accordingly sent orders to Cassagne to bid him
stand firm, and promised to support him with his whole dis-
posable force. Blit before dawn on the 4th he got news, from
the dragoons expelled from Vejer, that there was a heavy for<..'C
on the western road. Had La Pefia transferred himself fl'om
one route to another, or were the Allies operating in two
columns? Cassngne reported a little later that the cohnun
opposed to him had advanced no further, but that there were
still Spanish troops on the Casas Viejas road; and this was true,
for La Pefia had left a battalion and some guerrilla horse at that
place, to give him news of Cassagne, if the latter should move,
But there was also the garrison of Cadiz to be watched, and
it was showing signs of activity, On the night of the !!nd-3rd.
whcn thc field army had been lying at Casas Viejus, Gcneral
Zayll.S had, in accordance with the scheme of times left with him,
thrown his bridge of boats across the Santi Petri creek, and
passed a battalion across it, which entrenched itself 011 the mud-
Rat, facing the French works that cut off' the peninsula of the
Dermeja. They threw up a strong tete-dll~pollt, undisturbed,
being ~tlder the pl'otcctioll of the hea\'y guns in the castle of
Sallti Petri, and other batteries on the Isle of Leon. The move
could only mean that the garrison ofCadiz intended to come out.
Accordingly Victor resolved to stop its egress; waiting for the
dusk on the night of the 3rd-4th, he sent six companies of
picked voU~O'CI~rs to storm the Ute-dl~-p(mt. 'l'hi.~ they accom·
plished, the heavy gUlls flliling to stop thcm in the dusk: the
104 EVENTS IN THE SOUTH OF SPAIN [i\I'\RCIl4
Spanish battalion in the work (Ordelles Militares) was nearly
annihilated, losing ]S officers and gOO men killed or taken.
Dut the bridge itself was saved by the prompt sinking of
two of its ooats, and was hastily floated back to the islulld,
where Zayns laid it up for further use. He had been much
chagriuC'<J o.t seeing alld hearing nothing of allied forces behind
the F'rcllch, which he had beeu told to look fol' all 1\ft\rch 3nP,
])utting together the movement of ZayflS, and the fact that
some at least of the allied urmy 'I'M now on the Vejer road, the
Marshal came to the correct conclusion that the army ill the
field was intending to get into communication with Cadiz and
its garrison. Accordingly he made a new plan to suit this
hypothesis: of his three divisions one, that of Villattc, IVUS to
block the neck of the peninsula. along which the track from
Vejer alld Coni! leads to the Santi Petri creek and the Isle of
Leon. The other two, ("'Ollt'Cntratcd at Chicluna, wel'C to wait
till the allied force had found itself blocked in front by "illatte,
nnd then to faU upon its flank, in the space of three miles that lies
between the hill of Durrosa und the position where Villatte had
been posted. This plan would place the intercepting division
in obvious danger, since, while attacked in front by the head of
the allied Il.rmy, it might find Zayns attempting once more to
lay his bridge, and to take it in the rear. Such a movement by
the garrison could not be stopped, because the end of the penin-
sula, by the bridge-place. was under the guns of several heavy
batteries. But Victor directed Villutte 1I0t to fight to the 11:;t,
but to be contented with holding the Allies in check long enough
to enable the main body to fall on their flank. The sound of his
guns would be the signal for the two striking divisions to mol'c
uut frolll the wood ofChiclalla,and dash at the long (,.'OIUlllll whosc
head would be engal:,..w with Villatte, while its tail would still
be coming along the coast many miles to the rear. For 14,000
men had only the single line of commUllicatioll along which to
move.
I According to SchepcJer La Peil3, had sent an officer out from Tarjfa
in a fisllillg-boat on tlle ht March, to let tlle garrison of Cadil< kllOw tJI:lt
lie might not kecl' his time accurately; thilllllcssCllb'"Cl' was stoPIlCtl at!;tj;l
hy lIll English brig, Hud ~illce he was disgnised ILlll.! Ilnd 110 l':nglish Ilass,
he was detaim.'t.l BOrne time lI.9 a suspicious character, and only readll.~1
Cadil: 011 the 4th.
--~-
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Meanwhile Cassagne, at Medina Sidonia, was sent orders to find
out exactly what was in front of him, and if there was no solid
force, to march to join the main body on the morning of t.he
5th. He must have received the order to do so somewhere in
the afternoon of the 4th.
Victor's force was not so large as he would have wished.
Soalt hnd taken from him six battalions of infantry and three
c!lI'alry rcgiments, reducing thc total of the lst Corps left lIt 01'
near Cadi:-; to twenty-three battalions of infantry, three regiments
of cal'alry, and four or fh'e field batteries, about 15,000 men in
all. There were also present in the lines 3,500 men more not
belonging to the corps, viz. about 1,000 artiller)' and 800 engi-
neers nnd saFpcl'S belonging to thc sicge train, nnd 1,600 marinc
troops from thc flotilla which had been constructed in Cadiz bay.
These of course were useless for field operations; but they
served to man the lines, with the addition of three hattalions-
~,OOOmen-from the fighting force, the least that Victor thought
he couhl spare. For the garrison of Cadiz and the English
BL'et might attack in force any point of the Lines during the
absence of the main body. This left 15,000 men available for
fie.Jd operations: but Cassagne was still absent at Medina
Sidonia, with five battalions, 1\ battery', and one of the three
cavalry regimcnts, making 3,100 men in all. Thcre were thcre-
fore only 10,000 men left to face La Peila and Graham, till
Cassagne should come up. Victor, according to his own dispatch,
much over-estimated the force of the Allies, which he states as
8,000 El1glish anli 18,000 Spnniards, so that he went to work
in rather a despernte mood, thinking that he had to fight very
superior numbers, and that his only chance was to make a sudden
and resolute attack when he was not expected. As a matter of
fact he overstated the enemy by nearly a half, since thcre wcre
really marching from Vejer only 5,000 English and under 10,000
Spaniards altogether, and 110 help could come to them from
Cadiz till Villntte should be driven off'.
Each of the three divisions which Victor had under his hand
was short of se\'eral battalions; Ituffin's, the 1st Division, and
Leval's, the 2nd, had each 1\ battalion in the Lines and another
detached with Cassagne at Medina. Villatle's, the Srd, had one
in the Lines and three with Cnssagne. Hence they took the
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field, Rllffin and Leval with six battalions each, Villatte with fir£!
only. The respective forces were 3,000, 3,800, and 2,500
bayonets 1: each unit had its divisional battery with it. Of th£!
two Cflva.lry regiments. the 1st Dragoons, 400 sabres, was with
Ruffill, the ~Ild Dragoons, 300 Sll.bres, with ViUattc. On th£!
evening of the 4th Huffin's and Leval's men were concentrated
at Chicl1\.llll., hidden behind the woods which cover it; Villatte WAS
011 the ridge of the Torre Bermcja, between the Almall7.l.l. creek
and the sea, right across the track leading from Vejer to Cadir.,
and looking both backward and forward, with his attention ready
for Zayas a,~ much as for La. Pef1a.
Meanwhile the Allies were marching straight into the middle
of the trap which Victor had prepared for them. After passing
ConiI, the road on which their army was mO\'ing turns inland
towards Chiclana, while a mere track follows the beach towards
the Santi Petri. It was along this that La Peila was intending
to move. But in the dark the head of the column followed the
main road, and went several miles along it. At dawn the error
WM discovered, and the army, cutting across an open heath, got
down to the beach 2.
The point which the allies had now reached was a mile or so
south-east of the coast-guurd tower of Barrosa, where an isolatl't}
eminence called the Cerro del Puerco (Boar's Hill), crowned by
a Mlined chapel, looks out upon the heathy plain of Chic1l1na to
the north, and a scrubby pine wood (covering much of the
ground towards the beach) to the west~. The advanced cavalry
got upon the hill unhindered soon after daybreak, and met no
enemy. Ilor did patrols sent into the wood discover him for
some time. Presently, however, news came back from the fl'ont
, It chanced tlmt tl,e battalions in T..eval's divisiou were individuully
stronger lImn t1lOse ill tile othcrs-avcroging (140 IIlCll cac1" agnillst litlle
O\'er 600 in Villatte's anti UUffill'S divisions-officers not COWltetl. The
brigading was-ltuffiu, 1/9th Uger,l/OGth Ligne,l and 2/24t1, Liglle,
2 Provisional battalions of grenadiers. Le\·al 1 and 2/Sth Ligue, I and
2/54th Ligue, 1/45th, I Provisional battalion of grenadieT6. See Appelldi.~
at end of volume giving exact strengl1l.
t Sce Grahmn's diary, 11. 4(i5.
, The pinewood is now much shrunken, and cover;; only tlle northern
part of its original hreatlth. See an article on the top<Jgraphy of Uarra",'
by Colonel Verner in the SattmulY Review for Marcll 9, 1911.
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that a :French force had been discemed, drawn up bebveen the
Almnl17.8. creek and the sea, and blocking the way to Cadiz.
Being outside the wood it was "cry visible, nud seemed to be
about a strong brigade of infantry with a squadron or two of
horse. This was, of course, Villatte, waiting for the admnce of
the Allies. No other hostile troops were to be seen.
Ln Peiia now told Graham that, despite of the filet that the
men hrul been under arms for fourteen hours, and hutl llmrched
fig many miles in the dark, he was about to thrust this French
force out of the way without a moment's delay. Lardi7.abal,
with the vanguard didsion, was to attack it at once, while the
rest of the army took up a position to cover him from RUy
possible movement of the enemy from the direction of
Chiclana.
About nine in the llloming Lardi7.abal with his five battalions
reached Villatte's front, deployed and attacked him. The forces
were about equal, and the attack was repulsed with some loss;
La Pei'ia then ordered up the leading brigade of Anglona's
dh'isioll to support the vanguard. A sharp engRc~ment was
going 011, when a Ilew fire broke out behind Villatte. Zayns,
from the Isle of Leon, had recast his brid!:,1'C. across the Sauti
Petri, and was advancing to take the French in the rear.
VilIatte saw his danger, gave up his position across the peninsula,
and hastily fell back towards the passage of the shallow Alman7.tJ.
creek, .Ilear the mill of the same name. He recrosscd it, not
without some difficulty, and then drew up to defend the passage.
brdizabal was prevented by La Pci\a from pursuing him, and
halted opposite. The skirmish had been hot: Villatte had lost
337 men, the Spaniards a few more. Dut they had nchieved
their purpose, and the connexion with Cadiz had been duly
established.
About Iloon La Pel1a sent orders to Graham to evacuate the
Barrosa position, and draw in closer to the Almanza creek, to
,join the rest of the army_ Meanwhile he would be relieved 011
the hill by fhoe battalions of Crnz Murgcon and BcguillCll 1, to
which rearguard there was added one British battalion, Browne's
composite unit C9nsisting of the six flank companies of the 9th,
, Cruz Murgeoo was l:ommaudiug the two battalions attached to tile
British division, Ciudad Real and 4tll Walloon Guards.
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28th, and 8!2lld. Whittingham and the cavalry were to flank this
force on the eoast tmek,somewhere near the tower of La Darrosa.
This force was to move off' in its turn, when Graham should have
reached the main body, for the Spanish general had resolved
not to hold the Cerro, considering that an army of 14,000 men
shonld not be spl'ead out over four miles of ground, but be kept
more eonccntrntcd. Gl'Ilham entirely disngreed with this move-
ment; if the Allies came down and cmmmed themselves into the
narrow peninsula between the sea and the Almanza creek, there
wus nothing to pre\'ent Victor from seizing the Barrosn heights,
and placing himself across their front, in a way whieh would
block them into the cramped position which they had assumed.
The move practically threw them back on Cadiz, and Sllcrificcd
all the results of the toilsome flank march in which they had been
so long engaged. Graham had in the morning urged on La Peiia
lhe nll-importance of retaining the hill, but now saw his advice
rejected. Obeying orders, however, he set his column in march
towards the Torre llermeja and the Alman7,tJ. creek, through
the pine wood. At the snme time the rearguard undcr Beguim:s
and Cruz Murgeon ascended the Cerro, and took up the post
which the Uritish division had left.
The British column did not descend to the rough track along
the coast, but used a fair wood path right through the middle
of the pine forest, which saved them a couple of miles of detour,
and WllS practicable for artillery. They were soon filing along
betwccn the pines, lost to sight, and themselves unable to sec
a hundred yards in any direction.
At this moment, aoout 12,30 p.m., Victor suddenl)' broke Ollt
of the woods in front of Chielana with the 7,000 men of Ruffin's
and Leval's divisions. He was tired of waiting for Cassagne,
for he had now got news that the force at Medina had started
late in the mOMling, instead of at dawn, and would not be up
for two or three hours more. His cavalry had just reported to
him that the Cerro seemed to be abandoned, and that the troops
formerl)' holding it were marching ncross his front through the
forest. Since the main body of the enemy had. bccn located
opposite Villatte, on the Almam.& creek, there seemed to be a bJ"()oJ
chance of seizing the important Barrosa position unopposed, ami
of striking the renr division of the Allies while it was defiling,
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strung out helplessly ill a wood road, across the front of the
advancing French. The orders given by the Marshal sent his
cavalry regiment (three squadrons of the 1st Df'aorroons) to turn
the heights by their south-eastern flank, and seize the coast track,
while Ruffin ascended the Cerro by its gently sloping northern
front, and Leval struck at the troops known to be in the wood.
The French, being quite fresh, C/.l.Il1C on at 0. great pace; the
~lurshal had explained to his suoordinaks that haste was every-
thing. They were dearly vi~ible to the rearguard left on the
heights, partly visible to La Pel1a, who could see their flank up
the trough of the Almanza creek, but wholly invisible to
Graham and his troops in the wood.
A grellt responsibility now fell on the Spanish officers on the
Cerro; they were under orders to evacuate the heights when
Graham should have got away westward. 'Vhat were they to
do when it suddenly became clear that they were themselves
about to be attacked? They might attempt to defend the hill
with the one British and five Spanish battalions which Jay,
unseen to the French, under the seaward slope of the Cel"ro: or
they might simply obey orders, and retire towaroli thc main body,
abandoning their dominating position. The latter course was
the onc taken. The five Spanish battalions streamed down the
seaward face of the hill in no very good order, and fell in there
with the baggage of the whole army. All together began to
retire northward; there was ll. block on thc bench, the baggage
mules were driven right and left, and llJt\ny got loose and
bolted. Meanwhile Whittingham with the cavalry (three
Spanish I and two K.G.L. squadrons) ranged himself across
the track, where he was soon faced by the .French dragoons,
who had galloped round the south-eastern face of the heights
with remarkable celerity.
Whittingham's I'ctreat was lIot made without ll. pl'otcst against
it by Coloncl Brown€, who urgL'<1, firstly, that it was madncS3 to
abandon the height, sel"Omlly that he had Graham's orders to
stnud there, and could obey no others. The cavalry f,"Cnel'al
replied that, for his part, he had resolved to retire, and offered to
lend llrowne one of his squadrons to cover his retreat towards
I 111e rest of the Spanish cavalry beiug now with La Pcua by the
Almanl'.a creek.
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the British division, if he would not follow him lo tile coast
track. The fiery (,'oloud mac.le no reply, but turned to hi~
battalion and ordered it to occupy the ruined chapel on the top
of the Cerro and the neighbouring thil:kets, wld to prepare for
action. But in half an hour, seeing Whittingham's column far
off at the foot of the hill, and six French battalions comiJlg ill
upon him, Browne gave way and descended iuto the pine wood
in search of Gralmm l. The French-Ruffin's division-took
possession of the heights, and planted a battery upon them.
Meanwhile we must return to Grahalll, concealed in the wood,
and marching (as it were blindfold) across the front of Leval's
approaching column. He had no cavalry with him, but pre-
scntly two mounted gucrrilleroo rode up in haste, Ilnd told him
that the French were close on his flank. Riding back to the
rear of his division, he saw from the edge of the forest Degllines's
troops pouring down the llear side of the Ccrro, and Ruffiu's
mounting its northern ascent. Leval was also visible to the
1.1l.
Graham's mind was made up in a moment: • A retreat in the
face ofthe enemy,' he writes, •who was already in reach of the easy
communication by the sea-beach, must ha\'e involved the whole
allied army ill the danger of beiug attacked during the unavoid-
able confusion, while the different corps would be arriving 011 the
narrow ridge of llermeja at the same time,' i. e. he saw that he
himself coming out of the wood, Whittinghnm and Beguincs
from the shore trac.k, Rnd the main body retW'ning from the
AlmanY,,8. creek bridg~ would meet in disorder on the narrow
neck of the peninsula b)' the Torre Bermeja, and would be
unable to form au orderly line of battle. Even if they di~
and then held their groWld, the object ofthe whole expedition was
lost, and the French, in possession of the Ccrro del Pucrco,ouce
more blocked the army into Cadiz.
The alternative was to take the offensive before the two
:French columns had united, and to attack them while they were
still coming upon the ground, and before they had drawn up
in any regular order. It was evident that they were hurrying
forward without any notion that they were liable to be thrown
I 'fllere is a lively aecount of the altercation iu tIle memoirs of Browne's
ardent admirer B1akeucy (A Boy ill the Penill$u/u:/' lVur, p. 187).
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on the defensive at l\ moment's notice. In three minutes
Gmham hnd mude up his mind to attack himsclf, instcud of
allowing himself to be chased into the Bermeja position. The
wood, in which his division lay concealed, enabled him to hide his
movement, though it made that movement perilously disorderly.
'l'be orders given were simple: the leading brigade, that of
Colonel Whcatley, was to push stl'8.ight through the wood till
it reached the northern edge. and then form there, und attack
Leval. The rear brigade, that of General Dilkes, was to counter-
march down the wood-path on which it was engaged, till it too
cleared the wood, and then to form up and attack Ruffin on the
slopes of the Cerro del Puerco. The ten guns, in the centre of
the marching column, were to push up a side track which
seemed pllssable, and to form on Wbeatley's right, in the centre
between the two brigades. Meanwhile these movements would
take some time to execute, and the French were coming closer
re the 11'000 every minute. It was necessary to hold them back
at all costs till a line could be fonned. Vvith this object
Graham resolved to tlu'o\\' forward on each front a light inftllLtry
force, which should engRbI'e the enemy, regardless of order and
of losses, till the main body got up. On the left Barnard's four
companies of the 95th Rifles and the two companies of the ~Oth
Portuguese under Colonel Bushe, about 700 men in all, were
ordered to break throngh the wood directly before them, with-
out nny attempt at formation, and when they rCllChed its exlge,
to sall,Y straight out at Lcval's frollt, in the best skirmishing
line they could make. On the right there was a force already
to the front-Browne's flank battalion, 536 muskets, which had
just descended unwillingly from the Cerro, and was visible at
its foot.
This Illst force was near Graham as he sat on his horse
among the tI't.'C8 ut the wood's cnd. He cantered up to Brownc,
and asked him why the Ccrro had been I~bulldoncd. 'Becuuse
five battalions of 8palliards went oft' before the cllcmy came
within cannon-shot,' was the reply. "Vell, it's a bad business.
Broll'ue; you must iustanUy turn rowld again and attack.'
The flank battalion began to extcnd into skirmishing order.
when Graham, after a momeut's retlection, said, 'I must show
somcthing more :;Ell·ious t1111n skirmishing, Close the men into
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compact battalion! And then attack in your front and im·
mediately.' Dilkes's brigade was (',oming up, but was still a.
mile away in the wood, and Browne came out of the trees into
the open absolutely isolated, to attack uphill six battalions and
a battery with a two-deep line of just 536 meu 1. Blnkeney
says that his colonel rode into action singing the old lIaval
song-
'Now cheer up, my lads, 'tis to glory we steer,'
a tUllC to which he was much addicted at ull times ill and
out of season.
About the same time, or a few minutes later, Barnard's and
Bmhe's scattered and ulIevenline burst outof the northern edge
of the wood lL mile away, and fowld thcmsclves facing Levars
division at the distance of only some 400 yards. This force,
quite unaware that any enemy was yet near, was advancing
in two columns each of three battalions, the right one composed
of the 54th regiment uud a battalion of grClladU:r8 rCUlli8, the
left of the 8th regiment followed by a single battalion of the
45th. Their divisional battery was following on their left rear.
Barnard, who got a little further to the front than the Portuguese,
was facing the French 54th, Bushe, who was drawn back It little
in echelon, was opposite the l!'rench 8th. They had hardly
opened their lire, which had great effect because the enemy had
110 screen of voltigcurs out to cover him, and was caught
unprepared for all infantry fight, when DUllcan's ten gUllS,
which had made extraordinary good pace through the wood,
appeared, and unlimbering at its edge began to lire shrapnel
into the leading battalions of the French. Behind them the two
companies of the 47th, which proper!y belonged to Bamanl's
pro,·isionnl battalion, took post as their supports.
Thus the battle was suddenly begun on both fronts, hut
Graham had only 500 men up on one side, and 900 with the
gUlls on the other. 'The main body was <-'oming on through
the wood behind in an extraordinarily mixed order. When
Graham gave ordel's to Wheatley's brigade to face to their
right flank and push through the wood northward, and to
Dilkcs's brigade to tU1'll about on the road and retul'll to the
I All this from the graphic description in the autobiography of B1akencj',
13rowlIc's adjubmt, lO. lU8.
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Cerro by the way they had come. there Wa.'lIlO small confusion. Dy
some misunderstanding the rear companies of the 67th; which
WM the last battalion in Whentley's brigade. fnced Itbont Itnd
followed Dilkes, though the leading companies went off' with
their propel' companions, the 28th and 87th, On the other hlmd,
by tl. compensating mistake. the two companies of the Coldstream
Gnards, which belonged to Dilkes, turned north into the wood
and followed W'hcatley 1, The brigudes exchanged, as it werc,
S!50 men with each other. In addition the battalions, owing
to the sudden inversion of their column of march, were all
out of their proper order in their brigadcs, and went into o.ction
'almost anyhow:
But while a line of somc sort was being formed, the screen of
light troops which Graham had thrown forward, to detain the
enemy, during the deployment of the main body, had done its
duty by allowing itself to be knocked to pieces while attacking
fivefold numbers. It had to be sacrificed to gain time, and
carried out its orders completely, ''Vc will take the fortunes
of the right-hand fort:e first.
Browne's composite battalion had smrted from a position
close under the edge of the pine wood; it had first to cross
n broad but shallow ravine, and then to climb the gentle slope
of the Cerro, where it becAme fnlly visible to the enemy, though
there was a little cover here and there upon the hillside, in the
rorm of scattered bushes and slight dips in the gl'Oulld. The
French allowed the line to advance a little way up the ascent,
and then opened upon it botlt with a field battery pllU.'ed close
to the chapel on the summit, and with the musketry fire of
the three battalions which formed their right wing, Blnkency,
I '11le biography of General Dilkes seems to explain this matter,
Duntan, the artillery conunander, thought that he woultl be going into
action without any infantry supports, and rode to the nearest brigadier-
this was Dilkes-to ask him to lend 11 few companies to cover Un, gUllS,
Dilkes assented, and told the Coldstream companies in the middle of his
column to fall out and follow tIle guns, But Grnham l13d already set
aside the two companies of the 47tll, from Barnan]'s battalion, for the
S.1me purpose. 'Vhen Duncan found them waiting for him ill the edge of
the \\'0011, lie told the officer comnKllHling the Coltlstreamers that lie wall
not wanted, and these two companies marched off and fell into linc in
a gall in the front,of W1100.t1ey'1l brigade,
011.". IV 1
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our c"er-useful authority for this side of the battle, sa)'s that
the first salvo of the }'rench knocked over more than !WO oflicet5
and men out of 536 forming the line. Brownc ordered the men
to close to the centre, and endeavoured to continue his climb;
this was done with much difficulty, but, before the advance eouhJ.
be resumed, more than fifty men 1ll0l"C were killed or wounded
All the exertions of the colonel could not forlll a third line-
fourteen olncers ant of twenty-one were down, and more than
half the rank and file. The remainder now f«:attelm; the men
did not retreat, but threw themselves down, and commenced
indcpcndent firing from behind bushes, hillocks, and all)' other
cO\'er they could find, The French made llO attempt to fall upon
them by descending the hill, as would have seemed natural.
The reason was that by the time that the flank battalion had
becll disposed of, the main body of Dilkes's brigade had come
out of the wood, and was visible forming up at the foot of
the hill to deliver the real assault.
The Guards had obtained the necessary time to come up and
choose their ground through the absolute martyrdom of the
flank battalion. Dilkcs did not repeat the attack on the same
slope over which Browne had advanced l but pushed some
distance to the right, where the hillside showed more cover
in the way of scattered bll.'ihes and trees, and some dead ground
hid the men by its steepness from the fire of the battery Oll the
crest above. lllakeney describes them as strung out on a most
irregular front, a confused mass rather than a formed line. The
whole, while advancing, kept taking ground to their right, so
tlS to come up the hillside opposile Huffin's left willg. Their
extreme Rank was covered by Norcott's two companies of rifles
in more extended order. Partly owing to the cover, partly
to the difficulty found by the French f,l'\l.lIS in getting their
tire to bear, Dilkcs's brigade got wellnigh to the top of the hill
before it suffered any very serious losses. But on clearing the
last underwood, and reaching smooth ground, it WM charged
by the four battalions of Ruffin's left-two of the ~4th Line
supported by the two, reserve battalions of grenadiers reullis.
This was the crisis of the battle in the southern half of its pro·
gress. By all the rules of French military art four battalion
columns, fresh and well ordered, dll\l'ging down hill, should ha\'e
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been able to break through a disordere<11ine of decidedly inferior
strength pushing upwards against them. Dilkes had only 1,400
men, the four French battalions just over 2,000. Nevertheless,
the impossible happened. When the two columns of the 24th
Lignc came down, with drums beating fInd levelled bayonets,
against the centre of the firm, if disorderly, tine in front, they
weI'C checked by the furious -fire that broke out against them
from the semicircle into which they Imu pushed. This WIl:I onc
more example of the f.wt established at Maida five yoors before,
and rcaffinned at Vimiero, Tal'1.vera, and Bussaco, that no column
could break the Bri tish line by mere impetus. Iu this case the
!<'rench had every advantAge, since they were absolutely intact
troops, and had the ground entirely in their favour, while the
Guards and the wing of the 67th opposed to them had marched
two miles in haste, had then elimbed A steep !WO-foot slope
under fire, had lost their order, and were firing up hill. nut
the fire was delivered with astouuding accuracy, considering that
the men were blown with their climb and dreadfully exhausted.
The whole head of each of the descending columns was blown to
pie~s. The rest camC! to a standstill, and crowding togC!thc.r in
a disorderly clump, opened an irregular fire against the British
line.
The Ma.rshal, who wa.~ present ill person on the top of the
Cerro, then brought up his reserve, the two battalions of grena~
dicJ:ll undC!r GeuC!rol Chnudron Rousseau. He himself and the
brigadier were both distinctly seen leading on the coI\llnl1, the
Marshal waving his large whit.e.plumed hat over his head.
This charge! was delivered against the right of Dilkes's line,
wllere the Srd Guards and wing of the 67th lay, that of the
24th Ligne had been more against the cent.re and the 1st Guards.
But t.he result wa.~ the same, thongh the contest was more long
amI bloody. The grenadiers are said to have struggled forward,
losing heavily at eaeh step, till their front was within a vC!ry few
yards of Dilkes's line: it WM only then that they halted and
bcgnn to fire-It fatal step ill such n contest. where impetus was
the sole chance of the attacking mass, and superiority in musketry
fire (owing to the longer front) WlIs on the side of the English
line. This of course was a terribly murderous business to both
sides, as the figures presently to be quoted will show. But as ill
,~
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all similar contests during the Peninsular War, the line hit
harder than the column, The four French battalions began at
last to give way, and could not be kept together, Then Victor
tried to bring in the two left battlllions of his line to their aid,
but these two units were pestered and illlpeUed, whell they began
to move oll' fl'olll their 6rst position, by the rculIlills of Browne's
flank battalion, which (though reduced to under 300 lllllskets)
began to press forward again, when the troops hitherto ill their
front commenced to 1110ve off'to the right. 'They darted from
behind trees, briars, brakes, and out of hollows,' says Blakeney.
'I could imagine lIlysclf like Roocrick Dhu upon Delllcdi's side-
it was a magic ellect. We con6dently advanced up the hill and,
unlike most advances, in this one our numbers increased AS we
proceeded, soldiers of the flank battalion joining at every step.'
This srottcrecl little force hung on to the flank of Victor's right,
and prevented it from rallying the broken force now recoiling
from in front of Dilkes, The flankers had even the good
fortune to capture a howitzer from the left of Victor's battery
pla<..'Cd by the chapel Oil the hill-top; another gUll was taken by
the 1st Guards in their forward progress,
It must have been just at this crisis that the whole l''rench
mass broke; up to tlus moment it had been recoiling sullenly,
still kt.'eping up some fire from its re!\r. But now the observer
saw I, 'with loud and murmuring sounds, Ruffiu's division and
Rousseau's chosen grenadiers rolling with a whirling motion
dowu into the valley below, leaving their two brave genernls
mortally wowlded on the hill, which was left in possession ofthcir
bloodstained conquerors.'
The exhausted victors halted for a short time to re.form, and
were in a more orderly line than they had hitherto shown when
they commem:ed to follow the enemy down the slope. The
CAAualties in this part of the field may now be stated, tor neither
party was to lose many more men in the last episode of the fight.
Dilkcs's brigade and 13rowne's flank battalion had gone up the
hill with i6 officel'S and 1,873 men. They lost 25 officers and
588 men-about 10 men out of every 31 in the fight. The
French 10SK was positively more, proportionately not quite so
great. In the six battalions of Ruffin and Chaudroll Rousscau
1 Blakeuey, p. HIS,
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there seem to have been about 108 ofiicers and 3,000 men
present; of these 36 officers and 840 men were left 011 the hill,
i, e. 10 mell in every 35. The trophies remaining with the
viel:Drs were two guns and 107 ullwounded prisoners, beside the
llIultitude of disabled men left on the slope 1.
While this bloody bllliiness bud been going 011 upon the Ccrro
del Pucrco, it lllay be asked what wcre thc Spaniards 011 the coast
road doing-\Vhittingham's squadrons and the five battalions
of Cruz Murgeon and Beguines. The last named, "tl.th his three
buUuliollS, shepherding what was left of thc baggage-tenin,
quietly marched off' along the SCEL, and joined lA Pefia by the
Torre Benneja. Whittingham was of a little positive use; he
continued all through the fight to •contain' and occasionall)' to
bicker with the French cavalry regiment (1st Dragoons) that
fu.ced him near the Torre Barrosa. The two battalions of
Cruz Murgcon supported him. This force certainly did not do
its share-ISO German HURSars,300 Spanish horse, and 1,000
Spanish foot simply kept out of action 400 French horse. Thii!
1I'l\S something, but not much, for the dragoons (.'Ould not have
interfered very effecth'ely on the hill against DUkes's advance,
lx.'Causc the south side of the Ccrro is too precipitous fUl' hurse-
mcn. In short, 'Vhittingham's statemcnt in his report to
La. refill., that' all the cavalry fulfilled its duty brilliantly' is
n sad overstatement of the caSe.
Let us turn now to the other half of the fight, where Wheatley's
brigade and Duncan's guns were facing Leval on the open plain
just outside the (.>df,"C of the wood. At the moment when Browne
attncked the Cerro, llarno.ru's rifles and Bushe's llortuguese were
throwing themselves in a no less resolute fashion upon the six
French ootWliolllS in their .n·ont. They had the advantagc of
being invisible to the enemy till they emerf,"Cd from the wood, only
300 yardi! in his front, and of beiug supported, within a fell'
minutes of their arrival, by Duncan's ten guns, while Browne had
110 artillery assistance whatever, and II'W:I seen by the French for
half a mile before he got near them.
The confusion ill Leval's division on being suddenly attacked
I For further details sce the letters of Ge.neml Dilkcs, Colonels Norcott,
Stanhol>C, and Onslow. and Major Achcson, in Wellington's Supplemelltary
JJi~patchell, di. N'. 127-31.
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by an wlexpeeted swarm of skirmishers pouring out of the wood
was c.'<tremc. So much were they taken aback, that Vig<r
Roussillon of the 8th Line llSSures us in his memoirs that ,q, f,q,lse
alann of cavalry was raised, and that his regiment, and the first
battalion of the 54th, formed square before the mistake \\'l\.'l
recognizeJ, and caught some shells from Duncan's guns in that
uncomfortable situatioll, before they had time to deploy for
action against infantry. This they had to do lmder a heav)' fire
from Barnard's riflemen, who had advallced quite dose to them.
Leval's fighting formation was the usual' <:olumn of divisions,'
i. e. afront of two companies and a depth of three in each LmttaliOIl,
or (sincc these units averaged 650 men each, and the compunic.!
over 100 bayonets) II front ofscventy-two men and a depth of nine.
The length of Bamard's skirmishing line, with his 400 rifles,
seems to have (.'Overed the front of the right battalion of the 54th
lUld the left battalion of the 8th-some 1,300 men. 'rhe 95th
did considerable execution on them whilc they were getting out
of square formation: but when the columns advanced firing, the
skinnishing line had to faU back. Its los$ was heavy-sixty-fivc
killed and wounded; among the latter Barnard, commanding the
battalion. The ne-xt troops whom the French encountered were
the Rank companies of the 20th Portuguesc-350 men only, who
had advanced on the right rear of the 95th, supporting them in
echelon. This was a new corps, which had been sent to Cadiz the
momellt it was raised in 1809, and had never been under fire
before. Considering tllCir hopeless position, alone in front of
illl advancing division, the Portuguese behaved very well; they
held their ground for some time, while their colonel, Bushe, as is
recorded bY!Ul eye-witness, rode slowly backward and forll"ll1'd
behind thcm with his l:lpeetaclcs on, crying us the bulls whisUed
past, •Que bella musica,' to encourage his men. But he was SOOll
mortllll)· wounded J, and after his fall the line melted away and
I Vigo-Roussilloll says that he persoually c."ptureu Colonel HusIlc, WllU
was riding away slowly from the front, disabled by a woulld_ This seems
contradicte<:I by the very cirCllmstantial evidcllce of Blllluury, adjutllut of
the 20th Portuguese, \I-ho sars that Bushe had his horse shot under llim,
amI was morlally wounded, that lIe declined being sent to tllC rear, and
was propped 1111 and left behind by his own orders. french soldiers were
;;cell riJlillg Ilim as he lay,
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drifted to the rear, after having kept a battalion of the French
8th engaged for some minuws: proportiollately its loss was
mnch the snme as that of the Rifles-56 killed and wounded out
of 382 present-ol1e man in six.
11le first act of the dramu on this front WllS thus complete:
the detaining force sent out by Graham had been, as he expected,
driven in with loss, though not an appalling loss of 50 per cent.,
sudl as Browne's gallant Hankers had suffered on the Ccrro. Dut
the main body was now up, and had formed in the edge of the
wood, to the left of Duncan's guns, with no loss or interruption,
sincc it had been well covered all the time. There were now
some 1,400 men in line: the 28th, 450 strong, on the left, then
the ~1l bayonets of the Coldstreamers, the 87th,nearly 700 strong,
ill the centre; bc.rond them the right willgofthe 67th, about 250
bayonets, next to the guns, which were still under the protection
of the flank companies of the 47th which served as their escort
throughout the fight. The hrokel1 screeu of light troops which
had just retired was by no means ant of action; the 95th formed
up again behind the 28th, the Portuguese behiud the 87th, and
both were used again before the battle was over.
The formation of the French at this moment· was an uneven
liue of four battalion COlulllus,-eolluting frolll their left. lj8th,
~/8th, o/54th, lj54th; the other two battalions were in reserve,
the lj45th behind the French battery, which was now engaged
wiUl Dunc£tn's guns, the provisional battalion of grenadiers morc
to the right, and some distance behind the 54th regiment. The
wholc was advancing, but slowly: the battuliolls in the front line
were firing; the centre was £t little more to the front than the
win~..·s, the ~;l3th being ahead of the other hattalions because (as
its cluif de baJaillon remarks in his mcmoir) hc only allowed his
mcn to fire volleys by order, while the units on his right and left
were using independent fire. All had sufleroo in the previous
fight with Barnaru and the Portugne8C, and much needed time to
re-form, which Wl\S not granted them, because the English main
line charged the moment that the light troops had cleared ofl'
from its front. It is curious to note in the French memoirs
Umt the authors all write as if they had un oppressivc feeling
that the superiority of numhers was against them, and that thcy
werc beilJg k-d to a forlorn hope. This was roused partly by the
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immense extent of the British line in proportion to its depth,
still more by the hapvy existence of the wood behind Wheatley's
brigade. It hnd already vomitoo out two 1ively atlacking lincs, and
the encmy presupposed a third in rescl"\'C; nearly all thc Freneh
narratives definitely say that they were attacked by three line8,
while really there was only one, with the screen of light troops,
which had already been u;;ed up. As to the complaint cunt:ern-
ing inferior numbers, it is certain that Lcvnl's division hlu!
3,800 men, and \Nheatley's brigade only 2,500. The only
superiority of the British was that, in the artillery duel now
going 011 to the right of the line, they had tcn guns to six, und
soon crushed the l''rench battery, so that it gave llO eftectil'c
support to its infantry. Only one of the French battalions
attempted to deploy into line-this was the flnd of the 54th,
which lay opposite the British 28th-the others kept Oil from
first to la.<;t in column of divisions. An eye-witness (Surtees of
the 95th) remarks, • they never got into line, nor did they el'er
intend lo do so, I believe, but advanced iu solid bodies, tiring
ii·olll their front 1.'
The fight, owing to the French centre being slightly advanced,
began a little earlier there than 011 the wiugs, the first clash being
betwCCll the column of the French 2/8th, led by Vigo-Holls-
sillon, and the lille of the 2/87th, led by that enthusiastic
fighter, Major Gough. Vvc have narratives from both of them,
aud each insists that he kept down the fire of his men till the)"
were within a vcry short distance of thc encmy-sixty yards, says
Vigo-Houssillol1, twenty-fi\Oe, says <:Tough. There was then a
~ingle volley exchanged, and the French (:olumn, llluch the
Imrdcr hit of the two, broke up. 'As they were in (.'OlUlllll
when they broke,' says Gongh, • they could not get away. It
was therefore a scene of most dreadful carnage, and I must own
my weakness; as I was in front of the regiment I was in the very
middle of them, Ilnd I could not cut down one, though I might
have twenty, they seemed so confounded and confused 2.' There
was indeed a fearful crowding and melee here, for the 1st battalion
of the French 8th, yielding beforc the fire of thc British gUlls
and thc troops to the right of Gough, the wing of the 67th, fell
1 Surtees, Twcllty Years il'_ the Rifle Brigade, p. Uf!o
, &oe letter ill ltuit's Life of Lord (,'ough, voh i. p. 63.
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back shlcways against their own second battalion, and became
mixed ill onc mass with thclll. Thus the 87th werc sweeping
befol"e them, and ploughing through, a crowd of some 1,400, or
allowing for previous losses, 1,~OO men, while the companies of
the 67th were firing into its flank Md rear. The 8th Ligne
suffered worse losses than any other troops on the field that day,
S&\·e Browne's heroic flank battalion, losing about 50 per cent.
of the llIen who \vent into ll.Ction-726 killed, wounded, Md taken
out of 1,468 present. The colonel, Autie, was killed, and one
of the two battalion chiefs, Lanusse, while the other, Vigo-
U.olIssilloll, was wOlUlded and taken prisoner, The eagle was
captured from the middle of the 1st battalion after a desperate
struggle with the (-"olours-guard; Ensign K<."Ogh of thc 87th,
who first got hold of it, was bayonetted twice and killed;
~r&'€lLnt Mastcrson l then rUIl the aquUifl-rc through with his
pike, dragged the eagle away, and kept it during the rest of the
melee. This was the first eagle captured by the British during
the Pcninsular W!lr, !\lid its urrivul ill London wns rightly made
an occasion of considerable lx>mp and ceremony. The eagle wa.>;
prescntoo to thc PriuL"C UC&'€llt ill per.;on, who &"'Tantcd to the
87th tilC right to bear all cagle l1Ild a laurel wreath al)(wc the
harp on the regimental colours and appointments, and the title
of the' Prince of '''alcs's Own Irish Rcgimcnt.' Gough was
given a brevet lielltenant-colollelcy at once, and Sergeant
Mastersoll, who had captured the eagle, reccived a collunission
ill his own rcgimcnt; hc nnd hi:; descendants have served ill it
almost throughout the nineteenth century.
The rout of the 8th Lignc was not the lust triumph of tlic
87th on that day; driving the remains of that unfortunate corps
in front of them, they came upon the battalion of the 45th
Liguc, which had hitherto bL"Cll standing ill reocrvc behind the
French battery, and which Leval had jU5t ordered up to snpport
the broken fir.;t line. Gough, with thc grcatest difficulty,
sUL'CCCded in fonning about half his scattered though victorious
regiment to face this llew enemy. But there was hardly a colli~
~ion -" all the othcr French units wcrc brokcn by this timc, [llld
the 45th hesitated. 'After firing untit we came within about
1 A heredil.:.ry Dame of glory ill t110 87tll. '111e IlrC/;ellt representative
uf the family lVon his Victoria Cross at LadySlllith ill 1!JOO.
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fifty paces of them,' writes Gough, 'they (for us fortunately)
broke and fled, for lutd they done their duty, fatiglHxl as my
mell were at the moment, they might have cut us to pieces.'
That this battalion cannot have behaved well is sufficiently
shown by the casualty list-out of 700 meo present it ouly lost
55-far the smallest proportional loss in the whole French army
that day. Probably the weakness of its resistance is partly to be
accounted for by the fact that it was beillgoutflanked by the wing
of the 67th, who must have been extcnding in this direction at
the moment, prolonging the line of the 87th eastward. In its
double victory the 87th lost 173 men out of 700 in the field.
There remains the left wing of this fight to be dealt with.
Here the French 54th, in two battalion columns, was facing the
British lj!tSth and the 200 Coldstreamers on their right. This
was the only part of the field in which the French tried at all to
mallreuvre: the right battalion of the 54th began to deploy and
to turn the British flank, by moving westward into the edge of
the pine wood, but with little effect. We have a short account
of tlns fight in the memoirs of Cadell of the 28th.
,'We bud formed line under eover of the 95th, and then
advanccd to meet their right wing, wInch WllS coming down in
close column-a great advantage-and here the coolness of
Colonel Belson was collspicuoul>: he moved ru; up without firing
n shot, close to their right battalion, which just then began to
deplo)'. The Colonel then gave orders to fire by platoons from
centre to Ranks, Md low; ":Fire at their legs and spoil their
dancing." This was kept up for a short time, with dreadful
effect. The action being now general all along the line, we t\\;ce
attempted to charge. But the enemy, being double our strength
(since our flank eompanies were away), only retired a little all
each occasion. Finnlly, giving tlm..'C cht.'Crs, we clllil'g't..J. u third
time, and succeeded: the enemy gave way and fled in cvery
direction.' Of all Leval's division there now remained unbroken
only the single battalion of grenadkrs d:unis under Colonel
MClUlier behind the right rear. The routed 54th fled diagonully
to take eover behind it. Belson did not pursue very rapidl)"
and this wing of the beaten division moved off to the flank,
covered by the grenudiers, and prescntly met the wrecks of UIC
8th and the 45th not tar north of' the Lagulla del Puerco, the pool
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which lies beyond the heath, to the east. It may not be out
of plnce to give the losses: the 54th, with I,SOO men present,
lost $~abont one man in four. The grenadiers hardly sufferen
at all, never hm·ing come into close action. Of the British oppo-
site them, the 28th, with 450 men in the field, had 86 casualties;
the Coldstream companies lost 58 out of ~11 '.
Just as Leval's division arrived near the Laguna, it was joincd
by the wrecks ofRuffin's, descending in disorder from the northern
slope of the Cerro. It says much for the resolution of Victor
thal he succeeded ill halling the two disorganized masses, and
deployed two or three comparatively intact battalions and the
ten guns which remained to him, to cover the rallying of the
rest. At the 8fillle momcnt his cavalr,Y, thc 1st DrRf,'UOlIs, which
had galloped away rOlllld the east side of the Cerro when lluflin
was beaten off' it, came in and drew up on the right and left of
thc whole. It was a bold bid to secure an unmolested retreat,
for no more could be hoped. Some time was available for rally-
ing the troops, for Graham had also to get his cxhaw.ted Illell
into order. They came up at last, 'Vheatley's brigade on the
left., Dilkes's on the right, the b>UllS in the t'entre. The latter
were set to play ou the new front of the French, which thcy did
lI'ith great effect, the enemy being in a cramped mass. The
~kirmishers wellt forwllIxI, and a third l>Cpamtc engagement
seemed about to begin, when a small new force intervened. This
was one of the two squadrous of German hussars, which had fol·
lowcd the French dragoon:; around the back of the Ccl'ra, not Oil
the orders of 'Vhittingham, who made no haste to pursue, but
011 those of Graham's aide-de-camp POllsonby, who had carried
them off on his own responsibility. Coming like a whirlwind
across the lower slope of the hill, this !>I.juadron upset the French
scjuudl'oll of' the 1st Dragoons which formed Victor's flunk
guard on tlns side, and drove it in upon the infantry. Sn1ll.11
thongh the shock was, it sullk-ed to upset the equilibriulIl of thc
demorali7.cd French divisions, They went ofr in a sudden rush,
leaving behind them two morc guns, alld slreamed across the
plain towards Chiclana.
The battle was over; there was no pursuit, for the cautious
I These two COlllllllllicsJ wllO$Q losses, as it is SUClI llcrl.l, wcre ]u.\o.'1\'Y,
must 1111\'e been engaged \·..ith part of the left battalion of the French 54th.
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Whittingham came up ten minutes too late with the rest of the
ca.valry, in time to see the last of the enemy disappearing in the
woods. With him came up also the two infantry battalions
under Cruz Murgeon, and these were the only Spani'Jh troops
that Graham saw during the battle.
It llIay be noted that we have hitherto not had OCCASion to say
one word ofGeneral La Peilaor his two infantry divisions since the
main action began. On being informed, at the same time as
Grahnlll, of the approach of Victor from Chiclann, La Peila had
no thought save to defend the isthmus by the Torre Bermeja
against the approaching enemy. He drew up his own eleven
battalions acrmls it in a double or treble line, while Zayas, with
those which had come out of Cadiz, watched Villatte across the
Almrn17.a creek. Vlhen Beguines appeared from the Cerro by
the coast-track, he was put into the same mass, which must have
risen to something like 10,000 men. Presently new!! came from the
wood that Graham had faced about and was fighting the French.
La Peiia, as his own dispatch shows, concluded that the English
must inevitably be beaten, and refused to stir a man to support
them or to bring them off: Zayas repeatedl)' Wlked leave to
march up to join \VheatIey's flank, or to cross the Almanza and
to attack Villatte, but was refused permission. The first report, to
the effect that Graham WlU; driving the French back, La !'ei'ia
refused to credit. It was not till the fugitives of Leval's division
were SC€1l retreating past the head of the Almanza crC€k, that he
eould be got to aecept the idea that Graham was victorious.
And when pressed to join in the pursuit by Zayas, he merely
said that the men were tired, and the day far spent. The reap-
ing of the fruits of "idor)' might be left fot' the morrow.
V\rJlcn it is remembered that La Pcfia was only two miles
from Vlheatle)"s flghting-grOlmd, and three from the Cerro, his
conduct seems astounding a.~ well as selflsh. Grahnm's fight
la.stoo. nearly two hours. La Pefia could have ridden o,'er, to
sce what was going Oll, in CL quarter of an hour. He refused to
stir, CLnd deliberately sacriflced his allies, because he had got
a comfortable, almost an impregnable, position across the narrow
isthmus, and would not move out of it, whatever might happen
to Graham. This timid and selfish policy was an exact repetition
of his betrayal of Castai'ios at Tudela in 1808. With his 10,000
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men he could have c1'llshed Villatte if he had advanced on one
front, or have annihilated the remnants of Ruffin and Leval, if
he had ehosen to act on the other.
He had his rewR.rd: next moming Grahnm, after collecting
his wounded and his trophies, rccrossed into the Isle of Leon,
formally giving notice that in consequence of yesterday's proceed-
iugs, he WAS forcetl to withdraw his consent, given in February,
to scne under La Peila, and to fnll back on the discretional order!'.
gi,'cn by the Dritish Government not to undcltakellllY operations
in whieh he was not himself in chief command. It is impossible
to blamc him; no one could deny, after what had happened
on the 5th, that it was absolutely unsafe to go out in La Peiia'$
company. 'Vellington sent his complete approval to Graham,
well remembering his own experiences with Cuesta in 1809 1 •
• I concur in the propriety of your withdrawing to the IsIa on
the 6th,' he wrote, • as much all I admire the promptitude and
determination of your attack all the 5th 1.'
The division marched bnck into the Isla with only 4,000 men
in the ranks; l,9t58 had fallen or been disabled at Barrosa-
almost OIlC casualty umoug every four men in the field. But
Victor had been hit much harder; out of 7,300 men in the
divisions of Levtl.l and Ruffin much more than one in four, viz.
n.o less than 2,069l, were hors de combat; 262 had been killed,
1,694 wounded, 134 unwounded prisoners were taken, along with
the eagle und fivc guns 2. The units that had fought in the
Corro and on the heath by the wood werc absolutely dcmorali",cd;
it would have been impossible to put them in line again for
scvernl days.
If the slightest p\llih forward had been made all the 6th, it ill
certain that the Riege would have been raised. Victor had rallied
the broken troops behind the wood of Chielnna Oil Villatte's
comparatively intact division, and had been joined in the late
afternoon by Cassagne's 3,000 men, who had ut lust come up
from Medina Sidonia. liut there WAS panic all along the Lines:
while the battle had been 'b"Oing on, English and Spanish gun-
boats had threatcned their garrison, and had made small discm-
I W clliugtou to GrnlLam, from Snlltn IUurilllm, i\llIrch 26th. (Ditpatche~,
"ii. 300.)
t See lhe figures of losses in Appendix No. V.
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barkations ut one or two points; a battery had been CIlpturoo nenr
Santa Mal·in. If a more serious attack were made from the sea
next morning, it was clear that the line would break at some
point. 'The sinist~r phrases" destruction of the forts" and
"abandonment of the position" tlew from mouth to month 1.'
Victor called a council of war, and proposed to offer a setunJ
batHe lJchind Chic1anH; but he found little support among the
generals_ It was finally decided that, if the }\Uies should come
on in full force next morning, only sllch resistance ShOlllrl be
made as would allow time to blow up most of the forts, and burn
the stores Itud the flotilla. The 1st Corps would retreat Oil
Seville. Victor proposed that one or two positions, where there
were solid clo~ works., like :Fort SCnarmollt and the Trocadero,
should be left garrisoned, and told to defend themseh-es until
the army should return, \;tI'ClIgthenoo by SOlut and Seba.stiani, to
relie\'e them. lL is doubtful whether he would really han!
risked this 1l10\'e, since the time of his relum would have heeD
most uncertain, and he might very pl'Obably have been making
Il present to the enemy of any troops left behind in isolated
posts.
On the morning of the 6th the French retired behind the
Saltillo river, leaving the Srd Division (now coinmanded by
Cassaglle, for Villutte had been wounded) 011 the further side,
with orders to retire when seriously attacked, and to issue l\ signal
for the blowing up of all the forts of the south wing of the Lines,
at the moment that the retreat should begiu, Cassagne was then
to rejoin the Marshal behind the Rio Sun Pedm, beyond Puerto
Real, skirmishing as he went. liut no o'ace of the Allies was to
be seen on the mOnling of the 6th, and Cassagne was not forced
to move back, though by mistake one battery was blown up
without the ~igna1 being given 2. The only ~ign of life on the
part of the enemy was that a swarm of English gunboats and
launches appeared at the llorth end of the lines, and threw ashore
600 seamen and marines, who oceupied Puerto Santa Maria for
some hours, und destroyed all the smaller batteries between that
place and Rota wlhindered. For the French had concentrated ill
I lApene, Campagne8 rk 18Lo-11, p. 12L
~ See, fol' 8 curioQs note concerning Ulill incident, Lupclle, Appemli.l,
p.266,
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the fort of Santa Catalina and abandoned all their minor posts.
But the flotilla withdrew at dusk, leaving Vidor much pur,zk>d.
as to the purpose of his adversaries. On the morning of
March 7th he sent out a cavalry reconnaissance of several
!«jwu:lrons, which brought ba.ck the w,tollislung news that it had
exploref] the whole of the country hetween Chiclana and the sea,
including the battlefield, and hau seen no hostile troops, save a
large encampment on the Bermeja isthl11us,just above the bridge
of boats leading into the hla de Leon.
What hud htlppcned was that La PClia had determined tu
give up the expedition and retire to Cadiz. He had declined
to listen to a proposition made b)' Graham and Admiral Keats
that he should advance cautiously towards Chiclana, while the
British naval and land forces made a combined attack upon the
l'rocudero 1. He did not even send out cavalry patrols to dis-
CO\'er what had lx!come of Victor; if they had gone forth, they
would have fonnd that the Marshal had retired beyond the
Snltillo, and would have discel'lled his pre-parations for a gene-ra!
retreat. But after remaining encamped by the Torre Bermeja
during the whole of the 6th and the greater part of the 7th, the
Spanish arlllY crossed the bridge of boats into the Isla, and took
it up behind them. Only ~gJlines and his three battalions
were left on the continent, with orders to return to their old
haunts in the Ronda mountains. This little force retired to
Medina Sidonia on the 8th, and repulsed there a French (.'Olumn
of 600 mcn which came up tu occupy the town. But next day
a whole brigade marched against them, whereupon llegnines
evacuated Medina and went oft' towards San Roque and AIgCl';iras.
Victor was therefore able on the 8th to reoccupy the evacuated
southern wing of his lines, and to issue an absurd dispatch, ill
which he claimed thu.t Barrosa had bccn a victory. But for the
1 It is sometimes asserted that La Peila propooed to continue tllC
ClUllllaign, and was foiled by Graham's departure into the 1sla. But we
have Graham's own statement, in his dispatch to Henry 'Ve1Ies1ey of
i'llarch 24, tllat no sucb 111'°11081,1 was nll.de. <1110 only regret rucprcsscd
to me at Head Quarters on the morning of the 6th, on knowing of my
intention to seud the Britisll t.roops across tile S:mti l'etri, was tl,at the
opportunity of withdrawing the Spanish troops during the night was lost,
and on m)' observing 11\at after such a defeat tllere was no risk of attack
from the enemy, a very contrar)' opinion WtlJl upressed.'
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loss of 2,000 men, ancl a. ;;evere shock inflicted on the mornle of
his troops, he was in cxnctly the same position that he had held
on the 4th. The whole fruits of the battle of Barrosa hnd been
lost. What they might Imve been it is possible up to (I, ttl'btin
point to foresee. Supposing that Graham Ilnd not La Pe11a had
been in command. the army, raised to nearly j20,OOO men by the
junctioll of Zt\ya~ and of the 2,000 Anglo-Pol'tugucsc still ill
Cadiz, would have marched on Chiclalla llpon the 6th. Victor
would have blown lip the Lines and retiroo towards Seville, but
there would have been no reinforcements for him there, and he
could only have been brought up to fighting strength by tllll
calling in of Sehastiani and Godinot. nut, if these generals Cll.1ne
up to his aid, Granada and Corrlova would have had to he
evacuated, and the insurgents would have swept all over Eastern
Andalusia. The Allies could not have held the field, for even
before Soult's retum from Badajo7. there were still 50,000 French
troops south of the Sierra Morena. The siege of Cadiz would
ultimately, no doubt, ha\'e been recommenced, Granada ami
Cordova reoccupied. But meanwhile the immense work spent
on the Lines would have had to be recommenced de nooo, RlId
the ascendancy of the French arms in the south would have
received a rudc shock. Possibly Soult might ha\'e blown up
Dadajoz after its fall OIl March ath, instead of holding it, for
he would ha\'e required all his strength to recollquer Andalusia.
nut further than the immediate result of the fnc\;tahle raising
of the siege of Cadiz it is useless to make speculations.
The alarms of the French in Andalusia did not end with
Victor's reoccupatioll of the IinCll. Another episode was still to
be played out before matters settled down. The indefatigable
Ballasteros, having rested for a short time in Portugal, came
baek into the Condado de Niebln. in the cnd of February with
4,000 men. He defeated on the Rio Tinto Geneml Hemond,
whose weak column was the only French force left west of
the Guadalquivir since Gm·.an's departure (March 2). Hc
then marched promptly 011 Seville, having goOO inform!ltion
of the weakness of the garrison that had been left there. On
March 5th, the day of Barrosa, he was at San Lucar la Mayor,
only twenty miles from the great city. The governor, Daricau,
Cllme out against him and joined Remand with 1,000 men and
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three guns, all that he could dispose of, leaving Seville in the
hands of a miserable garrison, composed of convalescents and
jllramentad08 of doubtful faith. If Daricau had been beaten, the
city and all its establishments lllust have been lost in a day.
Dut Ballasteros refused to fight, and retired behind the Rio
'l'into, having had false news that a for(.'C sent from Estremadura
by Soult wus ou his flank. Daricau returned to Se"ille on
:March 9th, leaving Remand to observe Ballasteros, and was
joined by some detachments sent very wrdily by Godinot to
strengthen the garrison. Dut he had received such alarming
Recounts of the results of the battle of Barrosa, that he sent
theOlC troops 011 to Victor, and remained with a very weak force
in the city. But on March 9th Ballasteros, suddenly coming
back from the Rio Tinto, surprised Remond at La Palma, took
two guns from him, and drove him back into Seville. On the
'11th the Spanish general was back at San Lucar, and causing
great dismay to Daricau, who sent urgent demands for help to
Soult. Since &rrosu he could look for no help from elsewhere.
He was saved by the rumour of the capitulation of Badajoz,
which frightened Ba1lasteros away, for the Spaniard rightly
judged that Soult could, and must, send a considerable force
tlf,>a.inst him, now that his hands were freed.
WhClI, therefore, the Mo.rshal, ail we have already seen 1, callle
back in haste to Andalusia with Gazan's division, fearing that
he might find Ballasteros in Seville, and Graham pursuing Victor
from the cvacuated lines of Cudiz, he was agreeably surpri&.>d
to find that both dangers had been avoided, and that the crisis
in Andalusia Wtl.S at an end. His further movements belong to
a diflercnt campaign, Md will be related in their due place.
l\Ieanwhile Graham and La Pei'la were engaged in a violent
controversy. The British general had sent the most scathillg
(.oomments on his colleague's conduct to the ambassador, Henry
Wellesley, and to 'Vellington, and made his complaints also to
the Ref,rency. La Pefia on the other hand claimed the credit of
the \'idory of Barrosa fOl' his own skilfulmanagemcllt; accord-
ing to his magniloquent dif;patches all had gone well, till
Graham spoilt the campaign by taking his division back to
Cacliz. The ll.egency seemed partl,r to believe him, as they
I See p. 62 above.
Oll.~. IV h:
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conferred 011 him the Grand Cross of the Order of Charles Ill,
though at the same timc they offered Grahnm thc tille of a
grandee of Spain, which he refused, for he would not be honoured
in such company. nut Spanish as well as British public opinion
was so much against La Pena, that he was almost immediately
deprived of his command, which WilS given to the Marquis
Coupigny; while Graham, whose strong language had made it
impossible for him to be left in contact with the Regency, \Yll.S
withdrawn to serve with ·Wellington in Portugal, and made oyer
the chai:ge of the Anglo.Portuh'Uc:;e troOp8 at Cadiz to General
Cooke. Summing up the results of the llarr050. campaign, wc
may say that all it had accomplished was so to alarm Soult that
he came back in hilSte from Estremadura., leaving there under
Mortier a force far too weak to threaten any harm to Wellington
and POl'tugal. But evcn if Barrosa had never been fought,
Soull would have been harmless in any case, because }Iassenlt
was gone from Santarem before Badajoz fell.
SECTION XXIV
MASSENA'S RETREAT FROM PORTUGAL
CHAPTER I
SAN'I'AREi\I TO CELOlUCQ. MARCH 0-221<1), J8Il
ON the 9th of March Wellington bef,'i\ll at last to discover
the renl position of the various }?rench corps; till their rellr
was well past Thomar, it had been difficult to divine the main
trend of their movements, for the various columns had been
crossing each other's routes in n very puzzling fashion. But it
110W became clear that MasSeUR was intending to use all the
thrcc lines of communication wllich lend from the plain of the
'l'agus to the lower valley of the Mondego. Reynier aud the
£nd COi-ps. after passing Thornsr, had taken the bad mountain
road by Cabayos and Espinhal, far to the cast, and would comc
clown on to the Mondego near the Ponte de 1\1urcella, a little
above Coimbra. The 8th Corps had taken the central road,
that by Chilo de M~ans and Amciro, which joins the main
Lisbon-Coimbra ehausate at Pombal. Loison and his division,
ho.ving crossed the route of Rcynier, fell into the Chilo de
M8.lfans road behind Junot. Ney, a.fter holding Leiria till the
9th, with the divisions of Marchand and Mermet, fell back on
that day a march along the great rood in the plain (the Lisbon-
Coimbra chall$8ee mentioned above), and then halted. In front
of him was murching Drouet with Conroux's dh'ision of the
9th Corps, escorting the main train of the army, such as it was;
it reached Travatr0 do Baixo, five miles south of Pombal, on the
night ot' the 9th. Montbrun's reserve cavalry was all with Ney.
Of the three columns Ueynier's was 11,000 strong, that formed
by Junot with Loison in his rear had about 16,000 men, that of
Ney and Montbrun, with Conroux in front of them, comprised
over 20,000 sabres and bayonets. The main fact to he borne
in mind by the British general was that Heynier. had been sent
K~
5,855 "
10,251 meu
9,7!)4 "
4,734 "
11,OGG "
2,43[; "
5,000 "
132 MASSENA'S RETREAT TO CELORICO [i\LIlIC1I9
on an external road, separated by a very difficult mounttlin
chain from those followed by the other two COIUmll5, but that
Ney and Junot would undoubtedly unite at Pombal, where their
roads met, so that a mass of 35,000 men would be collected at
that imporul.llt centre of eOllllllullicatiol1 Oil the lOth or the 11th,
But Reynier could,not join them till tJle columns should have
got down to the Mondego, some days later I, Massena w~
rightly enough, trying to nse as many roads as possible, both to
avoill overcrowding of troops and trains on a single road, and
also in order that wider foraging might be possible, when the
army should get out of the devastated region north of Thomlll',
and descend into the valley of the Mondego, where it was hoped
that food would be far more procurable. But the result of
the disposition was that ReYllier would not be available for
several days, if the British threw their main force on to the rear
of Ney a,ud Junot fl.,?-d brought them to nction.
The road Leiria-Coimbra was moreover both the best and the
shorwst of all those that led from the position now reached b)'
'VellilJgton's marching columns to the "alley of the 1\Iondego.
By following it, and hustling hard the French column that had
taken it, the cOlllnUlllder of the Allies might hope to reach
Coimbra in time to prevent the French from taking np a secure
position on the lower Mondego, and establishing themselves in
.cantonments on its banks. For it was his main object to turn
them away from Coimhra ~l1d th.e coast-plain, alld to force them
up into the eastern mountains and towa~s the bordel"sofSpaill,
At first he did not think that the line of the Mondego could be
I The forc!!!! of tlu! French corps five days later (bu~ the numbers were
mud! tl,e same still) were, to he C)I;lIct [Return of ~Iarch ]5 in French
ArchiWt Nationale8]-
Reynier's 2nd Corps
JUllOt'S SU, Cortls •
Loison's Division .
Ne)"s other Divisions, llOtse Jlud foot
i\Iollthrllll'S Reserve Cavalrr .
Conroux's Division of the 9th Corps
Artillery Hcserves, Trlliu, Sappers, :\farine
B.1ttaliou, &c.
Total 49,1~ 1I1eu.
all exclusive of sick and wounded,
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held against the retreating I"rench by the trifling Portuguese
militia force that lay behind it-TrUllt's seven battalions a.t
Coimbra, Wilson's four at Pefiacova, which did not amount
together to more than 5,000 or 6,000 troops of \'ery inferior
quality. He issued orders to those generals to retire, without com-
mitting themselves to an attempt to defend the line of the riVCT
-'1'mnt had better go behind the Vouga, Wilson might retire
on Vi7,cu; both would ultimately join the northern reserves
uuder Baccelar, and co-opemte with that general in defending
the city of Oporto 1. But W'ellillg~on hoped that' matters
would never reach the' point ut whieh the safety of Oporto came
in question, for he thought that he would be pressing the rear
of the French so hard in /:l. few days, that they would be think-
ing of other things thnn taking the oftcnsive agninst nortbern
Portugal. He would do his best to thrust them north-eastward,
towards the frontiers of Spain. As a matter of fact we shall $(.'C
thut he more thun fulfilled his own forectlSt, for the F'rench were
so hotly pursued that they never succeeded in crossing the
i\folldego or seizing Coimbra. When they had reached its
gates, Masscna refused to take the risk of passing the river at a
moment when his rear was in such dire trouble that the whole
urmy would have been in danh'Cl' of destruction, if he bud beell
attacked when the actual operation of passage lVilS in progress.
Meanwhile the original movement of Reynier, Junot, and
Loisoll towards Thomar had caused Wellington to spread his
pursuing troops more towards the cast than was convenient,
when it tunled out that only Reynier was taking the mountain
road towards Espinhal, and that the other columns were going
to join Ney 011 the Lciria-Coimbra road. Originally ouly the
Light Division and Pack's llortuguese had followed Ney, and
they formed the only body of troops available for the pursuit of
what was now detected to be the largest body of the enemy,
1 Wellwgtou to Baccelar, Maf(:h 6: 'I couclude that Colonel Trant
will have retired from Coimbra UPOI1 t11e bridge of ti,e Vouga, whicll he
6hould destroy, and from thence on Oporto. The enemy ha,-c no boats,
and [ hOlle to be able to llrCSll tllcm so hard that tllCy elm get nOlle on the
Mondego.... If the enemy should turn toward Vizeu, you niB of course
do all that )'OU call to annoy them ill their march, !Jut seud all your
baggage, &0., across the Douro.' (iJillpatchu, vii. p.3:1i.)
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until the other divisions should come up from the renr, or be
marched westward from the Thomnr region.
On the 9th \Vellington's total available force, minus the
9llld Division and Hamilton's Portuguese, IlOW halted about
Abrantes and destined for Estrcmndura, aud miuus also the
regiments just landed at Lisbon, was about. 46,000 men I. or
these the Light Division and Pack's l'ortUgllest!, with Anson's
CIlvalr,Y brigade (now under Arentschildt), were at Leiria, in
close touch with ~ey's retreating corps. But the 1st, 4th, and
6th Divisions and Dc Grc>"s heavy dragoons were at 'l'homar,
two full marches enst of the Light Division; Picton with the
3rd Division was at Porta de MOB on the Sanmrem-Leirill
challss/:c, a day's jOUM1CY behind the vanguard. The 5th
Division and the independent Portuguese brigade of Ashworlh
were n mnrch behind Picton, about Alcanhede.
If Ne)' were to be joined by J unot and Loison, as now seemed
probable, in the directi9n of Pomba!, it would take one full day
for the 3rd Division to join the vanguard, two full days for the
rest of the nrm)" to come up. It would not be till the 11th'
, Viz.:
1st Division
3rl1 Divi~iol1
4th Di...ision
.'it1l Division
6th DiI,igion
Light Division
}'aek's })ortuguese Hrigade
AsI.worth's Portuguese BrigluIc
Cavalry, Britisll
" Portuguese
Artillery, British .
" PortugullSC
Engineers, \VaggOIl Train, &c.
Tot.....l Rritisll 32,080 allt1 14,250 Portuguese
The 2nd Division, left behind near Abrantes, had about 6,100 of all
ranks. Hamilton's Portuguese Division aoout 4,200, :Fanc's Briti~h
(13t11 Lt. Dragoons) and Portuguese cavalry was aoout 1,000 sabres,
artillery of both nations for the Army of Estremadura about 500. Th~
7th Divillion, now being formed at Lisbon, was composed of 2,800 British
and 2,300 })ortuguese. There were tlVO battalions not belonging to the
7th Division man:Ilillg up with it, with 1,300 bayonets (2/52nd, 2/88th).
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that!\. mass of' combatants would be collected sufficient to attack
the enemy, if he held the Pombal position. And thisconcentra-
tion had to be carried out for safety's sake; it would have been
iusune to bid the Light Division and Pack, the only troops
immediately available, to fall upon Ney and .Tunat and their
35,000 men. Ac<:oroingly Wellington directed the 3rd and
5th Divisions to close up mpidly upon the vanguard along the
cllUUatee, while the mass of troops around 'l'homar was to follow
tJle Chao de Mw;ans road ill JUllot's track and unite with the
othercolnmn in front ofPombal on the 11th. Onl)· Nightingale's
brigade of the Ist Division was detached, with one squadron of
dffil:,"OOus, to follow Reynier on his' eccentric' line of retreat,
Along the rough mountain road to Espinhal. Forty-three
thousand men out of the 46,000 which formed the disposable
tuwl of Vvcnillgton'~ arlllY were scnt ill pursuit of ::\{ussClla's
main body.
The bringing up of the rear divisions took time. Meanwhile
the Light Division with Pack's Portuguese and the atb\ched
cavalry, now united under the temporary ,control of Sir Wil\inJn
Erskine (for Robert Craufurd. the natural commander of such
Il. vanguard, was on leave in England), kept close to Ney's heels,
and on the 10th were at Venda Nova, immediately in fmnt of
his position at Pombal. The 4th Division were at Cacharia on
the same night, the 1st and 6th at Accntis and olher villages
Ileal' 'l'homar, the 3rd at Leiria. the 5th at llorto de Mos. All
these marches were executed through a country full of scenes of
horror: Picton, not 0. mall easily to be moved by scntiment,
wrote, <Nothing can exceed the devastation and cruelties com·
mitted by the enemy during his retreat: he has set 6re to all
the villages and murdered all the pcusulltry for leagues 011 each
flank of his march I.' The large town of Leiria was burning
in five places whcn the Light Division rcached it. The great
historic monasteries of A1cobwra Ilnd Batalha had been wrecked
in mere spite-the former, according to 'Vellingtoll, by direct
order fr011l the French heo.d qnarters. Every by-road and ravine
was strewn with corpses; a note from Grattoll's interesting
journal of the marches of the 88th gives au average picture of
1 l'iclon la Col. Pleydell. a letter printed in Hobinsoll's lAfe rif Picloll,
i.386.
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what the British army saw. 'At the entrance of It cave,' he
writes) 'lay an old man, a woman, and two young men, all dead.
The cave, no doubt, had served them as an asylum in the pre-
ceding "'inter, and appearances warranted the supposition that
these poor creatures, in a vain effort to save their little store of
provisions, fell victims to the ferocity of their murderers. The
clothes of the young pCfiSants were torn to atoms, and bore
testimony that they did not lose their lives without a struggle.
The hands of one were dreadfully mangled, as if in his last
efforts he had grasped the sworn which ultimately dispatched
him. Beside him lay his companion, his brother perhap~
covered with wounds. A little to the right was the old mall:
he lay 011 his back with his breast hare; two large wounds were
over his heart, and the back of his head was beaten to piece~.
Near him lay all old rust)' bayonet lashed to a pole; onc of his
hands grasped a bunch of hair, tom no doubt from the head of
his assassin; the old woman had probably been strangled, as 110
wound appeared all her body. At some distance from the spot
were two wounded soldiers of the French 4th Uger, abandoned
by their I.:omrades. These poor wretches were surrounded by
half a dozen Portugucsc, who were taking on them the horrible
vengeance common during this contest. On our approach they
dispersed and fled: both the Frenchmen were still alive, and
asked us to shoot them. 'Ve dared not, and when we had passed
all, we could perceive the peasants dl:sccnding from the hil~ like
vultures who have been scared from their prey, but return with
redoubled voracity.'
Before the marching divisions came up from the l'f*r, there
was a cavalry skirmish in front of Pombal between Arentschildt's
Light Horse (16th and 1st Hussars of the K.G.L.) and some of
Montbruu's dragoons, which wus of little importance as to
results, but lISSumes such a different complc.xion in the narra-
tives of the combatants on the opposite sides that it is harrl.l)'
possible to believe that they are writing of the same event I.
1 Karrlltil'e of Delagrave: 'La C3\'31erie 3nglllise se ilel.lorait avec
une ~ertaine auda~eJ et semblait vouloir provoquer un eombllt. Le
Gcmiral MOlltbrul.l s'm'llll~a lii:rem~nt lJOur l'aceepter. Les Anglllis avaienl
des ehevaux plus frais que lea niitres, et ils 6emblaient s'en prev/lloir.
Mais nos gens 81'8ient pour eux le I'rai courage et le sang-froid. Quelque.
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During the hours 011 the 10th of MllfCh, while the Engli!:ih
columns were toiling up from the fear to join the Light Divi-
sion, Ney's and Junot's corps remained stationary. the former
at the town of Pumbal, the latter at Venda da eru;..:, five milel;
behind it, resting, and seeking (mostly in vain) for provisions.
i\1a;;sella was determined not to move backward before he should
be obliged. MOlltbrun's dragoons rt.'COlUlOitrcd as far as the
bridge of Coimbra, which they found with two of its arches
broken, and cannon visible on the further side. The small force
in sight was the rearguard of Tranl's Militia brigade, which (in
ltl'CorolLncc with 'Vcllingtoll's orders) was preparing to draw
back towards the Vouga, but held on to Coimbra till a serious
attack should be dcliven.>d. Musseua. thereupon ordered his
cugiuecr, Colonel ValazC. to search for U {'"Oll\'cuicnt spot below
the town, at which a flying bridge might be thrown across the
escadrons de dragons, les lllus avanees, en voyant qu'on leg ehargeait an
g'raud g;\IOll, s'arrctCrclIt et IlouasCrcnt le Slbre eu a'·aut. et dallS cette
position relj:urent de pied ferme l'ellnemi. <.:ette mano:euvre eut un pleiu
succCs. L'ennellli fut rOIlli'IL, dt1sulli. i1 eut beaucoup d'hommes et de
che\'aux taut tues que blesses. Ellsuite les notres, dont pas un ll'umit
ete touche. tiraut un prompt 1)''Lrti de leur bon ordrc, et du desordre
des Auglais, eharghent it leur tour, et eurcnt en (luelques minute'! bon
marclu! de eette troupe, qui avait d'abord montrc taut d'nudace.' (C'am-
pagne de Por/uglll. PII. 191-2.)
Narrative of Tomkil.lscl.l. IGtl1 Light Dragoons: ,,,re followed the
euemy up 1.0 tile Pomool l'Illiu. wllel'tl t1111}· showell eight squndrons
formed on the heath in front. 'nle Hussars adranced with onc squadron
iu front and three in support. 011 which the enemy's skirmishC1'S retired.
aud the whole eight squadrons began to withdraw. We passed the delilc
ill our frOllt, and came lip ill time to join the Hussars ill tbeir cllarge.
We charged and broke one squadroo of the enemy, drove tl1at Oll to the
lieCol\d, and so 00, till tile whole eigllt wore altogotller in t110 greatest
confusion. '''hen we drol'c them Oll to their main sUPllOrt. \VC wounded
l;(l\'eral and took a few prisoners, and should Ilalle made more, but that
they were SO tllick tIll't we could 1l0t get into thelll. Tbe FrCllCh officers
called on tIlo men supporting to advance; but not a man moved.'
({)Wry, 11. 79.)
The returus show that the total loss of the British cavalry was uiue lllen
011 this day. Six bclollged to the Hussars, The report statcil Ulat olle
officer and ele\"en men of the .French were taken prisoners (see Ueamish,
lliltwy of the K.G. h, i. p. 320). Wellington'lI dispatch morely !;ays, "nlo ,
Hussars distinguished themselves ill a: chargc. wade umler thc cUlflm3uu
of Colonel Arentschlldt.'
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Mondcgo. On thil! day Reynier and the ~Ild Corps, far off on
the eastern mountain road, reached Espinhnl, the first village
beyond the Serrn dn Estrella. M that place has a by-road
leading to Coimbra, this detached body was getting nearer to
a possible reunion with the main body.
On the morning of March 11th the 31'0. Division joined
Wellington's vanguard after a toilsome march, and the 4th
Division, heading the column which came from Thomar, WIIS
reported to be in supporting distance. Ney, apparently having
detected the arrival of British reinforcements, then drew back
one of his divisiolls, and left the other p:fermet) in positioll all
the heights behind the tOWll, with a single battalion holding the
lofty but ruined castle which dominates the place. 'V'ellington,
Oil perceiving that the enemy was drawing back, orderl.J Elder's
battalion of' C&Jn.dOre5 1, supported by two companies of the
95th HiRes, to charge across the bridge tlnd occupy the town,
while the rest of the Light Division advanced in support, and
Pidoll moved to the left, to cross the stream lower down, The
atlacking force passed the narrow bridge under fire, cleared the
nearer streets and Msailed the casUe and the small force left
there. Seeing his rearguard in dangi!r of being cut off, alld
noting that Elder's force was small, Ney came down from UIC
heights with four battalions of the 6th Uger and the 6'9th
Ligne, thrust back the Ca~..adores and the supporting rifle COlll-
panie~. and brought off the troops in the castle. He barricaded
the main street, and set fire to the houses along it ill several
p!a(.'Cs before departing; these precautions detained for some
minutes the main column of the Light Division, whieh was
hurrying up to reinforce its van. The French were all retiring
up the hill before they could be got at, and only suffered a little
from Ross's guns, which were hurried up to play upon the
retreating column, as it rc-formed ill the position beyond Pomba!.
By the time that the Light Division had disentangled itself
from the burning town, and !lieton had erossed the stream Oll
the left, the day was far spent; and Ney retired at his leisure
after dark, without having been fuLther incommoded. The
British followed, and encamped 011 the further side of the water,
ready for pursuit next morning. Ney was much praised for the
1 No. 3 of that arm.
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lactical skill which he hud shown in saving his rearguard,
and Erskine was thought to have hmldled the Light Division
clumsily. The French losses, trifling as they were, much
exceeded those of the Allies-tiley lost four officel'S and nfty-nine
mell, all in the 6th and 69th. The ~adores lost ten rank llnd
file killed, and an officer and twenty men wounded-the two
companies of the 95th had an ensign and four men woullded-
ll. total of thirty-seven, little more than half the French loss.
Late on this day the 4th Division camE' up, and the 5th, 6th,
and Ist were reported to be close behind, so that Wellington
had his main body at last collected. He started the. decisive
operatiollJ:l on the following morning at 5 o'clock, advancing ill
t.lll"eC columns towards VCllda da Crnz, where Ncy had bccn
located on the pre"ious night by the cavalry scouts. Picton
and the 3rd Division were on the right, Pack's Portuglwse in
the centre, the Light Division on the left, with the 4th Division
supporting on the high-road, and the rest following behind.
But the enem)' had retired at an equally early hour, and was
IIot to be found at Vendn dn Crux. He had gone back to
Herlinha, where there is a bridge over the Soure ri,'er, forming
a de61e behind the village, and a high plateau flanked by woods
in its front. Mermet'll division formed on the plateau, with
i\larchand's in slIpport, while the rest of the French were 1I0t
far off, Loison's division being at Rabtu;al, three D1iles to the
east, and Junot's corps at COlldeixa, five miles behind llOOinha.
Drouet, with Conroux's division, had started during the night on
thc rood for Ponte de Mun:ella. und the Spa.nish frontier, eseort·
ing a. convoy of 800 sick and wounded and the small remains
of the reserve park of the army. He had orders to clear the
chauss{'C and to get into touch with Clupar&1.c, who was now
lying with the other division of the 9th Corps at Celorico. This
delachment would have revealed to 'Ve1lillbrtoll, had he knowlI
of it, that Mllssella was more anxious to secnre his line ot' com-
munication with Spain than to seize Coimbra and establish him-
self on the line of' the Mondcgo. For u good gCllcrul, intending
to take risks in 11. general action, does not detach 5,000 men 011
the eye of the decisive day. It is only 8CColld-rute commanders
who (like King Joseph at Vittoria in 1813) commit such
mistakes.
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It is clear that if Masscnu, had intended to make a serious
blow at Coimbra, he ought 1;0 have done so at latest 011 the
10th 01' 11th, before the English army was close enough to
hinder him. Junot's corps, which was entirely covered by Ne)'
and the rearguard, ww; well placed for a blow at the city, as it
was little more than tCll miles from the i\1ondego and the
broken bridge. But 1\fassenadid not march Junot in thisdirec-
tion" but kept him in a position to support Ne)', while olll}'
some t!fjuadrons of MOlltbrun'$ cavulry were sent against COilll_
bra. 'fhat general's proceedings showed great timidit), and
feebleness. On the afternoon of the 10th, according to Trant's
dispatch, his advanced guard appeared on the Monte de Espe-
l'an~a, thc height opposite Coimbra, and was seen to send down
reconnoi tring parties towards the banks ofthe rh'er, both above
and below the city, leaving unmolested the broken bridge,
behind whieh were the guns placed in the battery which 'l'rant
had thrown up to protect his retreat :Much rain had fallen Oil
the preceding night, the river wus full, and Montbrun's scouls
reported to him and to his companion the Engineer-colonel
Valaze that they could not find the fords which, as they had
been told, were situated at the spots that they had visited. On
the following day (Ml1rch 11th), while the skirmish of Pombnl
was going on, Montbrun moved in nearer to the city, showing
artillery and a cavalry brigaile at the CrllZ dos Moroi~os, and
occupying the convent of Santa Clara, which lies less than
a milc from the bridge. One of his squadrons tried to pass at
the ford of Pereim, fivc miles below thc city, but owing to the
strength of thc CUl'l'cnt failed completely, the mcn who first
tried the water regaining with difficulty the bank from which
they had. started. Nothing more was done by the French that
day, and Montbrun reported to Masscna that he had received
information that the whole or the brigades of Trant and
Silveil'a were in Coimbra, and that he had seen artillery in
position at the bridge 1. The real force opposed to him was
I Some Jo'rcnch authoriti~, £'wourahle to Masseua, a.."Serl tliat lIe \\1lS
not responsible for the failure to oceupy Coimbra, t1lat Ney, on tIle lOtb,
lllw. been toM to semI MaJ'C(lgntlt's brigade to support MOlltbruu, will'
said tllat be COllltlllot succeed without iufantry help (pelet, 11lofu Bur la
e«mpaglJe de Porlugal, p. 334). liut Ney, it is said would not detach
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seven battalions of Militia. l;omc 3,000 men, and six guns. This
was the last dny on which it would have been possible for the
French to ~ize Coimbra, for from the l~th onward Wellington
was pressing them so hard that, if the)' had set themselves to
force the passnge, and had succeeded, their rearguard, Md
probably a great portion of their main body, would have been
destro)·ed. For Ney, with allllis tactical skill, could lIot have
shaken off" his pursuers in such a way as to allow 30,000 men to
file over a single bridge, hastily repaired, when the Allies were
in hot pursuit. The French engineers, indeed, reported that it
would take several days to mend the bridge, even when the
Portuguese had been driven away from the further bank. The
main comment suggested by all this is thnt, since Massena was
intending to hold out on the Mondego, and to occupy its
.northern bank, according to his own dispatch sent to Napoleon,
he ought to have taken measures to secure a safe passage many
days l;mck-at the first moment when his rctrent begun on the
5th of March. Part of the mass of troops accumulated at
Leiria ought to have marched for Coimbra on March 6th.
1t was altogether too late to send a mere flying ct\llalry force to
appear in front of the place on March 10th.
On l\oIarch l~th Montbrun was prowling ineffecth'ely along
the south bnnk of the Mondcgo, and setting his horse artillery
to engage in 1I. futile exchange of fire with Trant's gllns, while
_tile brigade. This seems most improbable, for (1) Junot's corps, wllicll
was ill Ney's rear amI five miles nearer to Coimbrn, would have been thll
natural source from which to seek for infantry supports for Montbrun,
and (2) :i.\lassenll UOOlI 1I0t accuse Key of tllis lJUrticular piece of dis-
obedieuce ill his report to Berthier of March 1!J, uor ill the later oue of •
"'arcll 22, when lie is giving his reasons for 81l1Klrsetling 11is colleague fllld
sending him home to France. He !'limply says, in recounting his reasons
for not seilling Coimbra, that MontlJrllll fUld the flngineers reported' that
the river was in flood, that the bridge had two arches broken, tllRt tile
left bank was occupied by the forces of Traut and Silveira, and defended
hy call1lon. It would IHwe required several days to repair ~he l,ri.lge alld
to drive the Portuguese out of Coimbra; there was no pontooll train with
the arm}', alld not a Ilillgle boat on the MOlldego. III face (If the danger
of being attacked by \\'ellingtoll's whole force while the passage was in
progre!iS, lie resolved to renounce it.' 111e olle battalion of illf.1ntl')'
wllich was Bent to MOllthruu's Ilid Oll the 12th came from Soligllllc's
division in Junot's corps-as might have boeen expected.
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a battalion of infantry borrowed from JUllot tried to creep
upon the bridge, but was detected and driven off by grape.
But Ney was already engaged in ill1ch sharp flghting at Redinha
that he could not have drawn his troops off, or have escaped
towards Coimbra, e\'en if the passage of the Mondego had been
forced. 'Wellington, it will be remembered, was advMeillg
towards the 6th Corps in the morning, when he found that it
had retired from Venda da Cruz on to another position. Hig
cavalry discovered that not only was he in presence of the
6th Corps, but that another French column was on his flank at
H.abn~al (this was Loi50n's division). Moreover, the 8th Corps
wa.~ known to be not far off, for stragglers and sick from it had
been picked up upon the preceding day. Seeing therefore
that he might be called upon to face some 30,000 men, the
British general resolved not to open the fight over hastily.
'Vhen his three leading columns came up, Pack in the centre,
Picton on the right, the Light Division on the left, they were
halted in front of Mermet's line, and deployed; but no attack
was made till the 4th Division had reached the front line Md
joined rack, while the ]st and 5th were close behind. Then, at
two o'clock in the afternoon, an encircling attack was made on
Mennct's rearguard, the wings being thrown forward, while the
centre was wmewhat held back. The 8rd Division, entering the
woods on the French left, the Light Division those on their
right, advanced as quickly as they could through difficult
ground. Pack and the 4th Division halted beyond musket·
raugc of the centre, but suflcred a little from artillery fire while
waiting for the fhulk attacks to develop. Aftcr some twenty
minutes of hot skirmishhlg among the trees, Mermet's flanks were
turned by Picton on the side of the hills, and by the Light
Division on the side of the plain. and Ney hastily drew back his
front line behind the stream and the defilc. where Marchalld's
division was waiting in support. 'I'he retreating bnttnliolls were
somewhat jammed at the bridge, and lost heavily, while passing
it only a few yards in front of the skirmishers of the Light
Division. Picton tried to ford the stream higher up. in order
to cut off' the retreating force before it could reach its supports,
but failed, the water turning out too deep and rapid for fI8.5SIl.t,ae I,
I J spent b~o interesting hours at Redinha 011 September 20, l!JlO,goiug
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It took some time to file the Light and 311:1 Divisions over the
bridge, and to make a new line in face of Ney's second position
on the ridge two miles beyond the stream. But when the two
divisions Duce more wcnt forward, each turnillg, as before, the
cnemy's flank opposed to it, while Pack lUld the 5th Division
formed up again in the centre, Ne~' gave back without any very
strenuous resistance, and, abandoning his second position, fell
buck upon Condcixa, a village with a defile in front of it, five
miles north of Redinha on the great Coimbm cliau.ts{;e.
The day's work had been a very pretty piece of manremTingon
both sides. Ney hung on to his two successive positions jllst
!lO long as was safe, and l\bscondcd 011 each occasion at the
critical moment, when his flanks were turned. A quarter of
an hour's morc delay would have been ruin, but the retreat
was made just ill time. The two samds hOO delo.yoo Vvellingtoll
for a day, and his army had only advanced ten miles in the
twcnty-four hours. Yet it is unjust to accuse the British
general of over-Cll.ution, as Napicl' and ull the I,'rcnch annalists
have done. He was qnite right not to attack with the first
division that came up, and to wait till he had three and a half
in line. For he was aware that great strength lay III front of
him, and, for all he knew, the troops of Mermet might have been
supported not only by Marchand, as was actually the case, but
by the whole of Junot's corps. In that case all early attack
would have meunt a bloody check, and an enforced wait, till the
Srd, 4th, 1st, and 5th Divisions should have come IIp. As it
was, the French rear1:,'ttum] was dislod/:,red with a very mOOL>$t
loss on the part of the Allies, 12 officers and 193 men, of whom
the large majority were in the Light and 3rd Divisions, the
round the battle-ground, guided by ,\11'. Reynolds of Barreiro. TIIlI
village is most irregularly built, amI the Wll)' to tIle bridge not ob\'ious,
the streets being tortuous and nllrrow. '11le place is easy to defelld, bllt
not easy to get out of. A courteous denizen of He(linlla, Mr. J. J. Leitiio,
presented me witll all unexploded British shrapnel shell, which he had
got out of the sand of tlle ril'er-bed just above the bridge. Several more
llad been found Oil tMs spot; tlley must lJllve 1Jeen tllrown by the pursu-
ing British artillery at the French column hurrying o"er the bridge, and
had fallen Rhort, into tlle water. Each contained thirty-two balls, but tile
powder had decayed iuto au impalpable red dust. The sbell that we got
is now in tile United Service Museum.
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troops which had done the work. But the 4th Divisioll and
Pnck's Portuguese suffered some cnsunltie~ while waiting unclClr
cannon-fire for the flanking movement to take effect t. 'l'hCl
French 1081\ WA..'i 14 officers and fl1:3 men, nearly all from
Mermet's dh'ision, as that of Marchand was little engaged 2.
During this day the 6th Division, moving apart from the rest
of the army, marched Ilorth-westwl\.I'd to Soure, Md so got Upoll
the western ronte to Coimbra. It was apparently \Vellington's
intention. to push this detachment round the western or seaward
flank of the Freuch army, so as to threaten with it the right
wing of ruty position that the enemy might take up across the
Coimbra chall~8te. Iudeed., having found no hostile force of any
sort in front of it, the 6th Division was able to push in quite
close to Coimbra on the next day, and to take up a position at
Ega, which menaced Ney and Jllnot's march across its front if
they should still continue their retreat in the original direction.
I t was probably the movement of this division which caused the
French to believe that Wellington had landed a detached force
from ships at the mouth of the Mondego, and was pnshing it
forward towards Coimbra: an accmmt of the march of this
imaginary corps is to be found in several narratives 3.
Condcixa, to which Ncy had rctired on the cvcning of the
combat of ltedillhn, is a most important strategical point, since
here the chautt~e leading to Coimbra is joined by the last cross-
rond which meets it south of the Mondego, that which nins
eastward to the Pontc de l\1urcella and the Spanillh frontier.
As long as the French held Condeixa, thcy were in a position to
choose between an attack on Coimbra and a retreat up the
south bank of the dyer towards A1meida and their base. And
I See taMe of l~es in AppeUllix Ill. Of tile rl'gimclIlll the chief losel'!l
were the 95tll (13 men), and 52nd (13 men).
2 Of the fourtccu French officers killed nnd wounued no less tltall
thirteen were from the 25tll Uger, and 27tll ancl 50th Ligne of Mermet'~
uivision.
t c. g. in Dclagrlwc, p. 201 : 'De\lx eoJonnef'4 des sicIIS rmnontaient le
i\londl!go, le long des rives: celle I[ui avalt debarque a .Figuieras avait
(JOur hut l,rincil»lll1c couvrir Co"imbrc. .. J..'llUtrc, flUi rClllOlltnit In rire
gauche, 111'ait ere detachce de l'armee eUJlemie avec ordre de ueborder et
d'nttallUer la l1roite .Ies }'Tll1l1,-1lis.' nclnmilalso speaks of this imagiullrr
foree.
REDINHA
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with Wellington at his heels, Massella had now to make his
choice between the two courses. His dispatch of March 19th
to Berthier informs us that he resolved for a moment to offer
battle to the Allies at Condeixn, with the 6th and 8th Corps,
calling in perhaps (though he does not mention it) the 2nd
Corps from Espillhal, which is 110 mot'e thau twenty miles away.
The reasons which he gives for not doing SO are firstly, that,
since the departure of Drouet and his division on the 11th, his
whole fon:e was lIO more than half that of \Vellington; as a
mattel' of fact he had still 45,000 men, his advcl'Sar)' just about the
samellumber. Secondly, that themoraleoftheamlY was impaired
by long privations and short rations. Thirdly, that the stock of
ammunition was dangerously low, and the artillery horses could
lumU,Y move. Fourthly, that he was hampered by the fact
that his lieuteuants (he is alluding to Ney in especial) were set 011
abandoning Portugal, 'which contributes in no small degree to
a lack of that harmony which ollght to reign in an army.'
Fifthly, that a defeat at Condeixa would mean the inevitable
loss of all his artillery, train, wounded, and baggage, while a
success would not seriollsly injure \Vellington, who could always
retire Oll to the Lines ofTorres Vedras. Sixthly, that being in the
midst of £l. population roused to fury by the l'avl\,""Cs of his army,
he found that he could gather in little or no food, and was fast
utiiug up the stock that he had brought with him. Taking nil
these points into consideration, and being informed by::\lontbrun
that, even if he succeeded in seizing Coimbra, its bridge would
take two days to repair, he had l'csoh'ed to avoid a general aetiou,
to abandon any attempt to pass the :Mondego, and to draw hack
towards the 9th Corps and the Spanish frontier, where he could
find the food and the new c<luipmcnt which the army needed.
Accordingly, on the early morning of March 13th the decisive
titcp which committed Mnsscna to a retreat towards Celorico and
the 9th Corps was taken. The 8th Corps was marched. oll~
covering the train, alOllg the road which leads by Miranda de
Carvo to the Ponte de Murcelln and the upper Mondego,
instead of toward Coimhm, llOW only eight miles away. To
<:over its flank Loison's division was moved fl'om Rabtu;al, where
it had lain on the dny of tbe combat of lledinha, to 1"onte
Cubel'ta. Ne)' remained behind at Condeixa with his two old
o..u. IV I,
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divisions, to CQ\'er the fork of the roads, und la detain the Allies
as long as possible, while J unot llnd the trains were toiling along
the bad and mOUllWnousrond towards Miranda de Corvo. The
2nd Corps was still kept at Espinhal, where it was observed by
Nightingale's brigade, which had dogged its steps at a cautious
dismnec since the 9th.
These arrnngemcnts did not work very well, for ~e>' was
turned oul of the Condeixa position, much earlier than he or
"Masseua had expected, by Wellington's skilful manl,£uvre"
The movement U8<''<1 against him was much the same us at
Hedinha; the 3rd Dhision marched by a mountain path to tUn!
his left, while the 6th Division, coming in from SollfC by a wide
sweep. appeared at Ega., almost behind his right wing, and
threatened to bret between him and Coimbra. !\.Ieallwhile the
4th and Light Divisions, with the rest of the army behind them,
were halted on distant heights in his front, rcu.dy to attucK whclJ
the tuming movements should become pronounced. Ney was,
very properly, anxious about his retreat, for he could not an)'
longer (as at Pombal and Redinha) give back to his rear, but
was forGed to take a side direction, in order to follow the
8th Corps on the Mirnnda de Corvo rond. The moment that
he saw l'ieton making for this road, to cut him oft' from the rest
of the French, he set fire to the town of Condeixa and moved off
in great haste, just avoiding Picton, to Casal Novo, a villllge
n\'c miles east of his first position, where he fonned up again
ut dusk. The day's operations had been almost bloodless;
nothing more than a few musket shots were exchanged b)' the
skirmishers of the two sides. Dut they had been of the highest
strategical imporlancc, since they ended in the complete abandon·
ment of the attempt to reach Coimbra b)' the French.
Incidentally, the rapid fashion ill which Ney had been evicted
from the crosNoads at Condcixa nearly led to disaster some
of the outlying fractions of the French army. Massena him-
self had halted at Fonte Cuberta, six miles to the south-east,
with his staff and Loison's division, which was escorting the
reserve artillery of the 6th and 8th Corps. Ht: was intending
to cover Ney's left from any wide turning movcmcnt by the
British. The road on which this village lies falls into that from
Condeixa to Miranda de Corvo about three milcs from the first-
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IlIl.med place. Ney, when preparing to evacuate Condeixu., scnt
an aide-dc-romp to advise the Commander-in-Chief that he was
about to retire, But the ofiicer eharged with the mcssage lost
his wa)', and only an'ived at Fonte Cubcrta late in the aftenlOon
with the dispatch 1. By this time Ney had already reached
Cru;nl Novo, some distauce beyond the point at which the Fonle
Cuberta road fell into his line of retreat, Massena and the
division ill his company were therefore cut off from their proper
route for retiring Oil to thc main army. VVithin a few minutes
after the arrival of' Ney's messenger, a patrol of the German
hussars arrived at the village, and nearly rode into l\1assena and
Ilis staff, who were dining ill the open air ullder a tree outside its
entrance. There was a mutual surprise; the Marshal's escort of
fifty men ran to their arms, while the hussars halted, not lInder~
standing what they had cOllie upon. If they had charged,
i\Jassel1l\ might have been taken or slain, as several French nar-
rators assert, He mounted and galloped back ill haste towards
Loisoll'S "illfalltry, who were camped in tUld beyomI the village.
The hussars wellt oft' to report to their squadron commander
that FOllte Cuberta was still occupied-it had been with the
object of obtaining information Oil thi:; point Umt the recon-
naissance had been sent out, Masseua hastened to put Loison's
men ui1der march for CasaI Novo, by a "ery rugged side-tmck,
called up Clausel'll di"isioll to cover him, and got ofl' in the
dusk unhindered, save by a few flank skirmishers belonging to
l'icton's division, who came upon him in the dark and were
brushed away with case z.
I i\lnrbot sars thnt tllO officer arrived four hours after tlto ovaouation
of Condeixa, tholtj{h that lllace is only five miles from .,,"onte Culterta
(Jftimoire'J ii, 443). FririOll makes a mucll graver accusation against No)',
vi;,;. that lIe scut no messenger at all, and that the allied C!lmlry were
discol'ered by an officer named Girbault on Massena's staff.
I For an account of tbis curious affair see. Fririou, Noel (11'110 \\11$ with
Loison at the moment), l'elet, and i\1arbot. TIle latter (as always) gh'cs
the most picturesque and probably tlle least trustworthy accolwt. Ho
rorgels to mention that to'oute Cuberta was occupied by 1..oi5On'8 4,500
infantry, and writes as if a. squadron of hussars had retired before
i\lassena's CSt;Ort of 50 men. Aecortling to him the Marshal's !light.
retreat was much disturbed b}' the misadventures of bis mistress (ltenique'.Il
sister), whose horse repeatedly fell in the dark and roned over 11er, to hi8
intense auxiety. i\lassena'g dispatch says ouly, 'Le duc d'Elchiugcn
d
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This incident led to a. furious quarrel between Massena alld
Ncy, for the former asserted, as it seems, that the laUer had
promised to hold Condeixa for a whole day or morc, Rnd had
moved off at noon out of mere malice, so as to leaye his chief
in an e."{posed position. If we may believe the narrative of
Masscna's aide-de-camp, Fririon, he asserted that Ney had
deliberately wished to get him captured, and had e.."{ccuted his
retreat· c1andestinement' 1. It was impossible to persuade him
to the contrary. and he saved up his wrath for the next occasion
when he should be able to COIl\'ict Ney of open disobedienee, and
not of mere errors of judgement. Thcre can be nO doubt Ulat
he was doing an injustice to his lieutenant in suspecting him
of such a monstrollS plot; Ney was a man of honour; Massena
had himself such a doubtful record for probity that we eau well
understand his suspicion of others. In trntIl, what happened
was that the younger Marshn! had promised to defend Condeixa
longer than was really possible, when Wellington (as on thiHlay)
was in his happiest mood, and manreuvriug with a skill which
made a IOllg resistauL'C impracticable.
Hnt Loison's division WAS not the only l<'rcnch force which was
in ~eriOlls danger on March 13. MOlltbrun had lingered in front
of Coimbra, till his retreat also was imperilled by the 108s of
Condeixtl. tllld its till-important bifurcation of roads. At eight
o'clock in the morning he had made his last vain attempt
to Will his wa.y into the city-this time by negotiation. He sent
R parlemelltaire on to the broken bridge, with 11. demlllld that
Trout should give up thc pluce, and a promise that tilC citizens
should sufter no harm, and the garrison should be allowed free
l.bandouua la I,ositioll ue C:olldeixa. plus tOt que jc IIC 10 croyais. Le llOEte
ae Fonte Cuberta titait deCQuvert, et l'artillerie qui s'y trou\·ait corn·
promise. J'lI.i gngul'i a"cc e1le la graudc route IIRr ulle IllSrc1le ae Aauc,
a portCe de canon ae la ligne euuemie, paT uu beau clair de Iuue.'
1 <Le i\IarE!c11111 i\Jassoiua crut "oir dllU3 tOO mou"cmellt operE! it sou insu
l'intention de le faire tomber, Iui et son ctat-major, entre les mains de
l'cullellli. Le Gellernl FririOIl cll\~n.:ha a lui faire elltelldre qu'il devail
attribuer ce fa.it it. un oubli plutOt qu'it. un sentiment de mah·eillance.
:'oIais it lui fut impossible de le persuader. «Cette collduite est inexcu·
sable," lui dit MaE-SCn3; "le mou"ement rtftrograde de ces deux divisions
etait tJ.'(ccu!.e c1alldcstillcment j c'ost un ade que ricl! nc Ilout justifier.'"
(Fririon, pp. 150-1.)
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egress. This last WM really not his to grant, for during the
night 'l'rant had removed everything from the city except a
battalion of Militia and the two guns at the bridge. The
sergeant in command of these pieces (a certain Jose Correia
Leal, whose nume the Portuguese have very propel'Jy preserved)
adroitly wasted time by detaining the French officer. He told
him that he must wait till an l\1)swer Cllme from Tmnt, whose
absence he kept eoncealed, and then, after some hours, said that
his c.'Olllmundcr hacl gou(: to visit a distant point of the river
defence~ from which he would not be back till the next lIloming 1.
:\Ieanwhile, if any attempt were made to attack the bridge, he
lllul orders to blow up 8Cveral more arche~, which were mined.
Time drifted Oil, and meanwhile 1\fontbl'lUl rccci\'ed at 110011 the
new~ that Ney was forced to give up Condeixa 2, i. e. that there
was no more prospect of using Coimbraas a crossing-point. More-
av£!!' his own retreat W!\S in danger, if an English detachment
should march straight from Condeixa towards the bridge, n
distance of only eight miles. The French general was obliged
to ab:><.'Ond, Md the only route open to him, since the cltau$$k
was lost, was a rough path which. aft.er coasting along the south
hank of the Mondego for SOlUe time, turns np into the valley of
the El;a. 3, and so reaches Miranda de Corvo. After blowing up
nIany of his wheeled vehicles, Montbrun lmstcnoo to take this"
track, and escaped by it, though he was disem-el'oo and pursned
by some of W"ellingtoll's cavalry patrols, who pressed his rear-
guan:l and made many prisoners. But the dh"isiotl of dragoons,
with the infantry battalion attached. and the two horse artillery
batteries-their caissons had to be destroyed because of the
badness of the rotul-ultimately reached Miranda with no great
loss.
This was a. truly important day. the most critical in the whole
campaign, since at its end Coimbra was safe, and the whole
, For all this see Soriano da. LU~J Hi. pp. 360-1.
1 According to Delagrl\\"e he got the news neither from Ney nor from
all aide-de-camp of llill own whom lie Ilad left with the (ith Corps to
lransmit information, but from an emissary of )lassen8 named GirOtI, who
thOllght of llim when the proper llutlloritiell failed to (10 110"
I Called the Deu<;a by Napier Rnd other writCl'9-Rll erroneous contrac-
tion of Rio lie E<;R,
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French anny had been turned on to the road towards Spain.
Wellington was satisfied, and bad no reason to be othcl'wise.
The accusation made against him by many critics of over-
caution, which is said to have prevented him from de.~troying
1.oison's and Montbrlln's detachments, seems unjustifiable. The
cardinal fact that he was not superior in numerical strength
to the army that llC was pursuing is too often forgotten; indeed,
the l~rench writers from MassenR. down to to-day have nearly
always credited him with 50,000 or 60,000 men, whereas he had
barely 45,000, of whom only 3~,000 were British, and the
Portuguese were still ill great part llntricU. troops: for though
those of them who had passed the test of battle (PACk's Ilnd
Power's I brigades, the Cruradores in the Light Division, and the
artillery) had done admirably hitherto, there were still four
whole brigades whieh had never been in serious action since they
were reorganized in 1809 2, Nothing was to be risked, Ilnd
partial attacks by UIlSUpported vanguards were to be eschewed,
when (as Wellington remarked in his dispatch of March H)
'the whole country affords advantageous positions to a retreating
army, of which the enemy has shown that he knows how to
avail himself. They are lelwing the country, ns they entered it,
in one solid mass, covering their rear on every march by one (or
sometimes two) corps d'arm{-e, ill the successive positions which
the cOllntry affords, which COlPS d'arnu-e are closely supported by
the rest.' A general action against equal or superior numbers
rlLnged on a strong hill-position was clearly inadvisable, and the
plan of manc:envring the enemy ant of each line that he took lip
by a short flanking movement wa.~ infinitely preferable. Flank-
ing movements take time, and unless the enemy is very slow or
very rush, huve eftective rather than brilliant results. But
Wellington never' pla.yed to the gallery'; he was no vender of
bulletins; be had a small army which it was difficult to reinforce,
flud he could not afford to waste his precious men in hazardous
combats. It would have been of little profit to him if he hnrl
I Lnte Champlemond's, heavily engaged Rgl'inst Reyuier at Bussaco.
• viz. AshlVorth's (late A. CampbeU's), Spry's, Madden's (late Eben's),
II11U Harvey's, of which the third hml only one regiment engnged 3t
Dussaco, and the others had been 011 parts of the line not attacked by thl'
french.
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destroyed It divif;ion or two of the enemy, and had then un-ivcd
on the Spanish frontier with an army diminif;hed hy 10,000 men.
'fhe enemy had unlimited supports behind him; he hnd practically
none. For when he had taken out his field army, und had
detached Bcresford to Estrcmadura, there werc no regular troops
left in Portngal save the newly formed ith Division, which was~
coming up from Lisbon to join the main body. /
That V.,rellington's system was sound was sufficiently proved
by an incident of the next moming's moxch, when the army
f;uff'ered the only check which it was destined to meet during the
campaign, and lost more men than 011 any other day of this
e\·entful month. At early dawn on the 14th there was a dense
fog; notwithstanding this, Sir ·William Erskillc, who WM COlll-
manding the vanguard, composed of the Light Division, Pack's
])ortugllese, and Arentf>Childt's CA\'alry brigade, thonght fit to
march straight at the enemy, his orders of the preceding night
being to stick to Ncy's heels. The French rearguard, Marchand's
division. 'I'M holding the village of Casal Nm'o t, a strong post
011 a rising ground., surrounded with stone walls and enelof;ures,
while the rest of the 6th and 8th Corps were defiling along the
rood to Chuo de Lamas and Miranda de Corvo. The Light
Di\;sion, headillg the advancing eolnmn. ran into the picket'l of
the French, whereupon Erskine ortIered out three companies of the
5~nd tmd sent them forward to clear the way. They were soon
hea"ily eJlg~rrecl, for Marchand was in force. 'When the fog lifted.
daylight showed the five battalions of the Light Division elubbed
on the road, under the front of the enemy's line of a battery and
ele\'en battalions, ranged on the height of Casal NO\'o. }lack's
Portuguese and the Srd Division were some distance off, coming
along the defile which leads from Condeixa. The Light Division
had to extend and fight hard in order to keep its ground, while
the main body was coming up and developing a flanking move-
ment tlbl'ttinst the French. It lost heavily of necessity, and was
only released from a dangerous position by the movement of
Picton and the Srd Division to the right, which forced the
French to abscond. Marchand's division then fell back behind
I rwlIlkCt.l round Ca.'llll No,'o on September 28, 1010. It is livery small
place, under a low undulation of the high-1ring plateau whid the road
crosses.
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Mcrmct's, which was in position two milcs to thc real', between the
villages of Casal de Azun und Villa Seca J. This second position
WM properly turned, find carried withont lrn;s, if with some delay.
Then the enemy was discovered in the afternoon in a third and
still more formidable post, 011 the heights of Chilo de Lamas.
This II'llS treated in the samc fashion, the Light Division and
Pack'R PorttlgtleSCl turning its left, ]lieton its right, while tile
main body, coming up fmlll the rear, halted opposite its centre.
Ney thcn ga,·c up his position, and fell buck six miles dUII'll hill,
towards Mirunda de Con'o on the bunks of the E~a ri\'er,
where the 8th Corps and Montbrun's cavalry were waiting for
him. The pursuers, tired out by a running fight of twell'e
hours, during which thcy had gaincd fourtccn miles of gruund,
haltcd in fl'Dllt of him. Their loss lmd been 11 officers and
119 men in the British, and 25 in the Portuguese ranks, a total
of] 55, More than half fell in the mismanaged business of the
curly morning, in which the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th lost 9 olliccrs
and oycr 80 men, in an 11tterly unnecessary combat. This was
the first of two exhibitions ofll'rongheadedness by which the newly
arri\"cd generaJ, ViTillinm Erskinc, lost Wellington's confidem:c.
Thc scx:ond, 011 April 3rd, WM (as wc shall sce) to be a still
marc discreditable affair, The French loss at Caw Nm·o and in
the sLlcceedillgskirmishes of the day was apparently much smaller
than that of thc British, though the officiM.l figlll'c of 55 killed
1 'l1wl'c is a good account of the combat of CllSl1 Novo ill WiIliam
Napier's Hi81{JTY, iii, 119-20, and a still more striking one in his biography,
liP. fjf.-7, containing some ilistrcSEiing anecdotes. He was sevcrely
woullllcd, as was also his brothel' George Kapier of the i52nd, whose
narl·ative is quite as interesting as ,riUiall\'s, It is lie who de.<!cribes
.ENkine's reckless action hest-informed by Colonel Hoss that the French
were still in CasaI Novo' lIe kept blustering and swearing it was all
nonsense-that the captains of the pickets knew lloUling about the
matter, and tl,at tllere Wll8 not a mall in tIle village. J nst lIS he spoke
the dense fog began to clear, and b.1Ug came a shot from a tweh'e-
pounder, which struck the head of our column and made II lane tJlrougll
it, killing and wounding many. Theu came a regular cannonade, but
the wL.e Sir \I'nliarn was Sllre it "'ai' hut a single gun allll 11 picket
supporting it, and desired Colonel HoS!! to send my cornpauy against its
flank,' &c. Costello of tIle 95th Ims also lcft n vcry good amI lively
narrative of the day's work.
I ENGLISH MILES''I n. I1 _~y,~_o-,--,__ 1.v. b.· ",OX SCALE L '
'CASAL NOVO
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and wounded seems very low 1. On this morning the British, fol'
the first time during the retreat, began to take prisoners on l\
considerable scale; there were more than 100 captured between
Gasal Novo and Miranda de Corvo, partly skil'mishel's cut off
during the long bickering ill woods and enclosures which tilled
the day, partly stragglers aud marauders, who were taken in the
country.side while wandering away from their colours.
On this evening Reynier and the 2nd Corps. so long dh,jded
from the rest of the French army. joined the main columll.
l:rom "March 10th to March 13th they had lain at Espiulml.
resting after the difficult passage of the mountains. and endeavour·
ing, without much su(:eess, to scrape together food to fill their
depleted stores. Being closely observed, though not attacked,
by Nightingale's brigade, they could not scatter very flU' for
marauding. But on the 14th vVellington, during the CaM-I No\'o
fighting, threw out Cole's 4th Division far to his right to Penella,
wherc it got into touch with Nightingale. Seeing that thcl'C WItS
nOII't1 serious force in front of Hcynier. and that it might thmst
itself between him and the rest of the anny. Masscna bade his
1 '111e lo~ses of the 14th (Casal Novo) and the 10th (Foz do Arouce) have
UllfortlLlIlltely got mixcd in i\fltrtillicn's invaluable casualt)' listil, most of
them being credited to tIle 14th, witll the wrong lleadiug <Condeixa '-
which al'pcl.lTS to mcnn CMal NOI·o. III somc regilllellts the dntes
and name~ have not got wrong, e. g. I\'e know that on the 14th the
2jth regiment Imd 3 officers wounded, Rnd 3 more at Foz do Arollce
on the following da}'. Hnt e. g. ill the 39th Ligne Colonel Lamonr is
down as 'ble~ le 14 mJlrs;. Collllcixa,' while he was certainly wounded "t
J<'oz do Arouce on the 15th, where he was also taken prisoner. The total
of officers reconled as hit in tile 6th Corps 011 the Htll-15th is 22, of
whom 10 were certainly casualties of the 14th. This must surely imp1r
more than 55 in all, killed 'l1ld wounded. At tile low rate of 10 men
per officer it would give lOO-at the normal rate of 20 per officer it would
be 200. But the last is pro1J.ably too hiA"h. It was on t1li.~ da}' t1J:it
Marbot had his falllOus encounter with a riflc officer (offider dl! ChfU8eIl'l'll
tl pied) aud two hussars, of whom (according to his narrative) he slew the
first and wounded the otller two. It canllot be disputed that be hlld
a fight, for he is down as wounded in tlle official lists. Hnt he certainly
did not kill a rifle officer. The only ligllt dil'ision officer sl:lin that day
was Lieutenant Gifford, who was kille<l by a ball ill the head at Casul
Nol'o. It is also to be noted that tJiere are 110 cavalr}' casualties ill the
return of :\lareh 14, or indeed since Redinllll. l\farbot's SUPlIOSe<1 l'ictilll~
tllUS disappear!
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lieutenant break up without delay, and come ill to Mirandn de
Cor,·o. This WilS easily done by a ten.mile march in the after-
noon, and the !!nd Corps camped on the further side of the
E~n river that night. Thus the whole French army, sare
Conroux's Jivisioll, WIIS concentrateJ, and 44,000 men HUUer
arms, drngging behind them a baggage-train that W/IS slill
considerable, and over 5,000 sick and wounded, were gathered
ill the defile and the little plain north of it, with a most forbid-
ding mountain range in their front, and the pursuing columns of
Wellington in their rear.
The situation appeared so grave to Mnsscna that he rcsohcd
to lighten his army so far as was possible, in order to allow it to
march faster. On thi~ night there was a general destruction not
only of all wheeled vehicles, save a minimum of ammunition
waggons, but of all the baggage of the army, regimental as well as
personal. Ney set the e."{umple by burning his own carriage;,
Rnd nbandoniJ1g all that could not be carried on pack mules 1.
111e sick and wounded were transferred fl'Om waggons on to
beasts of burden-a change which caused the death or abandon-
ment of many hundreds of them dlll'ing the nc-...t two days.
A strict inspection was made of all the surviving dra\lght und
pack animals, and when those still in a fair state had been set
flside for the CI\ITiage of the sick and thc ammunitiol1, an order
was issued that all the rest should be put to death. To avoid
the noise which would haye been caused by shooting them, the
officer charged with this duty caused them all to be hamstrung,
a cruel de"ice which was surely unnecessary, for they could have
been kiUed flS easily as mutilated by the sword or knife. The
horrid sight of more than 500 live hors~ mules, and asses
sprawling or hobbling in a bleeding mass, just outside the
village of Miranda de Corvo, WflS never forgotten by those who
witnessed it 2 in the pursuit ofthe following morning.
1 For details see the dinry of Noy's aide-de-camp Spriinglin (p.470).
It ill lUJtounding to find MlISSenn. ill Ilia t1ispn.tch of :\farcIJ 19 to Bertllier
stating that between Miranda. de Carvo and Foz do Arollce 'nos equipages
et nos maladcs ne eess.1.illnt 1)aS {le filer, et riel] nLsolument n'est l"f)~tC
en arriere.'
I 'TIle most dh;gusting sigllt wa.'! tlle MBe>! f1ouudoriug in the muo1,
some with throats half cut, the rest barbarously IJoughed. What the
object of this was I nOl'cr couhl guess. TIle l,oor brutes couhl1lal'e lleen
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The SIl.ctificeof the baggage wa" the preliminary to adespemte
and fatiguing night march. The flnrl Corps started off' first,
then the 8th, leaving the 6th as usual to bring up the rear.
After firing Miranda de Corm, ill order that the conflagration
in the narrow street lending up from the bridge might delay the
adl'fLnce of the Allies, Ney followed the rest ·of the nrm)' at one
in the morning. All marched slowly in the dark for ten miles
of un uphill road, and before nOOll reached the long descent
into the valley of the Ceira, at the village of Foz do Aroucc I,
The 2nd and 8th Corps crossed the stream with much delay,
at a bridge which had been somewhat injured by the local
Ordenan\~a but was still serviceable. They deployed on a range
of commanding heights on the further side, and encamped.
Ney, always eager.to carry on the detaining process which he
had hitherto practised with snch skill, only sent three of his six
brigades across the river 2, though Massena had ordered him to
pass, and to destroy the bl'idge. Hc remained with the rest and
Lnmotte's light cavalry, posted on two long hills with the village
ofFoz between them, on the hither side of the water, Though he
had a good position, yet the defile to the rear was a dangerous
thing for such a large body of troops, since the 'Ceim was in
of no use to us, for they couhl lIot llave tra"e1Jllll n.nothcr le,'lgue. llwir
meagre appearance, with backbones ami hip!! protruding tlnough tl\eir
skin, and tlLeir mangled limbs, produce!1 11. feeling of disgust and com-
miseration.' (Grattan, p. 50.)
'It was pitiable to see tILc poor creatures in this state, yet thcre was
IlOmething ludicrons in tIle position Wllicll many had t'lken when thus
cruelly lamed. They were sitting ill grouP1J npon tILeir hiuder elldll,
staring in ol1ch ot1Ier'll. faces, as if ill deep eOllsult1tion on some important
subject.' (Donaldson ofthe 94th, p. 106.)
I Napier calls the village Foz de Arouce, and tllis spelling of it
(probably caused by an uncorrected printer'll error) hall been l>erpetuated
by every Englisll writer on t110 War. Yet Wellington lLas it riglltly spelt
with the' u' in his dispatch (vii. p. 370) lIS ' Foz de Arouce: Maw!nll., in
his, calls it Foz d'Arunce, wllicll is incorrect. Delagrave, Fririon, ulul
other French narrators follow him, sometimes with the variants Al'Once
or Arounee. TIlere ill 110 doubt that tllc nllme ill spelt Willl a <u,' nod
always hall heell, b)' the Portuguese.
I All Mnrchnn<1's Ili"ision nnd a hrigade of Marmet's (26th l.eger and
2jth Ligne) remained bellind. Only Labassee's brigade of .Merolet'!!
division crossed the water, with Loison'g division.
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flood, and every man had to retire over the single damaged
bridge. Moreover the troops, tired by the night march, guarded
themseh·es badly; in especial the cavalry, which ought to have
watched every road, with vedettes out for 111any miles to the
front, huddled together near the river for the convenience of
water and grazing: General Lamotte indeed crossed the Ceira
with great part of his men, und seems to IUl,Ye kept no look-out
whatever 1.
Wellington's pllr:mit this morning started very late. The
burning of the French bRggage and of the town of Miranda had
been noted in the last hours of the night. But at dawn a hea,'y
fog arosc, and 'Wellington refused to move his masses till it was
certain that the l!~rench were not still in position on the heights
beyond the river with all their 44,000 men. For if Massena
were seeking a battle, as was quite possible, now that he had
concentrated all his three corps, it would be reckless to attack
him when every man of the allied army had to file over a narrow
bridge. It was not till reconnaissances had pnshed across the
Eya. and had explored the bunting town, and the ground
beyond for some miles, that orders were issued for the army to
mareh on. Even then the fog had not lifted, and the morning
was some hours old before the Bm and Light Divisions were on
their way. They followed the retreating French up the long
ascent, picking up many siCK and straggh::I'S, and at about four
o'clock in the afternoou came in sight of the enemy iu their
new position behind the Ceim, with a formidable front extend·
ing for several miles along the hills, and Ney's real"Juard
visible 011 the lower cminences on the hither side of' the stream.
Picton and Erskine halted, thinking that it was too late in the
afternoon to undertake a serious attack, and that lVellillgtoll
would wait, as usual, for his supports to (:ome up. They had
directed their divisions to encamp and thrown out. their pickets,
when the Commander~in·Chiefr()(le up, not long before dusk.
I 1 !ltudicd the ground at Fcy.l do Arouoo DU September 28, 19]0. ·l1le
hridge is onl)' fonr and a half yards broad, and 107 101lg. It was approaclled
in 1811 hy the rood ill n sharp turn, whicll hl19 now been straighteued out,
so was far more difficult to cross than it is lIOW. '111e gap between the
hilt" ill Wllicll the village lies is about 200 yards l.road. 111c heights on
the .'rench left are much higher tlum those on their right.
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Surveying the enemy, and seeing that few battalions were under
arms, and that ~ey was evidently expecting no flghting-his
cavalry indeed had gi ven him no proper "arning of the approach
of the Allies-Wellington resolved to ~trike at once, though his
nearest reserve, the 6th Division, wus still some way oft Picton
was told to attack the French left, the Light Division their
right. The -first blow was very effective and partook of the
nature of a ~iUrprisc, for the cnemy was caught ullprcpared.
Some companies of the 95th Rifles, penetrating down a hollow
road, arrived almost unopposed in the village of Foz, quite
close to the bridge, while the rest of the Light Division was
holding Mal'chand's troops engaged in a frontal flght, and
PietOll was making good wa.y against the brigade belonging to
Mermet, which formed the French left. The noi>le of close
combat breakiIlg out almost in their rear, at a spot which seemed
to indicate that the bridge was ill danger, and their retreat cut off~
cansed a panic in the I·'rench right·centre, and the 39th regi-
ment broke its ranks and hurried towanls the bridge, where it
mct and became jammed again:ot Lamottc's cavalry, who were
hastily returning to takc up the position from which they had
unwisely retired an hour or two before. .Finding the pa&l8ge
impossible, the fugitives turned to a deep ford a little down·
stream and plunged into it, where mallY were drowned I\ud the
regimental eagle was lost I, while their colonel was taken prisoner.
Ney saved the situation, which had a.risen through his own
disobediencc to Mas:oeus's orders, by charging, with the third
battalion of the 69th regiment ~ the rifle companies which
had got into Foz do Arouce and werc threatening the bridge.
'l'hcy wcre drivcn back on to thcir support, the 5!tnd regimcnt,
and the passage having been clcared by the Marshal's exertions,
the troops to the left and right crossed it in some disorder, and
took refuge on the opposite bank. They were shelled during:
I It was found iD tlle rivcr at low water and sent to London. 'I1Jc loss
is mentioned ill Goorge Sinllllolls'S diary under March 16. \\rellillgtoll
sent it home ill July. (DilpatcMS, "iii. p. 76.)
S So both i\J3S!!Clla'S disl'atclt, lIud FririOIl, wllo WIIS "resellt witll the
brigade of which the 69th formed part. J\Iarbot is wrong in saying that
it WlIS thc 27t11. All tllC llarratil"l)$ on tIle French l!ide are I'ery confused,
and differ widely.
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their defile, not only by Ross's and Bull's horsewtillel'y batteries,
but by some guns belonging to their own Bth Corps, which ill
the deepening twilight failed to distinguish between pursuers
and pursued. By the time that night had fully set in, the
Frelll;:h rearguard was all over the river, and the bridge was
blown up. If the athLck had been delivered an hour earlier, it is
probable that Ney would have suffered losses far greater than he
.actually endured-perhaps ~50 1 men killed, wounded, drowned,
or taken-for the British divisions were prevented by the faili.ng
light from acting as ellectively as they otherwise might against
the mu.sscs hastily rcerossing the bridge. Wellington's loss WllS
trifling-4 officers and 67 men, nearly a third of them in the
ride companies which had broken the French centre for a
moment, and had then been driven back by Ney. 'I'he
small remainder of· the baggage of .Mal'ehand and' Mermet was
captured Oil this occasion, including some biscuit, which proved
most grateful to the Light Division, as it had, like the rest of
the British army, outmarched its transport.
It may IIot be out of plru::e to note that the combat of l"oz do
Arouce bore a singular resemblance to Craufurd's combat Oil the
Coa of July 24, IBIO. In each case a rearguard was tempted
to stay too long beyond an tlnfordable rivcr and a na.rrow bridge,
by the defensible nature of the position in which it found itself,
and nearly suffered a complete disaster. The only difference was
that Ncy hnd at least double as strollg a force as Craufurd, and
had also a whole army in line beyond the riycr to support him,
while the British general had no reserves near. III each case the
.endangered detachment got away by dint of hard fightiJig, with
appreciable but by" lIO means crushing losses. It is curious that
the tables were exactly turned between pursuer and pursned in
these two fights-in 1810 it was Ney who by a sudden assault
hustled the Light Division over the Con. In 1811 the Light
Division was at the head of the strikiug [Ol'<''C whieh thrust Ney
ovC!' the Ceim. If Craufurd had been in <''OllllIltUld illstettd of
1 Sprungliu says 400, Massenu, iu llis dispatch to Berlhicr, under 200,
Marbot 160, VictQfreol' et OOllgllilu 400. Spruoglin, as Ney's Bide-de-cBlllIJ,
had the best cbulU.:c of kUOIl'iug. But 1'I1urtinieu's lisUJ, ill which J can
only find tell or twelve casualties among officers, suggest u smllller
total l roughly perhups 260.
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the iucapable Erskine, there can be little doubt that the matter
would have bcell pushed to a more decisive conclusion, d~pite
uf the dusk.
On the morning of March 16th, the hills beyond the Ceira,
where a whole army had been visible Oil the preceding day, were
HOW seen to be almost void of defenders-on:!)' a trifling rear-
guard Wilii vi~ible watching the broken bridge from a di~tance.
Wcllington sent s<.:outs over the rh"er to reconnoitre, but did
not cross it in force. He had accomplished his main design of
thrusting the French ofi-· the Coimbra road and into the mOutl-
tain!!, and he had entirely outmarched his provisions. He had
\lOll' ,!,,"Ot so far from his base at Lisbon that food sent up from
thcllI..'C had far to travel, and he bad not yet succeeded in settiug
up all intermediate dep6t at Coimbra, though btore-ships were
already ordered from Lisbon to its port of Figueira \ now that
there was 110 danger of the enemy crossing the lower l\:Ionde,!,,'O.
During the last wl.'Ck the army had used up all that it carried
with it, and the l'ortuguese brigades, badly supplied by the
native commissariat, had run short even before the British.
Pack's and Ashworth's men had received no regular rations for
four da)'s 2, and had only kept up to the front by gleanillg in the
deserted bivou~ of the I;rCIICh, and borrowing the little that
thc British cOUlmissariat could spare. E\'erything had run dry
by the 16th, and Wellington considered that no great harm
would be suflered by waiting a day on the Ceira, for the first
<:OIlVO)' lo come up from the rear, since the French were HOW in
rugged grOlmd, where they could not make finy long attempt to
stand for sheer want of food. They must continue their retreat
or starve in a depopulated colUltr)'. Accordingl), Welli.ngton
:settled dowlJ ut Lousfu> a.nd took stock of the general position
of affairs; the result of his halt was a.n immense dischar{,'e of
arrears of correspondence-he had written only Olle dispatch
betwecn thc 10th and 16th of March, but got off· seventecn 011
1 See IJitpatchet, vii. p, 360.
I There is a bitter letter from Pack of March 21st in bis Nemoir.l'
concerning t11c 'lmd CO\l\lllif;S;,riat "IIU won:;c medical C6tablis11111cnt of all
inefficient and peuniless go\'erl.llncnt which no officer call serve with
pleasure or advantage,' which Ijuite bean:; out \Vellingtoll, Di~palche8, vii.
p.371.
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the last-named day. Some of these arc vcry important, Il.S
showing that he regarded the crisis as over, and the ultimate
evucuation of Portugal by the French us certain. 'l11C most
notable arc two orders to Beresford I, making over to him ouce
more the 4th Divi:;:;ion and De Grey's heavy dragoons for the
expedition into Estremadura, which now had as its object not the
relief of Bll.dajoz (whose capitulation ww; known) but the holding
Lack of Smut fl'ol1l Campo Mayor aud Elvas.
It will be remembered that the 2nd Division and Hamilton's
l'ortuguese had been left behind near Abrantes when 'VeIling-
tall determined, on March 9th, not to send an expedition against
Soult, till he could make it tip to It force sufficient to cope with
the army that was beleaguering Badajoz. They were Hot tu
colllmit themselves to nu}' oflensive operations, or to cross the
l'orlllgnese frontier, till the reinforcements arrived, but were to
move a stage on their way toward the south. Acc.:ordingly the
hettd quarters of the ~/l(l Divi~iollwere at Trama.&"tll on the 14th,
with its attached cava.lry (the 13th Light Dragoons) at Crato in
advance, while the l'ortngnese horse of OtWR.y had been sent to
watch the roads to Eh·as by Portalegre and Estremoz. Here
there \Vas a halt for a week, Beresford being absent with
\VellingwlI for five days, and it was not till the 17th thal the
movemcnt to\\-nros Estrcmndlll'ft began again, 011 his retum.
Meanwhile 1\1assena, oddly enough, knO\dng of the e.'i:istcnce of
a considerable allied force at Abrantes, and not feeling it Oll
his OWI1 flank, formed a theory that it must have been senl iu
Cl- long sweep up by the Zczerc, lo drop inlo the uppct· MOlldego
valley and Cllt him off from Spain. Nervousness as to this
imaginary movement had 110 small eRect on his main operations 2.
I ,~rellington lllld (';llled Beresrord up to him 011 Ma)' 9th, and the
lalter was present at I'ombol and Hedillhll. He rOlle hutil)' back to pick
up his forces, which were to form the Army of Estremadura, on the IGth
and reacbed Tbomsr 011 llle ljth March.
~ MMBel\a to Bcrlllier, from Mllceir." March 19: <D'aprCsles ra!lports,
le general Hill [he means Ueresford, who had been in charge of HiIl'~
fonner command since December) 6e portait IWec sa (li\'ision et Ull gros
detachement de I'ortllgais it tra,·ers les montagnes du lJaut :lezere, $I!
dirigeant lIur !;~ rive gallclle dll 1\fotltUgo. Des ce moment j'ai aloandOlln':
I'espoir de ganler ceUe rive sailS risquer une bataille.' ...• Dans I'elat
actllel des chases et c1'a!ltes les 1ll0UVC!lJCllts que I'cllncmi IlCut faire sur
1811] DETACHMENTS FOR ESTREMADURA 161
By sending off Cole and De Grey to join the future Army of
EstremadurIl, OIl the 16th March, We11iol:,rton rcducr..>d the force
about him by 7,000 men, and had no morc than 38,000 left all
the Ccira. The newly formed 7th Division, which was march·
iug up from Lisbon, and would ultimately replace Cole with the
main army, was at this moment only reaching Santarem; it did
110t l'OlIlC up to the front till ),furch wns at it!! cud. For the
rest of his operations against Massena, thcrcfOl"C, "\Vellington
was more than ever in a state of numerical inferiority, and
(on.oo to be cautious. Dut he was in a confident mood, fore·
seeing that the enemy could not now stop in Portugal, and must
be starved into a prompt retreat over the frontier.
His conviction that the crisis was over is shown by another
dispatch of the ~Oth March, in which he directs that the whole
of the Lisbon Militia and Ordenan~a be dismissed to their homes,
the former on furlough, the latter for good. The Militia of the
lower Bcim (the Castcllo Bruuco couutry) and of northern
Estremudum were also to return to their native districts, to be
sent on leave or kept under arms according as further events
might determine 1. Thus the Lines of Torrcs Vedras were lcft
ullgarrisolled, there being 110 furthcr danger to be feared in the
direction of Lisbon.
There was still much work, however, for the :Militia of the
North, Trant's and 'Wilson's brigades, who were brought down
to the middle Mondeh"O, and sent su<:cessive1y to Pefill Cova,
),Iortagoa, and Fornos, to guard the fords and restrain the l<'rench
from endeavouring to raid the north bank of the river. It was
unlikely that they would make a serious attempt to cross in force
into the bnrren cOlmtry lmder the Sel'nl. de Alcobn, when they
were in such a desperate plight for food, and would have the
llllied army close behind them, for the troops were to march
again on the 17th. The middle Mondego, it must be remcm·
bered, was bridgeless, and in flood from the sprillg rains: even
if l\fassena had driven off Trant and Wilson, it would have taken
him a lOllg time to build a bridge (sinl'C he bad no pontoons)
mes llancs, liar le j\fondcgo ou 1"'1' h.'S 1II011tngUCS de Guurdn, Ull s'cst
dirige le corps de Hill, U est necessaire de rapprocher l'armee de llotre
base d'ol~rations' [i. e. to relreat into Spain).
I Wellington to Beresford. (1Ji1iJilJ.tchu, vii. 376-6.)
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und VVcllington would have been pressing him in the rear before
he had got more thun a \·anguard.ovcr the water. The l\1arshal
seems never to have contemplated at this date a movement on W
Coimbra or Oporto by the north bank of the :\fondego, such as
is sum:,rested as possible by some of the eOlUmentators on the
campaign: after the day of Condeixa a retreat castwan:l was
always in his mind I. His army was too dilapidated to make
the least offensive stroke. • I think it neees.'>al'y for the interest;;
of his Imperial majesty,' vtrote Massena on the 19th,' to bring
the troops back nearer to our base of operntions by our fortresses
[Almeida and Rodrigo1, in order to let them reco\'er a little frolll
their fatigues and long privations, and to allow me to replu<."e so
much equipment which is now entirely lacking ~,'
On the 16th, the day after the combat of :F07; do Aroucc, the
2nd and 8th Corps marched before dawn, ill drenching rain, and
retired ail far as the AlvR river, where tile bridb"C of Ponte de
Mnrcclltl, reptlil"Cd fol' a moment b)' Dronet whcn he passed it
a few days before, httd again been broken by Wilson's Militia.
It took all the day to repair it, and by the evening only the
artillery hlld been sent liCI'OSS. The divisions of Mermct aud
Loisoll followed at (t. distance, leaving behind the much-tried
battalions of :.\farehand, whieh Ne)' had once more chosen to form
his rearguard. He drew them up across the road a few miles
froUl the edra, expecting to be attacked Ollce more ill the
llloming, But to his surprise \Vcllington did not cross the
ri\'er, and only scnt a few >;conts to discover thc positiOll of the
Marshal. Meanwhile his engineers mended the bridge at Foz.
011 the 17th, at dawn, Masscna sent the 8th Corps across the
repaired bridge of Ponte de Murcclla, after which it halted at
1 (llien ne nous empechait,' sars l\Iasseua.'s biographer Koch, 'de
passcr It guc le lIIOllUCgO, et ue nous tenure 1OlIltre:s ue III Sierra .le
.-\Icoba., d'oll DOUS menacerions Co'imbre et toute la contree compri£e
entre le MOlldego, le Ducro et la mer.' But there was a hinurance-or
rather three hindrances~the j\Iondego was not fordable at the moment,
and what was morc important, tIle stllrving llrmy could not have lived Oil
the country-side north of the Mondego. .Moreover the passage of the
l\Iondcgo witl. n lively enemy lit his heels would Ilavll Lecn too r1angerous
for :\lassena, who harl already refused to accept such conditions on the
day of Condei",a.
11 From l\Iassifna's dispatch ro Berthier, March 19.
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Corti~a, :Moita, and other "illages beyond the AI"u river, who~e
passuge it was plocpared to defend. But the ~nd Corps was
marched up-stream to Sal'zooo, the next ford, and placed there in
position, with a detachment beyond the river at the town of
Arganil on its south bank. The 6th Corps, following the other
two, crossed the Ah'a at Ponte de MUI'(,oclla latel' in the day, and
joined the BUI; it left a small detachment beyond the bridge
to observe the expected nrrival of the Allies. Of the horsemen,
i\lontbrun's lleavy dragoons watched the lower course of the
Al"a, from llonte de Murcella to its junction with the :Mondego,
while Junot's eOl'ps-cumlry was sent up the Ah'a eastwatu, to
hold the fords beyond Arganil.
These dispositions seemed to indicate an intention to make
a serious stand behind the Alvn, where the positions are very
strong. The river is a fieree mountain torrent in a deep bed,
with precipitous banks, and very few fOlus, Wellington had
fixed on this line, dllring the Bussaco campaign in the preceding
autumn, as the position where he should await the French if
they advanced by the south bank of the Mondego, and had
thrown np earthworks on each side of the Ponte de Mlll'ccUa.
These were, of course, useless to Massena, since the)' looked the
wrollg way; but the rivcr line was a11l10~t as defensible from the
north bank ns from the sonth, and presented a very formidable
obstacle to the pursuing enemy.
By the cveniug of the 17th 'Vellingtoll was once more in
touch with the enemy. The cavalry brigades of' Slade and
Arelltsehildt had crossed the bridge of Foz do Aroucc, and
followed the 6th Corp!> to the AIm, with the 6th and Light
Divisions behind them. The intillltry, however,did not show thcm-
selves, but encamped in the hills, some miles from the Pontc de
Murcella. They found the road shewn with dead 01' dying mules
alld horses, and took a certain number of French sick and strag-
glers.
But \Vellington had no intention of forcing the I'onte de
Murcella. position; while two divisions took this road, the
rest of the army (1st, Sed, 5th Divisions, and the Portuguese
independent brigades) were marehed eastward by the steep road
along the top of the watershed between the Ceira and the
AIm, the route Furcado-Arganil, towards the fords of' the upper
M~
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Alva. They drovc out of thc last-named place Reynier's obscrv.
i1]g detachment, which reported that it had seen the Allies in
great force marching up-stream. This news cOllviuced 1\IassCntl.
that his adversary was intending either to cross thc ford of
Sarzedo and attack Ueyniel', 01' to move still further up the
valley, and to pass the Alva in its upper course, so throwing
himself across the main road to Celorico, by which the Army of
Portugal was intending to retreat. Nothing but cavalry scouts
having been seen opposite the Ponte de Murcella, it was
supposed that \Vellington's whole army was marching 011 Arganil.
Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 17th, Massena ordered
the 8th Corps to break up hastily from its camps and to march
all night to Galliges, on the high road beyond Reynier's left.
This was done, and JUllot hurried oft: leaving hundreds of
foragers scattered on the slopes towards the Mondego, whither
they had been sent out in search of food dlu'ing the day. Ney
remained behind at the Puntc de Murcella., to keep the passa.,cre
as long as possible; he was uncertain, as was Massena, whether
there was in his front only a cavalry screen or a serious fon.'e of
all arms.
On the morning of the 18th this problem was solved, for the
Light Division came down to the river, drove Ney's rearguard
across it, and opened a cannonade against the troops of the 6th
COI'PS visible on the opposite bank. No serious attempt was
made to pass, the intention being only to hold Ney to his
ground as long as possible by demonstrations, while the real
crossing was made far up-stream. This plun had the desired
result. In the afternoon Ney received the news that the Allies
had begun to cross the AlvR at the ford of Pombeiro, from
which they had driven oft' one of Ueynier's battalions. If any
considerable force got over the river at this point, the 6th Corps
was cut off from the rest of the army; accordingly the l\Iarshal
ordered his three divisions to march oft' without a moment's delay; .
• I never saw Jolmny go off in such confusion,' says a Light
Division diarist I. The cavalry brigade of Arentschildt sent out
reconnoitring parties, who forded the river, while the engineers
rigged up a temporary wooden bridb'C close to the Ponte de l\fur-
1 Diary of George SimmOlls of the 95tli, p. 140.
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cella I, by which the 6th and Light Dh'isions were able to cross at
dawn on the following day.
On the left the decisive crossing at Pombeiro had beell made
by the Guards' brigade of the 1st Di\·ision 2; Reynier made no
attempt to snpport the single battalion at the ford, but called
it in, and drew np in battle order on the Serrn de Moita some
distance above the river. There was no fighting here, and after
dusk the ~Ild Corps decamped, taking the road Galliges-
Chamusca.-Gollvea-Cclorico, which runs parallel to and above
the Alva; the 6th Corps fell in behind the 2nd; the 8th, which
had already got further to the east during the march of the
preceding night, led the column and was beyond Galliges in the
afternoon J.
On the night of the 18th-19th and the following morning the
whole French army made a most protracted and fatiguillg
march, which cost them many stragglers and much material.
This was the longest stage which Massena made during the
whole retreat, more than twenty miles of mountain road being
covered in one stretch. On the evening of the 19th the head of
the 8th Corps was at Pinhany'Os, that of the ~nd at Carngcx;a and
Sandomil, that of the 6th at Chamusca. The British cavalry
in pursuit picked up an immense number of prisoners this day,
mainly small parties of foragers belonging to the 6th and 8th
Corps, who had been marauding in the direction of the Mondego
when their regiments received Slldden orders to march: they
returned towards their camps to fall into the hands of the
British cavalry. Arentsehildt's brigade alone took ~oo this day \
and the total according to Wellington's dispatch was 600 men 5,
Among them were an aide-de-camp of Loison'8 and several other
1 Napier says, < by an ingenious raft contrived by tIle staff-eorps'
(iii. 126), but Tomkinson of the 16th Ligllt Dragoons alld Simmons speak
of a wooden hridKe.
, So the diary of Captain Stothert of the 3rd Guarils, p. 2.50. He puts
the crossing later in the afternoon than the French sources, IIut the
whole 1st Division was across by dark. Several French critiC!! (e. g.
DeIagrave) blame Reyllier for not stopping the small force that first
crossed.
a These movements are best given in Fririon's diary: SprOnglin gives
some llelp for the 6th Corps.
• Tomkinson'g diary, p. 37. G Di8patches, \'ii. p. 375.
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officers. Some droves of oxen were captured from the for~rs
and from the rear of the 6th Corps, and this wns the only
food which the Dritish vanguard got that dar, for once more, as
sel'eral diarists ruefully not~ 'biscuit was out.' The pursuers
state that 'qualltitie8 of tumbrils, carts, waggons and other
articles were abandoned by the enemy 'I, and no doubt were
right, though Mas.<;ena wrote that evening from Maceim, • NOlls
n'al'ollS pas laisse en arrii're un malade, Ull blesse, ni la moilHlre
voiture d'artillerie ou de bagagcs' 2. Dut his dispatches fre·
quently contained what he knew that Napok'Oll would desire
to see rather than the truth. Considering the difficulties of the
retreat, and the skilful way in which he had condueterl it, he
might have been contented with his actual achievements, and
need not have padded out his reports with 'terminological
inexactitudes '. It must be confessed that his aide-de-camp
Fririon played II good second to him when he wrote in his
jonrnal that between the] 5th and 31st of March the Army of
Portugal left behind only twenty prisoners and fifty men lost
while maraudings.
On thc morning of thc 20th :March 'Vellington's llrlllY was
all across the Alva, but only the cavalry and the Light, Srd, and
6th Divisions continued the pursuit. The small convoy received
on the 17th was exhausted, and what litlle fuod remained WI\S
Illadc over to the three divisions llamed above, while the 1sI,
5th, and Pack's and Ashworth's Portuguese halted for five dn)'s
at l\foita and the neighbouring villages, till the first train of
provisions sent up from Coimbra should arrive. Of the troops
which could still be fcd, the Light Division pushed on as far as
Galligcs that night, the 3rd and 6th were behinrl them. The
French, thanks to their desperate night mareh, were already
a long way ahead, and it WllS latc on thc 20th before the cavalry
overtook, near Cen, their extreme rearguard, two battalions of
HClldelet's division and a hussar regiment. General Slade, whose
bl'igade WWI leading, refuSI..>d to attack them until infantry amI
guns came up to his aid, and the French slipped away before
1 SimmonS'l; (liary, p. 140.
t MasSl!llll to llerthier, from Maceira, March HJth.
, J"ririon's {Jalllllflg1l6 de Portugal, p. l70.
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Elder's Cn~ore.sand Bull's battery reached him 1. 'This \Vft.'; the
second day without bread, and the third without corn for the
horses, und we had marched nearly five leagues,' explains
It t'8.valry diarist 2. The pursuers were as harassed us the pursued,
and could go no further, but Slo.de was thought to have shown
weakness. He picked up a good many stragglers and sick, and
found the road strewn with broken vehicles and dying Illulc~.
Mennwhilc Masscna hOO divided his army into two columns
at the fork of the roads near Maccira. The 2nd Corps, takiug.
011 the right hand, the SQuthcm and more hilly route, reached
Gouvea. The 8th Corps, taking the northern fork, got to
Villacortcs, alld sent its cavalry on ahead to the bridge of
1"011105, which they found broken and guarded by Trant':>
Jlilitia. The 6th Corps, following the 8th, lay at Pillhall(ros.
Since leo'wing the Ponte de ::\furcella the French were a little
Il'S!! pressed for food: the district through which they were
IlOW pnssing W(l,$ fertile, and had not been raided before; most
of the peaSalltry had returned to it during the winter. Hasty
plundering on both sides of the road bronght in a certain
amount of food, especially in the way of cattle, which hud been
sent up into the hills, but were often discovered by skilled
marauders. There was continual bickering with the Ordenam;.a,
one purt)' of whom, only 300 slrong, tried, with more courage
than discretion, to defcnd the village of PenoJm against the
advanced gmuxl of the 2nd Corps. All along the road the pur-
suing Light Division found the dead bodies of peasantry, mixed
with those of the French sick who had fallen by the way,
On the 21st the 8th Corps reached Celorico, where Drouet
11'(1,$ found in position with Conroux'l'\ division of the 9th Corps.
The 6th Corps reachedCarapichina QlldCortira. The 2nd, turning
oil' at Villacod:es on the Guardn road. had n most distressiJlg
mountain march to Villamonte. The pursuing infantry of the
Light and 3rd Divisions reached Pillhallyos and Mucciru, with
the cavalry fi\'e miles in front, at the convent of Vinho. They
had now dropped fifteen miles behind the Freneh rear, and were
I According to f-'?irion's diary the H.A, gUllS arrivcd in time to shell
the rear hntt.1.1ion nnd kill onc officer.
! Tomkillsoll, p. Hi: 'Every Que talkl..l loudly of Shl(lc'~ COlulllct
tlJl'Ollgh the day.'
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quite out of touch with it, but continued to pick up stragglers
-~WO men are said to ha\'e been taken on that day 1. Like the
enemy. they were now commencing to get a little food from the
country. 'The peasants, who had all fled to the mountains on
the enemy's retreat, all seeing us come down, baked bread for
the troops, and gave us whatever they had left. They had
suffered a good deal, all the principal houses had been hurnt,
and those left a good deal destroyed, but the [French] trooJls
had 110t heeD able to discuver all the corn, &c., concealed 2.'
On the 22nd the French army had reached the end of the main
retreat. Two corps were concentrated in and near Warico 3, the
other (IWynier) reached Guarda, where it found Clap:l.r&l.e·~
division of Drouet's corps, which had been there for some weeks,
They were nOI\' only three marches from Almeida and four from
Ciudnd Uodrigo; commullication with these two places WM
open, for Dronet and the 9th Corps had now come into touch
again with the Commander-in-Chief, and were available for
keeping the roads safe. The English lw.d been outmarched,
and MasseuR might have retired to Almeida and Rodrigo
pr!lCtically unmolested, by n good cltal1S8CC. Dut this was not
to be the end of the campaign, as e\'ery one in the French
army, save its Commander-in-Chief, fervently desired. For
generals and rank and file alike wcre tired out, and yearned for
a cessatioll of mountain marches, and a rest in wcll-provisioned
cantonments, before they should be called upon for another
effort. But another and a most unexpected episode was to take
place before the weary columns reached Rodrigo. :Masseua
made one more attempt to •save his fnee,' and to avoid being
thnlst O\'er the Spanish frontier, along the road on to which his
adversary had forced him. This led to a fortnight more of
man<Euvres in the mountains, and to the combt\ts of GuarJn
and Sabugal, after which the French Marshal had to pocket
his pride and acquiesce in the inevitable. These operations are
of a character so different from those which preceded them that
I Simmons of the 96th, diary, p. 148.
t 'fomkinson's diary, p. 68.
I Ney rClnllilltJl.l quil.lt at Corti,o IInd Carapichin3 this day, but was
only ten miles from Celorico, and so may be considered as part of the
SlIme body 3S the 8th Corps.
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they must be treated as a separate soory. The retreat from
$antarem really ended at Celorico. The events between
IHa.rch 221ld nnd April 4th must be dealt with apart, since
tIle>' practically amounted to a belated attempt on the part of
Massena to seize the offensive once morc, and to shift the scene
of war without his a<h"crsnry's consent. The pmjcct failed, and
(as we shall see) was hopeless from the first.
Before dealing with it, a few remarks 011 the general character
uf the operutions t1mt had taken plllee between March 9th and
March 22nd mllst be made. '\Then rending in succession two
narrative.~ of Massena's retreat from Santarem to Celorico, olle
by all English and one by a French eye-witness, it ili of'1;ell
dWlclllt to renlillc that the two \\Titcrs arc describing the same
series of operations. Most of the French conceive the retreat to
ha\·e becn a series of triumphant rearguard actions, in which
thcir army got 011' practicaUy uumolested, under cover of the
skilful operatiollS of a small covering force. On the other hand,
the English tell the tale AS if the whole French army WAS easily
hunted out of Portugal bj' infcrior numbers, foiled in repeated
attempt'! to occupy n. permanent position in the valley of the
MOlldego, and finally thrust back in a direction which it did
not intend to take. 'Vhere the French tell of nothing but an
orderly retreat and small losses, the l<:nglish speak of the
capture of hundreds of prisoners, and the destruction of the
wholc baggage-train of thc retiring army.
To a certain extent the mental attitudes of both sets of
narrators can be understood and justified hj' the impartial
studcnt. ''''hCll a rearguard action takes place, tile c(wering
force left behind by the retiring army always thinks of itself as
being opposed to thc whole pllIsuing host. It considers itself
to he hraving the assault of immensely superior forces, and if it
holds il~ own for a time and gets off without crushing losses, is
well satisfied with its own conduct. This is both jnstifiable and
comprchensible. But to the pursuer the same rearguard action
presents an entirely different moral aspect. The few squadrons
and battalions forming the head of his advance find themselves
suddenly brought to a check by a considerable hostile force
arrayed in a formido.ble position. They are foreed to halt till
their supports begin to come up, from five, ten, or fifteen
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miles ill the rear. Tben, when a body of rescC\'c has bebruu
to accumulatc behind them, thcy launch themsclves upon the
enemy, who givcs ground after more or less fighting Rnd
retires. The leading brigade or dh'ision of the pursuers con-
siders that it has victoriously driven the whole hostile army
from its strong positioll, aml is no less l!lltis6ed with itself
than is the force to which it has becn opposed. In short, nll
rearguard actions begin with a check to the pursuers; thcy
all end with the retreat of the defenrters. This is their
necessary CQuri;C; both parties, if their gencrals play the 6'lLme
properly, may be ('ontent with themselves; the onc has gained
time for the escape of the main body of the retreating host,
the other has cleared the way for the progress of the pursuing
army. The only method ill which their relative merits call
be tested, is by asking whether the rearguard detained the
ad\'ll.l1ced guard as long as might have been expected, ill/licted
disproportionate losses upon it, and got a.Wll.y with the minimum
of loss to itself, or whether, on the other hand, the advanced
guard evicted its 0ppollellt~ from their position at a rapid rate,
with small sacritiees, and with considerable punishment inflicted
on the enemy. The mere facts thnt the rearguard held back the
pursuers for some hours, and that the ad vam:ed gURrd ultimately
carried the enemy's position, arc obligatory incidents of such
fights. 'When we eOllle to examine thc detllils of the combats
whieh took pltt.ee between the 11th and 19th of lHarch, we shall
neither hold with the :French narrators that for many days Ne)'
and two di \'isions of the 6th Corps fought aud held back
Wellington's whole army, nor with the English narrators that
the Light and 8rd Divisions, ullassisted by their eomrndes,
hunted 40,000 Frellch out of the Yalley of the lowcr Mondego.
Yet it is trne that of forty-four French infantry officers, who were
killed or wounded in Portugal between these dates, no IClis than
thirty-seven belonged to the divisions of :Marchand and Menllet,
while, similarly, of twenty-ninc British and Portuguese ofiicers
hit in the same period, no less thall nineteen belonged to the
Light Division and eight more to the 3rd. Clearly therefore
Ney did !lot <.'olltend with the whole British IIrmy, but only
with its two leading divisions, and those two divisions did not
contend with the whole l"l-cnch army. but only with the two
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units which formed its rearguard. Fine writing on both sides,
as to struggles against oven"helming odds, must he dis-
rcgnrdcd. Still more so may the exaggerated estimates as to
loss inflicted on the enemy which are to be found in the narratives
of most of the first-hand writers. ''\That they are worth Illay be
guessed from Marhot\! statement that the British lost 1,000 men
at ll.edinha-Noel raises this liberal estimate to ] ,800 I-the
reAl CAAllltlty liflt being 240. Similarly Grattan tells us that the
.French had 1,000 men lIors de combat at l~oz do Arouce 2. when
their actual loss seems to havc been about 250.
The accusations of timidity and over-caution which these
contemporary chroniclers lavish npon each other's generals arc
equally absurd. 'Vellington is always rallied by the French
for want of courage and enterprise, because he did not at once
dash the first b'o or three battalions that came up against a
division in position, but waited for his supports. And Ney is
criticized by both English und French writers for having some-
times withdrawn from the fight over early, because at Condeixa
and on the Alva he hastened to get out of a dan6P{!rous situation.
Both generah, in reality, acted with perfect tactical corrrxtness;
armies do not meet for the purpose of putting in the maximum
of fighting, without regard for ends or consequences, and the
oommander who attacks !.>efore he has a sufficient force collected
is blameworthy just in the same degree as the commander who
holds out too long in a hazardous position.
Most of the l?rench criticism on ,"Vellington is based on the
false h)'pothcsis that his arm)' outnumbered ~1assClla's during
the whole retreat, and that he therefore should have achieved
gccater results. As a matter of fact, as we have seen, he was
never stronger than the enemy, because he had been forced
to detach Beresford's two divisions against Soult before he
durtcd. And whcn, ill the later stage:i of the rctrcut, the
}'rench were short of Conrol1x's division of the 9th Corps, which
IUld gOlle on to Celorieo ahead of the main army. it must be
remembered that Wellington from March 16th onwards was
deprived of Cole's division and the heavy dragoons, who had been
I Noel, &ml!fl'jirs mili/aires, p. 141.
2 GI1~t!llU'S With the CQllnrwght flangers, 1809-18, 11. 68.
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sent off southward to join Beresford. A pursuing army dealing
with a superior retreating 8.1'1ll)·must act with the greatest caution,
lest it should suddenly run up against the enemy's whole force,
and find itself committed to nil offensive action against gN!ater
numbers in a strong position. 'Vellington never fell into this
trap; he manreuvred the French out of every line which they
took up, without incurring any danger, or allowing his udvcmry
any chance of harming him. While giving all credit to Ney for
the brilliant rearguard tactics by which he often held back the
pursuers for half a day, it is necessary to give equal credit to
'Wellington for having fought his way through half a duzen
formidable lines of defence, with a minimum of loss, and without
OltOO exposing himself to the chance of a seriollS check. After
all, his object was to drive Masscna away from the Mondego and
towardll Spain, aud that obj!.'Ct he achicvl.'<1 in the IlIost trium·
phant fashion.
1 'nH~ student must he fipeci"lly warned against Fririou's figures fqr
French losses, Though he was ),Iassena's aidtHle-camp, and wrote a
quasi-officilll account of Ute whole retreat, his numhers are ""holly
uutrustwortlly. He stateli (p, 149) that the 6th Corps only lost 179 kjl\ed
ami wounded betweell March 1 and March I.5, '111e Il.Ctual losses were
l·ombal, 63; Uedinha, 227; Casal Noyo, at least 5{j; Fo~ do Arquce,
at lcast 250 = 600_ Silllilarly he lit&tes the loss at Sabugl\1 at 260; the
official casualty list sent in to tIle MaN;.llal gh-es a total of 730. Fririou,
'from ilis position, must have seen, or at least could ha\'e seen, these figures.
SECTION XXIV, CHAPTER II
GU.4.HDA AND SAUUGAL. iI'IAllClI 22:-'I)-!\l'IUL 12'1'li, 1811
AT !loon on Ml\l'ch ~:?lnd, the day following that on which the
French head quarters had reached Cclorico, Masseua issued a
new set of orders, entirely contradictory to those which he
had been giving during the last fifteen da.ys. Though on
the 19th he had stated his intclltioll of 'falling back closer to
his base of operations all the fortresses [Almcida and Roddgo].
IInd giving the army a rest after its fatiglles and privations 1;
he now proposed to plunge back once more into the moun·
tains, and to swerve aside from his places of strength and his
depOts. The commanders of the corp~ recei \'00 the astounding
l1ew~ that it was the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to
turn south-eastward, towards the Spauish frontier and the central
'l'agus, with the object of taking lip a position in the Coria-
Plasencia (.'Ountry, from which he would threaten central
Portul:,"Sl on a new front. This nef,:essitated a. march from
Cdoril.:o through the mountains of Bclmontc a,nd Pcnamacor, and
then across the Sierra de Meras, into the thinly-peopled plateau
of northern Estremadura.
Supposing that the centre of the Iberian peninsulahnd been a
fertile plain resembling Lombardy or Planders, there would have
been somethillg to suy for this plan. Still more might it have been
advisable if the French army had been a fresh and intact force just
opening a campaign. relet, Massena's chief aide-de-camp, tries
lo justify the proposal by saying that· it was more conform-
able to the general rules of strategy; we should have connected
OUNelvcs with the 5th Corps in Estremadura, with the Army of
the Centre, and the general pivot of operations at :Madrid; we
should have brought Lord Wellington back to the position that
he had quitted; we should have kept the results of the advantages
recently won in Estremadura, which were so soon to be lost;
1 Dispatch to Berthier, frOlll MaceiraJ of Ulat date.
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we should also havc had the means to menace once more Central
Portugal and thc Lines of 'l'orrcs VcdrM 1.' This is all '·er}'
plausible, but it omits the crucial facts that the Arm)' of IJortugal
was tired out, destitute of munitions, and almost destitute of food,
and that it was proposed to lead it across two difficult l'all&teS of
mountains full of gorges and defiles, into a region which was Ollel
of the most thinly pcoplcdmld desolate in 11.11 Spain, where there
was not a single French soldier, much less ll. depOt of any sort.
This was the same district in which Victor had starved in 1800,
and in passing through which ''VeJlington had suffered so man)'
privations 011 the way to Talavera. It had been visited in
:E'ebruary by a flying column under Lahoussuye, sent out from
Tnla,vera, which had got as far llS Plasencia and Alcantara, Rnd
then retired, because it was absolutely impossible for 3,000 men
to live in it.
Massena'8 maps were very bad-the actual set u!>Cd. by his head·
quarters staft" is in existence, and call be seen at Belfast 2. Dut
his intelligence department must have been worse than his mflps,
if he was unaware of the character of the country on thc border
of Portugal and Spain, and of that lying beyond, in northern
Estl'emaduro.. He might have asked information abont it from
Reynier and Ney, who had both crossed it, but he did not. !\lost
striking of all, however, is the ignorance shown in these orders
of the physical and moral state of the French army. ]f it luw
ever reached PJaseneia, it would have got there without a gun
or a baggage mule-the caissons and carriages were almost all
gone already. A single set of figure.~ may serve to sholl" the
situation: the artillery of the 8th Corps started from Almeida
ill September 1810 with 142 wheeled units-guns, caissons,
waggons, &c" and 891 horses. It got back to Ciudnd Uodrigo
on April 4,1811, with 49 guns and caissons drawn by 18~ horses,
having lost 93 vehicles and 709 horses. Forty-one of the cais-
SOilS and waggons had bccn tlestroycd hefore the COlllmeuccment
of the retreat, the rest had been dropped between Thomur and
Celorico 3. There were left at the~end of March only 24 guns
I Pelet's Appendice 8ur fa Cllem IfE8pagllt in Viewin8 et Oolltjuhel,
21, p. 330.
I Captured at Vittoria, they were long after given to Belfast Unh'ersity.
, All tllese interesting figures come from the diary of Colonel Noel,
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with ~5 caissons of ammunition, to tlraw which l"C<luin.'d 1111
the horses remaining. How long could this artillery haye
fought with only one misson of ammunition per gun left?
How many horses would have been alive after another hundred
miles of mountain roads? Evcn if some guns had got to
llll\Sencin, how long would it have taken to get them ammunition
from Salamanca or Madrid, the nearest dcpOts? The same
question would be no less forcible with regard to infantry
ammunition, which was depleted to an equal extent with that
of the artillery.
But it i~ e\"en more important to remember that the Army
of Portugal was also in desperate straits for boots and clothing.
In lllany regiments a third or a quarter of the men bad no
liK>tgcar but· rh-lins,' or mocassills made every few days from
the hides of cattle. '1'he uniforms were in rags; many soldiers
had nothing that recalled the regulation attire but the capote
that covered evcrything.
Yet the main thing of' all wus the moral aspect of attairs.
The army would fight when it was its duty, as l"rench armies
always have done, but it was dis<.:olltented, sulky, angry with the
Marshal, to whom it attributed its miseries-though its indigna-
tion might have been more justly reserved for the Emperor, who
had set his lieutenant an impossible task. The rank and file
had sunk low in discipline, us must bc always the Cllile when
troops have been living by daily plunder for six months. And
this mune want of discipline wus most evidcnt alllong the gencrals,
who, now that Massena had failed, openly criticized him before
their staffs, and often neglected his orders. Masscna suspected
Ne)', .JUllO!;, and Reynier alike of intending to denounce him to
the Emperor as a blundercr. It will be remembered that he
had already detected Re,ynicr in a trick of this descriptiou 1•
Ney hn.d been girding at his orders with fury ever since the
retreat began, and WfUj telling all who cared to listcn Umt a
hasty return to Spain wus the onl:y possible policy, and that
thc dream of holding out on the Mondego or the Alva was
ab:>urd.
commandillg the artillery of Clausel's division; see his memoirs, pp. 137
allill46.
I &e p. 60.
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. It was probably not on mere strategic grounds, but because
he was determined to assert himself, to prove that he was
master of his 0\\'11 movements, und that he was not yet a beaten
man or a failw'c, that Masseua issued orders Oil the QQnd for
the 2nd Corps to make ready to move southward, not northward,
from GURl'da, and for the 6th and 8th to prepare to follow on
the same route. This provokL'd an explosion of wrath on the
part of Ney, who ill the course of four hours of the afternoon
wrote three sllccessivc letters to his .eommander, in terms of
growing irritlLtion. In the first, which was sent off' before
receiving the detailed orders for the new movement, he merely
set forth all the objedions to it, and inquired whether MasseUR
had the Emperor's leave for such a gencral chuu!,>'C of plans. III
the second, afler he had received and read the orders, he protested
formally lloo-ainst them, and said·that, unless positive instnlCtions
from Paris authorizing the new scheme had been received, the
6th Corps ghould not llltll'ch. He gave llIany urguments, and thcy
were incontestably true. 'The army has need to rest behind
the shelter of Almeida and (''iudad Rodrigo, in order to receive
the clothing and shoes which are absolutely necessary. and
which must be brought up from the magazines. Your Excellcncy
is mistaken in thinking that food can be got in abundance in the
region of Coria and Plasencia. I have marched through that
country (during the attempt to cut off Wellington'8 retreat from
'l'alavera in 18091 and it is impossible to exaggerate its sterility
01' the badllc~s of it:l roads. Your Excellcncy will not get onc
single gun so far, with the teams that we have brought out
of Portugal. Moreover this ma.nreuvre. so singular at this
particular moment. would entirel)' uncover Old Castile, and
compromise all our operatiolls in Spain. I am fully ",ware of
the responsibility which I take upon myself in making formal
opposition to your intentions, but, even if I were destined to
be cashiered or condemned to death, I could not execute thc
march 011 Coria. and Pluscncia directed by your Highness, unless
(of course) it has been ordered by the Empel'Or 1.'
Within two houn> of the second letter Ney sent in the third,
which was no mere prolegt, nor even a mere refusal to move, but
I 'Die thrw letters are all printed ill full ill Fririon's MemQiT, and the
second of them ill Delmas's Piece6 jIl6tificati~'e8, p. 607.
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nn open declaration of his intention to march hack to Almeida.
'I warn your Excellency that to-morrow I shall leave my posi-
tions of Carnpichillll and Corti~o, and L'Chelon my troops fi'om
CelodeD to Freixadas, and on the day after they will be between
l~reixadllS and Almeida. This disposition is forced on me, in
order to prevent the whole forte fcolll disbanding, under the
pretext of searching for the food necessary for its subsistence,
for food is MW absolutely lacking:
Unless he was to surrender his authority altogether, and obey
his lmoordiuutc, :l\ItlSScnll had IlOW to strike. Ney had put him-
self absolutely in the wrong in the way of military subordination,
though he was as absolutely in the right in the way of strategy.
AmI the Comlllander-in~Chicfhad c\'ery technical justification
when he formally deposed him from the command of the 6th
Corps, and directed him to leave for Yalladolid without delay,
and there await the orders of the Emperor. LoisOll, the senior
uf thc thrcc divisional generals of the 6th Corps, was ordered to
take over its command next morning. Several of Ney's parti-
sans urged him to refuse obedience, to seize the person of
MassCllll, and to declare himself Commander-in-Chief of the
Army of Portugal. ""Ye arc assured that he would have been
hacked in the step by the whole of his own corps, and would have
met no resistance from the others, for Massenil \\'as universally
disliked, alld every man wished to continue the retreat on
Almeida of which Neywas the advocate 1. Blit he shrank from
levying open war upon his chief, and departed among the tears
of the whole 6th Corps, of which he knew every o(Jk-et' and many
men by sight. It had been under him, without a break, since
he first formed it at the calllp of Montreuil, near Boulogne,
in 1804.
i\Iassena started off his aide-dc-camp Pelet for Paris next day,
with orders to get to the Emperor without delay, and explain
the situation hefore Ney could tell his tale. This his emissary
~u(.'Ceeded in doing, and his representations to Napoleon were
bncked by those of' Foy, who had borne Massella's earlier messnge
I Ney's aide-de-camp Spriinglin saPl in llis diary (p, 474) that Ney
IIl~it;.tcd for somll timll before Tcjl'Cting tllU idea of IL eau!, de 1II11'n against
:\laSS/!na, which was llOtly urged U)lOll him, and opines thut it would have
heen succCSllfnl al,ld mo~t llOllubr willl t110 army.
O)lAl'. IV N
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of March 9, and WIlS still in Paris. The Emperor seems to
have approved of Massena's stringent dealing with his sub-
ordinate, and even to have expressed his satisfaction with the
new plan for marching the Army of Portugal to the middle
Tagus I. He also declared that corps-commanders of the type of
Ney and JUllot were ll. mistake, and that to avoid further friction
he would cut lip the whole army into divisions, and abolish the
corps altogether. But at the same time he allowed Ney to return
to Paris, gave him a mere formal reproof, and then continued to
employ him in posts of the highest importance. Next year the
Marshal was to Will his last titlc of 'Prince of thc Moscolra'
lllldcr his m3ster's e)'~ on the field of Borodino.
Ney having been superseded and banished, Massena could
carry out his wild plan for a march towards northern Estre·
maduI'a through the midst of the Portuguese mountains. On
the ~rd the 6th Corps was brought into Celorico, alld its
artillery moved forward as far as Ratoeiro on the Guarda road.
The 8th Corps left Celorico and moved in the same direction,
with its cavalry at Ponte do Ladrao in advance. Drouet \dth
Conroux's division had already gOlle back towards Almcidn, with
the sick and wounded of the whole army; he wo.s ordered to
1 Foy lo Massella, April 8, 18lJ: <J'ai uit it Sa Majc.<;le que \'OUS
paraissiez litre dans I'intention de porter votre quartier general a Guarda,
mais que (no pouvaul pas vivre duus celw position) vous scricz llroballlo-
meut oblige de descendre jusqu'a Alcantara. CeUe position a paru
if. I'Empereur propre u protCger egalcment le midi et le nord de l'Espaglle.'
Some part.<; of this interview of :Foy with Napoleon, related in his usual
vivid style, are too good to omit. 'Did Massl'flla really intend to force
llle pas&"lg'e of lhe Tagus? He uid? "'ell tlleo, 1\C would llave Ilestro)'ed
his army if he had tried. But 1 was not worried about it; 1 kne\\' he
would /lovcr lry to cross. \Vould MllSSC1l3 pass lIlo Tagus, he who ill tile
Isle of Lobau [Wagram campaign of 18(0) would not try to pass a mere
brook! Tho momcnt you told me lIl3t he had relurned frolll in front of
Torres Vedras I knew that he would come back, and refuse to risk a general
engagement.... \Ve1lington is a cleverer man than l\1assina: he kept
his eye fixed on Claparede's division j if Claparede had been brought
forll't1rd, llle English would havc expocted to he attackc,.1, would have
gOlle back into their Lines. .. Portugal is too far off-I can't go there
mrself. The business would u~ke si" montlla, an,l ill tlmt six mOllths
everylllillg would be hung up iu .Europe,'" &c. See foy's Vie Mililaire,
pp. 13f).....40.
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take post at Val-de-Mula on the Turoll, between Almeida and
Ciudad Rodrigo. His other division, that of Clapar&.le, was
sent from Guarda to join him on the same day. Drouet, accord·
ing to some versions of the e\'cllts of this critical week, had
moved back of his OWI1 accord without waiting for Massena's
orders, But it is clear that there was absolute neceSl;lty to tell
ofT'some L"Overing force for the frontiers of LcOll, if the mail! arm)'
WAS to be drawn away to the central 'l'agus, lest Vlcllingtoll
should send off a detachment to attack Almeifla and Cilldad
Uodrigo, and finclllothing to hilld~r him.
.For the ncxt five days the march southward and eastwurd was
continued. After a rest of only two nights at Guardn, the
2nd Corps moved 011 the ~4th of :March by two bad parallel
roads through the hills, and encamped with its first division at
Sortelha and its second at Aguos Uellns: a flanking detachment
of cavalry occupied Belmonte, further to the west, in order to
keep a look-out 011 the \'slley of the Ze;rere. The 8th Corps
took up the position whieh the 2nd had evacuated at Guarda :
it is recorded to have lost man)' of its already depleted stock
of horses in climbing the steep ascent into that town, which
stands on the very .summit of the Scrra da. Estrclla, at a
height of over 3,400 feet above sea-level. .No other town in
Portub1'l\1 lies so high. 111e 6th Corp3 followed the 8th, but
halted sholt of Guarda, to cover the slow progress of it!;
artillery, which had to be dragged up the defHe wit.h doubled
tcums, so that half the gUllS and vehicles hud to wait at the
bottom, while their beasts were assisting to draw the first
section to its lofty uestinlltion.
The ~5th saw the head of the ~lld Corps at Val de Lobos 011
the road to Penamacor; the main body painfully trailed along
behind. J UIlOt and the Hth Corps left Guarda, but took, not the
path that Reynier hOO followed, but all ef.Jually difficult one
leading to Delrnontc. But the gUllS could not proceed with the
infantry dh·isiolls. They had to be left at Guarda, the Bel.
lIlonte road being pronounced absolutely impracticable for them:
this was a serious check to l\fa'lsenn, who had counted on llsing
this route for the whole corps. Qf the 6th Corps one division
(l\farchand) entered Gllurda, a second (Loh;on's old division,
now commanded by FereY)ihaltL-d at Rapoulln,at the foot of the
N2
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great mounblin on which that town lies. The other division
(Mermet) had taken a flanking turn, more in the plain, and lay
at Goveias, fifteen miles north·east from Guarda, with n rear-
guurd at .Frcixadas on the road to Almcida.
On the 26th, the last day on which it can be said that
Masscna's insane scheme for marching to Estremadura was still
being carried out, the whole 6th Corps closed up 011 Guarda;
the SUI Corps at Belmontc scnt out reconnaissanccs towards
Co\·jlhao, Munteigas, and the Zezcre; but the 2nd, which was
hearling the column of march, was C'.ompletely stuck ill the
lllountaiwi between Sortelha and Penamacor. It must have
SL-'ClIlOO a bitter piece uf irony to U.eynier when he fC<:ciwd
orders 'to profit by his stay in his position to collect grain, and
bake brClld and biscuit 1,' for he was in an almost entirely
uninhabited country. on the watershed between the sonrces or
the Coa and the Zezere, with the Sierra de Meras, the frontier-
range between Spain and Portugal, in front of him.
Next morning (}larch 27) Hcynicr. though he had the cx-
ample of Ney's fate before him, was driven by sheer necessity
into sending an argumentative dispatch to the Commander-in-
Chief, who had 1I0W got all far all Guaroa. He begged him lo
give up his great plan: 'no food could be procured for the wholc
way from GURl'dn. to Pluscncia; if thc corps C\'cr got to the
latter place, it would find no resources there, for the Coria-PIa·
sencia. country does not grow its own corn, but is fed in ordinary
times from the valley of the 'rictar and other distant regions.'
This Reynier knew from his uwn cxpericnces in that region,
when he had been observing Hill in the preceding slimmer.
He also warned Massena. that he was taking the army into an
impasse, for the Tagus is a complete barrier between northern
and southern Estrcmadura, A.nd could not be crossed sa\'C Ilt
the ferry of Alconetar, where there were now no boats, the
bridge of Alcantara. (now broken), and that of Almaraz, where
there was only a flying bridge of pontoons t.
At the same time Junot was writing from Bclmonte to say
that he could go no further; not only had he been forced to
leave all his guns behind at Guaroa, but 'Ies troupes meurent
, Fririon, C(lmJ/(lglle dll Portugal, p. lib.
2 For all this see Koch'g Vie de .1IUl/thlU, pp. 413-20.
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de faim, et ue pcuveul pal> se presenter ell Ugne.' He had St'OUI'eu
the country as fur as Codlhilo with his cantlry, in search of
food, with the sole result of' ruining the few horses that were
still in passable condition.
In short, the game was up-it ought never to have been
begun-und Nc)"s remonstrances (though not his insubordiuu4
tion) were completely vindicated. On March ::!Bth Massena
reluctantly conceded that a prompt retreat into Spain was the
only course possible. Hut he chose to base his change of plans
not 011 the true ground, viz. that he had ordered the army to
perform an impossibility, but on two other facts. A report had
just been received from Drouet; that general, on reaching the
lIeighbourhtXX1 of Almcida, had sellt word that the forll"ess was
in the utmost danger, for it had only fifteen days' food', and,
if the 9th Corps had to retire, it wonld fall from starvation in
a fortnight. The state of Ciudad Rodrigo was little better.
He therefore besought the Prince of Essling not to expose these
two all-important places, by ClI.rrying the Army of Portugal oft'
to the valley of the Tagus. This gave a strategical reason for
surrendering the ncw scheme of campaign, but there was also
a moral one. 'Lassitude rcigns in the ,Army of l'ortugnl:
many of its regiments were in the expeditions of the Duke of
Dalmatia [Soult's Oporto campaign of 1809] or that of the
Duke of Abruntcs [JUllot's Villleiro campaign of 1808]. The
officers murmur, and, as I must llo<l"l\in repeat, the Army must
ha\'e two or three months of rest to reCO\'er itself. I was
the ollly soul who was determined to hold 011 in !lodugnl, nud
unless I had set my will to it in the strongest fashion, we should
not have stopped fifteen days therein•... The tl'00PS are good,
but they nccd repose. Living by marauding, even though it was
organir.ed marauding, such as we have been compelled to author·
izc, has ill 110 Slllall degree weakened discipline, which is in the
greatest need of restoration ~.' All this was very true, but it
had been equally true on March 22n<l, when Ma.'lsCnlt gave his
orders for the march all Plasencia. The root of his ft\ilul'e lay
I 'l1,is WIIS " gro!lll exaggerntion, as it turned out that there \VIIS forty
dars' food ill hand. M_na accused Drouetof drawing on the rations for
his own 9th Corps to an inexcusable extent.
t Masseua to .Berthier, March 31, from Alfayllle'!.
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neither in the state of Almeidn, nor in the demoralized condi-
tion of the army, but in thc fact that he had directed his troops
to execnte a movcment which was impossible without magazines
to live upon, or roads to march upon 1.
On lHarch ~9 l\fassen!l. gave the orders which marked the
abandonment of his great plan) and commenced his retrograde
movement towards Ciudad Uodrigo. Reynicl' and the li!nd
Corp8) abandoning the mountain roads, c:a.me down by a Iaternl
march to SabugaI in the upper valley 01' the Coa: they wcre to
stop there till Junot Uild the 8th Corps, coming in from Bel-
monte, should have reached them and pnssed behind them, The
6th Corps meanwhile was to halt at Guarda till the 8th Corps
had extricated itself from the mountains, but it was ordered
to throw back onc division (Ferey's) to Adiio 011 the Sabugal
road, eight miles to the south-eMt, as the first echelon of its
forthcoming movement of retreat towards the Coo. Mll.SSt1na
himself and the head quarters of the army moved from Guarda
on the moming of the 29th to Pega, a "illab'C some miles
nearer the Con than Adiio.
On this morning the British army, of which Massena had henrd
practically nothing for eight days, put in its appearance in the
most forcible fashion, falling upon the enemy just as he was in the
midst of a complicated movement, with hi~ three corps scparntcd
from cach othcr by distaIH,'cs of some twcnty miles.
·Wellington, it will be remembered, had halted about half of
his anny on the AI"a upon March ~Oth, for sheer want of pro·
visions, sending on only the two light cavalry brigadcs and the
3rd, 6th, and Light Divisions to pursue Massena 011 the Celorit'(l
rood. He had no doubt that the cnemy was about to retire
from Celorico alld Guarda towards the Span.ish frontier with the
smallest delay-the policy of Ney and of everyone else in the
I<'rcneh army s!\vc MasseUR llimsclf. On the 24th. Slade's dra*
goons occnpied Celork'(l, a.nd reported that the enemy had left
it on the preceding day; two columns were traced: the larger
[6th und 8th Corps] had gone towards Guardu, the slUaller
[Drouet with Conroux's division of the 9th Corps] had taken the
I 'Vhen Replier marched from Coria to GuarJa in SeptclIloor JBlO. be
had been obliged ro make tile vast circle Coria-Alfayates-S3bugal-Guarda..
ill order 10 avoiJ the miscmble lllolUltaiu roads.
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high·road towards Freixadas and Almeida. There was nothing
yet to indicate to 'Vellington M~sena's intention of proceedhlg
in the direclion of Estremu.dura and the middle 'l'aguli. He wrote
on the 25th to General Spencer, • The French have retired from
Celorico, und appear to intend to take up El. line on the Coo.
Their left has gone by Guarda, apparently for Sabugal'-and
to BCl'csford, ''l'he French have gone towards the Con: their left
will cross at Sabugal, I should think, and their right about
Pinhel and Almeidll. 1 '.
On this day (March ~5) the first cOllvoy of provisions from
the new bllSC established at Coinibra reached the camps 011 the
Alva, and ·Wellington was at IllSt able to set the 1st and 5th
Divisions and Ashworth's Portugue.~e in motion 2, They started
on the Celorico road, and reached Galliges that night. No news
had yet come in of the southward movement of the French from
Guardn, which had begun on the preceding day. 'l'hevaJlguard
of the army had now established itself in Celorico, which was
reached by the Light and Srd Divisions on the 25th-26th: thcy
had come up very slowly, being sadly distressed for food, and
therefore forced to make very short stages. Only one ration
of bread had oc-en given out in the last four days.
On the 26th the cavalry pushed out from Celorico 3, Arent-
schildt's brigade took the Almeida road, Hawker's (this colonel
\I'M in temporary command of the 1st and 14th, while Silide
managed the whole vanguard) pushed towards Guurda. Each
swept the "illages on the flanks of its route, The result of the
exploration was to show that a very large body of the enemy
had retired on GUllrdn, and a very small body on Almeida.
A patrol of the 16th Light Dragoons hit ou ){ermet's rearguard
ami took an oflh.'Cl· and eightccn mell from it. The reports of the
following day came to much the same-it began to be c1eal' that
almost t.he whole French arlllY mUllt hlwe gone to Guartla,
I Both uispatcheg are dateu from Santa i\larinha, Man:h 25th.
! Pack's Portuguese were 80 exhausted anu sickly that they were left
behind for n rest, nud to wnit for more fooil, at i\lungualile Oil the upper
i\loudego.
, <Gellenll Slade hat! been ill Celorico ti,e whole of )'esterilay,' cOllllllains
Tomkillson or the IGth, 'and ret had not the least idea where the FrcllCh
had retired to.' Diary, p. 89.
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and at las1 'Vcllington begull to havc thc first lie\\'3 of
:Massena's southward movcment, though he did not yct grasp its
meaning. • The i'Tench appeal' to stick about Guarda,' hewrote
to Beresfom, 'and ycstcrday thcy hud somc people well Oil
towards l\Ianteigas: but I have heard nothing of them from
Grant [the falllous seout and intelligence ofiicc,'] and I conclude
they were only a patrol.' Now Manteigns is at the SOllrce of
the Zezere, near Covilhao, and this' patrol 'wa.~ nothing less
than .fullot's flank cavalry, exploring out from Belmonte, which
the 8th Corps had reached on the preceding day. But so little
did 'Vellington guess what was running in Massena's mind, that
he wrote on this day that he was proposing to take a short turn
to the Alemtejo to snpervise Beresford's operations (which were
hanging fire in the most discouraging fashion), as soon as the
French were over the frontier 1.
Meanwhile 'Vellington made up his mind that, since the
enemy persisted in lingering at Guarda, he mllst manreuvre
them out of that lofty city. But imagining that two, ifnot
three, corps were concentrated in its neighbourhootl, he would
not attack lill his rear had eome up from the Alvll. to Celorieo.
This did not happen till the ~9th,when the 1st Division rooched
that place, with the 5th close behind. But on the previous day
he had already started off' Picton to cross the Serra do. Estrella
by the mountain road by Prados, and the Light Division witll
Arentschildt's cavlllry to take the longer route on the other
bank of the l\fondego, which goes to Guarda via Baracal, Villa
Franca, and Hapoulla. A flanking detachment, composed of
a wing of the 95th Rifles, came upon IL small rearguard lcft
behind by Mermet at Freixadas. and turned them out of the
village, taking a few prisoners (March 28).
On the ~9th the Light Division and the two cavalry hriglldes
mov!..'!l in UIJOII GUll.I-da from Rapoulla, while Pietoll closed in
from thc west, on the side of the higher hills, and Genernl
Alexander Campbell, with the 6th Division, advanced between
the other two columns, by the road on the east side of the
Mondcf,TO which passes through Ramilhosa 2. The three cOllVcrg-
I \Vcllingtoll to Honry 'Vellcsley, :\lllrcll 27, from Gouvell..
t Napier (Hi. 129) is wrong ill saying that the movement was' Supported
by the 1st, 6th, amI 7U. Divisiolls.' 'nICSO ouly rCllClH:.1 Cclorlco that
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iug columns appeared upon thc heights tlrollud Guanla within
a fc\\' hours of each other, l'ictoll being first on the spot The
l"rench had hardly any waming, for the cM'alry screen had kept
the British hidden till the last. Pictoll found Mermel's and
Marchand's divisions 011 the plateau of Guan!a, with Ferey's at
ib foot on the etlStel'll side, alread)' stal·ting on its march for
AdtlO, which was to be the commenccment of the general
retreat that Massclla contemplated on the next da)'. It seems
cletll', frolll French soun:es, that Loison was practically takcn by
surprise. I"ririon, the chief of the stafl' of the Army of Portugal,
says that, visiting Guarda to see hol1' the 6th Corps was arranged,
he found Maucune's brigade encamped in a ravine dominated on
all sides, with onl.y onc battalion on thc hill on which Picton
appeared a few minutes later, and the rest in 11 position where
they were perfectly helpless. There was no other covering force
at all out in £l'Ont of the town. Hence, whcn the British c1osL'(1
ill, LoisOll got Hurried, and, seeing the Light Division threaten-
ing to press in on his rear, absconded at once without fighting.
As his force was still nearly 15,000 strong, and \Vellington had
as yet only three divisions, of no greater numbeN;, in front of
the formidable bill of Guarda, it seems that the flight of the
6th Corps from sueh a position was somewhat ignominious.
Ney wuuld undoubtedly have fought a brilliant detaining action
with his rearguard I.
Loison went off in great haste on the two roads open to him,
both leading south-east towards the Coa: one by Alliio ulId
da}', :md were fiflecn miles from the field. See Di:lry of Stothert of tIle
Guards, p. 232. Napier was misled by the vague wording oC Wellington's
displltch to Lord LivcrlKlOI (vii. 425), from whklL it might 1,e SUPIM;lSetl
that these divisions were up.
I 'I1JC 3rd Division arrived some time before the Gth and tlle Light
wcre in actuul touch with tllC enemy.
Picton writes about this: ' Massena with Cull 20,000 men was on the
heights, ami in the city of Guardll, wlum I mmle JlJ}' ll(lpellranCe atD ill
the morning, with three British and two Portuguese regiments.... He
ought immediately to have att.'\cked me, but allowed me to remain witlLiu
400 yards of his ml1iu body for about two hours, before the other columns
came up, But of course their movements were alarming him, and
decided him not to h32.3rd au attack, tIll: Cailure of wllich would have
Ilrobably brought on the total discomfiture of his army.' Letter in
Uobinsou's Life (ll Piclun, vol. i1. PII. 3, 4.
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Pega towards Sabugal, the other by Villa Mendo and .?IIllr-
meleiro to Rapoulla da Coa. The British infantry could nel'er
come up with him. The cavalry pressed his rear, and made lllany
prisoners, mainly fomgillg parties which were straggling in to
join the main body. A patrol of the 16th Light Dragoons
captured 64 men in one party, and took 150 sheep and 20 oxen I.
The total number of prisoners was between two and three
hundred. But the French rearguard of tlu'ee battil.lions of
infantry kept well together, and was in loo good order to be
broken by unsupported squadrons of cavalry. The main body
of the 6th Corps marched all day towards the fords of the Coa,
but had not reached that river at nightfall. One of its colulllns
cncmnped at Pega, the other at Marmeleiro.
On the ncxt morning (March 30) Mnssena was in a vcry dan-
gerous situation: his tluee corps were still ullconccnbnted, and
.Tunot was lingering at Belmonte, from which he only mo\'ed
that morning towards Sabugal. If Wellington had known of
thc i~olatedposition of thc 8th Corps, he might, by pushing down
a column from Celorico, have cut ofl' its line of retreat towards
the Con, whcre the l!nd Corps was awaiting it. nut by ill-luck
no reports came to hand about .Tunot, and Wellington was
under the impression that two, and not onc. corps had bew
holding Guarda when he attacked it 2. He was aware that
Reynier was at Sabugal, but did not apparently receive any
information which demonstrated that there was another heavy
(.'Olumll ill tlllS direction, uow comlllcncing to movc sli'll.ight
across the front of his own advanced guard. J unot was ablc to
extricate himself by two painful marches over villainous cross-
roads ill the mountains, from Belmonte to Urgueira (lHarch 30)
and fmm Urgueira to Sabugal (March 31). He was only able
to win salvation because he had left all his artillery behind him
at Guarrla, and was therefore able to go wherever infantry could
1 See Tomkillson's Diary, p. 00.
, Wclliugtoll to BcI'C!ifortl, from Cclorico, March 30: 'Yesterday 11'6
mameuvroo the French out of Guarda. Massena was there, some &1.y
with llis whole urlllY, J think cOTt.nillly with b'o corl's: Jlot a shot Wl\.9
fired.' (wpatche" vii. 412.) Same day to Charles Stuart: 'They were
much stronger than we: J had ollly three ilivisioll!l on the llill.' (Dis-
patella, vii. 418.)
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climb. His guns had been given in charge to the 6th Corps,
and formed part of the column under Ferey \;hat marched by
I'ega to the Coa.
Meanwhile the 6th Corps had to complete its retreat to the
line of UIC Coa, and reached it ill the afternoon, harassed but
not seriously damaged by the two Dl'itish cavalry brigades, of
which Hawker's followed the column on the northern and
Arenlschildt's that on the southern of the two parallel roads on
which Loisoll was moving. All llCCOWlts agrcc that General
Sladc, who was directing bo\;h brigades, showed o"er~Cl\ntion,
lUld missed several fair opportunities of attacking the enemy's
rearguard, in open ground very favourable to cavalry and horse·
artillery tactics l , He only picked up a few strugglers, and the
ellemy was safely across the Coa by nightfall, l\farchand's divi·
sion at Ponte Sequeiro, Ferey's and Mermet's at Bismula, seven
lIIiles further to the south, where they were uow only eight
miles from Reynier's right wing at Sabllgal. The British had
1I0t yet detected JUllot'S flauk march, which was hourly bringing
him nearer to safety.
On the 31st the 8th Corps escaped from its dangers, reached
Sabugal, and, passing behind Reynier, pushed on ten miles further
to AlfaJutes, where it halted for a mueh-lleedL'<1 rest. The
troops were reduced to the last e,...treme by exhanstion and
hunger. At Alfayates, within three miles of the Spanish
frontier, und only two marches from Ciudad Rodrigo, they at
last began to receive regular provisions, and had nearly got out
of the mountains into the rolling upland of southern Leon.
'Why Massena, the moment that he knew that J UDot was safe,
did lIot continue to retreat on to his magazines it is hard to say.
But he remained for two days more behind the upper Coa, and
thereby exposed himsclf to continued danger, for his army was
~trllng ont on too thin a line, watching twenty miles of the river.
1 Nallier's sL'ltements (iii. 129) are quite borne out by 'l'omkiusou's
Diary: 'J1I the rear of l'ega is an open plain of two miles wl1ich tlle
enemy 11al1 to P.'lS8: as usual we looked at them for llalf nil 110Ur: tl'en
tlle guns were on]en."I1 up, and in place of firing at the maill body could
onl}' get within range of their pickets. . . we continued to follow, and,
although thlly Imu 110 cavalry, our gcllernl Wallllff'llid to go into the plain
to get the gllWl ill rang6 of the infantry: they of course got clear off.'
(Diary, p. 91.)
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Apparently he thought, from seeing no British infantry 011 the
30th aud 31st, that 'Wellington had haltL'<l at Guan.la, alld did
lIot iutend to continue the pursuit on Sabugal. His own forces
contiuued in their old positions throughout the 1st and 2nd of
April, save that all Montbl'un's reserve cavalry was sent to the
l'Car, to the valleys of the Agueda and the A:awa, to rest and
rceovcr itself. the larger proportion of the surviving horses being
quire unserviceable. The corps-cavalry of Reynier, JUIlOt, and
Loison also sent back many dismounted men, and hundreds
more whose mounts were incapable of use for the prel>cnt, 80
that the brigade of light horse attached to each was n'<iuced to
a few hundred sabres, many of the regiments hadng only olle
efficient squadron left, and none more than two I. The retreat
from Santarem had practically disabled the l''rench cavalry.
Wellington, meanwhile, ha\'ing discovered by the explorations
of his horse, that the enemy was standing firm on the COlt,
resolved to dislodge them from thcir last hold on Portugal. To
do this he required his whole force, and the 1st Md 5th Divisions
moved onward from Celorico to Freixlldas on the 3Ist, to come
up into line with the Srd, 6th, and Light Divisions. With
them there was 1I0\\' present the long-expected 7th Division,
whieh reached the front at the cnd of the month, though incOlll-
plete. :For the light brigade of the German Legion had arril·('(l
at Lisbon more than a fortnight late, and only four battalions
ill the British service ~ and five of Portuguese 3 were at prescnt I
allotted to the ncwly formed unit. But in o.ddition severnl
newly landed battalions 4 came up and joined the old divisions,
so that nearly 6,000 infantry in all were added to the arm)',
After deducting lIlany Illcn left behind from sickness or exhaus-
tion G, during his o.dvnncc over the wasted regions of Dcira,
'Vellingtoll had now about 38,000 men with him. Il. fOl"CC vcry
1 As late as May 1 the regimental statisticIJ 511011" tllat the 3rd Uragoolls
had only 139 Il.vll.ilnhle 1'01'SCS, sick 01' ~lIml, ami the lOlh Dr/lKoons ouly
233. They had started the campaign with 5G3 and 535 respectively.
, \"c caunot 8lIY' four British battalions; for two of Ulelll were foreign
corps, the eMSSt«r8 Bri!(lI!1liques and the Brunswick Oels Light Infantry.
'111e two line regiments were t1.1C 51st and Slit}l.
37th and 19th Line and 2nd Ca~adores, forming Collins's brigade.
I vi~. 2(88111 for 3rd Division, 2(5211d for Light Division, 1/36th for the
(lth Division. a Including Pack's whole brigade.
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nearly equal to that of the enemy, which on the ht of April
IlRd sunk to 39,905 including officers, if the 9th Corps, now in
the vicinity of Almeida, be omitted.
The plan which 'Wellington evolved for the final eviction of
the I"rench from Portugal was to turn their left wing all the side
orSaoub'1lI, while containing their right wing (the 6th Corps)
Oil the centrnl Coa. Occupation was at the samc time found
for the 9th Corps, as 'Wilson's and Trant's Militia brigades
were directed to cross the Coa near its confluence with the
Ooul"o, Ilnd to threatell Almcid!~ fl·om the north side, a move
which could 110t fail to have the eflect of keeping Drouet
pinned down to his present position, since his special L.'lsk was
the protection of that place. It,is a little difficult to make out
why Wellington ehose to break in upon tbe French left rather
than theil· right. 1"rom the strategical point of view it would
have been preferable to cross the Coa north of the flank of the
6th Corps, and to throw the whole weight of the British army
so as to drive the French southwn.rd, towaros Sabugal and
Alfayates. For they would thus be separated from the 9th
Corp~, thrust into the barren and nearly roadless mountain
district of the Sierra de Gala and the Sierra de l\fcras, Illld cut
olffl"om Almeida and even from Ciudad Rodrigo, which the,y were
desirous of covering. Whereas to turn their left wing would
only have the effect of pushing them buck 011 their natural line
of retreat towards Rodrigo, and would press them towards
rather than away from the 9th Corps. The British general's
l'OurilC l:il'COlS, however, to have been guided boY tactical rather
than by strategical considerations. He thought that he had a
good opportunity of catching the Qnd Corps at Sabugal in an
isolated position, and crushing it, before the 6th or the Sth
could come up to its help. And but for a chance of the weather
it seems that he might have accomplished this design with
complete success.
Sabugal, a little walled place with a ruined IHoorish castle.
lies in 0. projcd;ing bend or hook of the Coo, which turus back
just above the town at right angles to its original course, which
is directly from east to west. The river is not f!lr from its
~Olll'ce, and though its banks are steep its waters are narrow,
and there al'e many fords both above and below Sabub'1ll. If a
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strong turning columll, concealing itself in the hills, passed alollg
the south bank of the Coil., and crossed the rj"er some miles
above the town, it could throw itself upon the rear of the
~nd Corps and cut it off from its retreat on Alfayates. Mean-
while a. geneml attack by Wellington's main body would drive
it from its position straight into the arms of the turning column,
and there would be n good chance of inflicting a crtlshing defMt
upon the corps, perhaps of capturing it wholesale. lfthe attack
were delivered by surprise at dawn, the whole matter ought to
be completed before either the 6th or the 8th Corps could get
up to the support of Uc)'nicr. \\Then at last they could appear
011 the field, the ~Ild Corps would be already demolished, and
W·ellington wag prepared to risk a breneral action.
It W~ with this design that his movements of the Ist and 2nd
of April were planned. The 1st, 5th, and 7th Divisions were
brought up from Celorico to Guarda, and from thence to join
the Light, grd, and 6th Divisions which were already lying
alOllg the Coa o\'er against the French lines. The 6th Division
wus left at Rapoulla de Con, facing Loisoll's centre, and a single
battalion of the 7th Division observed the bridge of Sequeiro
opposite his northern flank. These troops showed themselves
frl'el)', and kept Loison anxious, for nothing seemed more likely
than that the gencml attack wou.ld be directed against him.
Meanwhile the whole of the rest of the army, five divisions and
two cavalry brigades, over 30,000 men, was launched against
Reynier. 'rhe turning column was to be formed by the Light
Diyision and the two ca\·alry brigades, who were to fonl the
Con at two separate points two and three miles respectively
above Sabllgal. If Erskine, who wa.<; to command it, so decided,
the column might cross even higher up: it was intended that
it should appear far beyo1ld Re)'llier's left wing, and should
strike over the hills of Quadraseis to the village of 'l'OlTC Oil the
Alfayates road, where it would be placed across his line of
retreat. 'fhe /:,"l'(lUnd in that direction was open and favourable
for cavalry. MeiUlwhile the enemy wns to be givcn no chance
of falling upon this detSlChment, since he was to be attackC!<l in
front with very superior forces. Picton and his division were to
cross un ensy ford a mile south of Sabllgal, the 5th Division wa.~
to ass....dl the town-bridge ut the same moment. The 1st and
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7th Divisions were a few miles behind, ready to support the two
lending colullms in the front attack. It wns intended that the
turning force should cross the Coa first, but only so far ahead of
the frontal attacking force as to make it certain that it should
not get engaged with the main body of the cnemy, before the
Srd tllld 5th Divisions were comillg iuto uction. The French
pickets having been pushed close back to the river on the
preceding day by the cavalry, it was certain that they would see
nothing of the movements till they were well developed.
Unfortunately the morning of the Srd of April was ouc of
dense fog-good for conccnling the march of the troops, but bnd
in that it prevented the troops from discoYering their objective.
Both Pidoll and Dunlop (who was commanding the 5th Division
in Leith's absencc on leave) resolved not to mQ\'e, and scnt to
Wellington, who was hard by, for orders. Not so the ra..<;h and
presumptuous Erskine, who repeated this day the precise mistake
that he had made at Casal Novo three weeks back. 'Vithout
coming himself to the front, he sent all aide~de-camp to the
Light Division, to hid it descelld to the river and cross at the
ford which had been assigned to it in the general scheme. The
Ciwalry were ulso ordered to move forwurd and take the other
ford, more to the right, by whieh they were to ~t into the
enemy's rear.
Bcckwith's brigade, the leading one of the Light Dh'isioll,
t'Ollsisted of the l/43rd, Elder's Ca~dores (the Srd of that arm),
and four companies of the 1/95th Rifles. It was waitillS in
t'OlulIln, Oil the road above the river, when Erskine's aide-de· camp
rode up, and asked the brigadier in a peremptory tone ' why he
did not cross.' Beckwith at once struck off in the direction
where he supposed the ford to be, but, missing his line in the
fog, did uot march sufficiently far to the right, and reached the Coo
tlot at the true ford but at a ha7"aroous pas~ nearly a mile
nearer to Sabugal 2, where the water came up to the men's arm~
pits. Drummond's brigade followed at a distance, and used the
same wrong path. The cavalry, to whom Sir William Enkine
1 Details mar he verified in Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, xiii.
It Gll.
! Wellington's orders were to cross 2 miles at least abo\·e Sabugal.
·11lC actual crossing was onlr I-t miles above.
192 MASSENA'S UETREAT: S.AllUGAL [APlllJ.3
had joined him~lf, taking their bearings from the Light Divi.
sion, camc dowlI to the river not vcry far to its right, at a point
somc two miles more to the west than WM intended. They lost
much timc in searching for a ford; by the time that they
fOlllld one, the Light Division was already heavily engaged, and
the passage ultimately discovered was so close to that force that
the Dragoons came up almost in Dl'lImmond's rear, instead of far
out 011 his f1allk.
Heyllicr's picket;; were clo$C to the water's cdhre, alld opened
1\ scattering fire on the head of Beckwith's colulllll while it \VIIS
still struggling across the river. Butthey were cw;ily drh'cll o/l~
and the brigade formed up on the further side, in the IIsual
order of the Light Division, with a very strong skirmishing
screen, composed of four companies of the 95th and three of
Elder's Cuyadores. The 43rd and the other half-battalion of the
Portuguese camc on in line, t\ fcw hundred yards bchilld the
riflemen. They were still smothered in the fog, and coulc! dis·
co\'er nothing more than that they were purlming the French
pickets up a gentle slope, mostly unenclosed waste ground, hut
cut up by a few fields with low stone walls. Pushing forward
briskl)', they prcsently camc upon a French regimcnt, which was
already under arms, and preparing to show a front agaimt them.
';Vhat had happened in the mist was that the Light Division,
illSteud of hretting round the flank of Reynier's position, had
struck dirccU'y against it. The 2nd Corps had been established
011 the long hill behind Sabngal and abm'e the Coo., ready to
resist a frontal attack, with Merle's division on the left and
Heudelet's on the right, above the town. Beckwith had struck
upon the 4th Uger, tile left regiment of the left-hand division of
the corps. Merle. warned by the fire of the pickets, was making
a new front, en potence to the general line of the French army,
and had just got the four battalions of the extreme flank regi-
ment drawn out. They were, as usual, in column of divisions,
(double companies), with a weak skirmishing line in front,
whieh wa.~ at once driven in by the Hifles and C~adores. Merle
then led down his four columns tlf,J'Uinst the screen of light troops
which covered lleckwith's line, and drove them back with con·
siderable loss to himself, and little to his opponents, since he had
0I11y skirmishers t.o shoot at, while his own corripll.l:t battalion
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columns were very vulnerable. The light troops fell back to each
flank of the line presented by the 4Srd and the formed com-
panies of the Ca)adores, and then halted and turned upon the
enemy. The balance of numbers was now in favour of J3eck.
with's brigade, for though he had only two and a half battalion~
and the enemy four, the French units were ,'ery weak, the 4th
Uger having only 1,100 mell, while the 4:3rd alone was a strong
battalion of 750 bayonets and its atIXiliary light troops were at
lea<;t 600 more. It was not surprising, therefore, that the l~rench
regiment soon went to the rear, badly hit, after a short sharp
exchange of volleys. Beckwith followed, pushing the enemy
through a small chestnut wood, till he arrived at the southern
summit of the ridge on which the French line had been drawn
ont. Here he found himself confronted by the f\evell battalions
of the 36th of the Line, and the ~nd Uger, the remaining regi-
ments of Merle's division, which were hurrying along the c~st to
the assistance of their comrades of the 4th LCger.
Blinding rain came on at this moment, And much diminished
the efficacy of the British fire. Attacked by double numbers of
fresh troops, Bcckwith's brigade was thrust bock for some
distance. Dut they rallied behind some stone walls of enclosure~,
jUst as the shower ceased, and after all obstinate contest of mus·
kctry, stopped the French regiments, who, falling into disorder,
retired up the slope to re.form. Though conscious that he was
now engaged against hopeless odds, and though he could see
nothing of Drummond's brigade or the British cavalry. which
ought by this time to havc comc up to his support, Bcckwith
went up the hill a second time in pursuit. 'Vhen he reached the
crest he came upon the divisional battery of Merle, drove it off,
t\lldcapturcd Olle howitzer. Immediately after, he wa~ outflanked
on his left by infantry, apparcntly the rallied 4th lAger, while
on the right he was charged by two squadrons of chasseurs and
hussars, nIl that the depleted cn\'nlry brigade of Pierre Soult
could put in line that day. The 43rd and their comrades were
hardly pressed, and had to give ground, bnt sheltering once more
among the enclosures. refused to relinquish their position 011 the
slope. The captured howiber lay ont in their front, in an open
space swept by the Illllsketry of both parties. Desperate
attempts wel'C made by groups 011 each side to rush out and
o"u. '" 0
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bring it ill, but to llO effect, NI the cross-fire was too heavy.
Bcckwith's brigade was ill a lIlost dangerous position, only
preserved from annihilation by the fact that the mist and rain
prevented the enemy from recognizing the smallness of the force
opposed to him-two and a half battalions against e1e,'en, or
1,500 men ~ooainst 3,500.
At this moment assistance at last arrivcd~the flnd Brigade of
the Light Di yisioll under Drummond appeared on the scelle. It
consisted of the two blLttolions of the 52nd, the 1st Ca{adorcs,
and fOllr companies of the 95th, about 2,000 bayonets. Having
lost touch of the Ist Brigade at the ford, it had taken a route
much more like that originillly intended by \Vellillbrton to be
employed, and had come up the back 810pc of the heights, far
to the right of Beckwith, without meeting any encmy. 'fhe
noise of the combat attracted Drummond to his left; he changed
his diredion, and was coming over the hillside and approaching
Bcckwith when he rcccivt.>O. a most il1~advised order from
Erskinc-who was with the cavalry some way to his right rear
-directing him not to adwUlce or engagel. lint to ha\'e held
back would have meant to allow the 1st Brigade to bedestro)'ed.
Disre~rarding the order, Drummond deployed the 1J5~nd, the
Ca.)adores. and the 95th 011 the right of the enclosures where
Beckwith was lighting, with the 2/52nd in reserve, and advanced
firing. This attack by a fresh force was too much for the French
2nd and 36th, who had suffered severely in the earlier fighting.
They /:,1'/lVC WtlY, and Drummol1d, with Beekwith following in
echelon on his left, regained the crest of the heights Md re-
captured thc French howitzer. 'I',he two brigades were still
engaged in a fierce struggle with !\ferIe's division when Reynier
brought lip the 2nd Brigade of Heudelet'$ division, the seven
buttuliolls of thc 17th Ugcr lLnd 70th Lignc, which had formed
the centre of his original line of battle. These troops attncked
I This fact comes from a MS. note by Sir John Bell of the 52nd, in mr
possCS!Iion. He writes: 'Just as tile 2nd Brigade challged its directiou,
the General, being at some distance, sent all order for it not to e~.
But the slafl' officer wllo carried it, uud DrullullOlld, seeiug how malters
stood, took the liberty of forgetting the message, 80 that lleckwith shoulLI
hal'e the full benefit of the support lit lllllld, No 'llll'Stioll was Iwer asked
as to the non-delivery of the order:
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lhe left flank of thc Light Division, Bcckwith's mCIl, and put
them in grave danger, for the mueh·tried 43rd t\nd 3rd Ca~a.
dores were in great disorder. At the same time the two :French
squadrons charged again upon the flank of the 5211d. Fortunately
11 stray squadron of the 16th Light Dragoons came up and
Il:sisted in repulsing them. This was the only aid given by the
cal'alry this day; Erskille contrived to keep them useless,
countermarching in the mist, some way frolll the fighting ffont.
At this moment the fog suddenly lifted, and both Wellington
and Reynier wefe able to make out the face of the battle. The
sight was not altogether comforting to either of them: 'Welling-
ton could st"C the Light Division on the crest, opposed by a very
superim' enemy (the pfo(M)rtion was about five to three at this
moment) and with their left flank turned by the column which
hnd jllst come up. Ileynier, on the other hancl, saw t]te masses
of llicton's and Dunlop's divisions halted close above the fords,
lit nud below Sabllgal, and just preparing to cross. He had so
strillped his centre and right, while bringing up troops to crush
t.he Light Dh;sion, that only the two regiments forming
Heudelet's 1st Brigade, the eight weak battalion!! of the
31st Uger and 47th Ligna, about 3,300 bayonets, were left to
occupy two miles of slope on each side of the town of Sabugal.
Reynier suw that they must !:Xl scattered by the appl'OllChillg
onset, for 10,000 men were hurrying down towards the fords,
and gave instant orders for a general retreat. The intaCt
brigade was to abandon Sabugal and the heights, conccntrate,
Md go off' at the double, to take up a. position a mile to the rear,
on the road to Alfayates. Merle's shattered troops on the ere'st,
facillg the Light Division, were directed to make oll' ill such
order as they might, taking the artillery with them, and to seek
rcfUb"C behind this- reserve. To prevent Beckwith and Drum·
mond from pursuing them, the !?lnd Brigade of Heudclet, the
17th Uh-er and 70th, were ordered to keep up a defensive fight
upon the hcighbl where they had just come into action.
This brigade was thereby exposed to grave danger, for while
it was doing its best to • contain' the Light Division, Picton,
coming up from the river at a. furious pac,:, with the 5th Fusiliers
deployed in hi!'! front, rushed in upon its flank, and drove its
Imttalions one upon another. The 17th allq 70th were
o~
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o....erwhelmed and thrnst down the back of the hill with a loss
of 400 men, of whom l~O were unwounded prisoners. Thei~
wrecks took refuge with the other brigades, which retired as
rnpidly as they could along the Alfuyates road, with the 315t
Ugcr and 47th Lignc, the only intact bod)', covering the flight
of the rest. The British 5th Divisioll had crossed at Sabugal
without meeting opposition or losing SI. man, but was too far to
the left to beaf any use in urging the pursuit. That duty fell to
Picton, who wns pressing the French rearguard when the rain,
which had been fulling for almost the whole morning,
became absolutely torrentiu~ und hid the face ofthe country-sid!!
so thoroughly that 'Vellington commanded the whole army to
halt. It is said that this order was given on the false intelli.
gence that the 8th Corps was visible coming up from Alfayates
to join Reynicr 1, a report for which there was no foundation
whatever. Erskille and the eiwo.lry never touched the retreating
force, Sll.ve one squadron of the German hussars, who hnpj>e(l
upon the l'rench transport column, and captured the private
baggage of Reynier himself and General Pierre Soult 2.
So ended, in comparative disappointment, an operation which
would have had glorious results if the fog hOO 1I0t intervened,
and which might, even with that drawback, have been much
more decisive if Sir "Villiam Erskine had, shown ordinary
prudence and ability. The actual combat, as W"ellington truly
observed, 'was one of the most glorious that British troops
were ever engaged in,' for the Light Division, with its 5,500
bayonets, had fought the whole of the 2nd Corps save one
brigade, and had punished its adve~ries in the most exem·
plary style, without suffering any corresponding loss. 'Really
these attacks in column against our line arc vcry contemptible,'
wrote W"cllington to llercsford next lporning, The chief glory
lay with the 4Srd, who fOl1ght three separate contests with three
successive bodies of opponents, and counted very nearly half
\ This statement is made br TomkinSOll in his diary on April 3, p. W.
, M811Y Ilctails in tlljS nnrrntivc of the comloat of Snbugnl will be found
to differ from those given in earlier histories. I pave been rel}·jng for the
Freudl mUI'emenb! largely on U\e life of Gcuemll\lerlc, the offi~rwho
waR ill charge of most of the fighting, and had the best chance of gh-illg
1\ correct stor)'. [Rraljuehay's l-e GbI/TIII Mer/e. PI'. 100-1.]
\ L~?~~_;;__ -Dru1/Jrc.~ -'~--J.,
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of the toW British loss in their ranks. Beckwith, their briga-
dier, was the admired of all beholders; eye-witnesses relale with
pride how he rode first in the MVaIlCe and last in the retreat,
with blood streaming from a wound on his temple, keeping the
men in rank, checking those who showed a tendency to quicken
the pace, and directing the fire with perfect coolness. It was
ill a great degree the confideucc inspired by his cheerful and
resourceful leading which enabled tile brigade to keep up the
fight ago-inst impossible od~ down to the moment of the nrrival
of Drummond and the supports upon the scene.
Thetotalloss,ofthe F'r-cllch was 6] officers and 689 men; this
fearful proportion of losses in the commissioned ranks was due to
the b'll.llulltl'Y with which they threw awuy their lives in bringing
up to the front the shaken and demoralized soldiers, who could
not face the English musketry. One gun and 186 unwounded
prisoners were taken. The British loss was only 169-that of
their Portuguese companions no more than 10. Of the total of
179 no less than 143 were men of the Light Division, of whom
80 belonged to the 4Srd ; Picton's troops, only engttoo-cd for a. few
minutes at the end of the combat, had twenty-five casualties.
'I'he horse artillery lost one, the German hussars two men
wounded. It is sufficient!y clear from these figures who hud done
the fighting that day I.
On the afternoon following the combat of Sabugal, Massenll
ub<tndoned the line of the Coa, drawing back the 6th Corps to
join the other two at Alf'ayates. Ne...t morniug (April 4) at
early dawn the· whole army made a forced march to the rear,
for there seemed every probability that Wellington would
appear, to force on a general action, during the course of' the
day, and it was necessary to avoid the chance of being thrust
against the Sierra de Gata, aud cut oft· from Ciudad Rodrigo.
Accordingly the !lnd Corps covered more tban twenty miles,
and did not baIt till it bad reached Fuentes de Oi'\oro; the
I &.'Il the taLles of the :Frcneb unu British losses ill AppcUllix !\o. V/.
Fririoll, as chief of the staff, must have seen and passed the French returu
giving 700 casualties, yet in lLis narrative allows for only 2,soJ saying,' 011
a beaucoup exagere les pertes: les chiffres que nOU8 dOllnou..s BOut tre8
exacts.' 'fllis is Ollly one example of his habit of falsifying figures, ill
which he rivalled Masseua and Soult.
j~8 MASSENA'S RETREA'l', SADtrGAt t" ..,,,,
6th Corp~ marching a less distance, halted at F'uente Guinaldo
on the direct road to Ciudad Rodrigo. The 8th Corps, on a
road betwccn the other two, stopped at Campillo; the reserve
cavalry of l\'lontbrun, which was in such bad condition that it
had to be covered by the infantry, instead of acting as their
screen, drew back to El BodOIl, and other villages in the imme·
diate vicinity of Rodxigo. B)' this movement Masseua rcco,'crcd
his communication with the 9th Corps, which still lay on the
Turon near Almeida, for the 2nd Corps was now within fifteen
miles of Drouet's head quarters at Val de Mula, while the 6th and
8th Corps covered the roads to Ciudad Rodrigo. On the follow-
ingday (April 5) the two lnst-named corps drew back to Carpio,
~fo.rialva, and other places within a few miles of that fortress,
hut the flnd Corps remained at Fuentes de Oi'ioro, in order to
keep touch with the 9th till the latter should have evacuated a
po~itioll which had now be<:ome dangerou~ and over-advanced,
For if Mussena went back to the Agucda, Drouet could not
linger near Almeida, lest he should be cut off from the mRin
army.
Meanwhile 'Wellington had oecupied on the 4th Mas,!II!na's
old head quarters at Alfayates, and sent forward his canl.lry to
Aibergaria., Alamedilla, and other villages, where they Cfl,llle in
touch with the outposts of the 2nd and 8th Corps. The Light
Division felt for any traces of the :French at Val de Espinha
and Quadraseis, and finding none pushed on to Alfayates.
The 1st and 3rd Division/:; came to that place also 011 the ncxt.
day. By that c\'euing (April 5) it was certain that. Mnssena
was falling back to Ciudad Rodrigo, perhaps even further to the
rear. The state of his army, of which W'ellillgton had ample
evidence from the capture of marc sick, stragglers, and baggage
during this and the two next days 1, rendered it e},,'tremely likely
that the French would not be able to halt till they reached their
mngazilles at Salamanca. The British general had no intention
of following the cncmy far into Spain; hc had again outmarchcd
1 In the Diary of Tomkinson of the loth Light Dragoons there is
n curious note us to the capture of a <caravan' or large coach belougiug
to the head-quarter staff', and more espedally to i\Ia~seua'6 Portuguese
adviser, the J\1arquis d'Alorna, on April 7th. Sixty-fil'e infantry were
captured hy thc regimcnt Oil tile salllC day.
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his supplies, for the new base at Coimbra had only just been
elitabli~ht..-d, and cOllvoys from it were coming ill slowly anti with
great delays, since they had to be brought up over the wasted
and depopulated region which the French had just evacuated.
Till he had some magazines accumulated lleaTer the frontier, he
could not dream of a serious offensive movement into Leon. His
letters at this time arc full of lumcllls as to the state of the
Portuguese troops, especially of the brigades which were fed by
thC!ir own commissariat. They had dropped so mallY sick and
stragglers in the advance, that on April 8th they were ~.500
short of the number with which they had started from the
Lines of Torres Vedras: the brigade ill the 5th Division had
fallen to 1,061 rank and file from 1,400 with which it had set
out-that in the Srd Division to 1,190 from l,S19. Pack's
brigade had beelllefl: behind all the Mondego from sheer inability
to march, alld had not been able to join in the Guarda and
Sabllgal operations I. It was necessary to wait till the ranks
\rere fuller-the men were not lost but lefl: behind exhausted.
and could be collected when a systematic supply of food was
procurable. The allied army could not dream of entering Spain
with the intention of lh;ng by plunder and requisitions, as the
l~rcnch habitually did.
Wellington's ambition at the moment did uot go beyond the
hope of recovering Almeida, which he conceived to be doomed
to fall, and possibly Ciudad Rodrigo also, if the enemy should
be forced to fall back towards Salamanca. But Almeidn, at
least, he was determined to make his own, and the first necessity
was to clear away the 9th Corps froin its neighbourhood. He
was convinced that Drouet would retreat when he heard that.
Massena had retired to the Agueda, and thought that his
motions might be quickened by a demonstration. The 6th Divi-
sion and Pack's Portugnese were destined for the blockade of
Almeida, but they would not be up for some days, and mean-
while Trant's Militia, which was already on the lower Coa, was
directed to push in boldly upon the place, and promised the
support of Slade's cavalry brigade on the 7th. Trant, always
daring and full of enterprise, pressed forward to Val de Mula, on
I See letters to Beresford of April 6th a.Dd to Cha.r1es Stuart of April Oth,
in Di.J!6.tlOhu, vii. pp. 4JO--li.
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the further side of Almeidn, and met there ClllparCde's division
on its way towards the Agueda-Conroux had already departed.
The Militia engaged in an irregular fight with the French, who
-turned promptly round upon them, and seemed likely to make
havoc of them Jlear the village of Aldea do Obispo. But just as
the attack grew threatening Slude's dragoons appeared from the
south, with Dull's horse nrlillery battery, and drcw lip on the
flank of the enemy's troops. The artillery were already beginning
to enfilade them, when Claparcde, forming his division into
battalion squares, made a hasty retreat towards the Agueda, ami
pnssed it at the bridge of Barba dcl Pucrco. Erskinc, who wru;
in command of the expedition, did not press him hard, and the
:French, according to their own account, only lost 7 killed alld
4 offk'efS and 24 men wounded, all b)' cannon shot, for the
dr8b'OOll8 were not allowed to charge home 1. Slade captured,
however, some baggage and a good many stragglers, marauders,
and guards of small convoys, who were surprised in the open
rolling country before they could get oyer the Agueda.
Wellington could now surround and blockade Almeida; he
had been Ilourilihing some hopes that the French might evacuatc
it, whell Drouet departed from its neighbourhood, for he was
aware that its stores had run yery low. Dut \Vhen it became
evident that the place was not to be abandoned, he reali7.ed that
it would take some weeks to reduce it, for he had llO battering-
train whatever, indeed there were 110 heavy guns nearer than
Oporto and Abrantes. It was not till the following autumn that
a proper siege-train was organi ...ed for the Anglo-Portllgllese
army. Almeida could only be attacked by the weapon of
famine; Badajoz, which was beleagucl'ed at the ~me time, had
to be battered with a few guns borrowed frmu the ramparts of
the neighbouring fortress of Elvas. The British army had now
been two years in Portugal, yet 'Vellington still lacked the
materials for L'Ouductiug thc smallest offensi ve operation against
strongholds in the hands of the French.
I Nallier (Hi. 13,';) SIIys tIlat tIle I<'reneh lost 300 men, wllich coutrastll
strangely with the official numbers given by the French. Probably
Drouet gal'e only tile actual loss i.1I action, while tlle Bri.tish accounts
spook of all the stragglers taken tllat day as if they llad been captured ill
the fight. The 16th certainly got 66 prisoners from a convoy guard.
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It was known, however, that the stores in Almeida had rUII
low, for the 9th Corps had been consuming them while it lay
close by, in spite of l\Ia5sena'~ ~trict direction~ to tile contrary.
But" starvation kno\l's no laws. A~ a matter of fact there were
still over thirty days' rations in the m~"t\.Zincs, though it had
been repOrted both to 'Vel1ington and to IHassena that the
stock had run down much lower; 1 Drouet ha.r1 falsely stated on
onc occasion that there was only enough to last for fifteen days.
'fhe British general ftUlcied that four wL'Cks' blockade might
reduce the place, and thought that he was quit of the Army of
POltllgal for a much longer space of time. He even hoped to
cff'ed something against Ciudad Rodrigo 2, which was also under-
"ietuallctl, for on reaching the frontier MtlSsCna hatl ~Il forced
to indent upon it for supplies for his brokcn host. If the French
retired to Salamanca, as seemed quite probable, 'Vellington had
hopes that he might be able to starve ont Rodrigo. But he was
not intending to throw his troops around it; they were to remain
011 the Dos Casas and the Azava, covering the siege of Almeida,
but only observing the Spanish fortress with cavalry. 1;'01' the
cutting of the road between it and Salamanca only irregular
forces were to be used: "\Vellington would not send uny of his own
divisions forward beyond Rodrigo, but requested thc daring and
resourceful guerrillero chief Julian Sanchez to throw his bands
in this direction, the moment that the French army should have
retired from the Ah'UL>(ia. Sanchez hatl been fot many month"
already occupied i.n similar work, having spent ull the winter in
rains to cut of!" convoys and small parties passing from Salamanca
to Cindad Rodrigo, or from that place to Ahneida. He had
been hunted, oftell but vainly, by General 'l'hieooult, the go'·eruor
of the province, whose columns he had usually succeeded in
avoiding, while he was always at hand to fall on weak 01' incau·
liOllS detachments on the march 3.
1 Wellington, Di8patcnt8, vii. p. 448.
t But, as he wrote to Beresford 011 April 14, , 1 was Ilot ver)" SlIuguille
of the results of the blockade of that place, and had indeed determined
not to make it in allY strenglll : IInd 1I0W it is U!;l:!!ess to keep auybotly 011
the other side of the Agueda save for food aud obserration.' (Di8pa/che8,
vii. 457.)
S for the slate of semi-blocJ.:ade ill wilich Sancile:!; had kept Ciudad
Rodrigo, see the Memoirs of the DucllesS of Abrnnles (vii. pp. 275--7), who
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On April 8th, as Wellington had expected, the Army of
llortugal resumed its march into the interior of the kingdom of
Leon, all the three corps passing the Agueda, and retiring,
Reynier la San Felices el Grande. JUllot to Sv.nti Espiritus,
Loisou to Alba de YeItes, J unot, while passing, had
been ordel'ed to send into Rodrigo a reinforcement for the
garrison; he detached a battalion of the 15th and another of
the Irish Legion, which brought up the troops in the place to
3,000 men. From the 8th to the 11th the retreat continued,
till at lnst the 6th Corps went into cantonments at Salamanca,
Alba de Tonnes, and other neighbouring places, the 2nd at and
about Ledesma, and the 8th at Toro, behind the others.
Drouet and his two divisions held the line of observation against
the Anglo.Portnguese, with head quarters at Sail Mufio1.. So
ended, fifty miles within the borders of Spain, the movement that
had begun at Santal"em and PUllhete,
The eflectivc of Massena's arm)', wns on April 15th 39,546
sabres and bayonets. It had started in Septembel' 1810 with
65,050 officers and men, and had numbered 440,407 on March 15th.
111e exact ]085, howevc'r, was not the mere differclJ(:e between its
force of September 15, 1810, and of April 15, 1811 (~,504), for it
had received at midwinter two drafts under Gardanne and Foy,
amounting to S,W men in all I . On the other hand, the figure.!;
of April 15th do not include two COllVOJS of sick sent back into
Spain, one of82 officers lLnd 8Sg men dispatched under the charge
of Dronet from the Alva on March 11, and a second and larger
one sent back frOlll Celol'ico to Almeida on March 22, along
with which went some dismounted eamlry, und solIle artillery
which could 110 longer ~ollow the army, The whole may have
amounted to 3,000 men. Both of these convoys dropped large
number8 of dead and stragglers by the way, but it is impossible
to ascertain their total. ,"re must also deduct the escort of an
officer, Major Casabianca, sent from the front to Ciudad Rodrigo
W!I$ beleaguered tlLere while ller lmsooud W!I$ in Portugal. For the hunts
orl':"anized against llim by Thiebault, see the latter's Memoirs, iv. 449-61,
&e. 81111ChC'I. inten.:cI,wd numbers of dispatches which were of great
use to Wellington, as the)' kept him informed of the state of tile I'reuch
in northern Spain.
I See vuL iii, Appendix, p. 543.
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ou 2lst JUlluary, who took 400 men! with him and never returned.
Deducting the 4,315 thus sent back to Spain, and setting them
against the 3,9l25 received from them.-e, it appears that Masseua's
tota1loss must have been just under 25,000 men, or SS per cent.
of his original force. Of these 'Vellillgton had some 8,000 us
prisoners, including the 4,000 captured in the hospital of Coimbra
on October 7th, 1810. The remainder had perished-not more
than Q,OOO in action, thc rest by the sword of famine. 'iVelling-
ton's scheme had justified itself. though its working out had
taken many more weeks than he expected. ~or was the mere
loss in men all that the Army of Portubral hud suffered. It
returned to Leon stripped of everything-without munitions.
uniforms, or train. It ha.d lost 5,8j2 horses of the 14,000 which
it had brought into Portugal, and practically all its wheeled
\"ehic1es; there were precisely S6 waggons left with the army.
'1'be men were still rendy to fight fieCl-ely when they saw the
necCllsity for it, but were sulky, discontented, and perpetllally
carping Ronainst the Commander-in-Chief. whose last unhappy
inspiration-the projrt-1.ed march from Guardll to Plasencia-
had filled up the measure of their wrath. And indeed the)' had
good reason to be disgusted at it, for it was wholly insane and
impracticable. But every misfortune of the last six months-
the bloody repulse at Bussaco, the loss of the hospitals Ilnd
magazines at Coimbra, the long smn'atioll at SantlLl-em, the slow
and circuitous course of the retreat, was imputed to Massena's
account by his chief subordinates as well as by his rank and file.
What the b'Cllerals muttered in the morning wll..'lloudly discussed
around every camp-fire at night. The whole army had lost in
morale from six months of systemlJ.tic marauding, was quite out
of hund in the way of discipline, und hOO no confidence in its
lea.der, who Wll..~ absolutely detested. The departure of Ney.
who was liked and admired by all ranks, had been a great dis·
couragemc!Ilt, because his skilful handling of the rearguard
during the retreat had been understood and appreciated, while
Massenu wus cried down as a t.actician no less than as a strate-
gist on the general results of the campaign. A general whose
! Wben Foy went back from '1'homar 011 .March 6 to ltodrigo his escort
was taken fmm the 9th Corps, not fmm the Arm)' of Portugal, so does
not COl1ul. See Piece8 Jua/ificatit'f!8, No. 46, ill Foy's Vie Mifilflire, p. 3.57.
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troops no longer rely on him callnot get the best out of his
army, and for this reason alone Napoleon was justified ill
removing the old Marshal from his command in April, when the
full tale of the retreat had reached him.
Yet there can be no doubt that Massena was hardly treated.
That the expedition of Portugal failed was, in tile main, no
fault of his. Neither he nor his master, nor nnyone else on the
French side, had foreseen 'oVellington's plans-the devastation of
the country-side, which rendered it impossible for the invader to
live long by marauding, and the systematic fortification of the
long front of the Lisbon Peninsula. For the actual game that
was set before him, !\Iussena had not been given sufficient pieces
by the Emperor. As Wellington had said more than a year
before \ the French could not turn him out of Portugal with
less than 100,000 men, and Napoleon had only provided 65,000.
Moreover, as the British gcncml had added, he should so
manage affairs that 100,000 li'rench could not live ill' the
country if they did appear; and this was no vain boast.
MasSCllU, then, was sent to accomplish tlJl impossible task, and
his merit WU$ that he came nearer to his end than Wellington
had believed possible, before he was forced to recoil. Many of the
French marshals would never have got to Coimbra: certainly
nOllc of them would have sll(,'CC(..-dcd in holdillg on at Sautarcm
for three mont4s. There can be no doubt that the rrince of
Essling did not exaggerate when he wrote to Berthier 2, 011
March 31st, that it was his own iron will alone which htul kept
the firlllY so long and so far to the front-that but for him it
would have recoiled on to Spain many weeks earlier. His heroic
obstinacy gave his adversary lllallY an unea.~y day, while it seemed
in January and February as if the calculation for famishing the
French had failed. Massena., in short, bad done all that was
possible, and the general failure of the campaign was not his
fault, any more than it was that of Soult, on whom the blame
has always OC.oeIl laid by the elder marshal's advocates. We
have shown in an earlier chapter 3 that SouIt did all and more
than all that Napoleon had directed him to accomplish. If he
I Sec pp. 167-8 of val. iii. t Dispatch printed jll Fririon, p. 157.
, See abo,'e, PI)· 24-5.
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had literal1y obeyed the tardy orders that reached him from
Paris he would only have exposed the 5th Corps to defeat, if not
to destruction. The ex post facto rebukes that the Emperor sent
him were unjust. We are onee more driven back to our old
conclusion that the deterlp.ining fac~rs in the failure of
the campaign of Portugul were firstly that Napoleon refused to
appoint II single commander-in-chief in the l'el.linsuln, to who1ie
orders aU the other marshals should be 811ictly subordinate, and
secondly that he persisted in sending plans and directions from
Paris founded Oil facts that were seven weeks late, or more,
whcn his dispatches reached the front. Oii this we have
enlarged nt sufficient length 011 nn earlier page.
SECTION XXV
EVENTS IN NORTHERN, EASTERN, AND
CENTRAL SFATN
.CHAPTER T
KING JOSEPH AND HIS TROUBLES
WHILF. following the fortunes of Wellington and Massena,
during the first four months of 1811, wc have been compelled to
leave almost untollched the sequence of events in the rest of
Spain; not only the doings of Suchet and l\facdonald in the
far cast, which had no practical cOllncxion with the campnigu
of Portugal, but also the minor affairs of the southern and central
provinces. Only 8oult's expedition to Estremadura, which came
into close touch with 'Vellington, has been dealt with. It i.
time to explain the general posture of the WM ill the Peninsula,
during the time when its critical point lay between Lisbon and
Abrantes, where Massena and Welliuf:,>ton stood face to face, each
waiting for the othel' to move.
'Vital was going on in Portugal. was, as we have already seell,
practically a secret to the :French in Spain. ]i'or the Portuguese
Ol'denfillliu and the Spanish guerrilleros had done their work
of' blocking the foods so well, that no accurate infofmation
penetrated to J\.bdrid, Valladolid, Of Seville from Santarem. It
was only at rare inter\'als, when Foy and other officers cut their
way throngh this' fog of' war' that the condition of a/lairs Oll
the Tagus became known for a moment. The fog descended
again when they had passed through on their way to Paris, and
given their information as to the fortulll.'S of the Army of
Portugal during the weeks that preceded their departure. The
gaps in the llarrative were "ery long-nothing got through be·
tween the departure of Masscna from Almeida on September 15,
1810, and Foy's first arrival at Cindad llodrigo on November 8th.
1811] THE 'All~[Y OF THE NORTH' fW7
There was another lacuna in the knowledge of the situation
between that date and the passage ofMasseull.'s second llUl:<:cssful
messenger, Casabianca, from Santarem to Rodrigo in the earliest
days of February. And after Casabianca had passed by, the
next news came out through Foy's second mission, when he
started to announce the oncoming retreat on March 5, and brat
to the borders of Leon on March 13. 'l1te only way in which
King Joseph at Madrid, or the generals of the' military govern-
ments' of Old Castile, or Soult in Andalusia., felt the coursc of
the war on its most important theatrc, \I'M that they wcre for
lllall)' months freed from Illly anxiety about the movcmcnts of
Wellington. He WM • contained' by Massena, and, however
he might be faring, he had no power to interfere by RM'ned force
ill the affairs of Spain. The French for all this time had to
deal only with the armies of the Cortes, and with their old and
irrepressible enemies the guerriUeros of the mountains.
While the fate of the Portuguese expedition was still uncertain,
while it seemt>u possible to Napoleon that Massclltl might cling to
his position at Santnrem till Soult came up to join him on the
'l'agus, a considerable change was made with regard to the I-'rench
troops in northern Spain. Convinced at last there was little to
be said in fa\'our of tlmt system of lllllny small' military b"Overn~
mcnts', ill Old Castile llnd the neighbouring provinces, which he
had created in 1810, the Emperor resoh'ed to put them all under
a single commander. This would give him six less independent
generals to communicate with, and would ensure for the future 11
much better co-operation between the cli lIisions which occupied
the "alley of the Douro and the Pyrenean regions. The six
military governors had been each playing his OWII game, and
taking little notice of that of his neighbours. Their enemies
were mostly the guerrillero bands of the Cantabrian hills and of
Nallarrc. Etwhgcllerul did his best to hunt these elusive enemies
out of his own department, but took little heed of their tres·
passes on his neighbours' territory. Evasive and indomitable
partisans like Mina in Navarre, Juliull Sanchez in Old Castile,
and PorHer and Longa in the Cantabrian sierras, found it com-
paratively easy to shift their positions when the pressure on one
region was too great for them, and to move on into allother~
they were sure that the hunt would soon slacken, and that they
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could return at their leisure to their old haunts. The Emperor
thought that it would be possible to make an end of them, if 0.11
his garrisons and movable columns in northern Spain were Pllt
under a single commander and moved in unison under a single
will. Hence came the decree of January 8, 1811, creating the
, Army of the North,' and hauding it over to Marshal lJessiercs,
whose name IVns still remembered in those regions owing to his
old victory of Medina de Rio Seco. His authority extended
over the troops stationed in Navarrc, Biscay, Burgos, Valladolid,
Salamanca, the Asturias, and Santander, including not only the
regular gnrrisons of those pl'o\'inccs but the two divisions of the
Young Guard, which had replacro Drouet's rorps in Old Castile,
and the division under Serras which watched Galicia from the
direction of Bena\'ente and AstOl'ga. The total of the forces
placed under his orders amounted to '70,000 men, of whom
59,000 were 'presents sous les armcs,' the rest being in hospital,
01' detached outside the limits of the territor)' assigned to the
Army of the North.
Considerable as was this force, it did not accomplish all that
the Emperor hoped, even when directed by a single commander
of solid military talents. Bessicrcs, though 11 capable officer, was
not a genius, and the Ut..ks B.'lSigned to him were so multifa.ious
that after a short time he began to grow harassed and worried,
and to cavil at every order that was sent him. He was directed
to 'suppress brigandfto""C,' i. e. to put down the guerrilleros, to
support the Army of Portugal against 'Wellington whenever
necessary, to keep an eye upon the Spanish regular forces in
Galicia and the Asturias. This, be declared, was more than
eould be accomplished with tlw forces at his disposal. <If I COIl-
centrate !!O,OOO men all communications are lost, and the insur·
gents will make enormous progress. The coast would be lost as
far as Bilbao. We are without resources, because it is only with
the greatest pains that the troops can be fed from day to day.
The spirit of the population is abominably bad: the retreat of
the Army of Portngal h08 turnoo their hends. The bands of
insurgents grow larger, and recruit themselves actively on every
side.... The Emperor is deceived about Spain: the pacifica-
tion of Spain does not depend on fl bnltle with the English, who
will Accept it or refuse it a... they please, and who have Portugal
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behind them for retreat. Everyone knows the vicious syslcm
01' our operations. Everyone allows that wc are too widely
scattered. "Ve O(:cllpy too much territory, we use up our
re...<Ollrces without profit and without necessity: we are clinging
on to dreams. Cadiz and Badajoz absorb all our means-Cadiz
because we canllot take it, Badajoz because it requires a whole
army to support it. Wc ought to blow up Blldajoz, ilnd to
nbandon the siege of Cadiz for the present. 'Vc ought to drnw
iD, get solid bases for our magazines and hospitals, and regard
tll'o.thiros of Spain as a vast battlefield, which a battle may
give us or cause us to lose, till the moment that we change our
system and take ill hand the real conquest aud pacitiCl1tioll of the
country,' &c.1
All t.his means that Bessieres fOllnd it impossible to pacify the
~orth, and concluded that it was useless to try to complete the
l'UlJ(]Uest of Andalusia or Portugal, when that of Navurre and
SunwlIder was so far from being secure that no small party could
go two miles from 0. garrison town, without a large probability
of being ctlt off by the insurgenb. He would have had his
master abandon Andalusia and Estremadurn, in order to con-
centrate such masses of troops in the north that the guerrilleros
shonld be smothered by Illere numbers, lhat every mountain
village should have its garrison. There wns small likelihood
lhat his views would find favour at Paris; the Emperor knew
well enough the effl."Ct on hill prestib"C that would result from
the aoondollmenl of the siege of Cadiz, following upon the relrellt
of Massella. from Santarem. It would look like a confession of'
Jefeat, a renunciation of the great game of conquest; if the
French armies retired beyond the Sierra More1l8, the results of
eighteen mont.hs of victorious CAmpaigning in the south would be
lost, and the Cortes at Ca.diz would once more have a re.alm to
administer. Hence all that Napoleon did for Bessieres was to
send him in June two Dew divisions for the strengthening ot'the
b'llrrisolls of the North~, and to bid him fortify every important
stnlioll Oil lhe high-road to Madrid, and e\'en the main bridges
of the upper Ebro. A few months later he r~ea1led him, partly
1 llessieres to Bertllier, printed in thl! ApIlCuJbt to llelmus, \'01. i.
p.562.
7 See 0010\\', 1'. 225. Divisions Soul13m and Calfarelli.
O"U. IV ,.
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become he considered him a pessimist, partly because Bcs~icrcs
quarrelled with King Joscph, who was continuolly soliciting his
removal. But before the Duke of Istria departed he had many
more troubles to go through, as will be seen.
The main diflicultk'S of the Army of the NOlth arosc from
geogrnphical facts. While the plains of Leon and Old Castile
could be scoured b)' cavalry, and easily traversed b)' fl),ing
columns, so that it was not impossible to keep some SOlt of
order in thcm, this flat upland was bordcred 011 the north by the
long chain of the Cantabrinn sierras and their foot-hills, broad,
rugged, and nearly roadless. llehind these again la)" the lIarrow
and difficult coast-land of Asturias and Santallder, cut up into
couutle!;:) pett)· valleys each drained by its own small river, and
purted from its neighbours by spurs of the great sierras. How
was this mountain region, seventy miles broad and two hundred
long, to be dealt with? The French had no permanent garrisons
on the coast between Gihon, the port of Oviedo, which Wail
generally occupied by a detachment of Bonnet'" division, and
Santander, not fiu from the borders of lliscay I. This last
Bcs~ieres describes us '!I. bud post from every point of view, only
to be defended by covering it with large bodies of troops,' und
only accessible by a series of difficult defiles. III the Calltabrian
highlands dwelt Longa and Porlier, witb bands which had
assumed the proportions of ~mall armies; they could communicate
with the sea at any onc of a dozen ~tty ports, and draw al1l1S
and supplies from the British cruisers of the Bay of Biscay.
E\'en Mina would occasionall)' get in touch with the sea through
this coast-land, though his main sphere of operations was ill
Navarre. There were dozens of smaller bands, each based 011 its
own valley, but capable of joining its neighbours for a sudden
stroke. Again and 8crrain French columns worked up into these
sierras from the plain of the DoUl"O, and went Oil a hUllt after the
patriots. Sometimes they caught them and inflicted severe loss;
more often they were eluded b)' their enemies, who fled by paths
that reb".ilar troops could not follow, into some distant corner
of the mountains. It was impossible to garrison each upwld
valley with a force that could resist a gencrallevy of the insur-
I Bessieres soon after his arrival put a garrison in Salltolia, between
Santallder and Bilbao.
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gcnts. Even little towns like Pates, in the Lieballo., Longa's
usual head quarters., which were repeatedly taken, could not be
kept. The' Army of the North' would have required 150,000
men instead of the 70,000 whom Bessieres actually commanded,
if it was to master the whole of this difficult region. Indeed,
Canl:abria could only have been conquered by an enemy possess·
ing a sea force to attack it in the rear, and occupy all its little
ports, as well as an overwhe1millg land army operating frum nil
sides. To the cnd of tlie war Longa and Porlier, often hunted
but never destroyed, maintained themselves without any great
difficulty in their fastllesses..Nothing but the general despair
and demoralization that might have followed the extinction of
the patriotic cause in the whole of the rest of Spain, could
have brought the war in this region to an end. Nothing of the
kind occurred: the Cantabrians kept a high spirit; they won
nUIJI)' small successes, and they were perpetually helped by the
British from the side of the sea. Bessieres had a hopeless problem
before llim in this quarter, considering the Sil.e of his army.
But this was not his only troublc; Bonnct in Astnrias wus
holding Oviedo and the district immediately round it with a
strong division, which varied at one time and another from 6,000
to 8,000 men. He was very useful in his present position,
because he cut the Spanish line of defence along the north coast
in two, and because he seemed to threaten Galicia from the
north-east. The threat was not a very real onc, for he had not
enough men to delh'cr an attack on eastcrn Galicia and at thc
same time to hold Oviedo and its neighbourhood. But he was
a source of trouble as well as of strength to his superiors., for
it was very difficult to keep in touch with him through the puss
of l'ajares, and if he were to be attacked at once by the Galieians
and by a British landing-force, his position would be a very dan-
gerous one. He had been put to great trouble by RCllO\·alCS'lj
Illlval expedition ill October 1810', though this was but a small
furce and had not received any real help from Galicia along the
land side. Bessicres, aftcr he had been a few DlOlltllS in authority,
was inclined to withdraw Bonnet to the south side of the SieM'llS,
and to abandon Oviedo, but was warned against such a move
by his master, who said that this would bc I a detestable opem-
1 Sce voJ. iii. pp. 486-7.
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tion,' a." it would relieve Galicia from the threat of invasion,
allow of the re-formation of a Junta and an army in Asturias,
and necessitate a heavy concentration at Santallder I. Never-
theless the Marshal did at one crisis withdraw the dh'i~ioll fwm
Ovicdo.
llctween Bonnet in the Asturias and Ciudad Uodrigo, the long
front against Galieia was occupied by a single weak Fl'el)ch
division, that of Serras, whose head quarters were at BeuM'entc,
his udvullc('-'Ci. post at Astorga, and his flank-guards at Leuu
find Zmnorn 2, If the army of Galicia had been in good order
this force wonld have been in great danger, for it was not strong
enough to hold the ground allotted to it. But when Dell'anjue
ill 1809 drew off to Estremadura the, old Army of the North, he
had left iJehind him ouly .a few skeleton corps, and the best of
thesc had been destroyed in defendillg Astorga in the following
year. The formation of El new Galician army of 20,000 men
llad been decreed, and the cadres left behind in the country bad
been filled up in 1810, but the results were not satisfldory.
The Cnptuiu-Gellcml, Mahy, was a mlltl of little energy, aml
spent most of it ill qUll.lTcls with the local Junta, whom he
accused of conspiracy against him, alld charged with secret
cOI'l'e:;pondence with La Homana and his palty. He seized their
letters in the post and imprisoned two members, whereupon riuts
broke out, alld complaints were sent to the Hegency at Cadiz.
This led to l\'lahy's recall, and the captain-generalship was
given to the Duke of Albuquerque, then on his mission tu
London. He died without having returned to Spain, so that
the appointment was nugatory, and the Regency then gave it to
Castm1os, who was at the same time made Captain-General uf
Estremadura, after the dcath of La Romana and the disaster at
the Gcbora. Castafios went to the Tagns, to rally the poor rem-
nants of the Estremaduran army, and while retaining the nomi-
!la! command ill Galicia never visited that provilll:e, but lleputed
the command in it to Snntocildes, the young general who had
so bravely defended Astorga in the preceding spring. He had
been sent prisoner to Fram:e, but was adroit enough to escape
I Carre8poltduJlce, rlo. 17,785, 13tll June, ]811.
, Since tile disaster at I'uebla. de Senabria. (vol. iii. p. 270) Serras Jlad
drawn ill his leR fillllk und abandoned the Galiciau foot-hills.
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from his captivity, and to make his way back to Corunna. His
appointment W88 popular, but he got no great service out of the
Galician army, which was in a deplorable condition, and hope-
lessly scattered. The Junta kept mltny battalions to garrison
the harbour-fortresses of Conmlla, Vigo, and l"erl'Ol, and thc main
body, whose head quarters lay at VilIafranca in the Vicrzo, did
not alllount to Illore than 7,000 men, uestitute of cavalry (which
Galieia could nevcr produce) and very poorly provided with artil.
lery. There was another division, nndcr General Cabrem, some
4,000 strong, at Puebla. de Senabria, and a third under Barcena
and Losadn Oil the borders of the Asturias, opposite Bonnet.
The whole did not amount to 16,000 raw troops-yet this was
sufficient to hold Serrll8 in observation and to watch Bonnet,
who was too much aistracted by the Cantabrian bands to be
really dangcl·ou~. But in the spring of 1811 the Gnliciaus
could do no more, and \Vellington was much chagrined to find
that he could get no effective assistance from them, after he had
driven Masscnl!. behind the Agueda, and so shaken the hold of
the French Oil the wholc kingdom of Loon. It was not till June
that Santocildes found it possible to descend from the hills and
threaten Serras. This led to a petty campaign about Astorga
and on the Orbigo river, which will be nurrated in its due place.
VVhile affairs stood thus in the north, King Joseph and hi~
'Army of the Centre' were profiting for mallY months from the
absence of any danger upon the side of Portugal. Indeed, the
period between Septcmber 1810 and April1S11 were thc least
disturbed of any in the short and truublous reign of the Rey
11ltruao, so (al· ns regular military affhirs went. There wns 110
enemy to face save the gneITilleros. yet these hold partisans, of
whom the best known were the Empeeinado and El Medico
(Dr. Juan Palarea) on the side of the eastern mountnins, and
Jnliiln Sanchez more to the west, on the borders of I.eon,snfficed
to keep the 20,000 'men of whom King Jo~ph could dispose I
I 'l1le King in all his dispatchelllleemll 10 understate lds 011''' force. He
sometimes culls it only l.5,OOO men. But a muster roll of the Army of
the Centre, which I have copied from the Archives de la Gllerre, for
.'ebruary 16, 1811, sholl's a total of 20,000, viz, Dessollcs, 3,300, German
Division, 5,200, Spaniards, 4,200, Lahoussaye, 2,500, Treillard's I.ight
Cavalry, 1,400, Artillery 'l'nlin, SuI'pers, &c., 1,000, Royal Guards, 2,000
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in constant employment. Such a force was not too much when
every small town, almost every vil1~gel of New Castile had to
be provided with a garrison. Roughly speaking, each province
absorbed a division: the Germans of the Rheinbund occupied La
Mancha, Lahoussaye's dragoons and the incomplete division of
Dcssolles I held Toledo and its district, the King's Spaniards the
Guadalajam cOlUltry, leaving only lhe Royal Guards and some
drafts and det.achments to garrison the capital It was with
considerable difficult}, that Joseph collected in January 1811
a small expeditionary force of not over 3,500 men 2, with which
Lahoussaye went out, partly to open up communications with
Soult in Estremoourtl, but more especially to search for allY
traces of the vanished army of l\1assena in the direction of the
Portuguese frontier. Lahoussaye started from Talavera all
February 1, communicated by means of his cavalry with Soult's
outposts between Truxillo and Meridn, and then went north·
ward across the Tagus to Plasencia, from which his cavalry
searched in vain, as far as Coria and Alcantara., for any news of
the Army of Portugal. From Plaseucia he was soon driven
back to Toledo by want of supplics. Joscph had directed him
to seize Alcantnra., re-establish its broken bridge, and place
a garrison there; but this turned out to be absolutely impos·
sible, for it would have been useless to leave a small force in this
remote spot, when it was certain that it must ere long retire for
lack of food, and might well be cut off by the guerrilleros before
it could reach Talavera., the nearest occupied point 3•
The Army of the Centre just sufficed to occupy the kingdom
of New Castile, and was unable to do more. At least, however,
it could maintain its position, and was in no danger. The King
was even able to make state visits to places in the close neigh·
bourhood of Maddd, such as Akala and Guadalajara·, and
of nil arms. III addition there were 6,000 drafu! for Soult tletained in
New Castile, but about to start for Seville.
I \l'llicll l1a(1 only se,'en b.1Ualions, the reBt being witll 80ult in Auda·
lusia.
2 Composed of two cavalry regiments of Marisy's brigade, three Germ:lll
Imttalioll!~ from La i\lancha, and two French hattalions.
~ Napoleon in a dispatch of 22 Marcll (C()n'ttpQlUumce, Xli. 400) bb.ml'i'
Lahoussaye for llot stoppillg ill northem Jo:stremadUrll, ill touch with Soull.
t See Miot de Melito's M&ooiru, iii. 153-G.
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seems to have regarded the possibility of such a modest tour as
a sign of the approaching pacification of this region.
But just at the moment when Joscph llollapnrte's military
situation wa.<; SlLfe, if not SS\.tisfactory. he WM passing through
a diplomatic crisis which absorbed aU his attention and reduced
him to the verge of despair. We have already alluded, in an
earlier chapter, to Napoleon's insane resolve to annex all Spain
beyond the Ebro to the French Empire I, in return for which he
was proposing to hand over Portugal, when it should be con-
quered, to his brother. The proclamation announcing this
strange resolve, which was to make Frenchmen of Mina and all
the gucrrilleros of Navarre, no less than of the Catalan armies
which were still striving so hard against l\Iacdonald, was delayed
in publication. For the Emperor wished to wait till Lisbon was
ill the hands of Ma.sscna, before he made known his purpose.
But Joseph was aware that the proclamation had been drawn up,
and had been sent out to the governors of the northern pro-
vinces, who were only waiting for orders to issue it. The news
that the English had evacuated Portugal might any day nrrh'e,
and would be the signal for the dismemberment of Spain. He
had sent in succession to Paris his two most trusted Spanish
adherents, the Duke of Santa-Fe llnd the Marquis of Almenara,
to beg the Emperor to forgo his purpose; all Wll.'1 to no effect.
Santa·Fe came back in December absolutely crushed b)' the
reception that he had been given; the Emperor had delivered
to him an angry diatribe, in which he complained that his
brother forgot that he was a French prince, and remarked that
• man.y other European sovereigns, who had received much
harder measure, did not make nearly so mnch noise about it as the
King of Spain ll.' Almenara reached Madrid about a week later
to report an equally characteristic interview with Napoleon. He
had been directed to inform his master that he should be given
one more chance. Let him open negotiations with the Cortes
at Cadiz, making them the offer that if they would rreoglli7.e
him as King of Spain, he would recogni7.e them as lawful
representatives of the nation, and rule them according to the
I See \'01. Hi. pp. 506-7.
! See ~Hot's 1Ifimoirel, Hi. 160, for tile discouraging results of this
embassy.
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constitution drawn up at Bayollne. Cadiz and the other for-
trc8SCS held by the troops of the Regency must open their gates,
and Napoleon would then promise to make no annexations of
Spanish soil; he would even guarantee the integrity of the
kingdom. If the Cortes refused to treat, the Emperor would
regard himself as free from any pre\'iOllS engagements made with
his brother or the Spanish nation. The pro\,inccs beyond the
Ebro would become part of Francc. He added that if affairs in
Portugal wellt badly, it would not be wise to open negotiations
with Cadiz at all, for fear that the Spaniards might take the
mere fact that proposals had been made to them as a token of
growing fear and depression on the part of Joseph.
The King £md his ministers knew well the impracticability of
making any ofreI.' to the govel.'llment of Cadiz, which (with all
iL~ faults and intemal dissensions) was determined to fight to
the death, and had never shown the least intention of recogniz-
ing Napolcon's nominec as King of Spain. They looked upon
the scheme as merely a preliminary to the publication of the
edict for the annexation of the provinces beyond the EbrJ.
King Joseph was to be made to demonstrate his own futility,
since he would reeeive an tUlgry and contemptuous reply, or 110
reply at all, nnd it would then be open to his brother to declare
that the attempt to govern a united Spain by a king had failed,
and that it was necessary to dismember it-perhap~ to cut it up
into a number of French military governments. This seems to
have been ,Joseph's own impression; in the council at which the
Emperor's proposal was discussed, he broke out into violent
reproaches and bitter complaints against his brother, alld
explained with tears to his ministers that he and they WCI'e
betrayed. He was now for abdicating, and this would hllve
been the most dignified course to take. He talked of buying an
estate in Frnnce, and settling down, far from Paris, as a private
person. He had indeed charged his wife's nephew, Mal'ius Clary,
to cross the Pyrenees, and purchase a castle and lands for him ill
Touraine or the South, where he might hide his disgml.'C and
disappointment.
This move provoked Napoleon's wrath. He signified his
displeasure. 'The members of the Imperial family could not
legally make auy acquisition of land in Fmnee without the
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formal I,:onscnt of the Emperor. In nddition, it was impossible
for the King of Spain, or the commander of the Army of the
Centt'e, to quit his post without having received the Imperial
Ruthori7Ation. Painful as the declaration must be, if the King
took such a ha?.ardous step, he should be arrested at Ba)'onllc on
crossing the frontier. There must be no more talk aoout the
constitution of Bayollue: the Emperor could dispose of Spain
at his good pleasure, and'in the interests of the Frellcll Empil'e
alone.' If Joseph persisted in the idea of abdication, he must
first make a formal statement to that effect to the French
ambassador at :Madrid, and, providl'<1 that it was considered
that the step would cause no dangerous results, nor gi vc rise to
any slanderous reports, he might come to his ~t..ate of :Mor-
fontaine Ileal' Paris and' finish the matter en regie 1:
.Toseph at first seemed inclined to accept any terms by which
he might emerge from his present ignominious position, and
actually had scveral interviews with Laforest, ill which t1lt~y
discllssed the drafting of a deed of nbdimtion. Blit it seemcd
that Napoleon would prefer the prolongation of the present
state of affairi>, and for his own purposes intended that a puppet
king should continue at Madrid. By the ambassador's advice
the document ultimately took the shape of a letter in which
Joseph, instead of alxlicating in definitive form, merely stated
his wish to do so, and referred it to his brother. His confidant,
i\liot de Melito, with whom he talked over the whole matter,
expresses his opinion that Ilt the last moment the fascination of
the crown overpowered his master's full sense of resentment.
'The King's note was a good piece of writing, but I consider
that it did not state clearly enough that the course to which he
inclined, and which he preferred to nll others, WM abdication.
I wished that he had made a stronger affirmation of this, and told
him so, but to 110 effect. It was easy to see that the llame of
King had still (l powerful attraction, from which .Joseph could
I All this from the letter of the Queen of Spain, detoiling her iuterl'iew
Ivith the Vue de eadore, who sent for her in the Emperor'8 Ilame Oil
JanullrY 15,1811, /llId administered thi~ hitter meSllllge to her, for her
husband's benefit. See the letter given in l'IIiot's MtmoiTt8, Hi. 171-2.
Cf, Napoleon's dispatcll to Laforest, amba~dorat Madrid, Corre8p6nJo.uu,
17,111.
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not escape. and 1 wondered at the glamour and intoxication
which (as it seems) hangs about supreme power, since the mere
shadow of that power could o\'erweigh with him so many rebuffs
and so much resentment I.-
Napoleon m!l.de no reply to his brother's declaration ; he had no
intention of taking over the formal responsibility fm' the govern-
ment of Spain, and preferred to leave another to answer for all
its obvious injustices and oppl'essions. Affairs were at a standstill
for some months, till in April Joseph, taking the opportunity
of a formal invitation to become one of the godfathers of the
newly-bom King of Rome, the heir of the Empire, made a sudden
and unauthori~d sally to Paris. He started from Madrid on
April 29, nccompanicd by nine of his oourtiers and ministers,
and crossed the llidassoa into France on May 10. He made 110
halt at Ba,yonne, lest he should be stopped there by orders from
his brothel', and when, at Da..x in Gascony, he received an Imperial
dispatch forbidding him to quit Spain, he was able to plead that
it was too late to act upon it. Pursuing his journey night and
day, he presented himself at Paris on May 15th, and announced
to Napoleon that he was come to discharge in person the hononr-
able duties of brod-parent at the approaching baptism of his
nephew.
Though annoyed at fhe King's arrival, for refusals and evasions
of a brother's petitions are transacted more easily by letter than
face to fB.<.'E!, the Emperor thought it well to make no open show
of displeasure, and accepted aU the explanations given to him.
There followed a series of interviews at Rambollillet, in which
.Joseph allowed himself to be talked out of his project of abdica-
tioll: for the Emperor declared that he found him useful in his
present position, and informed him that it was his duty, as It
brother and a French prince, to obey the directions of the hend
of his house. In return Napoleon" promised to make many
arrangements which would render the King's position less intoler-
able than it had been for the last year. He would provide him
with a monthly subsidy of a million francs from the French
treasury, of which half would be for the sustenance of his court
and ministers, and the other haW for the pay of the Army of the
1 l\liot's Mb/w;res, iii. 176.
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Centre. Orders were issued to Smut, commanding the Army of
Andalusia, Bessieres, commanding thc newly-formed Arnlyof the
North, and Suchet, so far as the Army of Aragon waS" concerned
(but not for Catalonia), by· which they were directed to pay over
to a commissnry appointed by .Joseph one quarter of the gross
revenues which they were raising in the districts which they
occupied. They were also directed to leave the law courts in the
King's hands, and not to allow judgements to be giveu in the
name of the Emperor. It wus this last prncticc, frequently
Mopte<! by Kellermann in CAstile, which had irritated Joseph
more than any other misdemeano.ur of the local commanM
dants.
What Joseph most desire<l, a real directing power over the
mo\'ements of all the French troops in Spain, was not given him.
nut he was granted u sort of illusory superintending authority:
if he was at the head quarters of any of the armies, h.e Wtl..<; to be
given the honours of supreme command; aU the marshals and
generals commanding annies were to send him frequent reports,
and 1I0t to undertake any operations without informing him of
them. 'The King must have reports of evcrything that happens;
he must know everything, and be able to act in his central
position as a sort of agency for transmitting information to the
generals. This communication of intelligence, observations, and
rtdvice may even take place through his Spanish Minister of
War 1,' wrote the Emperor. The King flattered himself that
this meagre conceAAion gave him something like a directing
authority over the annies. He told his courtiers that he was
gi,·cn the position of GencralMin·ChieP, and used his brother's
permission to send advice in reams to each of the local com-
manders. Unfortunately there was no way of making them
take this advi<:c; they answered more or less politely, showing
reasons why they could not follow it, and went 011 their own ways
as before. It was to no effect that J oseph got leave to have hi~
old friend Marshal Jourdan sent back to him, first as governor
of Madrid, and later as chief of the stuff. He flattered himsclf
I Napoleon to Eerlhier, from Qaen, May 27. Corrupondance, no. 17,752.
I See Miot lie Memo's NtmQireiJ, iii. 107-8, null compare it with the
actual terms of Napoleon's concession given in his letter to Berthier
quoted a\M)re.
flJi!O KING JOSEPH A..!'JD HIS TROUBLES [MAV
that his dispntchcs would be taken more seriously by Soult or
Suchet when they came countersigned by a marshal of
France. Bnt he erred, for the younger commanders looked
upon Jouroan as effete and pw£ his prime-nor wcre they
altogether wrong.
Nothing can be more curious than thc Emperor's memorandum
to Berthier, which directs him to lay these conditions before
Joseph. • I am thu~; he writes, < satisfying the desir-es which
the King expressed to me, save on the siugle point of the supreme
command over my troops. I cannot give nway that supremc
command, because I do not see any man capable of managing
the troops, and yet the command ought to be one and indivisible.
In the note which the King gave me, all the arrangements were
complex and confused. It is in thc nature of thillb"S that if one
marshal were placed at i\Iadrid, and directed all operations, hc
would want to ha\'e all the glory along with all the responsibility,
The commanders of the Armies of the South and of Portugal
would think themselves under the orUers lIOt l;Q much of the
King as of that mal'i>hal, alld ill l'ODscqueuce would not givc him
obedielH:C.... My intention is to make no change whate\'el'
in the military command, neither with the Army of the North,
nor the Army of Aragon, nor the Army of the South, nor the
Army of Portugal, SU\'C so much as is necessary to securc for the
King reports from them all.... I want to do all that I call to
give the King a new prestige on his retuMl to Spain, but nothillg
that may in any way disorganize the Army of Andalusia, 01' any
of the other armies 1.'
It is clear that we have in these few sentences the key to all
Napoleon's difficulties in conducting the Spanish war. He did
Dot wish to •have a marshal at Madrkl who would want to have
all the gIol'Y along with all the responsibility,' i. e. he refused to
make one of his servants dangerously great. Soult's intrigues
for kingship at Oporto in 1809 were not forgotten, and Soult
would have been the obvious candidate for supreme command,
llOW that Masscna had been tried and found wanting. 'I'he
Emperor preferred to go on with the hopeless s)'stem that was
already working, by which he himself directed operations from
I All from the Caeti memorandum for Derthier quoted alx)\'e,
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Paris, basing his orders 011 faets that were often /llllonth old whell
he learnt of them, and sending ont those orders to reach their
destination another month later. He was aware of the evils of
this arrangement., hut anything was better than to hand over
supreme power over 300,000 soldiers to a single lieutenunt. It
is strange that he did not resolve to descend into Spain himself
during the summer of 1811, for European politics were at the
moment so quiet that he W/lS actually thillkillg of concentrating
80,000 menat Boulogne, for a real or a threatened descent on the
British Isles 1, a project which he had not been able to dream of
since'l.'rafalbrar. The tellsioll between :France and Russia, which
was to increase in a dangerous fashion during the autullIn, was
not so great in Mayor June as to make the idea of a Spanish
campaign impossible. If it was possible to think of an invasion
of Euglalld at this moment, it was surely equally fcasiblc to
'-'OlIsider the advantages of a desCCllt on Lisbon or Cadiz. But
apparently it was the physical distance between Paris and the
further end of the Peninsula which deterred the Emperor from
~cizillg what turned out to be the last Lwailuble opportunity for
1\ sally beyond the l'yrenees. As he himself observed on another
occasion, he would be at the end of the world in Portugal, and
a crisis might arise behind his back before he got UIl)' Il.dequulc
news of it 2. This WilS different from campaigning ill ccntral
Europe; when at Vienna or Berlin he was still in touch with
Paris. The only parallel to un ill\'asion of Portub"tll would be
all invasion of Russia, and it will be remembered that Napoleon's
apprehensions were absolutely justified by what occurred in the
autumn of 18U during his absence at Moscow. Theastounwng
oonspirncy of General Malet was within an ace of sncceeding,
I For dispatches concerning this, and notes as to the troops ami shills
to be employed, see Corrupondanf:e, J1,824, 17,875, &c. 'ne project
seems to have lleell seriously thought over, the Emperor wrongly believing
that England was rtripped of regular troops,
3 'Le Portugul est trap loill: jc Ile peux pas y aUer; il faudrait six
mois, l'elldallt six mois tout est suspelldu: rEurape est sans direction:
Ics Russcs pcuvellt se declarer, Its Anglais dllbar'lUCr nu llOro, En
verite, qualld 011 voit la difference qu'un hODlme met aux evenements, it
est impossible tic lie lIDS avoir de l'amOllr prol/re.' 30th March,1811.
Napoleon's interview with Foy, reported by the latter ill Vie Milu,tirc 11"
Gbl&al FOJ/' p•..J.40, .
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because it was possible to put about all manner of false nJmours,
when the Emperor was lost to sight on the steppes. A handful
of plotters-we might almost say a single plotter, Malet himself
-with no assets save impudence and reckless courage, seized
the imperial ministers, mustered an armed force, and almost
established a provisional government and mastered Paris. This
was only possible because the Emperor and the grand army had
got so fal' otI'that the touch between them and France had been
lost, and absence of news fol' mau)' days had set the toub'11C of
rumour loose 1. Under such circumstances almostan:ythillg might
happen, for imposing as was the Colossus of the l~rench Empire,
it stood on no firm base, its feet were of clay. Napoleon hoped
to build a permanent structure, but there can be no doubt that
all through his reign its stability depended on his own life and
strength. If he had been cut oft'suddenly by a cannon-ball at
Jena or Wagram, or by the knife of a fanatic such as Staps-
Spain could have produced such enthusiasts by the score-chaos
would have supervened in France. When once the'rumour was
set about that the Emperor was dead, anything became possible
in Paris. No one knew this better than himself; in his cynical
moments ·he would remark to his confidants that he was well
aware that if sudden death came to him the public feeling would
be one of relief rather than of sorrow. It was the constraining
force of his own indomitable will alone which kept everything
together, and if he removed himself to some very remote corner
of Europe, from which his orders could not be transmitted con-
linuously and at short intervals, there was grave dunger that the
machine might rWl down.
Hence it may perhaps he said that the l>ellinsula was saved
from the presence of the Emperor in 1811 because of the neces~
Sllry limitations of a onc-man power. He dared not remo\'c
himself from the centre of affairs; he would not lllake oue of
his jcalOlIS and ambitious lieutenants over-great, by giving him
supreme command. This being so, the bad old system had to
.go on, and that system of over~late orders grounded on ovcr-
late intormation 2, and followed (01' not .followed) by over-late
I :1'or a similar hint of danger ill ~009, see above, vol. i. pp. 600-61.
Z Somctimcs OIl absolutely false information, duc to the ErN~ror·.. vast
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e.....ecution, was bound to fail, when the enemy's movements were
guided by the cool and resolute brain of Wellington. More
than once Napoleon wrote in a petulant mood to complain that
it was absurd that all his Spanish armies should be detained
and kept in check by a mere 30,000 British troops I ; he refused
for along time to take the Portuguese seriously, and would only
reckon the Spanish guerrilleros as 'briga.nds' or' cana.ille.' 'Vhat
he failed to see \I'M that a small army worked by a general 011 the
spot, who had minute local knowledge and admirable foresight,
was necessarily superior to a much larger force directed by ordeN
from a distancc, and commanded by sevcral marshals who wcre
bitterly jealous of each other. :Moreover he ne\'er thoroughly
comprehended the way in which the movements of his armies
were delayed by the fact that they were moving in a country
where e\'ery peasant was their enemy, where provisions could
only be collected by armed force, and where no dispatch would
reach its destination nnless it were guarded by an escort of from
50 to ~50 men. And he refused to see that a division or an
army corps was in Spain practically no more than the garrison
of the province which it occupied-that, if it moved, that pro~
vince'immediately became hostile soil again, and would hase to
be reconquered. He was always prescribing the concentration
of 1arh"C bodies of men, by means of the e\'acuation of places or
regions of secondary importnnce 2. His marshals, knowing the
distnnce from the theutre of war leading 11;1l\ to muke llYllOtheses which
had been fal8ilied, because of the mistaken premises on whieh he grounded
lhem. For CJi:ample, 011 March 30, 1811, lie told BerUlicr that i\ll'I.'lSCna:.'l
heal} quarters were at Coimbra, and that a detachment of llis anny
occupiell Oporto, and these' news' were to be sent on to Soult (CtJrrupolI'
dallct,17,531). On tllat day .MasSeDa was already behind t1Je Coo on
his n.-treat to Ciudnd Rodrigo.
I Compare the dispatelles of March 30, where it is demonstrated that
Soult hag 1I0Uling to feur for Bal1ujtrl:, ooelluse ,\rellillgton cannot «ctuch
more than 16,000 men against it, and that of December ]2, where it is
demonstrated tllat SQult lmvillg 80,000 men SllOuld Le u.slmmoo ofJlimself
for allowing the 'affront' of Arroyo dos Molillos to be put upon him by
Hill and 6,000 Uritish.
J '11 ne fant pas se diviser: iI faut r~unir ses forces, presenter des
masses imposantes: toutes les troupes qll'on 1'1i88O e-II arriere courent 10
risque d'etre battues Cll detail, 011 foreees d'aballdOllucr Its postes,' &c.
Napoleon to SQuIt, OorreBponlklnce, December G, 1811.
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practieal in(.'OIl\'eniences of fiuch evacuations, were loth to carry
them out. To disgarrison a region meant that all communi-
cations were' cut oft~ and that the nearest P08ts were at once
blockadctl by guerrillero bands. Whene\'cr the Army ofAndalusia
(''Ollcentrated, it ceased to receive its dispatches or its convoys
from Madrid, and soon learned that Granada and Seville were
being menace<l. 'Vhenever the Army of the NOlth concentrated.
the rood between Vittoria and Burgos was cut, and the parlulall
descended from the Cantabrian mOWltains to threaten all the
posts in Old Castile. And the concentration, when made, could
only continue for a few days for lack of food, for there is hardly
a region in Spain where a very larf:,te army, 80,000 or 100,000
men, can livc on the country for a week. It was this, and lIO
mere jealousy of rival genernls, which forced Soult and Marmont
to part, as we shall see, in June 1811, and Marmont ann Dorsenllc
ill September of the llame year, and which in November 18U pre-
vented the immense body formed by the united Armies of the
South, Ccnb-c, North, and Portugnl, from pursuing \Vellingtoll to
Ciudad Rodrigo. If such a force as 80,000 men were concentratt>d,
it had to be fed; after a few days of living on the country it
would be fon:ed tu ask for convoys. But COll\'OY6 coming from
long distances were the destined prey of the guerrilleros; if not
captured they were at least delayed ad iryillil1tm. Meanwhile
the army in front would run out of provisions, and be fon.-ed to
8cstter itself ouce more in order to live. After MIllillCII!l\
venture 110 Frcnch marshal ever dared to think of plunging into
Portugal, where he knew that he would find before him R. country
systematically devastated. No one was better aware of this
limitation of the l~rellch power than Wellington. He had
written ns early as 1809 that the enemy could not turn him out
of the Peninsula with anything less than 100,000 men, and that
he could make such arraUbtements that an army of that number
could not live in the country. The prophecy was fulfilled o\'er
and O\'er again. With the enormous strength of the imperial
(L1'mies it wa.~ not impossible to colled 80,000 or 100,000 mell-
but it was impossible to feed them. All concelltratiolls must
be but temporary. When the enemy was massed, the Anglo.
Portuguese army might have to give ground, or only to accept
all action under the most favourable conditions. But the
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French would soon have to scatter, and then 'Vellington regained
his freedom of action.
It was useless, therefore, for the Emperor to reiterate his
orders that his marshals were to join their armies and 'livl'el'
entin une belle bataille' against Wellington 1. It takes two
sides to fight a battle, and Wellington was detennined nc\'er to
aceept a general action, when the nllmbers were hopelessly
against him. He would give back into Portugal, and the enemy
eould not follow him for llIore than a march or two.
Meanwhile, though he could 1I0t undedake to descend himself
into I'ortugal, Napoleon did not cease to pour troops across the
Pyrenees. It is often said that after Massena's expedition of
18]0 he began to neglect the Peninsula, and to turn all his
thoughts towards the growing tension with Uussia. This is not
correct; it ignores the fact that the Frellch armies in Spain rose
to their highest numbers during the year 1811. While not
ceasing to send their regular drafts to all the CQrps there
engaged, the Emperor dispatched three new divisions of his
best troops to the front during the summer. These were no
collections of newly-raised fourth battalions or regiments de
lIlmr:lte, but old units of high reputation, drawn partly from the
Army of Italy, partly from the garrisons of the coasts of France.
One division, under General Souham, ultimately went to join the
Army of Portugal, the second, under General Caflarelli, was ab-
sorbed in the Army of the North, the third, under General Reille,
was sent to reinforce the garrison of Navarre and Aragon, where
Suchet wanted fresh troops to occupy the land behind him, when
he was pushing forward towards Catalonia and Valencia. In
addition, two fresh regiments of Italian troops were requisi-
tioned from the Viceroy Eugene Beauharnais for service in
eastern Spain 2. The total reinforcement to the armies beyond
I Napoleon to Berthier; orders for Bessieres and !\IarmOlllof May 26,
1811.
'See C!orres]!Qlldallce, 11,184, Napoleon to Clarke, 8th June, 1811,
The divisions were composed as fo11ow8 ;-
Souham. 1st Line (4 hatts.) and 6211d Line (4 hatts.), from Turin and
Marseilles; 23rd l...eger (2 halts.), from Auxollne; 1OJ8t l.iue (4 halts.),
from Turin and Spezzia. Aboul 7,000 men.
Calfarelli. 5th LegeI' (2 hatt~.), from Cherbourg; 3rd and 10.5t1\ Line
0>1..<. ,.. Q
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the Pyrenees amounted to some 25,000 men, in addition to the
regular annual draft of conscripts. The deficit in the strength
of the French forces caused by Massenn.'s losses in Portugal
was more than made up, and the gross total in October 1811
amounted to no less than 368,000 men. Nothing WAA withdra\nl
from the Peninsula till the following winter.
(each 2 blltlg.), from Rennes; 10th lAger (4 batts.), from Hennes; 621ul
Line (2 batts.), from Touloll. About G,OOO men.
lleille. BIst Line (2 batts. at l'ampeloua, 1 from Genoa); 10th Line
and 20Ul Line (4 batts. each), already at ~aml)Clunn; 60th Line (4 batts.),
from Touloil. About 7,500 men.
Italiau'Division. 1st Line (4 batts.); 7th Line (4 batts.). About 4,000
men,
SECTION XXV: CHAPTER U
SUCHET ON nu; tmRO. TH"~ FALL OF TORTOSA
h< the last vaoo-es of the third volume of this work we brought
the history of the campaigns of Suchet and Macdonald in
Aragon and Catalonia a8 far as December l~th, 1810, the day
on which the Marshal came down to the lower Ebro at the
head of the field-divisions of the 7th Corps, in order to covel'
the long-delayed siege of'l'ortosa, which his colleague, the com-
mander of the Army of Aragon, was about to take in hand.
For five months, ever since August 1810, as it will be
remembered, Suchcl had been waiting to COlllIllCllL'C the attack
all 'l'ortoSll, which he was not strong enough to conduct with
his own resources, since the besieger would have not only to
execute his own operations, but to fend oft' at the same time all
attempts by the Spanish armies of Catalonia and Valencia to
relieve a fortress which was equally important to each of them.
For Tortosa commanded the one land route by which Catalonia
and Valencia were still able to communicalc with each other; no
other bridge 011 the Ebro was ill Spanish hands. It was highly
desirable to keep the line of defence in eastern Spain unbroken,
and Tol'losa lay at its narrowest and most dangerous point.
The Emperor Napoleon attached an immense importance to its
capture, alld considered that after its fall, and that ofTarragona,
the conquest of Valencia and the termination of the war on
this side of the Peninsula would be at hand. Ah'Mdy in
September 18ID he was looking forward to all these events as
matters of the near future '. But though Tortosa was actually
to be captured in January 1811, 'l'arragona in June, and
Valencia in December, the long-foreseen consummation was never
to come to pass. For two yCal'S morc, dowll to the very cnd of
I CQrrup<mdmlCe, no. 16,910, of 8eptem1Jer 10, uno,
q~
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the war, the indomitable Catnlnns wcre destinoo to maintain
their independence, despite of all the successes of the French
arms.
Tort.osa was not quite so indispensable in reality as It looked
Oll the map. l~or though it would have been a point of absolutely
,·ita} importance to the Spaniards, if they had been compelled
to conduct all their operations by land, it must not be forgotten
that the Dritish command of the Mediterranean gave an alterna-
tive route for communication between north and south, which
the Fl"ench could ne\"er tOllch. Long after TortoM. han fallen,
troops were repeatedly and easily transferred from Catalonia to
Valencia, and vice versa, despite of the fuet t1mt Suchct IIlU!
completely mastered all the land routes. Indeed it may be :mid
that the sea passage ftom one to the other was al ways preferable
to the route through Tortosa, for the country about both banks
of the lower Ebro was rugged, barren, and thinly peopled, ana
'fortosa itself-a decayed cit), of 10,000 inhabitants-was the
only place in this region which presented resources of any kind
for an army on the march. It is, moreover, twenty mile<;
from the sea., and not El port; strange to say, there is no decent
harbour at the mouth of the Ebl'O. Though the river is inter-
mittently navigable for a good many miles in its lower course,
its estuary has never been a point throngh which trade dip--
charges itself to the sea. The commerce of r.outhern Catalonia
goes to Tarragona, sixty miles to the north of the Ebro moulll,
that of Northern Valencia to Peniscoln, thirty miles to its
south. Tortosa, indeed, was more important to the French
than to the Spaniards, since Napoleon's armies were tied down
to land routes, nnd, if ever they were tu make a lodgement in
Valencia, would find the possession of that city and its bridge
absolutely necessary, if they were to keep in touch with the
troops left in Catalonia.
At last, ill December 1810, Maedonald had accomplished the
preliminary duties which rendered it possible for him to move
on Tortosa. He had revictuaUed Barcelona., so that it would be
safe for some months from famine, and he had repaired the gap
in the French lines in northern Catalonia, which had been caused
by Hemy O'DonneU's daring expedition to J..a. Bispal in the
preeerling September. Thoug1:J the Spanish army had not been
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crushed, nor iud(,.>ed seriously injured, it had been thrulit aside
for the moment: Mncdonnld had brought down three divisions,
o\'er 15,000 men, to Mora on the Ebro, some twenty-five miles
to the north of TortOM, and with them he was prepared to act as
a covcring force to the projected siege. He was strong enough
to render UllY attempt ut relief by the Cato.lo.ll army impossible,
for a force sufficient to beat him could 1I0t be collected by the
enemy, unless they abandoned all their outlying posts; and this
was practically impossible, for local feeling in the Principality
was too strong to allow of the withdrawal of the smaller Spanish
detachments from the various valleys and small towns which
they CO\·cred. There was still the Valeneian anny to be con-
sidered. but Suchet considered that he (,.'Ould himself deal with
that unfortunate and oft-defeated forcc; he had already pro\·ed
its weakness at the series of engagements in August I in which
he had so effectually scattered the levies of the dictator
Jo:iC Caro. Que division would probably suflice to keep the
Valencians at bay, while with two others the actual siege of
Tortosf\ could be taken ill hand. It was the Catalan army alollc
which had made Suchet anxious, and he was now to be relic\'ed
of all carc 011 that sidc by l\1acdonald.
The preparations for thc siege, it will be remembered, hud
long been in progress. ever since August magazines and material
had been accumulating ut Xcrtn. They hud beeu brought d01\'1I
the Ebro from .MequineIl7.a, whenever the water was high enough
to allow of navigation-not without mueh difficulty, aud occa-
sional petty disasters when the Catalall miqueletes made a pounce
upon an exposed 00111·oy2. Fifty-two heavy guns were now
lying ready at Xerta, with 30,000 rounds of ammunition fOI"
them, IUld 90,000 lb. morc of powder. To set in motion thc
besiegingarlllynnd this vcry large battering-train,it olllYl'C<)uircd
that the covering forces on each side of the J<:bro should take up
their po!>itiollS. 'When l\Iacdonuld hud brought uv hi!> troops
to Mora, and undertaken to movc them to Percllo, the jUllction
point of the two roads from Tortosa to Tarragona, nothing
more remained to be settled. If the Catalan army should try
to attack him it would certainly be beaten, being far too weak
I Sce 1'01. ilL p. 41l-!. 2 Sce 1'01. iii. p. ;';03.
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to face 15,000 French troops concentrated in olle body. For
the restraining of the Valcllcians, 011 the other side of the Ebro,
General Musnier with 7,000 men was placed at Uldecona, twelve
miles beyond 1'ortooo on the great road to the sonth.
These arrangements being made, Suchet crossed the Ebro at
Xerta by his pontoon bridge on December 15th with lwelve
battalions, and made a sweeping circular murch to shut ill
Torrosa 011 the northern side, while five batl:Alions more, under
General Abbe, moved by the other bank to block the bridge-
head, by which the city communicates with Valencia and the
SQuth. The operation was completed without resistance, save at
the Col de Alba, where a post of 600 Cll.tlllans, placed to cover
the road between Torlosa and the pass of Balaguer, was dis-
covered. This small force \Vas driven into Tortosa after a
skirmish; two slIlall convoys Oil their way from Tarragona b)" sea
hOO to lul'll buck, because the way into the cit), WM closed.
The siege of Tortosa was remarkable for its swift progress
and completesucce.ss-it can only be compared. with"Vellington's
Cil.pturc ofCindad Ilodrigo, just a year later, in this respect. The
Arm)' of Aragoll arrh'ed in front of the city on December 16th
-the surrender took plac'e on January 2nd, At lirst sight the
problem set before Suchet appeared by no means likely to receive
such a rapid solution, for Tortosa as a fortress had muny strong
points. The city lies on and around the end ofa Bpur of the Sierra
de Alba, which runs dowll to the bank of the Ebro. This spur at
its termination is many-headed: three ravines divide it into four
separate hills, of which the highest is that crowned by the castle.
The other three die down into llndulations,tlnd leave between them
and the Ebro a comparatively flat space, on which the lower part
of the town is built. Its higher quarters lie on the slopes where
the various hills begin to risc from the level. The old enccinte
of Tortosa had consisted of a mediaeval wall running across the
hills and down the ravines between them, SOllS to enclose nothing
but the inhabited parts of the city. But after a famous siege
during the 'Var of the Spanish Succession (1708), a number of
onter works had been constructed to crown the culminating
summit of each hill, and keep future besiegers at a distance, while
part of the inner ancient fortifications had been trallsfOnllCd into
a series of bn.stion8, 50 far as the ground allowed.
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The outer works were; (1) Starting from the river, Oil the
extreme north-east front, a large hornwork called Las Tell8,W-:l I,
crowning the hill which lies most to the left, protecting U)(~ suburb
of Remolinos, and commanding the flat ground as far as the river,
from which it is only 400 yards distant. (!l) A second homwork
covered the outer side of the castle hill: this was called El Boncle;
there was a deep ravine 011 each side of it. (3) A sort of outer
enceinte with three bastions (La Victoria, El Crista, and CruL'eS)
nms along the summit of the fourth hm, which is broader thall
the rest and expands into a plateau; the old town wall formed
a second line in !"Car of thi8 advanced front. (4) '111C last hill,
that most towards the south-cast, was crowned by n stl"Oug closed
fo~ llamed after the Duke of Orleans, the general who had
captured the city for Philip V in the year 1708. Between the
Orleans hill and the river there was nu high ground; this wus
the only open front of the city which was approachable on a level
without any natural hindrances. Here the enceinte had no
outer works; it consisted of two larf,re bastions, San l'edro and
San Juall, with a dcmi-Iullc named El Tcmplc projecting betWC(lll
them. This last was a low work of no great I'ltrength: the curtain
behind it, which joined San Pedro and San Juan, was a mere
shell with 110 terraee or room for guns. The other (south·
western) side of the city was sulliciently protected by the broad
and swift river, 300 yards in width; behind it was onl)' the
ancient wall, but, as this was wholly inllc<:essible, its weakness did
not mattel·. In thc middlc of' thc river fi'ont, which was 1,~::WO
yards long, was a gate leading to the great bridge of boats.
This was proteeted on the further bank by a little Ute·d!~pollt,
bum in the form of a ravclin and wcll tll'lllcd with artillery.
The garrison consisted, when the siege began, of 7,179 men,
including 600 artillery and a weak battalion of Urban Guards.
The regimenls were drawn partly from thc Cutulonillll and
partly from the Valencian army. there being seven battalions
from the former and four from the latter 2. The governor was
I Nal'ier's 'Tenaxll.s' and Bclmlls's ''renailles' = < the l'inchers.'
t 'nle strength of the garrison raises a conflict of authorities. 'DIe
Spanish official figures are those given aoove, which are followed by
Schepcler and Artec1le. But Suchet !:aye that he captured 9,461 prisone~,
illclUlliug tllc wounded ill the hosIlitale, ami tlmt se"enll hundred Illell
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Major.Gelleral Lilli, Conde de AlacM, all old oJIil."el' who had
won some credit, two years back, by bringing off' his small corps
intact after the battle of Tudela, when he had been cut
off by the French in the mountains', Unfortunately it is
impossible to argue that because an officer has made a skilful
retreat he i8 a good fighting.mall. LiBi, indeed, proved the
reverse on this occasion-all that can be said in his defence is
that he was old and in bad health. His conduct during the
siege was vacillating and inexplicable. he more than once
declared that be would gi\'c over charge of the defence to the
second ill command, Brigadier-General Yriarte. But he lI'ould
then appear again, Ilnd countermand all Yriarte's orders.
III the end he capitulated on his own account, against the
wishes and without the knowledge of the brigadier.
The problem in poliorcctics set before Suchet and his cngineers
at Tortosa had 80me resemblance to that which was to confront
Wellington at Badajoz a few months later. Given a town to
besiege which is partly built on heights crowned b'y forls and
partly ill the flat, is it better to attu.ck one of the forts,
which if taken commands the whole town, 01" to start against
the lower front? The latter will be easier to assail, but after
its fall the strongholds on the heights may hold out as inde-
pendent fortresses. 'Whereas if a dominating work on a high-
lying hill is taken in hand, it may make a very hard and long
resistance, but, if once it is captured, the whole city is overlooked
by it and must surrender. The answer to the problem seems to
be that all depeudJ:I on the governol' ami the garri~lI; if he and
they are weak, it will suffice to attack the easier front, for when
the lower town has fallen the morale will be so shaken that they
will surrender, without attempting to hold the upper works.
But if they are aeti vc and obstinate, it lllay be worth while to aim
more lUlIl lJtlrisbetl before tile stlrreutler. He gives 1& muster roll of the
garrisou purportiug to bear out his figures (Mimoire8, i. p. 369), which
BelmllS CQllics. Siucc' Suchct's SpKuisb toluls are often more than
doubtful (cC. vo!. Hi. p. 30-1) I accept the figures given br bis adversaries.
Tbe Deccmber figurca of the SpKuish Arm)" of ClItalonia show 13,040 mcu
in 1111 distributed in garrisons, including tllOse of Tarragona, Tortosa, Sell
tie Urgel, Cardona, and 8maller places. I think that 7,000 for Toroosa is
1,rolmble.
1 See \'01. ii. 11. U.
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at thc most commanding position, which, if cuptured, absolutely
t'Ompels the capitulation of the whole place. Yet there reml~ill>j
the danger that the crucial fort may be so strong that no effort
cnn take it from a determined d~fender. This happened to
Wellington at the two earlier sieges of Badajoz; the fall of
San Cristobo.l would have brought about most illcvitubly thc
surrender of the city. But it proved too hard a nut to crack, in
the time and with the means at the English general's disposal.
Suchet at Tortosa struck at the easiest front, taking the risk
that hc might have to conduct 0. second siege of the upper works
(1lS he had to do at 'l'arragona, his next leaguer). When he had
breached the weakest point, but before a storm had been tried,
thc imbecilc go\"crnor capitulntcd.
The weak front of'1'orto$& was the bastion of Sau Pedro and
tlle demi-luue of El Temple on its flank. l1H~y were not pro-
perly supporteJ or flanked by any works on highel' ground, for
Fort Orleans (on the IlCl\rest hill) did not comllland all the Hul:>
in front of San Pedro, and moreover Suchet intended to give this
fort so much business on its own account that its gunners would
hlnc little attcntion to spare for thc attack 011 the lower ground
to their right. There were two additionnl adnmtU:,ll"Cs; the soil
in front of San POOro was soft river mould, very easy to dig;
and moreover thiil bastion could be enfiladl.>U by batteries on the
other side of the Ebro. Such batteries hud nothing to fear, if
properly constructed, from the gUlls of the little tete-tln-pont;
while on the river front of the city there were no ClLIlllon at all
-they could not be mounted 011 the mediaeval walls.
On the 16th, 17th, und 18th Suchet was emplo>'ed in bringing
up his siege-guns, choosing the emplacements of his camps, and
constructing flyillg-bridgcs across the ri vel', bolh above alld below
the fortress. On the 19th active operations started, with the
development of a false attack on .Fort Orleans, whose attentioll
it was necessary to distract. The construction of a firt!t parallel
against this work was begun with some ostentation, and had
to be can'ied out under a fUl·jOllS fire from its artillery. 011
the night of the !!Oth-~lst the real business l.'Qlmnenced:
2,300 men crept across the flat ground by the river opposite Sau
Pedro, and threw up IIn entrenchment within 160 yards of its
ditch. They were undis<:overed and unopposed, for the night
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was dark and windy, and the Spaniards had no outposts beyond
the walls, and kept bad watch. At dawn 500 paces of trench
had been constnlCted, and a safe access to the parallel had
been contrived, by connecting one of its ends with a ravine
which cuts across the flat a little to the rear, and whose bottom
could not be searched by the gWIS of the place. The trench was
sloped tl,Wnyon the right, so as not to be enfiladed by down-
ward lire from Fort Orleans, which would have (.'Ommanded
it supposing it had been drawn exactly parallel to the front
of'San Pedro, This was a tremendously advantageous start;
seldom has a besieger been able to begin his works at Such a
short distance from his objectivc,
Next morning the new trench became visible to the Spaniards,
who turned an the artillery of the neighbouring front upon it,
but to little effect, for the soil was soft and the French had dug
dcep. A sortie was made from the dcmi-lunc of El Templc, but
was driven off with loss. The only successful effort of the
Spaniards on this day was that the guns of Fort Orleans
succeeded in destroying part of the trenches of the false attack
in front of them, and dro\'e out thc workers. This was of
little consequence, as Suchet was not reany aiming at the fort.
On the 22nd and 23rd December the main attack was urged
with a celerity that seemed appalling to the defenders; despite
of a heavy fIre of musketry as well as of arlillery, approaches
were pushed forward from the first parallel, to within 80 yards
of the bastion of San Pedro and 110 yards of the Temple
demi-lune. The works opposite Fort Orleans were repaired
and extended. On the !!4th the two approaches in the plttill
were connected b)' a long trench, which fonned the second
parallel, only 60 yards from the walls. On the :l5th new zig-
l'.a.gs, thrown out from this line, reached the glacis of San POOm.
The garrison made two sorties in the night to hinder this
advance at all ha.zards, but failed, being driven of!' by the
musketry from the second parallel without much difficulty:
the force employed, 300 men, was too small. Meanwhile the
artillery and sappers were constructing ten batteries, four-and
these the largest-in the main frontal attack, but four others 011
the heights over against Fort Orleans, and two beyond the river,
whose special purpose was to enfilade the front of Sail 1'OOro,
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and also to play upon the bridge of boats which joined the
city to the Ute-dlt-pont. The trenches 011 the heights before
Fort Orleam; were al$o strengthened, and a second parallel
constrnct.cd ill front of' the Jirst, at some loss of' life; but
it .was necessary to keep the enemy 011 this front employed, 01'
he would have interfered too much with the real attack in the
plain.
All this had been accomplished before the French had fired
It single gun; there is hardly another instance to be quoted of
a siege ill which thc assailants got up to the glacis, and crowned
the t:overcd way, without any assistance from their artillery. It
seems that the gunnery of the defence must have been excep-
tiollll.lly bad, and the sorties hitherto had been small and feeble
-quite insullieient to interfere with, much less to destroy, the
approaches. Noting batteries sketched ont 011 several points
aud approaching completion, Y riarte sa IV that he must at all
costs try to delay the opening of the adversary's fire, and on the
night of the 27th-28th made two snllies in considerable force-
600 men came out of the Ra..'ltm gate, beyond Fort Orleans, to
attack the upper trenches, as mallY more issued from San Pedro
against the main attack. The first-named sortie was all entire
failure-most of the men lay down and began to skirmish with
the trench-guard before they had got near the works; a very
few rea.ched them, and were killed on the parapet. But th~
attack in the plain was a serious onc, and pressed home. The
lodgement in the covered way WM captured and destroyed, and
the Spaniards penetrated to the second parallel, and captured
part of it for a time. They were finally drivcn out by a reserve
of fonr battalions commanded by General Abbe, but not before
they hOO done considerable damage. The besiegers had to spend
the followiug day and night (928-:?l9 December) in repairing the
trenches and parapets, and getting Il. fresh lodgement in the
covered way. On the morning of the latter day the ten siege-
batteries opened simultaneously with 45 guus, and very 800n
gained a marked superiority over the fire of the defence. The
cannon of Fort Orleans and the bastion of San Juan were
silenced, as were also those of the Temple demi-Iune and
San Pedm. The bridge of boats was nearly destroyed. Next
night, the Spanish fire being crushl.-rl, the third parallel WllS
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constructed 011 the very brink at' th~ diteh of Sail Pedro, and
within 25 )'arcls of the wall of the bastion. The mortar batteries
were employed in distributing a rain of projectiles in the streets
behind the attacked front, to prevent the besieged from con-
stmcting defences and barricades on which they might fall back
when the wall was breached. Though not altogether successful
-for the Spaniards succeeded in building some traverses and in
blocking and loopholing mallY houses-the hOIllburdment caused
many casualties, and cowed the population, who evacuated this
quarter and sought refuge in the interior of the town. The
interior of Fort Orleans was also shelled with some effect: its
garrison retired to their bomb-proofsJ and kept very quiet,
making little attempt to repair the injuries to its outer wall, or
to replace the injured caullon.
On the night of the 50th the French succeeded in getting
down from the third parallel into the ditch of San Pedro, with
the object of milliug the scarp and blowing dowlI sufticieuL
debris to fill the ditch. Their first party was driven out again
by the fire of two gUllS which had been brought up to enfilade
the ditch from the extreme flank of the bastiqll. But on the
following morning all the siee,re-battcries were turned 011 to tbe;c
gUllS, and destroyed thcm. Meanwhile the Spaniards had
abandoned the We-du.-pollt, taking the men away by boat, and
throwing the guns into the water, except thrcc injured and
~piked pieces. The ditch was occupied during the dlly
(December 31st) and thc miners got to work, so little incom-
moded by the fire of the defenders, who were hardly visible on
the wall, that they lost ollly two men killed while establishing
themselves in their dangerous position. Their most serious
hindrance came from the good quality of the masonry which
they were attacking-it was mediaeval work and as hard as iroll.
The decisive stroke at this point, however, was to be giVeJl by
the artillery, and on the night of the 31st a battery for four
~4-poullders was cOlllmenced in the third parallel-only 2li Yllrds
away from the ramparts of San Pedro. It had not yet opened
when, at ten o'clock on the morning of January 1st, 1811, the
govenlOl' hoisted the white flag, and sent a Colonel Veyan into
Suchet's camp, to treat for surrender. The proposals, however,
were quitc inadmissiblc, t\S AIachll outy eovcllantcd to cvacuate
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Tort.osR if it were not. relieved in fift.een days, and demll.T1ded
that the garrison should not be prisoners of war, but should be
ll110wed to march to Tarragona with arms and baggage. Suchet
refused to treat (as was natural) but was delighted with the
aspect of affairs-a garrison which begins to parley before there
is a practicable breach in its walls is obviously demoralized, and
needs only a little further persuasion by the strong arm. He
sent back with the Spanish parlemmtain: his own chief of the
staff, Colonel Saint Cyr·Nugues, with orders to impress on the
governor the futility of further demands sHch as those he had
just madc. He nnllounccd that he should storm the place nc.-.::t
morning unless one of the upper forts were placed in his hl\llds
as a pledge of complete submission. The governor therefore
called and (..onsulted a (,.'Ouncil of war: some of the officers and
llotnbles assembled voted thtlt Itll attempt must be made to
defend the breach, others that the garrison should retire into
the castle and forts, and abandon the town as untenable. But
there were some despairing yokes rttised: the rcpresentativcs of
the municipality spoke with terror of the bombardment of the
last few days; some of the officers complained that their troops
were completely demoralized, and were leaving their posts to
hide in the to~·n. Suchet's proposals, nevertheless, were j·ejected.
Only a little more persuasion, however, was required to
bl-eak down Alacha's nerve. On the morning of the ~nd of
.JlInuary the 4-gUll bl\tlery opposite San Pedro opened with the
best effect; by the afternoon there was a breach 15 yards
broad, and the miners reported that they had got deep enough
into the lower walls to make an explosion profitable. The
curtain at the back of the 'l'emple demi·lulle had also been much
battered, and was crumbling-but all assault here was not
practicable, as the intervening work was still in the hands of
the Spaniards. For a second time the governor hoisted the
white flag, but Suchet ol,JereJ the fire tu continue ut the breach,
and began to collect his storming columns in the shelter of the
parallels, while his mortar batteries played on the town at large.
He was afraid that the enemy was scheming for a suspension of
arms, during which they would clandestinely repair and retrench
tile broken wall. The answer that he sent back, when a second
pnrlemrntavre cnme out to him, wns that he must have· a simple
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A.nd complete capitulation, and that one of t.he upper forh ml1st
be placed in his hands before he would allow the bombardment
\
to cease.
Alacha contiuued to kecp the white flag fiying on the citadel
and to exchange messages with Suchet, while the fire was still
going on at the breach of San Pedro, where Yriarte was doing
his best to keep his men together, though he had his doubt:> as
to the result of the threatened assault. Meanwhile the French
!,'Elllcrnl took an extraordinary resolution: gathering from the
confused and wll.'l:ering replies of the govenlor that the old man
was at his wit's end, and ready to yield to pressure, he came
to the castle gate himself, with his staff and a company of
grenadiers, and sent for the ofl1ccr on guard-who did 1I0t order
his men to fire because the white flag was flying, and messengers
continufLlIy passing to and fro. Suchet told the astonished
subaltern that hostilities were at an end, and that he must see
the governor without delay. 'When Alacha. came down to him,
he assumed a peremptory tone, said that further resistance wus
criminal, that the 8.S5llult was about to take place at once, and
that the garrison would be put to the sword if resista.ucc COil·
tinued. He bude the governor ratify on the spot the terms of
capitulation which had been sent ill upon the pre\,jous after·
noon. Utterly cowed, the old man obeyed at oncc, mlled for
a pen, llnd signed the document upon the carriftoo-e of a gun.
The company of grenadiers which had accompanied Suchet
occupied the castle, and orders were sent down to the city to
l.'e8.SC all resistancc. '111C first notk'C that Yriarte got of what
had Illtppenec:l was by hearing French drums beating ill the
streets behind him, as a column descended from the citadel to
force the defenders of the breach to lay down their arms 1.
"'hen they had withdrawn, the storming column rail into the
gap, and sacked the quarter adjoining, despite of the cries and
I This narrative of the filII of TOrtoSll is m!&inly dcrh'cd from tile sou~s
given by Arteche, especiallr Yriarte's narrative, and from Schepeler and
Vncllni. These in some details diffcr from Suuhct's story repeated by
Belmns, though there is no fundamental discrepancy. But it is clear tl\at
Alacha wag evcn more to blame than the Frencll versions would give us to
understand,
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remonstrances of their officers. They would not be chented out
of what they considered their lawful prey I,
III this disgraceful way fell Tortosa, after only eighteen ds)"g
of siege, twelve of open tl-enches, and four of bombardment.
The French lost no more than 400 men, nearly half of them
among the AAppers and artillerymen ll, for the infantry only
suffered ill repelling the sorties. The Spaniards had about
1,4.00 killed and wounded, but as the garrison marched out only
8,974 strong and had started with 7,179, it is clear that there
had been other wastage. During the last days of the siege the
Urban Guard disappeared, and the commanders of the regular
troops were complaining bitterly of desertion among their men.
Indeed, from the governor downwards, there seems to have been
too much demoralization ill all ranks. The second in command,
Yriarte, and many other officers did their duty, but the defence
was not what might have been expected from Catalans, with
the example of Gerona. before their eyes. From the start
Suchet had the mastery, and lm'gely owing to the mismanage-
ment of his adversaries; if (for example) they had kept proper
watch, he would never ha\·e been able to start his first parallel
at the distance of only 160 yards from the walls-this piece of
Illek saved him many days of work. Uut if the defence wns
unskilful, and anything rather than resolute, the main re;ponsi-
bilit)' falls on the governor, whose conduct was calculatetl to
discourage even the most zealous subordinates. l~or he some-
times pleaded his age and infirmit)·, and declared that he handed
over all responsibility to the second in command, shutting him-
self up in the castle for whole days at a time; but on other
occasions he interfered in details, countermanded orders, and
practically resumed charbte of the defence. But to Cl.lllll coullcil
of war, to rccci ve its opinion in favour of protracted defence, and
then to capitulate behind it.'! back was worst of all. Sueh con-
I Vacani, iv. 420-1.
I The figures of 400 killed and wounded /{iren by Belmas seem very
low, IlUt are borne out by the invaluable lists in Martinlell, who Sl101l"8
that only some thirty officeril were killed or wounded at Tortosa, of whom
tweh'e belonged to the engineers, artillery, and sappers. '1birtyofficers
llit im!.ly (at tlle usual rate of one to t\Venty men) (l(I() c"I.~U:lltiC$, hilt it.
is very possible that there were no more than 400 and odd, for the engineer
officers, of whom si.~ were killetl or l'l1ft, rlln Speci:all·isks.
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duct was absolutely ignominious, and it WflS not without reason
that the Catalan Junta ordered him to be hied (in his absence)
for cowardiee and treason. He was condemned to death, and
the sentence (grotesquely enough) carricd out upon his cffigy,
while he was safe in France, a prisoner on parole.
That nothing ,-ms done from outside to save Tortosa was
mainly due to the rapidity of Suchet's operations. The Junta
of Catalonia was busily engaged in concerting measures for con·
centrating a relieving army, had sent to Cadiz for arms and
(if possible) reinforcements, and had opened negotiations with
the Valencians and with the irregular forces of Carbajal And
Villa Campa in the Aragonese mountains. But who could calcu<
late thnt the defence would last only eighteen days? Before
any general scheme had been worked out the place had fallen I,
The only organi1.ed force in the neighbourhood was the section
of the Catalan army which lay in and about Tarragona. The
responsibility here lay 110 longer with the active Henry
O'Donnell, who had thrown up the command in December, Rnd
AA.i1ed to the Balearic Islands to give his gangrened wounds time
to heal. General Yranzo, as the senior officer in the principality,
ought to have taken over the charge of operations; but he
called a council of war at Tarragona, and declared himself
unwilling to assume the position that had fallen to him. He
was unpopular, and the ClI.talans were holding violent meetings
in favour of the Marquis of Campoverde, who enjoyed much
local popularity at the moment. This ambitious officer finally
obtained the interim command, oVling to the abnegation of his
seniors; but Tortosa had fallen before he was seated in the
saddle, for he was finally recognized as chief only upon
January 6th, four days al\er the capitulation.
But even a capable officer, enjoying undisputed control o\'er
all the Catalan forces, could have done little during the few days
that the siege of Tortosa lasted. The covering army under
Macdonald was too strong to be meddled with by the two
divisions based 011 Tnrragona. On the first day of the sicge (as
we have already seen) he marched. from Mora with his ]5,000
men: on the ]8th he came up to Perello, where meet the two
1 For all this see Wimpff'en'a report8 printed ill tlle AP[Jelldb, 10
Suehet's Mim(}irel, i. 359.
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road8 from Tortosa to the north, thus allsolute1y barring any
attempt to approach the place. After some days he found it
impossible to feed his troops ill this rugged spot, and divided
them, placing one division of 6,000 men nnder Frcre on the..
'l'arragona-Amposta road, in the direct rear of the besieging
army, while with the other two he retired to Ginestar 011 the
Ebro, twenty miles due north of Tortosu, fWill whence he could
l'einf'orce Suchet in a single march if the Spaniards made any
movement. But no one came agaillst him: the existence of his
army ill this quarter sufficed to paralyse the modest force then
lying in the neighbourhood of 'l'arragonu. Cumpovcrde took
one division to the Fort of Balaguer, coverhlg the coast road,
from which he observed Frere at a distance; while Yranzo with
the other occupied Macdonald's old headquarters at Momblanch,
But they knew that they were too weak to risk an advanee
from these points, and while they remained quiet Tortosa. fell,
The only diversions carried out during the sit!o"'e were in corners
of Catalonia, where even a considerable su<.'cess would have hud
no effect on the course of affairs on the lower Ebro, A French
foraging party of 650 cavalry was cut up at Tarrega., near
Lcrida, on Janutlry 1, by a detachment from Momblanch, On
December 25, a landing party from the British frigates on the
Catalan station surprised the post of Palam05, and destroyed
there two gunboats and eight transports which were coa.'lting
down from Cdto towards Barcelona. But remaining on shore
too long they \\-ere surprised by a .French flying column, and
driven baek to their boats with a loss of O\'er flOO men, in-
cluding Captain }'anc of the Cambriall, the officer in eomllll\ud.
On the news of the fall of Tortosa the Spanish divisions drew
back towards Tarragona. Suchet left General Habe!'t in
charge of the captured city, dispersed Musnicr's troops to
Morella, Alcai'iiz and Mequinen7.a., and left the Neapolitan
brigade lent him by l\facdonald at Mora. Harispe's division
escorted the Spanish prisoners to Saragossa, and was accom-
panied by Suchet himself, who had much to settle in Amgoll
before he took in hand the siege of Tarragona, the next task
imposed upon him by the Emperor, who had informed him that
'he would find his Marshal's biiton within its walls'. Before
leaving the neighbourhood of Tortosa Suchet ordered four
0101£>1. I"
"
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battalions of Habert's division to execute a COIp de 11Iail~ UpOll
the little fort of San Felipe de Dalagner, on the coast defile of
the Col de Balaguer so often mentioned of late. It was com-
pletely successful-after a short bombardment, part of the
garrison escaped along the Tarr/lb"Ona road; the governor with
ninety Illen surrendered [January 8, 1811J. The fort was a trifling
work, but its strategic position was eminently important, as it
blocks the only road along the sea from '1'armgona to the regions
of the Ebro mouth.
Mu(:donald, being 110 longer needed in the din_'t:tion of
Tow&\, resolved to retum to Lcridn, at thc same time that
Suehet went oft' to Saragossa. The)' were to meet again in the
spring for the great enterprise against Tarragona. For reasons
not easy to fathom, the Marshal made his Illarch to his base 110t
by the direct TOad, but past Tarragolla \'ia Reus and Valls.
Pwbablj' be wns desirous of' clearing the countr)'-sidc of the out-
lying Spanish troops a8 a preliminary to the siege, and perhaps
he had some idea of destroying any magazines that might lie ill
this direction. That he could have no serious intention of
blockading Tarragolla was shown by the fact that he had sellt
back all his cavalry, save one regiment, and mOlot of hi!:! guns, to
Lerida. Since he had also lcnt his Neapolit.an brigade to
Suclle~ his column was not much over 12,000 strong.
Macdonald was usually unlucky in his Catalonian campaign.
ing; though he had won great reputation in mountain warfare
IIb'Uillst the Austrians ill his early days, he does not seem to hare
been able lo appl)' his knowledge of' it t.o Spain. Marching
from Ginestar by I,'a15et, he reached and occupied the large town
of Reus, only ten miles from Tarmgona,on January 12th. From
thence he set his army in motion for Vall5 011 the 15th, march·
iug acruss the front of the fortress, with which he cleurly hud lIU
intention of interfering. His ,'ullguard was formed by the
Italian division, which was followed at a distanCE of three miles
by his three French brigades and his single regiment of cavalry.
Meanwhile Campoverde, now in command at Tarragon8, had
deroched General Sarsfield with a di\·isioll of 3,000 foot and
SOO horse--all that the Army of Catalonia possessci1-to obscrl'e
the march of the French, while he himself remained just outside
Tarragona with the remainder of his troops-some 8,000 men.
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Sal'sfield had taken post at PI(\, some five miles llorth of Valls,
which town be had e\·acuated Oil the approach of the enemy.
When :Macdonald's leading brigade reached Valls, infonnation
IVa:; received that thcre was a Spanish forcc close in its front.
Without waiting for orders from the Marshal, who ha.d merely
directed that Valls should be occupied, the commander of the
vanguard, General Eugenio 1, resolved to bring the enemy to
action. Marching with five HalitUl battalions and ouly thirty
chasseurs-about j2,500 men in all-he ran headlong into
Sarsfield's forces drawn up in a well~llIllSked position, the
infantry oc.'Cupying u ridge, the 800 cavulry hidden in a wood
to the left. Unable to estimate the enemy's strength, and
thinking that a brisk attack might di-i\·e them oft' the ground,
Eugcllio-a mUll of recklcss l.:oumge-made a direct frontal
charge against the enemy's position ill column of' battalions.
He was completely beaten, his brigade fell back still fighting,
and he WItS himself mortally wounded. The recoiling mass Wll8
I>il.\·ed fi·om annihilation by tilC arrival on thc field of the othcr
Italian brigade, that of l'alombini, on which it rallied. But
Sarsfield's troops were determined to finish appropriately thc
day that they had bcglUl so well. Thcy fell 011 the newly
formed line and broke it, the cavahoy turning Pnlombini's right
and sweeping it away. The whole Italian division would have
been unnihilatetl. but for the arriv",l of two Stluadrons of the
24th Dragoons under Colonel Delort, who charged the victorious
cavalry. a.nd, though hopelessly outnumbered, g/\\"e the Spaniards
so much trouble that the routed infantry of Eu&renio and
Pulombini cscltpl.,<l into Vl\lls, without much further loss.
~[ncdollald had refioained from briuging up the French brigades
lo help his vltuguarcl, because he had discovered a colullllI undel'
Cmllpovcrdc coming out of Tarrngou/\ to threaten his !'C(\!,.
This demonstration kept him occupied while the Italians were
bcing cut up by Sursfield, whose operations wcre extremely well
lllanaged and resolute. The Italian division and the dragoons
lost 600 men iucluding n few prisollers 2-the Spaniards only 160.
, His IIIl!Ue was really Orsatelli, hut he always a!lpear;; ill the reports
018 Kugenioo
1 VlIcaui $lIys ouly 200 (vo 20). including ;3 officer;; killed auu 13
wOUlldetl, but Martiuicu·s lists show a officer;; killed and 24 wounded;
d
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Ne.... t day (January 16th) Macdonald was in order of baWl!
at Vans, with two fronts, one facing towards Sarsfield and the
lIorth, the other towards CumpO\'erdc and Tarragona. But
the Spaniards wisely refused to commit themselves to a general
cngagement, and Macdonald would llot divide his anny by
marching to assail one or the other of the two hostile columns.
III the night he retreated to Momblanch by a forced march,
lcaving the enemy encouraged by the reslllts of the l'Omoot of
the 15th, and no less by the fact that the Marshal had lIot tried
to a\'enge his check by an attack on the following day. The
l?rench retired to Lerida unmolested, and the Duke of'I'arentum
beguu to make preparatioll!! for his approaching return tu 'farm-
gOlla in company with Suchct's corps, us had been ordercd by
the Emperor. It is difficult to see that 11ncdonald gained 8n)'-
thing by his curialiS flank mal'(;h, and he certainly lost heavily
ill Prestihre. Campovenle, exultant at the good fortune of his
first venture in arms, recovered from thc dcspondcncy cu.uliCt!
by the fall of Tortosu, and dreamed of making a grent hlo\l'
against the French by no less an achievement than the recapture
of Barcelona.
Ever since the commencement of the war plob and conspira-
cies had been rife in that great city-it will be remembered that
Dllhesme had been forced to punish the most important of them
by 11 series of executions 1. Discontent was as keen as e\'er, amI
Il knot of patriots had formed a scheme fOl' opening to their
Ji'iellds without the gates of the fortress of Monjuich, which
dominates the whole place. This was to be done by the assis-
umce of a repentant' JUTl\mentado,' a Spanish cOlllmissary ill
the French sen'ice lIamed AJcina., who had access to the strong-
hold, and imagined that he had corrupted the fort-major, !I
certain Captain Sunicr, who for a great sum of money uudertook
to leave one of its posterns open on the night of March 19th.
Campoverde, who loved plot~ and intrigues, arranged to have
his men ready outside the ditch on the appointed night. Unfor-
tunately the officer who was supposed to be a traitor was only
it is illlp~i1Jle tllat 27 officers slJould he hit alld only 239 men-the pro-
portion of 1 to 9 is incredIble, and the loss must have been more like 000.
Scllcpeler and tl,C Sp.1uiartls put it at J ,200} whic11 is ttro Iligh.
, See vol. iiL p. 24. '
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feigning discontent and treason, and kept informing Maurice
Mathieu, the governor of Barcelona, of all the details of the
plot. It was allowed to proceed, in ordel' that a sharp blow
might be infiictcd all the Spaniards. Before the appointed
night Campoveroe suddenly marcherl the divisiollfl of Surs6eld
and Courten to the immediate vicinity of Barcelona, and sent
fOfwu.rd from them a body of 800 grenadiers, who were to execute
the actual coup de main. They were allowed to descend into
the ditch of Monjuich, and to approach the postern, when the
whole of the ramparts were lighted up with cressets and fire-
balls, and a furious .fire was opened upon them. The head of
the column was blown to pieces, a hundred men were killed and
wowlded at the first volley, and four officers and many of the
rank and file taken prisoners, before the remainder ('ould scramble
oft· in the darkness. The supports hUlTiedly retired, and the
business was over-save that l\faurice Mathieu caused the corn·
missary Aleina to be shot in public next morning as a warning
to traitors. Sueh plots seldom succeed, hut that they must not
be too much disl"egllrded 8..'1 it source of danger was shown only
a few weeks later, when Figueras, the second fortress ofCatalollia,
wa,'I slleccssfully surprised by the Spnniaros, as the result of a
conspiracy exactly similar to that which failed at Barcelona 1.
The unfortunate affair at ilConjuich was not the only sign of
the revived activity of the Cutalalls under the leadership of
Cnmpoverde, a. busy and active man, but (as subsequent events
showed) one lacking both resolution and true strategic instinct.
He was one of those who take lIlany sehelllCl:! in hand, but fail
for want of determination at the critical moment, and was a vel'Y
poor substitute for that hard fighter Henry O'Donnell, whose
place he had been so eager to seize. Oil :\fnrch 3rd he made u
vain attack to recover the fort of San Felipe de Balaguer-
marching with Courten's division of 4,000 men he beat the
French 117th ont of Perello, where it was covering 'l'ortosa. and
laid siege to the fort. But General Habert came up with a
for(,'C from the garrison to reinforce the 117th, and the attack
had to be given up almost as soon as it was begun. 1\forc
fruitful were some attacks of the somatenes of northern Cata·
lonia on convoys passing between Gerolltl. and Hostalrich. And
1 See below, sect. xxviii. c1lap. i.
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Sarsfield, pushing forward to Cervera, usefully restrained tIle
foraging of Maooonald's cavtlll'Y in the region cast of Lerida.
But all this came to little, and Campovcl'de's efl'orts seemed to
ha....e no ycry visible results, and certainly did nothing decisive to
prevent 81lchet and Macdonald from completing their prepara-
tions for'the siege of 1'arl'agonn.
It was much the same in Aragon, where Villllcampa and
Carbajal wcre contending ill the mountains 'of the south witl,
the garrisons which held Darocn, Alcaiiiz, Tcruc1, and the other
chief lowns of thi.~ nlggeil and thinly peopled district. The fall
of Tortosn had set free for the moment mally troops of the
Srd Corps, and Suchet employed them in scouring the country
between these posts, and endeavouring to clear awny the parlitllls
from their chief rallying-places, I~yillg columns under Gcnerals
l'ans and Abbe marched up and down the sielTas in the "ile
weather of February, expelled the insurrectionary Junta or
Al'agon from Cuenca, which was at that time its head quarters,
mld chased Cllrbajal to :9fo>'n, where the frontiers of Castile,
Aragon, and Va.lencifl. meet. The Empecinndo Cltme m'er the
mOlmtain;;, from his usual beat in the Glladala.xarn. country, to
help the Aragonese, but had small success, Yet the net remit or
all this hunting was little. 'This cxpedition,' says Suchet him-
self, ' which took two brigades over the border into Castile for
twelve days, procured us a few hundred prisoners; a more useful
thing was the destruction of some small manufactures of anns,
Bnt we were to sce ten timcs, nay a hundred times more, U1CSC
partisans appeAring once again in the plains; they always sur·
rounded us, were always dispel1le(1 rather than defeated, and
ne\'er grew discrmraged ','
1 SnchetJ ,IMmoi11'.i'J i. 260.
SECTION XXVI
FUENTES DE ONORO AND ALBUERA
CHAPTER I
U&IlESFORD'S CAi\U'AlGN IN .J<.:STHEMADunA. THI'; FInST
SIEGE OF BADAJOZ. i\IARGH-APRIJ, 1811
ON the nth of March, as it will be rememberetJ,Imaz-the
deplorable successor of the gallant Menacho-surrendered
BI\daju7. la :Marshal Soult, despite of the message;; which he had
receiw~d that nn Al1g1o-1'0liugllf!re corps WIU! on itll way for his
relief. On the 14th the conqueror, appalled at the news of the
battle of !kLrrosa and the danger of Seville, marched back to
Andalusia, tAking with him ll. brigade of dl'agoons and the
greater part of Gazan's infantry division. He left behind him in
Estrcmlldura Morticr with a force of some 11,000 men, composed
of fifteen battalioll,'; of the 5th Corps I, five cavalry regiments 2,
:md a heavy proportion of artillerymen and engineers, who were
required for the garrisoning of the fortress of Bndajoz no less
than for the siege of the small places in its vieinit,Y, whose Cflp~
ture Soult had delegated to Mortier as his parting legacy.
This was a small force to leuve behind, charged not only with
the occupation of an extenflive province, but with the duty of
continuing the offensive, by attacking Campo Mayor and Albu-
querque. Eh·as the Marshal can hardly have hoped to assail-
it was a fortress as largealld in some ways stronger than Badajoz.,
with a garrison composed of Portuguese troops of the line
All)' idea of nn inl'asion of the .Alemtcjo W(lS useless, now that
it was known that Mnsflena had departed fl"om his old position
on the Tagus. The Emperor had ordered Soult to undel-tuke it
I 1110 oleven batt.alion.~ of Girurd'a division, and frolll GaZllIl'a tho lOOth
of the Line, alld a battalion of tlie 218t Uger put in garrisou at Badajln.
~ 26th Dragoons, 211(1 aud 10th Hus9al'8, 21st Chllsscu!"S a chevaJ,
4tli ('''hasseuN Espag-nols. Only the lOt11 Hus-~rs and the 21st Cbasseurs
helongoo w the 5th Cor~.
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merely for Mnssena's assistance, amI the 'Army of Portugal'·
was no longer needing such help: for good or for ill it hud
moved away on its own business. It remained to be seen whether
Mortier would be able to carry out the orders given him, for /l0
one in the French camp could tell whether the British reliev-
ing force for Badajo7., whose existence had been known since
March 8th, had actuully started for Estremadura, or had joined
in the pursuit of Mllssena, when it received the news that lmnz
had made his disgraceful capitulation. If this force wel'e on
itA way, and proved to be strong in numbers, Mortier would be
thrown at once on the defensive, His duty would be to hold oft'
the Allic>s till Badajoz was in a state of defence: and the repair-
ing of the fortre"'s would take some time, even though the greater
part of its fortifica.tions were intact, and only the Pardaleras Fort
and the ruined bastions behind it required reconstmction, If
the Allies cmne on in great force, and without delaying: for a
moment, it was el'en possible that Mortier wonlc! have to hlow
up Badajoz and withdraw its garrison, for it would be absurd to
leave behind, in an untenable post, such a large body of men as
would be l'equil'oo fOI' the holding of its extensive enceinte.
The actual course of affairs in Estremadura followed logically
from 'Vellington's orders to Beresford ou the 9th and the 15th of
i1arch. On the 8th, us it will be remembered, lleresford had been
directed to mm·ch to the relief of lladajoz with the 2nd and 4th
Divisions and Hamilton's POliugllese, some 18,000 IOCR. On
the 9th these orders had been countermanded, on a false report
that Masseua had concentrated and was offering battle behind
Thomar. The 4th Division and oue brigadc (Hoghtoll's) of the
2nd werc called off~ and marched to join Wellington's main
hody. The re..,t of the 2nd Division and Hamilton's Portuguese
stood halted, in or near Abrantes, till the intentions of the
French should be discovered, It wus not till :March 19lth that
"Vellingtoll, reassured as to his adversaries' intentions, thonght
it possible once more to take the relief of Badajoz ill hand I,
t ~othill~ <:ouM be doue iu Estremadura without the 2nd Division, an,1
D'Urban's diary shows that the orders for the 2nd Division to march into
the Alemtejo were only given 011 the 12th. Here3ford's c1lief of the staff
nole3 on that day, ' Orders to General Stewart [c£lmmanding 2nd Divisiou]
10 fix his Ilead quarter;; at Tramagal, to mOl·e the 13th to Crnto or Cana-
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'l'he troops about Ahrante... were ordered to prepare to march
for the Guadiana in successive brigades; the absent brigade of
the 2nd Division, which bad reached Thomar, was dirccb..>d la
retrace its steps and join the main body of that unit, Dut the
4th Division had gone on much further; it was well on its way
tOll'iU'ds Coimbra, and was engaged in the Pombal-Hedinha
operations. It was not till the 15th that Wellington thought him-
selfable to dispatch it, along with De Grey's brignde of dragoons.
to cross the T~<rtls in the wake of the 2nd Division. Beresford
himsclr, who had joined the main arlll), for a few d!\ys b)'
Wellington's own orders, was not given his final instructions
and sent off to the south till the following morning.
But before the moment at which Beresford started, the whole
face of affairs had bccn Chffilged by the news, re<:eived on the
14th, that Badajoz had surrendered on the 11th, Wellington
was not prepared for this blow. 'I had received on the 9th,'
he wrote to Lord Liverpool, 'accounts of a most favourable
na.ture, from which I was induced to believe not only that the
place was in no danger, but that it was in fact untouched: tllat
its fire was superior to Ulat of the enemy, that it was in no
want of provisions and ammunition, had sustained no loss,
excepting that of the governor Mena.cho, and was able and
likely to hold out for a month. General Imaz, a person of
equally good reputution, had succeeded to the command, llud
great confidence was reposed in him, ... 1 had called LIp to
the al'my the 4th Division of infantry and the brigade of
heavy cavalry, under the cOllviction that Badajoz would hold
out for the time during which it would be llccessal'y to employ
them. Experience has shown that I could not have done
without these troops, and it is also clear tho.1, if I had left
them behind, they could not have saved Badajoz, which the
governor surrendered on the day after he received my assurances
gueira [botll in tlte Alemlejo south from AbrollteS), (lIld to let tlm I-roolls
remain as at present-unless it should become necessary to concentrate
for the protection of the Bridge ofl'nncos.' TI)L~ shows tllat ,~rellingtoll'$
statement to Lord Liverpool 011 March 14th (DiS/Xllcllu, vii. 360) t11:\t
• troops had marelum from TIlOmar on tlle 9th, and that part of Sir William
Bcresford's division, whicll had not passed the Togus, was put in motion,
and that their head 11ad arrived within three marehes of Eh'as,' can apply
lit moot to Hamiltou's Portuguese. '
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that he should be relieved, and my entreaties that he would
hold out to the IllSt moment I ..
As far as the argument from time goes, it is clear that
Wellington is stating indisputable facts. Supposing that he
had 1Iot countermanded on the 9th of March the orders to
Beresford which he had given on the previolls night, and that
the three divisions designated for service in Estremadura had
marched with unrelaxing vigour, the head of their column
could not have been further forward than Arronches (if they
took the Portalcgrc rood) or Estremos (if they took the Ehas
rond) at the moment when Imaz surrendered. As the former
of the.<>e points is about twenty-five and the latter about thirty
miles from Badajoz, the capitulation would not have been
prevented. For the govel'llOI' was determined to surrender, and
did so in full knowledge of the fnet, transmitted by semaphore
from Elva.'l2, that 11 relieving expedition was in hand. Whether
the nearest allied troops were (a.'l was actually the case) at
Abralltes or (as might have been the case) at Estremos, would
not have afleded him. For, a.'l tbc proccOOings recorded at his
council of wur show, he concealed from his officers the news
that succour was promised. and allowed one of them to put
down in the proc?s 'tJCl'balof the proceedings the statement that
'there was no official news whatever that any army of succour
was in movement.' Such official news Imaz possessed, through
the semaphore messages sent on by General I..eite at Elvas, so
that it is evident that he kept them from the knowledge of
his subordinates.
If Badajoz had held out for a fortnight after March 9th,-
and 'Vellillgton supposed that it was well able to defend itself
for 1\ whole month-the relieving column would have been in
good time. The dispatch of March Uth set in motion two
divisiolliJ from near Abrantes, that of the 15th sent on the
third from the banks of the Ccira. Steady marches of twenty
miles a day. or a little les.", would have bronght Stewnrl ancl
Hamilton to the neighbourhood of Badajoz on the 17th, and
Cole with the 4th Division and the dragoon brigade on the
I Wellington to Lord Lh'erpool, March 14, J)iifHJtl:hu, vii. 360-1.
, See p. 60 above.
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24th 1. If, as is probable, Beresford had waited for the arrival
of the last-nanu~d force before presenting himself in front of
the French lines, the 24th of March would have been the
critical day. It is hard to believe that Soult could have fought
to advantage, since he must have left so many men to blockade
Badajo7. that he could not hn"c faced Dcresford with more than
12,000 sabres and bayonets, numhers inadequate to hold oft'the
18,000 Anglo-Portuguese who formed the allieu Army of Estre-
madura. It is quite probable that he might have rnised the
siege, and altered battle with his whole army, somewhere south
of Badajoz. But into these possibilities it is proflt.less to
InqUIre.
Since, however, 'Vellington and Beresford knew on the night
of the 14th that rUlI\z had surrendered, there was no longer the
same need for hnstc that existed down to this moment, and the
ru:lmnce of the Anglo-Portnguese Arm)' was made I'd a moderate
pace. Hamilton's POItnguese were at Portalegre by the 17th,
the 2nd Division <;amc ill on the 19th and 20th. Bel'esford
himself appeared on the latter day, having ridden throngh from
the neighbourhood of Coimbra in four days. The 4th Division,
which had made an uclmirable march, a hundred and ten miles
of mOllntain rond in six days, came lip on the 22nd. On this
day, therefore, the whole 18,000 men of the expeditionary force
were t.'olleeted within fOlty miles of Badajoz, and Beresford had
to make up his mind as to the course of his campaign. The
orders given to him by ''''ellington had been to concentrate at
Portalegre and attack the French, who (as it had 1I0W beeu
asccrtaincd) wcre moving out to besiegc the little Portuguese
fortress of Campo IHayor, just across the frontier. The small
Spanish force under CastaflOs at Estrcmos-thc wrecks of the
old Army of Estremadura-wns to be called up to l'lr-sist 2.
Wellington, who did not know of Soult's departure for Seville,
I Cole actually reaclled Portlllegre on the 2Znd, 110 could huve heen in
front of Dadajoz on the 24th.
2 nrlllliugton to Beresford, Murel, IRill (Di8pflt';"e8, vii. 3i2), 'You had
better lose ))0 time in mo\-ing up to l'ortalegre, and attack Soult, if you
CUll, at Cfllnpo Mayor_ I will come to )'Oll if I cuu, but if I cnnnot clo not
wait for me. Get Castai'ios to join rOil from Kstremos with any Spanish
troop5 he can bring. VOII must be tll'O day~ marching from Porlalegre to
Cam~ Mu)'or, 1 believe.'
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thought that he could not lXJssibly collect enough men, after
garrisoning Budajoz and Olivenza., lo enable him to face Beres·
ford. In a supplementary dispatch he told his colleague that he
thought it most likely that the Marshal would go south of the
Guadiana without accepting battle. In that case the allied
anny must be careful, when following him, not to trust its com-
munications and line of advance or retreat to all)' temporary
bridge, but must use the Pol"tuguesc ri,'crsidc fortress of' Jeru-
mcnha as its base, and construct there a bridge composed of'
twenty Spanish pontoon-boats, which (as Wellington was
informed) had been floated down from Badajoz before the
siege of that plaee began. Beresford was to construet a strong
We-dn-pont 011 the Spallish bank to cover this bridge 1, and
might then move forward and invest Badajoz if hc were
able.
A most prescient note occurs in this dispateh, which seems
as if it were written in prophetical foresight of what was tu
happell at Campo Mayor five days Inter. •The cavalry is the
most delicate arm we possess. We have few officers who have prac-
tical knowledge of the modeofllsing it, or who have ever seen more
thall two regiments together. To these circumstances add that
the defeat of, or any great loss sustained by, our cavalry in these
open grounds would be a misfortune, amounting almost to a defeat
of the whole; you will therefore see the necessity of keeping
your ca\'alry as much as possible en mll33e, and in reserve, to be
thrown in at the moment when opportunity offers for striking
u decisive blow.' It looks almost as if Wellington knew that
Gcueral Long, who communded Bcrcsford's cavalry, was going
to make the very mistakes that he actually committed on the
fi,."t collision with the enemy.
The moment that the 4th Division and De Grey's dragoons
reached Portalegre, BCl'esford began his march all Campo Mayor
(March ~2) scnding out Colborne's and Lumley's brigades of
the ~Ild Division to Arronches., and the Portuguese cavalry
brigade of Otway to Azumar. This last-named unit had been
watching the frontier between the Tagus and the Guadiuna cver
since. Mussellll.'s retreat from Salltarem, and joined the !!nd Did-
I Wellington to Rer~ford, Marcl," 20 (Di$palc:lWI, \'ii. 374-6); SOl1\6
details added from D'Urball's diary, whicll do not appear in tlii.'l dispatch,
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i:liOIl 011 the gOth of March. Hamiltoll'i:l Portuguese illfautry
division was to follow next day, the 4th Division WIlS to be
a.llowed two days' rest after its fatiguing march from the Ceira,
and was only to sttut on the ~4th 1, On the !5th the whole
army was to he in front of Campo Mayor.
It remains to speak of the position in which the enemy was
found. Between the 14th of March, when Soult departed from
Sc\'ille, and the 25th, whcn Bcrcsford's army made ils sudden
and quite unexpected descent into the middle of the F'rench
forces, only eleven days elapsed; but MorHer had tumed them
to h1'QO(1 aC<.'Ount, and had more than fulfilled all that had becu
expected of him. On the very day that Soult started for
Seville he marched !lgainst Campo Mayor, with nine battaliOlIS
of infantry, a cavalry brigade, and part of the sicb,re-traill which
had just captured Badajoz. One other battalion was left as
hrarrison in Olivellza, the six that remained from the corps were
told oft' for Badajoz, where General Philippou lmd been appoiutcd
governor. With the aid of three companies of sappers they
were already busily engaged ill levelling their own old siege-
wot'ks, and commencing the repairs to the battered front of the
walls. Mortier conceived that there could Ilot be ally danger
in carrying out the orders that Soult had left, for he conld find
llO traces of any hostile force in his vicinity, save the Portuguese
garrison of Elvas, and the 4,000 men who formed the wrccks of
Mendi7.abal's army. This demorali7"oo force had rallied at
Campo Mayor, but on receiving the news of the fall of Badajo/'
retired in haste to EstrclIlos, twcnty miles within the Portuguese
frontier. Their presence there was II dallger rather than a defence
to the Alcmtejo, fOI" 1I0t only did they (.'Ollsumc some llltlgtlziues
collected there by Wellington's orders for the use of the expedi-
tionary force, but they plundered recklessly ill the neighbouring
villages, and committed such outl'llf,res that the Portuguese
Government was almost forced to take military measures against
them 2. Mortier had nothing to (ear from this quarter, whilc
I All these details are from V'Vrbau's Journal.
~ 'n,C consumption of tI,C Estremos llIaw'Zilles by Meudir.ahal's ItlllJl
\lill be found mentioned ill the pamphlet (written under Ueresford's
directiou) c.-tiled < Strictures 011 NajJier's I'ellinsular "rar ' [LOlltloJl,1832].
"When the i\Iarglml (Heresford) put his cort'" ill ntolioll from the TllgUS
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he could hear no uews of the approach of any Briti~h force from
the direction ot' the Tagus. The ~nd Division and Hamilton's
Portuguese, it will be remembered, had only been ordered to
resume their movement towards Estremadura on the 13th, by
Wellington's dispatch of the 12th, and when Mortier started
from Badajoz they were only just commencing their advance
from the neighbourhood of Abrantcs towurds Grato and Por-
talegre, and were very nearly a hundred miles away, so that
it was impossible that he should get any information concerning
them.
Campo Mayor WIls ttll uld-ftlishioned fortress, which had nut
becn remodelled since the \¥ar of the Spanish Succession, its
greatest weakness was that nn ouUying fort (Siio Jrnio), only
200 yard~ from the walls in a commanding position, had been
dismantled, but not blown up and levelled to the ground. It
oyerlooked une of the bastions of the place, and had only to be
seizt'<l ill order to provide an admirable starting-plate fur
operations against the enceinte. No serious attention had beell
paid to Campo Mayor of late, the much stronger place of Eh-as,
onl), eleven miles away, having absorbed all the attention of the
Portuguese h"O\-ernment. The Spaniards had been garrisoning:
it 101' the last six months, but when they hastily departed the
Governor of Eh-as threw into it hnlf a battalion of the l'orta-
legre Militia. (about 300 men) and a company of artillery. This
handful of men, aided b)' the Ordenawia of, the place, were all
that were at the wspositioll uf the vcry gallant and rcsoun:eful
old engineer oflicer, Major Jose Joaqmm Tala)'u, who Wt\S left
ill charge of the place. As the population was under 3,000 501I1s,
the levy of the Ordenl\u\'1\ cannot have amounted to more than
300 men, and many of these (as WWl still the case ill most parb
of POl'lllgal) had no firearms, but only pikes. But the chief
he was int'omloo that the Uritish Commissar)' in the Alcl1ltejo hatl from
:WO,OOO to 300,000 ra.tions ill store for his use, But this officer had also
IJeell ordered to supply the Spanisb division lately ill tlLat province, and
(most incautiowJy) issued {or its service whate\'er its commander required,
Owing to this inadvertence on the p.1.rt of the Commissary (whose llame,
1 think, was Thompsoll), wheu Marshallleresford arrived the etare was
uIJ8IJtutety emptg - (p. til]. His ,HllllC I/;Ulf '11101llImlJll, <lUll IJC was im-
mediately sUllCrse<led by Wellington's order (IMpatchu, vii. .l2li),
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magistrate (juiz de/ora), Jose Cal'valho, served at the head of
them with great energy. and wc arc ussurcd that (contrnfY to what
might han been expected) the citizens took a more creditable
part than the militiamen ill the defence I.
'Vith no regulars sare the compnny of artillery, and no
more than 800 men ill all to protect a long enceinte, it might
have been expected that 'l'ttlaya could nUlke no defence at all-
indeed he might have cI'tlcuntcd the place without any blame.
Uut being a man of fine resolution, and recognizing the fact
that he was doing the greatest possible servit.-e by detaining
7,000 l<'rcllch before his walls, und thereby covering Elvus ulId
allowing time fOI" Beresford to arrive, he resolved to hold out as
long as possible. The l"rellch seized Fort Siio J olio on the night
of their arrival (March 14th) und opencd trcnchcs on cach side
of it, commencing at the same time three batteries, of which
two were sheltered by the dismantled work. Next morning two
of these works were in u position tu open tire 011 the town, sincc
the heavy guns for them had only to come from nadajoz, a mere
nine miles away.
D~pite of this Talayu held out for seven days 01" bombard-
ment and open trenches (l5th-21st MaJ.·ch). He concentrated
all his artillery on the approaches and the breaching·batteries,
and for some time held his 0\\'11. all the 19th a breach was
opened in the projecting bastion (de Concelho), but the Govc11Ior
refused a summons to slIncnder,and actually beat off an assault
that night. all the following day the whole face of the bastion
began to crumble, and, since further resistance was hopeless,
Talaya accepted the terms offered him by l\Iortier-viz. that the
garrison should Iuy dow11 its arms if not relieved within tWCllty-
four hours, the Militia and OrdenaJl~:a not to he regarded as
prisoners of war. but to be allowed to stay in or retire to their
homes, on condition that they should not again bear arms
against the I.<rench. A similar favour WI'L'i extended to the
Governor himself, who was allowed, •on account of his great
age,' says the capitulation, to retire to his own residence Oll
giving his word of honour 110t to serve 8{,"8.in~. As the whole
I Soriano da. Luz, Hi. pp. 631-2.
: Colonel Dicksou Illet Talaya only two days after the surrender aUlI.
had an interesting interl"iew with him. See Dickson's JQurllal, i. 1.1. 366.
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garrison. save the artillery, were irregular troops, MOliicr took
over less than 100 prisoners. Some fifty guns, mally of them of
very antique and useless fabric, and 10,000 rations of biscuit
were captured. The delay oftwellty-four hours in the surrender
of the town turned out very unluckily for Mortier, as it just
gave time for Bercsford nnd his ann)' to arrive, only four da>"s
after the surrender, before the place had been dismantled or
injured.
The cight.day defence of the absolutdy untenable Campo
Mayor contrasts ill the strongest ftlshioll with that of the neigh-
bouring Spanish fortress of Albuquerquc. This, too, was a very
neglected and antiquated place, but it possessed a citadel on
1\ high crag, which might have been held for some days against
anything but heavy artillery, and it would have taken some
time to erect batteries which could effectively reuch it. When,
however, Latour-Maubourg, with two eavwl'y regiments, sum-
moned it, on March 15, the Governor at once began to parley,
and on being told that infantry and guns were comillg forward,
actually opened his gates next day, before the two battalions and
lwo gUlls sellt by Mortier iu"rin:d. This demoralized officer -\\,us
Major-General Jose Cagigal; his gal'rison COllsisu.-d of two bat·
hilions of the Estremaduran regiment of }~erllando VII, about
800 men, and a few artillerymen with seventeen brass gullS of
position. This was, on the whole, the most disgraceful surrender
llIade during the whole Peninsular War-it can only be com-
pared to the celebrated capitulation of Stettin ill 1806, when
the Prussitm general, in an exactly similar fashion, yielded
Il fortress to 1\ brigade of hUSSllrs who were impudent enough to
SUllllllon it. But Stettin Wl\8 n far worse case than Albuquerquc
-since it was a modem stronghold with 8; garrison of no less
than 6,000 men.
After the surrender of Albuquerque, Latoul'-Maubourg sent
011 a regiment of dragoons to Valencia de Alcantara, the last
fortified place in Spanish hands between the Guadiana and the
Tagus. The small garrison evacuated it, and the dragoons,
after bursting seven guns found within its walls, and blowing up
its gates (March 17),' returned to Badajoz.
He call finu 110 praise high enough for the old engineer officer. D'Urban
also speaks of him in most appreciative terms.
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The news of the loss of the one Portuguese and the two
Spanish fortresses did not detttin Bercsforcl a moment in his
oovance, indeed he was only anxious to attack the enemy before
he should have either repaired and garrisoned, or else dis-
mantled and destroyed, Campo Mayor. On the 24th, Cole's
4th Division, hoxing had its two prescribed days of rest, marched
from Portalegre to Arronches, where it caught up the cavalry
and the other two divisions. Nothing had been discovered of
the French, save some hussar vedettes only three mile~ north of
Campo Mayor. It seems that Deresford's approach came as
a complete surprise to Morticl', who had mndc no p~cparations to
meet it. He had withdrawn the greatcl' part of the troops who
had formed the siege corps to Badajor., and had left Latour-
Mauoourg to dismantle the place-for he had mnde up his
mind not to hold it. The cavalry general retained three of his
own regiments (!?l6th Dragoons and ~lld and 10th Hussars),
one infantry regiment (the 100th of' thp. Line), a half-battery of
horse artillery, with a large dctachment of the military train,
who were in charge not only of the siege-guns lately used, but
of thirty picces fi'om the walls of' Campo Mayor, which it was
intended to bring over to Dadajoz. The rest of the Portuguese
guns were to be burst, w; useles::l l.\lId antiquated. The engineers
were selecting sections of the enceinte, which were to be mined
and blown up. The whole French force was about 900 sabres
lHld 1,200 bayonets, plus the detachments of the auxiliary arms
-perhaps 2,400 men in all I. There was a very fail' chance of
capturing it entire, owing to the careless way in which Latour-
Maubourg kept watch. The presence of scouting parties of
Portuguese dragoons had been reported to him 2. But probably
he attached little importance to theil' prcscnce in this direction.
There had been cavalry of that nation on the E.~tremarlnran
frontier ever since January.
I There is great difficulty ill making out wllat were the Freuch cavalry
regiments, but Martillieu's lists show losses in the 26th Dragoolls (ei~ht
officers) Ilnd 2lJll Hus$.\rs, and Long sllcnks positively of the 10th Hussars
as present alSQ.
2 D'Urb..'lll, recounoitring witl, one, was sighted and c1111.s00 ll. little W1'Y
by French hussaril. See C. E. Long's vindication of his ullcle, General
Long'l! Military Reputation [London, 1832), pp. 74-6.
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At half~past ten o'clock on the very rainy morning of the
~th, Beresfonl's ann)' was advancing on Campo MaJor in three
cOllvcrging columns, the bulk of the !:!nd Division prccedcd by
De Gl'e)"S dmgoons on the high-road, Hamilton's l'ortugllcsc
division on a by-path over a ridge to the east of the road, with
the 13th Light Dragoons and two Portuguese squadrons in their
front, Colborne'$ brigade and the remaining Portuguese hol'$C
Oil n corresponding ridge, some way to the western or right side
of the clwll.$see, Colc followed a mile in the renr as reserve,
The French outpost,> were found as 011 the preceding day, only
three miles outside the town, General Latour-Maubourg
chanced to be vi$iting them, probably in tardy consequencc of
the reports of the previous day. 'When attacked thc)' retired
.'ikirmishillg, to delay as far as possible the advallce of
Beresford's leading sqnadrons. Latour-Mallbourg, seeing that
the Allies wcrc coming up 011 a broad front, and at least
16,000 strong, rode back hastily inlo the town, oruerro
the drums to beat, and directed infantry and ct'walry alike lo
abandon their bag~ae, and to form up without a moment's
delay on the glacis outside the southern gate for a retreat, A
colullln of sixteen hea,'y gUllS from the walls of Campo Mayor
and the siege-tmin, with practically no escort, had started some
little time back, and was on its way to Badajoz along the high-
road before the alarm was given 1. The allied cal"alry, on coming
in sight of the town from the ridge to its nOIth, discovcred the
enemy just moving all; the infantry regiment in column of route
on the road, with onc hussar regiment in front of it and another
in rear, while the ~6th Dragoons, some little way ahead, was
covering the rest from being intercepted on the high-road, for
Latour-l\-1aubourg had seen that his danger lay ill the probability
that Deresford would strike in, with the horse of his van, between
him [Illd Badajoz, and so force him to fight his way through,
under pain of being surrounded and captured if he failed. This
indeed was Bcl'esford's inwntioll, but being impressed with
'Vellington's warning not to risk or lose his C'AYalry, he had
\ Delmas says t1mt it luul startell fW}'", and must be right; while
Laptme, who thillks that it was loaded up alld sent off after the alarm,
fails to aC(l{Illnl for its being six miles along t11e roall when surprised.
Heal'Y guns travel sloll'ly. Beresford corroborates .Belmas,
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ordered General Long, who was in command of the division of
that arm, not to commit himself against a snperior force, and
'to wait for the infantry to come up if he were in any doubt;
yet if the opportunity to strike a blow occurs he must avail
himself of it l ,' The whole cavalry force with the army was
only eleven British squadrons and five Portuguese, the latter
very weak, lLnd the total llumlXlr of sabres was about 1,500,
El. very small allowance for all army of O\'CI' ]8,000 men, and
therefore very preciolls.
When Latour~.MnuboUl'g saw the British divisions coming on
in the distance, he marched off with all pos.'lible speed, and had
such a start that his column, whose pace was set by the quick
step of the infantry, bad got Ilearly three miles from Campo
)fayor before it was seriollsly threatened. General Long had, by
Bercsford's oNers, directed his StJundrons to sweep ellSt of thc
walls of the towll, out of gunshot, in case there should chance
to have been It garrison left behind. The sweep was a long one,
hecause a rl1\'illl;! WM discovered which fOrlocd the rcgiments tu
turn further eastward than was iLt first intended. They came
up in two detachments, one formed by the 13th Light Dragoons
and Otway's Portuguese, more to the left (cast), the other of
De Grey's dragoons further to the right (west). The first body
WItS neA.rly level with the dragoon regiment which was moving
ahead of the French column, the other was not so far to the
front, being 400 or 500 yards away from the rear flank of the
J'rench. The nearest British infantry and guns. Colhorne's
brigade and Clccvcs's German battery 8c.'Companyillg it. were Ollt
of Right, two miles to the rear, hidden by undulations of the
b~'otll1d; so was BeresforU himself and his staff, who \Vel'e ridillg
ahead of the main body.
Seeing a fight forced on him, Latour-Maubourg resolved to
accept it. He had a fort'C of all arms, and thought himself
strong enough to beat off' cavalry ullsupported by infantry or
gUllS, evcn though thcy outnumbered his own horsemen in the
proportion of five to three, Accordingly he suddenly halted
1 This is Long's account of the onlers givcn by Ueresford (p, 75 of the
Villdi~ltion qf the Military Reputation qf the (ate General Long, by C. E,
IAJlIg), ill a letter from the general to GCllcrnl Le j\fllrdlllllt. 111;811.g",,,,'!ol
pretty well with Here::>ford's \'ersion of the .facts. and is 110 doulot correct.
,2
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and formed his infantry in battalion squares on the high-road,
with the hussars Ranking them in deep order, while the dragoon
regiment, with its right wing drawn back and its left wing not
far from the leading hussars, formed a line at nn obtuse angle to
the main body, ready to deliver a flanking charge on the British
and Portuguese if they should attack the infantry.
Long, considering, as he says, that he was strong enough to
attempt the 'blow' of which Beresford had spoken, resolved
first to drh'e off the l~rench dragoon regiment which threatened
his flank, and then to fall upon the hussars and infantry. He
seut orders to De Grey amI the heavy drahl'o<)nS to close in upon
the renr and left Hank of the French, from whom they were still
separated by a ridge, but to hold ofi-' till the rest of the troops
had disposed of the coyering mmlry. He then advanced with
the light squadrons, English and Portuguese, to get beyond the
French dragoons-his line was formed with two Portuguese
squadrons (7th regiment) on the extreme let\, then the two lInd
n half sqnadrons of the 13th Rritish Light Dragoons 1, and to
the right the three remaining Portuguese squadrons (1st regi-
ment).
Seeing that Long was mau<£uvring to outflank him, Latour-
MRl1bourg ordered the 26th Dragoons to charge before the
movement was far advanced. 'fhe British 13th formed to their
front, and started to meet them; the two lines met with
a tremcndous crash, llcithcl' giving way, and wcre minglcd for
0. few moments in desperate hl\nd to hand fighting 2, in which
Colonel Chamorin, the E'rench brigadier, was slain in El pCl"iiolllll
combat with El corporal named Logan of the 13th. Presently
the French broke, and fled in disorder along o.nd beside the
Dadajoz road. Then followed onc of those wild and senseless
pursuits which always provoked Wellington's wrath, and induced
him to say in bittenlcss that the ordinary British cavalry
I A squadron Wag nb.~cnt witll Colbornc's COIUIlIIl Rnd RlIotller troop Oil
distant reconnaissance work, and the regiment was not much over ZOO
F:abres,
t Napier's story tllat tlley charged through each other, fonned up front
.to rcur, and tllCIl chargcd cach othcr ngnin is strongly dellied by Bcrcsfonl
as (purely supposititious' (Slne/un8, pp. 162-3), and not continncd by
LonS or any other eye-witness.
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regiment was' good for nothing but galloping I.' General Long
says in his account of the affair that he found it impossible to
stop or rally the Light Dragoons, and therefore sellt after them
the two squadrons of the 7th Portuguese, to aet as a support.
Hut the Portuguese put 011 a great pace to come up with the
13th, got excited ill pursuing stray knots of French dragoons,
broke their order, and finally joined in the headlong chase as
recklessly as their comrudes.
The ride was incredibly long and disorderly, quite in the style
of Prince Rupert at Edgehill. It was contiuued for no less than
seven mile;; four mik'S from the place where it hud started, the
Light Dr~ff()()ns came on the artillery convoy of sixteen heavy
gUlls which had left Campo Mayor ill the early morning, and
had crawled on ahno~t to the gates of Badajo7.: the small escort
was dispersed, and the drivers were cut down Ot· chased off the
road. Many of the POI'tuguese stopped to make pri7.c of the
horses-most valuable personal plunder-and went off' with
them ill small partie8 tow8.lxls the allied camp. The pursuers
should have stopped here. There was no object in chasing an)'
further the few surviving F'rellch drabJ'()()ns, who were scattered
broadcast, The guns, with tl lOlLg tmill of caissons und CUI'tS,
wcre left standing beside the road, but little attention was paid
to these valuable trophies. One or two were rehorscd and
turm..u towards the British lines by some officers of the 13th.
The main body of the pursners, howevcr, did not stop with the
convoy, blit, still sabring at the routed French, I·ode two miles
und a half further, till they hurtled against the bridge-head
fortifications of Badajoz. They were only stopped by being
shelled from Fort SUII Crmtobal, and fired 011 by the ganisoll of
the t€te-du-pollt. It is said by olle l~relleh authority 2 that the
leading dragoons actually reached the barder-gate of the
covered way of the latter work, and were shot there. Marshal
Mortier, lean\ing what hail happened, sallied out of the fortress
with a cavalry regiment amI four battalions, captured quite a
number of straggling dragoons, whose horses had fallen or given
out in the wild ride, and found the bulk of the artillery convoy
standiug lonely and tellmless by the wayside. It was drttgb"C(!
1 See '·01. i. 1'. lW. ~ Re-lmlls, iii. [I. 557.
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along into Bndnjoz, save onc howitzer Rud six caissons, which
were left behind Oil the approach of Deresford's main body.
:Mortier also picked up near the place where the convoy was
lying, and brought into Badajoz, Latour-Maubourg's column,
whose further fortulles need to be detailed.
'Vllcn the 13th Light Dragoons find the 7th Portuguese went
off' on their mad escapade, General Long found himself left in
frollt of the main French force, with only the three squadrons
of the 1st Portuguese cu"tdry, which had formed his reserve, tllld
the Heu\'Y llrigad~ distant half a mile from him. and on the
other side of the French line. It was apparently his intention
to charge the enemy with these troops, a most hazardous e.'i:peri-
ment. for the French with a regiment of 1.~OO infantry ill square,
Hunked by four squadrons of hussars, were dangerous to deal
with. III all the Peninsular 'Vur there was only one occliiJion
(at Garcia Hernande1. in lSU) where formed squares of either
side were broken by the cavalry of the other, and the lOOth Ligne
011 this occasion had 500 hussars to support them. There WliiJ
:some delay while Long was sending till uide-de-cump to the Hcavy
llrigade to bid them prepare to attack \ and, seeing him holding
hack, Latour.l\fauholll'g started off his column once more along
the high-mad, the infantry marching ill square, with two
squadrons of hussars in front and two behind. '1'0 stop him
from moving on, Inng bronght forward the 1st Portugnese to
check the hussars, But when they advanced toward them, and
were about to enguh"e, tl'le front side of the leading French
battalion square opened a distnnt fire against their flank. Sur-
prised by this, for they had not realized that they wel'e within
effective range of the hostile infantry, the three Portuguese
squadrons broke and galloped off~ pursued by the hussars fur
some little way 2.
1 So, at least, 1 gather from T..Ollg'6 Ilarratil'e: llC So'lYS that 'JIt.~ sent
an order for the advance of De Grey's brigade' (p. 3<1), and ill allother
place (p, li3), that' it wall only necesSoU)' to charge and throw into
confusion the cavalry at their (the .French) belld nnt! rear, and the object
was a.ccomplisllcd.' The object is defined as the' annihib.tion' of the
French column, w!lich Long thinks would have surrendered.
"111is regiment lost one officer :lUd ten men killed, :Illd tl,irty-two
woulLded, beside some pl'isolleN'. ill the abOl'th'e 3(h'ance, The to'rench
st.ltmncnt Lhat tIJe 2nd Hussars 1lI11llc '(le bcllCil clJur~,,' is llJCrerorCl
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At this moment Marshal Beresford and his staft' mme upon
the scene, on the ridh"e ne..'\r De Grey's brigade, and !law the
threc PortuguesL'S quadl"OlIs rallying at It distauL"C, and still ill
disorder, whilc the heavy dl'lIo0'00ns were preparing to attack,
On inquiring what had become of the 13th and the rest
uf the Porlugucsc, Beresford was told by onc of his Shl(P
that they had been cnt ofI' Ilnd were believed to have been
captured, Horrified at this news, which brought to his mind all
Wellington's warnings, Bcresford forbade the Heavy Brigade to
charge, and bade them hold oft', till some infantry and guns
should come ~p, He was indubitably right in so doing, for, a~
all prc\'ious aml later cxpcricll<:e proveU, it was most unlikely
that they would have broken the French squares,
He sent back for the nearest iurantr)" which was Coloorue's
bril,,'Udc, and some gUllS, Meanwhile the enemy continued
moving off' at a great pace, followC(1 at lL distance by the heavy
dragoons, while Long and the three rallied Portuguese squadrons
marched pamllel with their flallk, The two purties had pru-
ceeded several miles in this way, when the 13th Light Dl'agoons
{'..ame in sight. l'eturnillg from the direction of Badajoz. and their
Porluguese companions with them, Soon after, two gUlls of
Cleeves's bn.ttery got up, unlimbered, and opened a fire at long
range against the rear of the French, It had sOllle effect, hut
the enelJl)' kept his ranks and cOlltiuued to move 011 !IS fast us
possible, lea"ing his dead and wounded in the road. The
artillery horses were exhausted and unable to keep up, where~
fore Bcrcsford ordered the whole force to halt, snyillg that with-
out inlantry there was nothing morc to be done. At this
lllOllIent Colborne's brigade was no more than half a mile behind
a<.:cording to Long and ccrtain othet· witnesses 2, Dut Oil the
evidently justified. Hut it was the lIanking' infantry tire which demoralbcJ
ll,e Portuguese (Long's Villdicati01), p, ,(0).
I Hyall aecounts this was .Baron Trip, a Dutch emigri officer. who was
servinA' on lleresfor{l'lI staff. Thc statement was \'cry astounding, e\'en
incredible, considering that the country wag open and undulllting. Hut
it was almost equally incredible that the 13th and 7th Portuguese should
huve Imrsued the Frcllcll drllgoolls completel)' out of siglit, six miles
aII'll)', without leaving a mllll beiJiud.
2 Colonel G;.llric1, a s"~ff officer of lIlc 2ll<1 Division, ~ays tlull
t:olbul'llc's bl'i!':"dde was onl)' .50(1 yards in rc.1r of the heavy uragoons, aud
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other hand, Morticr with 2,000 infantry and 11 cavalry regiment
from lladajo7. \I'M visible, wuiting for Latour-Mnubourg Ileal'
the spot where the dismantled convoy was standing. The two
French fon:e~ joined, and retired into the fortress with nearly
all the recu.ptured gUlls-only one Rnd some caissons remained
to be picked up by Deresford's advance.
The loss of the British on this occasion, all in the 13th Light
Drab1'OO1lS 1, was 10 killed, 3 officers llnd ~4 men wounded, and
fl~ prisoners; among the Portuguese ht and 7th camlry all
officer and 13 men killed, 40 wounded, and 55 prisollers-
a total of over ]50. The French suffered more-the 26th
Dragoons alone had 8 officers 2 and over 100 men killed,
wounded, and taken, the train and artillery had been dreadfully
cut up at the capture of the convoy, and the infantry had lost
g officers and many men by the fire of Cleeves's guns. The
total casualties were o\'er QOO 3. But the moral effect uf a
combat is not judged by (l. mere comparison of losses, find thc
British officers were llHlCh diso.ppointed, lleresford lLlld his
friends held that Long had by mismanagement wa,.<;ted 150
precious cavalrymen-Long declared that if Beresfol'd had not
taken the comulIllld out of his hands he would have captured
the whole French column. This last claim was absolutely Ull-
reasonable: it is far more likely that he would merely have caused
severe loss to the two heavy dragoon regiments by persisting.
The MarshoJ and the Gcneml were on bad terms from this
moment onward, and the former took the next opportunity
given him to remove the latter from the chief command of the
allied cavalry. The most curious comment 011 the combat of
Campo Mayor is Napier's statement that 'the 19th Light
Dragoons were severely reprimanded for pursuing so eagerly.
But the unsparing admiration of the whole army l'()Ilsoled
them!' Pursuing eagerly is a mild expression for riding seven
the lo'rCIH.:1t still iu si/{1Jt when Beresford ordercd the fiual halt, See
l..ong·~ Vindication, p. G5.
I E.'I:ctlpt three wounded ill the 3rd Dragoon Guards ill skirmiglU$ with
the hUf\&1;N of tile French rearguard.
~ Que killed, six wounded, one prisoner. For names sec _"l\rtillicn'~
lists and liul1plemcllt tllcreW.
3 Belmas sa)';s liD, but thigjg too,1ow,
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miles off the battlefield, and on to the glads of a hostile fortress ..
Vt/elliugton'$ comment was that' the undisciplined ardour of the
13th Dragoons and the 7th regiment of l)ortuguesc cavalry is
not of the description of the determined bl"8.vcry of soldiers
confident in their discipline and their officers. Their conduct
was that of a rabble galloping as fast llS their horses could carry
them. after an enemy to whom they could do no further mischief
when they were broken: the pursuit was continued for an Ull~
limitro distance, and sacrificed substantial advantages, and all
the objects of the operatiOlt, by want of discipline 1.' A similar
reproof was published in a General Order, to be read to the
cavalry.
The ollly really 8atisfacwry result of the combat of Campo
1\1l1yOI' was that lleresford recovered the town intact, with some
b"llllS which had not yet been sent off to Badajoz, and a consider-
able amount of stores, including 8.000 rations of bi~cuit, The
place was at once re-garrisoned with the Faro regiment of
militia from Eh'as, who rapidly repaired the breach, [t was
tenable again in a few days.
On the 26th Ueresford disc<,)\'ered that the French had with-
drawn entirely beyond the Guadiana, keeping nothing north
of it sa\'c thc bridge-head and Fort San Cristobal I\t Budujoz.
All accounts agreed that after deducting the garrison of that
place Mortier could not ha\'e more than 8,000, or at the most
10,000, men available for the Held, so that there was no reason
why \Vellington's orders to thrust him out of Estremadura, and
besiege Badajoz, should 1I0t be carried out. It was purticularly
directed in those orders that the cxpeditionary force should cross
the Guadiana at Jerumcnha, and make a bridge at that place,
only a few miles from the strong fortress of Eh'as, the base of
its line of communications 2" Accordingly the 2nd Di\'isioll and
1 Welliugton to Beresford, from Cclorico, March 20 (Di8P(ltcM8, vii.
412), By an odt! error \\Tellington wrote the 1st i'ortllglle.'>C, but it was
Ule ith which joined in the hunt,
t Napier censure;; Ueresforfi for 110t eroAAing at Meril1a, t11irty miles
east of Bat!ajoz. But (I) '\'cllillgton's orders directed him to use
JerumenlltLj (2) to march to Merida would ha\"c been to pass across till)
front of an enemy who had a bridge-head at Badajoz, from which he could
j)ush out detachments to cut the line of COllllllullication, Call1po Ma)'or to
;\lerit!a; (3) Ehll.'! was the ouI,- possible base, and the oul)' place where
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Hamilton's Portuguese marched to Elvas on the ~th, leaving
Cole and the 4th Division (still much fatigued by their long
march) for a day at Cmnpo Mayor. There can be no doubt that
if Beresford had been able to cross at Jerumenha 011 the 21th or
28th he would have compelled the French to retire southward at
onee,and might have invested Badajoz, then not yet fully reptlired,
I\S soon as be chose. But B. most tiresomc series of hindrances,
for which it seems unjust to blame the Anglo-l'ortnguese com-
mander, now began to crop up. The first and most fatal was
that the stock of Spanish pontoon ooats which, as he had OC-ell
told by ''Vellington, would be found at Elvas or Jcrnmenha,
was not forthcoming. Only five were discO\'ered: two complete
bridge-equiPfit,rres had been kept by Imaz at Badajoz. and werc
now in the hallds of the French. But twellty large pontoons, t1S
the cngineers declared, was the least number which wOlllcl suffice
to bridge the Guadiana. An attempt was made to seek for
rh'er-craft to eke out the pontoons. But by \Vellington'sordeN
all the boats Oil the rivcr for many milcs had been dcstroyed,
when SOlllt entered Estremadura in January. Some Portuguese
pontoons were ordered from Li~bon, bllt it would be a week or
~o before they could be carted across the Alemtejo, MeauII'hilc
Captain Squirc, lhe engineer chtU'.6'ed with tile bridge·buildiug,
off~l to lay trestles across the shallower part of the bed ofthe
Guadiana on either bank, and to moor the five pontoons in the
deep channel ill the middle to join thclll. To this Bcrcsford
assented, aJld the bridge-place was selected on the 30th: Squire
promised that the whole should be completed on the Srd of
April; he could not finish it earlier, as the wood for the trestles
had to be found, cut down, and shaped ab in-it·w.
The delay of a week thus caused was of the less imporlalwe,
however, because of another contretemps. There were 110 stores
rcudy to fL"{.'<l the army whcn it should cross the Guadiana.
The flOO,OOO rations at Estremos which Wellington (as it will
be remembered) had promised to Beresford, were found to hose
been entirely consumed by the wreck of Mendizabal's army,
magazines could be safely formed, or munitions, siege artillery, &c.,
llrocured; (4) the rood Campo l\Iayor-i\lerida was very bad; (5) Merida
was withiu reach of the Freudl AnllY of the Centre, which Imd de\.acll-
mellU at Truxillo and Almarall.
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who had been lying there for the last three week~. There was
lIothing to lade upon the mules and carts of the expcdilionury
force; the troops were in great difficulties from day to day, ate
the 8,000 rations at Campo Mayor, and were finally forced to
iudent upon the stores of the garrison of Elvils, which ought to
have been sacred to the defence of the town.
Lastly, and this was perhaps the most important of all, the
shoes of the 4th Division, which had marched continuously from
the 6th to the 22nd of March, first fmm the Lines to Espinhal,
and then from Espinhal to rortalegre, were completely worn
out. Cole protested agllinst the division being moved till it
was reshod. ~o footgear could be foulld at Elvas, and though
tUI immediate requisition was sent to Lisbon, the convoy bringing
the ~hoes would obviousl,Y tnke It week or so to get \JP 1. }~rom
the 26th of March to the 3rd of April Bercsford WWl perfon.'c
immo\'able. This loss of eight days was apparently the rCUSQlI
why Badajo:r. did not fall into his hands a little later, for the
fortifications, which were still ill a dangerous slate of disrepllir 011
the 25th, were practically tenable by the second week in April.
The stores ill the fortress were a less important matter. lm~
when be sUl'l'cndcrcd had over t~ month's ratious fot' 9,000 lllCll,
which, even when a certuin amount had been collSumed by
Soult's field army, left a nucleus sufficient to keep the garrison
of 3,000 men placed in tile town by MOI·tier out of need for
lllany \\·eeks. In addition, cattle had been requisitioned all ovcr
Estremadura. The small movable force of 8,000 men which
was a.vailablc 101' observing Bercsford, was now living cntirely
on the cOllntry-side, in order to spare the stores of lll\dajor..
Beresford's delay in crossing the Guadiallu, t11ereforc, \\'1\S
11llfortullate, but apparently inevitable, and there seems 110
reason to blame him for it. On April Srd the engineers reported
that the bridgc at JCl'umcnha would be ready that eYcning, and
I Tlle.!le notes I\.!I to Beresforll's difficulties are taken partly from the
Journal of bis chief of the staff, D'Urban, partly from tILe latter's lIetailed
report on the Estrcmaduran calnIJ.'1igu, llUblishcd in 1832, but written in
1311, partly from the StrictUrt8 ,m Napier'sllislO'1l, vol. iii, written under
Bcresford's eye. The latter migllt be considered 8uspiciou8 if they were
not completely borne out by the two forlller, as well as b)' Wellingtou's
Dil1jllJ.Il:hclI, vii, 41·J, 420, 432,
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the three divisiolls concentrated on the left bank: the water
was low, and a difficult ford for cavalry had been found abO\·e
the bridge, by which a squadron of dragoons passed. and
established It chain of pickets 011 the Spanish side. No French
were seen abroad, though it was discovered that they still had
l\ garrison ill Olivcnza, ohly :;ix miles away. It ill difficult to
make Qut why 110 attempt was made to obstruct tile building
of Beresforo's bridge-the cnemy had five regiments of C8.\·alry
in Estremadura, alld 6,000 infantry of Girard's division were
available for field service. Even a small detachment with sollle
guns would huvc made it impossible for the Brith;h CIlgillCCI'S to
complete theil" work. nut the Allies found a great advantage
in the fact that Mortier had just recei ved orders to return to
Paris, and had on l\far<;h 26th handed over the command of all
the troops on the Guadiana to Latour-::\1aubourg, who was
a good divisional general on the battlefield, but a ver)' indifferent
strategist. All his manreuvres during the following month
were weak and confused. How it came that frolll the 30th of
March to thc 7th of April no Frcnch cavalry wcrc secn opposite
,Jerlllllenha, much less any serious force sent to disturb the
bridge-building, it is impossible to concei\'e. By all accounts
the horsemcn who should lmvc been ill front of Olivcnla wcrc
at this time mainly employed ill scouring the villages ofCentml
Estrellladura for cattle and corn, and escorting what they could
seize into Badajoz ano. the camp of Girard's di\'isiun.
On the moming of March 4th, when the allied troops should
have crossed the Guadiana, Beresford was brought the untoward
llews that the river had risen three feet in the night, had swept
away the trestles, und fOl'L~d the enginecrs to draw baek the
live pontoon boats in the ccntral stream to the Portuguese
bank. The squadron beyond the river was cut off from the
army, and communication with it was only restored during the
Jay, by l'igging up a flying bridge composed of a raft and a
tape. The cavalry ford above the destroyed bridge was of course
impassable, Throughout the 4th and 5th the water continued
to rise, fronfstorms higher up the ri \'er apparently, for there IVas
no rain at Jcrulllenha,
The positioll was exasperating to the highest degree. 'Es·
tablishing It permanent bridge is out of the questioll,' writes
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D'Urban, the chief of the staff, in his journal. 'The means
are R11ything but ~ccurc either for passing the army (tedious
beyond measure, too, no doubt), or for establishing a com-
llmnicatjoll afterwards for supplies and other purposes. Never-
theless the general state of things, and above all Lord
'Wellington's reiterated orders received this morning, render it
necessary to pass 1.' The engineers, put upon their mettle,
finally made the five Spanish pontoon boats into two fiying
bridges worked by ropes. On these a battalion of infantry was
passed across the river, and slockaded itself on the other side.
Later in the day (April 5) SOllle small tin pontoons arrived
from Lisbon, and out of these, helped by all the wine-ca..'lks of
the neighbouring villages, collected ill hasle, a floaling bridb'C
was constructed, • not very substantial, bul, upon trial, found
capable of admitting infantry to pass in file 2: It was not
ready till noon Oil the 6th, but by the two flying bridges the
whole 2nd Division and three squadrons of cavalry were passed
on the night of the 5th-6th, What might ha,'e happened it
Latour-J\iIiLubourg had concentrated at Olivcnza, and fallen on
the first two or three battalions that crossed with a force of all
arms, we had better not inquire 8. A disaster on a small scale
might very possibly have occurred. But not u Frenchman
Wll.'! $Cell. /
Dlll'ing the 6th Hamilton's Portuguese passed with infinite
slowness 011 the flying bridges, and the cask and pontoon bridf,"C
heillg at Il\st completed, CoJe's 4th Division and Long's cavalry
began to file over it at dusk, an operation so tedious that the
last of them were not over till the following dawn. Ere they
were all across a 'regrettable incident' occurred: the ad\'anced
cavalry pickets were formed 011 the night of the 6th-7th by
, Thi~ must luwe beell '" elliugtou's Celorico dispatch of March 30,
saying that • between clIevalets (trestles), boats, Spanish alld I<;llglish
POIlWollS, alllla ford, I shoulU hope thllt tlU.l GUlllliullll Illay 11e 1};l$Se<.l in
safety' (D/8]XltcM8, \·ii. 414.)
2 D'Urball's ]'{arraliV8, p. 10.
a Bcresford maintaiued that troops Oil the right bank could be llrotected
by the fir(! of tlle gUlls of Jerumenlla, which is ill a lofty position, com-
llillllUillg tile Spanish shore. But they IVOUltl lUlve boon of little use if tl,e
l'rellch llad attacked at night. (StriCIU~8 ('Il Napier, p. 177.)
~10 IlEIlESFOllD IN ES'l'IlEMADUHA [APRil. fl
Yll1jOl' MOl'l'iS'S S<IIlM!'Oll of the 13th Light Dl'l1!.'Oo!ls. Owing
t,o bltd sh\ff' work in the placing of them (as D'Ul'oon llnd
General Long both assert), the main guard of this sqnadron was
surprised by French cavalry ill the dusk of the morning, and
captured almost entire, two officers and fifty men being taken,
The assailant~ found that they had run into the camp of a
whole army, and pl'Omptly retired before they could be touched.
At last Latoul'.Maubourg had given signs of life; this
reconnaissance hud been conducted by a flying column of two
cavalry regiments and four battalions, undel' General Veilland,
sent out to Olivenza from the camp of GiranJ's division, with
the VEry tardy purpose of hindcring Bercsford's passage,
Veillll.nn reported to his chief that the enemy was across in such
strength that he could do nothing, The appearance of ~O,OOO
men 011 the Sptmish bank of the Guadiana, so far to the south
of Badajoz, placed Lntour-l\'Iallbourg in a very delicate position:
if he f'ita.yed twenty-four hours longer in his present camp close
to Badajoz, he lost his communications with Andalusia, and
might bc pushed eastward up the Guacliana, out of touch with
SouIt, and having no retreat AA.vetowards the dista.nt Army of the
Centre, It was even possible that a rapid advance of the Allies
might drive him into Badajoz, the last thing that he would
desire. Accordingly he concentrated at Albuera, twclve miles
south of that fortress, as a preliminary move, and prepared to
fall back from thence by the great southern c!1UU8see, towards
IJerena and the Sierra Morena, where he would preserve, and
shorten, his line of communication with SouIt. Phillipon wa~
left with 3,000 men in Badajoz, which WIl.'l now quite be)'olld
danger from it coup de main, and able to take care of itself (or
some weeks, till reinforcements should come up from Andalusia
for its relief. 'Vith great ullwisdom Latour-Maubollrg left
Olivellza l:,rarrisoned also; it was, as had been tihown in January,
contemptible llS Cl fortress, cven when held by a large force, alld
the French general placed in it only a single weak battalion of
under 400 men. There were stiIl on the walls the few guns
that had been taken from the Spaniards-no more than fifteen
were monnted, and several of these only on makeshift carriages.
'Why Latour-Maubourg chose to sacrifice a battalion it is hard
to sce; Napoleon wrote to Soult a month later to (.'Ondemll the
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policy of RmAlI garriRonR in the strongei\t term", 1. At t.he be~t
OJivenl'.a, when so weakly held, could 110t hold out fOl' more
than (l. few days, and if Beresforo had tried to rUllh it by
escalade, when first he arrived before its walls, he must un-
doubtedly have succeeded, for 400 men cannot defend three
miles of enccinte against a serious assault. There were some
magazines in the place, and a small hospital of sick, who could
not be removed 2, But it was obviously absurd to throwaway
(l. battalion of sound men to keep them from capture for a few
days. It has been suggested that Latour-Mauboul'g merely
wanted to gain time a; but the time gained was t.rifling~
OlivenZtl. only held ont five days-and might have fallen
much sooner.
Beresford's train and guns having joined him beyond the river
on March 8th, he moved to Olivenza on the 9th, in an order of
Illarch ready to deploy iuto an order of' battle in case LatoHr-
Maubourg should turn up with his small field force. The town
was summoned on the same aftemoon, Ilnd when the governor
refused to sUl'rcudcl', the 4th Division, still almost mmble to
move for want of the shoes which were daily expected from
Lisbon, was left to besiege it, with the aid of heavy gUlls to be
brought from Elvn.~, only fifteen miles awa}', The extreme
weakness of the garrison was not known, or the Marshal would
not have wasted time by ordering regular approaches to be
wade. 'rhe rest of the army bivouacked on the Badltjoz road
a few miles beyond Olivelll'.tl, and on the following day occupied
Valvcrde, and pushed its cavalry to .Albucra, cutting the clwt/.ssh:
.between Badajoz and Seville. No enemy could be found, and
it was ascertained that Latour-Maubourg's rearguard was at
Santa l\1arta, ten milcs to the south, and the rest of his troop:;
far beyond it. On the 11th the infantry, minl1ll the 4th Division,
I COrl'liIlfJ'J"dflllCe, Jl:xi. 146: 'Vous voyez que cc que j'al'ais prevu est
arrive, qu'on a eu la simplicite de laisser du mOIHle dans Olivelll'.a, et de
flLin~ Ilremlr.., liL 300 l'olllml\!l; &c. TILis Wll.~ ullmling to lLll CI'rlier order
to Soult oot to make small detacllmeots, and to blow up Olivenza.
1 Ninety-eight sick altcmled hy sixteen surgeons were comprised ill the
surrender all April 16th.
~ 'n.il'! is Lapen(l'S vielv, who eays tllat tIle 400 gallant men were
knowingly SlLcrifil:ed in this hope: 'l'intCrct de I'urmce 'I demundC 11;
sacrifice' (p. 146).
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were at Albuera, while t.he bulk of the cavalry marched to nnd
out how farsouthwam the enemy was ready to withdraw.
Central Estremadura, at any rate, was now in Heresford's
hands, and he was in El position to carry out vVellington's orders
to drive the 5th Corps over the Sierra Morena and invest
BlldlljoZ. In Ilccorduncc with his instructions he llad seen
Castafios on March 30th, and settled with him that the wrech
of the old Army of Estremadura-now about 1,000 horse and
3,000 foot-should join in the campaign. Castauos, who showed
himself both eager and oblil:,ring, had promised that his infantry
should seize the bridge ofMerida, and that, when it was occupied,
his cl1\'all'y, under Penne Villemur, should join in the movement
to sweep Latour-l\Iaubourg over the mountains, operating on
the eastern road (Mcrida-Ribera-Usagrc-Llerena), while tile
allied cavalry took the western one (Albuera-Los Santos-Fuente
Cantos-Monasterio). These promises were carried out: l\forillo's
infuntry division occupied Merida 011 the 10th, and next day
Pellne VilIemur's cavalry had reached Almendralejo.
The siege of Oliven?..a gave little trouble. The only difficulty
was the improvising of a siege-train, even 011 the very modest
scale required to deal with such a weak place, It was invested,
as we have sccu, on the 9th. On the 10th Majol' Alexallder
Dicksoll of the Portuguese artillery. and Captain Squire of the
Engineers reconnoitred the place, and determined that the
proper starting-point for the attack was the same ruined luuette,
outside the walls, which thc Frcnch had choscn us their first base
in January. On the night of the 11th this point was occupied
with the loss of one man only. killed by the enemy's ill.Jirect.ed
fire. A battery for six guns was constructed in the gorge of the
ruined work, but the pieces themsclve~, which Dickson went to
choose from Eh'as, did not arri vc till tile 14th; thc cask-bridge
at Jerumenha being too weak to bear them. they and their
ammullitiOll had to be ferried over on the flying bridges. The
six 9l4-potluders were placed in position that same night. At
daybreak they opened, and by the time tho.t they hud fired
seventy rounds each, long ere noon, a practicable breach was
made in the nea.rest bastion. Thereupon the governor, seeing
that to have stood all assault with bi~ handful of men would
have been mo.drJess, surrendered at discretion. J-Ie marched out
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with only 9 officers and 357 men under arms, giving up also
96 sick, and some commissaries and medical officers. Several of
his miserable stock of fifteen guns were found to be practically
u~eless save to make a liaise, for (as has already been mentioned)
they were fixed not all proper carriages, but on the main timbers
and wheeb of ox-carts, and could not be ele\'ated or depressed.
The governor deserves some credit for hnving held out five
days; if the Allies had been aware of the weakness of the
garrison, they would have swamped it nt once by an eSClliade.
On the next morning (April1tith) Colealld the 4th Division,
who had at last received their much-needed supply of shoes,
llUl.l'ched to join the rest of the al'my. A Portuguese gurrisoll
WIl8 thrown into Olivenm, but there was no intention to hold it,
if the enemy should COllle up again. It was only a man-trap.
lleresford might 1I0W lun-e illve.;:tcd lladojoz, if it had pleased
him so to do. But he thought it better to drive l.atour-
i\ItLUbourg completely out uf Eslrellludum, IUld across the Sierra
1I:10rel1a, before tnking the siege in hand. The main reason for
his resolve was that it \I'M dear that a week or ten days at lca~t
would be requirL'<.1 to organize a battering-truin at ElvtloS, for the
bombardment and breaching of' the fortrci:s, and he thought it
lllore profitable to spend this interval ill pu.~hing the }'['ench as
far from Bltdajoz as pOS8ible, rather than in sitting duwn before
it to no purpose, and waiting for the appearlUlL'e of the siege-
train. It was apparently an omission on 'VeUinglon's part not
to have ordered Gi;neral Lcite, the go\'eruor uf Elv!\.S, to begin
llIaking preparatiolls for the gathering of l\ purk alld the
collection of a large body of artillerymen, on the same day that
he finally launchL'<1 Beresford's I JOl'ce into Estl'ellludura
(Milrch 16). But this had lIOt been dOllC, llml it was not till
April 18th that Major Alexander DicksOll, who had almudy
learnt whllt was Iwailuble in Elvas while organizing the little
trniu required for the capture of Olivcllza, was directed to take
ill hand the much larh'"Cr 8.lId more difficult task of collecting the
I DicksOll'S JourllallJ, recently llUhlislied by Major Leslie, Il./\., are the
tin;t autl most illJllOtlallt source ill which to SlUlly lllC two c,~rly !lritisl,
sieges of Badajoz, as \Veil as tlte smaller mattel' of OliVCIll-lI. I am usiu;;
thcm I'cl'l'ctuall}' all through Lhe followiug IJ«¥e;,.
OIU.:r, IV T
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men and material destined for the siege of a fjrst~c1ass fortress I.
This delay seems extraordinary: did Wellington think on
March 16th that Badajoz. only five days in the hands of the
French at the moment, would he im;upable of defence whell
Bcresford should appear in front of it ubout the ~5th of that
same month? It is quite possible that this would Imve been
the case, and that the .French would have blown it up. if the
Jerumellha brid!,>'e had been standing ready for the passage of the
army on the next day, ~ 'VellillgWn had supposed. The D~­
patches give us no help on this point; ·Wellington speaks of
investing Badajoz, hut gives no hint as to how the investment
was to be followed up, till March 27th, when he observes to
Beresford thut 'Elva.\l must supply the means for the tl.tw.ck all
BadajoOl, if possible; if it has them not, I mnst send them there;
this will take time, but that canllot be avoided 2:
ElvftS, as matters turned out, did' supply the means,' but the
resources to be fouud there were so limited that, lli; was wittily
said at the time by Pieton, Vie1lington, both in May and ill
J lIue 1811, • sued Badajoz i,n forma pal/peris,' and if the place
had faUen it would have been almost a miracle, for no sutJici~l\t
material to ensure it.~ capture had been collected even by the
month of June. The main difficulty arose from the fact that
'Vcllingtoll llad ne\'er been provided by his Government with
a siege-train. Looking upon the war in Portugal as esscntially
defcnsi"c in character, the Home authorities had forgotten that
it might have offensive episodes, and that a great siCo"'e might
not impossibly be one of them. The Briti~h army in Portugal
possesseU nothing in the way of artillery save the ordinary horse
and field batteries (or' lroops' and' companies' as they were
then called), with their S, 6, and 9-poulldcr guns. If u few
hundred men were told ofr to heavy pieces in the Lisbon lines
during the preceding autumn, it was 1I0t that they were intended
for bllch service-they were parts of incomplete or nuhon;ed
batteries, which had not taken the field when the Clllllpai6'11 of
1810 began, wld were waitiug to complete their e{!uipHHml,
The British army in Portugal was absolutely destitute of
artillery de:>tilled for and trained to the working of sie/:,rc-guns.
1 This date is that given by D'Urbau's Jourllal.
~ Di,palclu!lI, vii. 40i. From GouvC3,.i\Jarcll 2i,
1811] DICK SON'S STRANGE SIEGE-TUAIN
The only lll'itish pieces of heavy calibre used in the spring
of 1811 were ships' cannon lent by the commander of the
squadron in the Tagus.
For such work as was now before them, therefore, the Allies
had to depend entirely on what the Portuguese ufljenals could
supply. But all that could be fOllnd in them was now mounted
OIl the iuterminable locdoubts of the Lisbon lines, save such as
had been !:lent to strcllgthen Eh'us, Abrantes, and Pcniche.
l'mctically eve]')' gUll in l'ortllgal was defending some work,
::;nmll or b'l'eat; they had all been requisitioned down to the
most antique !md imperfect pieces. The walLs of Elvus were
It. perfect museum of ancient artillery: among the heaviest
pit:<:Cll, carefully sorted out because of their calibre, lUul chosen
for the siege-train that wns to batler lladajoz, were to be seen
not only many !e4-ponnden; bearing the arms and cyphers of the
earliest kings of the house of Bragamm, Joi'io Md Affonso, but
still older brass gUlls of' enormous length, showing the names of
l'hilip 111 and IV of Spain, and dating back to the yean; before
1640, when Portugal was a discontented province of the
Hapsburg killgs 1. It seems almost incredible, but is actually
El fact, that some of the cannon used by 'lVellington's lUell
against R'tda,iol': were just two hundred years old. Those that
were not quite so antique were mainly pieces of early eighteenth-
century pattern, without the later improvements invenh.. J by
the J.'reneh scientific artillerymen of' the days of Louis X V and
Louis X VI: for the Lisbon arsellal had persisted in using old
models long after they had been dropped in the larger couutries
of Europe.
The gUllners fOI' the siege were of course mainly POltuguese,
though It few were afterwards drawn from the imperfed British
companies at Lisbon 2. Those first emplo),ed were borrowed
from the bralTison of Elvas; they comprised a great Humber of
recruits only partially trained, but did their best. It ww; the
gUllS, not the men, that were at fuult-or ruther, both the gum;
I DicksOll, ill his JQlIrlull, p. 446, specially mentions lllis curioU9 fact,
and notes the Ilame of I'hilip 111 and the dates 1620,1636, l<Hu, 10.52 on
some of the gUlls he used.
~ "l1lese were the cOlll,Jauies of Bredill, Haynes, It.lyllsford, and Glubb;
scc 1'01. ilL p. 55!).
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and the ammunition, lor the Portuguese C8.1I11on·balls in store,
dl!tiug from all ages, varied much in size, I!lid DicksOll had to
sort each '-'OIlVOY of 24 Ib, or 12 lb. ahpt into batches, some of
which were rather small and some rather large, And to apportion
them to particular pieces. Thc old brass 8e\'enteenth-eenturyguns,
being generally worn from long use, needed the biggest shot,
and c\'cn tllese were so lurge in thc borc that the balls fitted
loosely, and the discharge suffered from' windagc.' The impact
of ~uch :;hot "'as not half what it should have been I. With
.tiuch too18 to cmploy, it is not wonderful that the Allglo-
Porluh'1lesc artillery madc a poor show ut the first siege or
nlldajm;. But worst of all wa!'. the fact that the number of
pieces was at first far too small-Elvas could only spare a certain
!).'ut of the armament of its walls, Md it was 1I0t till some weeks
hud pussed lImt guns, British and !lortugllese, could be brought
up from Lisbon, and with them drafts of artillerymen of both
nations. Uut twenty-three guns and 400 arliUer)'men were all
that Dicksoll could collect for the first siege, and these werc nul
rctldy till April was out; indeed, it was 110 smull achievemcnt
to orgallh'.e ~1 siege--train of any /;ort between April 18th and
May 6th, frolll the sole resourecs of the fortrcss of Elva~. Of
the additional hindrance cawed by the small numbers und the
iucxperielll"C of thc cllgillecr oflkcrs, iLnd the totalltlck of trained
~appers, we shall speak in the proper place.
The ::lpace of time before the siege-tritin for Badajoi: could be
got rcudy was elllployed by DeresforJ in clclIriug southem
Estrcmadllfa of the encmy. Having lcft It brigadc of the
~nd Division at 'l'alavcm H.eal, a battalion of the Lllsitalliml
Legion (from Cole's dh·jsion) in OIiven....a, and some squadrons
of !lortugue8e cuvah'y round the ~outhern front of Badajoz, to
wakh the gttrrisoll, the urmy 1II1lrchc:..'<1 for Sllnta Marta UHt!
Zafra, on thc high-road to Sc\'ille, with its OWll cu\'ulry in frunt,
and Penne Vjllemur's Spanish squad rOils 011 the left (April 16th-
18th), The bulk of the infantry went 110 further fOl'l\'al'd,
because Latour·Maubourg withdrew into the Sierra l\forena 011
the rumour of its npproach. The ca"a!ry continued the pUl~llit
-at l.os Santos 011 the 16th its leading regiment, the 13th Light
• Dicksoll, JOOTIlI./.I, PI). 405, 44B.
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Dragoon.~, had a smart affair with the French rearguard (flnd
Hussars), and routed it with the loss of three officers and
many mon 1• After this Latour-11anbourg new!r stopped till
he had I'cached Guadalcanal, on the borden of Andalusia,
evacuating Llcrclll\ and the other lowns on the Estrcmudurfill
slope of the mountains (April 19th). Bel'csfard thereupon left
his British cavalry at Zafra, and Penile Villemur at Llercntl, to
watch the pmscs, while he drew back his infantry divisions to
lake in hand the siege of Baclajmo: (April20lh), with the excep-
tion of the brigade of Colbornc, which was sent out with some
Spanish horse to demonstrate against Latolll'.!\{aubom'g, and to
drive him still furthel' sonthward if he showed sigl1.~ of irre-
solution.
'Vhilc these operations were in progress, there WM n short and
unexpected diversion in the extreme south-west corner of Estre·
mndura, caused. by the appearance of an outlying French column
ill that quarter, which had. 110 connexioll with Lntour·:Maubourg.
A word as to this is necessary, since its result was to bring a new
Spanish fOfce into Beresford's sphere of operations. When
SOlllt retumed to Andalusia in the middle of March, his fil'St
cam was to drive off' Ballastcros and the other dctn.chment,~
which had been threatening Seville in his absence. They gave
back into the Condado de Niebla, n.c; has already been mentioned.
Hut at the end of the month the situation was complicated by
the news that un expedition from Cndi:t., the division of Zllya.~
had landed at Moguer, ill the estuary of the Hio '1'into, vand
seemed about to join Ballasteros.. If this junction had been
made, the force collected in the west would have been too Im'gc
to be safely neglected, Wherefore Soult sent ont General
Mamnsillllnd the Prince of Arembcrg, the former with sevell
battl\liolls of Gazau's division, and the latter with two Clll'ah'y
regiments, to attack the Spaniards, At the approach of this
column of 4,500 men Zayas re-embltl·ke<l. losing 300 men from
his renrgunnl in so doing (April!). Ballustcros retired into the
mOllntains. i\{arallfiin thought it his duty to cndeavour t.o
make an end of this a<..'tive and elusive adversary, whose con·
stant llppearanccs and reappearances on thc Aank of Seville had
1 Long says that the 13th took ahout 150 I)ri~onel"ll (VindicatiQIl, p. 104),
hnt tlle !-"'rellcl. accounts do not acknowledge 1I11}'tlLing like sucl' lQS.Q.
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caustod so much trouble. Sending back his cavalry and glln~ he
plunged into the hills with his infantry, and for twelve days hunted
Hal1astcl'Os up and down the rugged upper valleys ofthe Odiel and
the Rio Tinto. On April l£th Balla!ltero~ gradually pushed
northward,came down to Fregenal,on the bordersofEstrcmndura,
where he offered battle, but was beatcn, and fled to Xeres de
105 Caballeros. Maransin pursued, and reAChed thnt place on
thc 14th, while llallRSteros retired to Salvatierra de los &r1'Os,
not far from Santa Marta, and close on the flank of Beresfol'd's
firmy. Mnransiu, who had long been cut ofI' from touch with
other I,'rench detachments, was wholly unaware that he had
run into the neighbourhood of a Dritish force, and would hllse
been captured, or defeated, if he had stayed a day longcr at
Xeres, fOI' Ballnsteros had called fol' help to Bercsford, and
the latter waS preparing to throw two divisions upon his f1nnk
ancl rear 1. Letters from Latollr-Maubourg to Mamnsin, to
warn him of his danger, were intercepted by the guerrillel'Os
and sent to thc British camp 2. But an Ajrallcesado, one of
the principal inhabitants of Xel'es, wnrned the l~rench general
just before it was too late: and, hastily leaving his position at
night, Mnransill retired into Andalusia \,ia Fregeual aud Aracenu,
and ultimately joined I.atour-Maubourg by a circuitolls route.
Ballasteros stayed behind in Estremfl.dura, and the allied force
in that province was strengthened by his 3,500 men. But this
was not all: the Regency at Cadiz resolved to place tl. con-
siderable army in this direction, their own city being more than
amply garrisoned, aud expeditions to the south being unpopular
since the fiasco that followed Darrosa. all April 25th Gcneral
J:Hake took the two dh'isions of Zayas and Lardizaool (both
of which had fought at Barl'osa), and lauded with them at
Ayamonte, the port in the mouth of the Guadiana. From
thence he moved up along the Portuguese fronticr, and joined
1 V'Urban visited Bnllasteros's camp on tlle 14th and settled with him
all tlle details of a joint march against l\laransin (wllOrn Illey wrongl)'
supposed to \le d'Arem!>erg, not knowing that the latter had returned to
Seville with the cavalry). 'If d'Aremberg takes the liait, and folloll"s
Ballasteros, he must (Ill lost altogether; even if he halts at Xeres we OUgllt
to get hold of him,' writes D'Urban in llis diary. Rut i\laransin /led on
the morning of the 16th.
2 U'Urball's diar)' under the 17th April.
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Bullasteros near Xel'cs dc los Caballeros about [l fortnight later.
IJetwcen them the)' Imd over 10,000 infantry and about 800
cavalry, but few guns, for Blake found it difficult to horse the
batteries that he had brought with him, and left all save six
pieces behind, at Ayamonte, to follow when they could procure
teams. They had not rejoined him four weeks later, whell the
battle of Albuera was fought. The presence of lllake was not
altogether an unmixed benefit, for he was independent of
Castaiios, who commanded the' 5th Army' 01' old Estremaduran
force, and the two generals were ancient rivals and did not seem
likely to co-operate with nn)' <:ordiaLity. Dut if Soult wus to
make his appeamllce for the relief of Badaj07., it was as well that
the Allies should be as strollg as possible on the front by which
he must attack.
Before, however, Dlftke had arrived in Estremadura., the invest--
ment of Dadajoz had begUll. It was directed by 'Wellington
hilllseU~ who dropped suddenly into the middle of the campaign
on the 20th, when he arriverl at Elwl..s. Having seen Massena
retrent to Salamanca, and break up hi::! army into Ctl.ntonmcllts,
he now considered that it was safe for him to pay the! visit to the
south which he had always projected. Leaving Sabugal on
April 16th, he rode across country by Castello llraneo and
Niza, and reached El\'M on the fifth night. The next day but one
he eonduded a reconmlistiUllce of lladtljoZ, escorted by a brigade
newly landed at Lisbon, whieh he had ordered to join Deresford
-Alten's two light battalions of the King's Gel'man Legion.
The examination of the defenees of the fortress was made under
some difficulties, for at the moment when ''''eUington was riding
round the walls a large working party of the garrison, which had
been dispatched to cut timber in the woods to the south, was
returning into the place. PhiUipOll, the governor, thinking that
\Vellington's eS<.'Ort was a detachment sent to cnt off' his work-
men, came hastily out of the fortress with three ba~talions. and
swept off the high-road two companies of the Germans who were
ll(.'(.'Ompanying the hctul-quarters' staA~ with the los::! of fifty or
sixty men. The working party hu~ried to join their friends,
and got into the gate before the main bod,Y of Alten's brigade
could come up. This intcrruption being over, '\\relliugtoll com-
pleted hifl llun'ey of the whole circuit of lladajoz, and on the
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ncxt d:l.y (Apl'i123rd) is.'lUe<1 elaborate orders to Beresforn, COll-
cerning the policy to be observed in Estremadura during the
siege. He had ncvcr intended to sWo}' more than a few days
in the south, to supen'i~e affnirs, and on the fl5th a dispatch
received from Sir Brent Spencer, the senior officer left with the
main amlY in the north, rcported such activity of the French in
that dircction that he rooe hard for the fmutiers of J-£OI1, whcl'e
he :l.rl'ivecl OH the 29th.
The orders dictated to Bel'esford governed the whole eouN-C of
the Cilmpldgll in Estrclllndul'(l. during the llext month, nnd wcre
of the highest importance, 'VcUington directed t1mt the siege
of Badajoz should be begun the moment that the guns and
material lI'ere ready, but warned his colleague that its COIll-
mencement would infallibly bring Soult to the relief of thc
plnec, with every available man thnt he could SCl'llpe togethcr
frol11 AndalusiR. It wns impossible to Cfl.lculate what the
strength of his army would be: if he raised the siege of Cadiz
01' e\'llcuatcd Granada, so that he could bring Il vcr)' huge force
with him, lleresford was to retire behind the Guadiann, anci
assume a defellAive pOAition on the Caya river in front of Elnls.
If foreell fmm thence, he must retire even as far as POt'l:alegl'C
should it be necessar)'. But ifSoult (as wus more likely) camc lip
with a force which was not absolutely o\'erwhelming in numbers,
, Marshallleresford will consider of and decide upon the chau<.'C
of sucCess, nceordillg to Il. view of the relutive number of both
armies, Ulld making a rCiLSOnable aUowance fOl" the number of
Spanish troops which will co-operate with him. . . . If he
should think his strength sufficient to fight a general action
to snve the siege of lladajoz, he will collect his troops to fight
it. I belie\'e that, upon the whole, the most central llnd
ndvllntageotls place to collect the troops will be at Alhuera....
All this must of course be left to the decision of Sir William
Be1'Csford. I authorize him to fight the action if he should
think proper, 01' to retire if he should not I,'
The co-operation of the Spaniard\! was the crucial point.
Unless it were assured, 'Vellington considered that lkl'esforo
mLlst assume the more cautious and defensive attitude. If it were
secured, the bolder policy might be pursued. The lines which
I Di8fHltch~J vii. 491-2,
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'Vellington laid down were in the main those which had nlready
been suggested by Beresford: (1) Ca.<;taiios must undertake to
keep the horse of Villemur in the Sierra Morena, closely observing
LlI.tour*Mallbourg, bnt forbid him to engage in any fighting;
he must retire if pres.~ed; the infantry of the 5th army must
stay at lHeridn., as at present, but be ready to join Beresford if
Soult invaded Estremadura. (Q) Ballasteros was to take a similar
position on t.he ot.hcr flank, with his head quarters at Durgllillo~
(llCllr Zafra) I llud his advII.lJ(:ed posts at Pregenal and Monas*
teria; if Soult moved fOl'wanl, he was to join Bercsfol'u
without attempting to fight. (3) When lllake's iLrmy had landC!I,
it II"M to pass lip the Guadiaua, and take post at Xeres de
105 Caballeros; all any alarm from Soult. it was (like the other
Spanish troops) to join Beresford at once. If these arrange-
ments worketl, at least 15,000 Spanian:ls would be in line at
Alhuera, the chosen position, to assist in holding back Soult.
And,l\s wc- shall sec. the scheme did work eXl\ctly liS 'Nellingtoll
had designed, and the whole force was collected. (4) Lastly,
and this was all*important, when the allied forces were concen-
trated, they must be placed undN· a single commander, and not
worked with divided authority and divided respollsibilit)" as had
heen the rose in the Talavera campaign of 1809. Cuncerning
BJllke there could be no difficult)', as he was junior to Castn.Jios,
and the latter bad consented to place himself at Beresford's
disposition when they met at Jerumenha on Mal'ch 30th. Too
much praise cannot be gil'en to his reasonable amI conciliatory
conduct, which WOIlC rcndered possible the co-operation of all
the allied forces during the ensuing campaign.
'Vellillgton therefore, as is c1ellr, furesaw the whole l"Out"SC of
subseqnent opemtions, and even fixed the exact bnttle-spot on
which the fate of Soult's attempt to relieve Bndajo7. lVould be
decided. Thc only point left to Deresford's decision WM
whether the strength of the Fl·ench army was such as to render
a successful resistance PC?ssible. And when we come to con*
sideI' the respective forces at the disposition of the two parties,
it can hardly be urged that Beresford was wrong to accept
battle. 'That his victory was a hmxl-fought amI costly onc came
, Not to be confused with another Burguillos on the GUlulalquivir,
north of SeI·i!1C.
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from minor tactical ch'Cumstaut'Cs, which will be explained in
their due place.
As to the details of the projected siege of Badajoz, Wellington
laid down an equally clear policy. All gUlls and material were
to be collected in Eln\s, Campo Mayor, and Oli\'cllza, and nul
to move till everything was ready. The main communications
of the arIDY were to be across a floating bridge to be constmeted
at the junction of the Cayn and the Guadiuna., fh,c miles below
Dadajoz and six. from Elms. The permanent bridge of Meridn
and the temporary bridges at Jermuenha would be subsidiary
resonrces. Lastly, and here was the most important point, the
general scheme to be pursued was that the besiegers should first
reduce the allUying defences of Bndajoz, Fort San Cristobnl
on the north bank of the Gnadiann, the Pardn,leras and the
Picurina on the south bank. Only when all these were taken
would operations against the city itself be begun. To quote
theconcludillg paragraph of "Vellington's memomndulll: • ''''hen
the British army shall be in possession of San Cristobal, Picurina
and Pardaleras, Marshal Beresford will determine upon the
point at which he will attack the body of the place. It is
believed that, upon the whole, one of the south faces will be the
most advantageous:
There can be no doubt that all the mishaps of the two first
British sieges of Badajoz had their origin in these original
orders of'Vellingtoll, which were drawn up on the advice of his
chief engineer, Colonel Fletcher. The great mistake was the
choosing of the almost impregnable fort of San Cristobal as one
of the three first points of attack, and the making illl subsequent
operations depend upon its capture. No doubt the possession
of this lofty and commandiJlg work would render the fall of
Badajoz certaill, sim:e it overlooh-d the castle and tlll the
northern end oHhe city. But it was the strongest purt. of the
whole defences, fmd when the miserable and antiquated train of
artillery at Beresford's disposition is taken into consideration,
and it is rcmcmbered that the siege Wll.$ to be conducted
•against tim~' as it were, i,e. with th~ hope that it might be
eoncluded before Soult could collect a relieving force, it is cleal'
that San Cristobal ought to have been left alone, The otilel'
points designated by Wellington, the Pardaleras find Picurilla,
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were llluch more accessible, and the capture of one or other of
them would have brought the besiColYCrs close to the walls, though
neither of them commanded the whole city ill the same fashion
liS San Cristobnl. The best commentary all the sieges of 1811
is that a year later, at the third and successful leEl.c.<YUer, Welling.
tall left the high-lying fort on the other side of the Guo.dio.no.
entirely alone. The original orders of 1811 gave three separate
and distinct objl."Ctives, and nOllC of thesc wcre to be mere' false
attacks,' since it is distinctly said thnt operations agninf<t the
clll.'einte were only to begin when all three of the forts were in
Dritish hands. \Vellingtoll was not a trained cngineer; hc was
dependent OIl the advice of the officers of that arm, and it
seems that they gave him bud. counsel, as they certainly did to
Beresford during the subsequent weeks. The most puzzling
thing is to make out why Colonel Fletcher and his colleEl.c.<YUes
ignored Soult's precedent; the French engineers had concentrated
their attack on the Pardaleras front as their sole obje<:ti I'C, fOl'
their other operations were false attacks. The English
engineers, instead of concentrating their eflods in the same way.
wasted their work on three separate points, which was all the
more incxcusable because they knew thnt the resources which
their comrades of the artillery arm had at their disposition were
most illtldequate for a great siege. Hcnee came a very costly
and deplorable series of failures.
On the day of \Vellington's departure fmm Eh'llS heavy mill
fell, and the Guadiau!l rose" high, lIot merely washing away the
cask-bridge at Jerul1lellhn, but rendering the working of the
flying bridges impossible. This was a serious matter; not only
did it put a temporary stop to the communications betwCCll
Elvas and the army. but it raised the question as to what might
happen if a similar mischance were to occur when Soult was in·
vading Estremadum. For if the J cl'Umenhn. bridges should break
when the Allies were concentrated at Albllera, they would have
no line of retreat and an impassable river behind. Beresford,
with this possibility ill his eye, olxlel'oo an alternath'e line of
communication to be established viII. Merida, and sent a brigade
of the 2nd Division thither to reillforl.'C the Spnniards ofMorillo,
and a day later the whole 4th Division. His anxiety on this
point d.id not cease till, Oil the 5th of May, fl. strong pontoon
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bridge hnd been bllilt at the point selected by "Vellington, the
place where the CtLya falls into the GlIadiann. By this time the
JCI'lImenha bridges were again it! working order, but it was cleal'
that it would be a mistake to trust the whole snfety of' the army
to them.
It was only on this same day (May 5) that Colonel Fletcher
amI ~:ll~or Alexander DicksOll reported to Bel'csford that they
wcre ready to produce the means for the lltlAck on lladll:joz: the
former had his stock of plntforms, fascines, and gabions pl'epal'ell ;
the latter had organized the first convoy of artiller)' and aHllnu·
nition from Eh'as. On the 6th, therefore, the investment of
Ba.dajoz on the south side of the Guadiann. was completed by
the British brigadcs of Lumley llnd Alten and the Portuguese
brigade of }<'onscca, while on the following day the brigade of
Kemmis and the 17th Portuguese (part of the garrison of Elvas)
appeared opposite San Cristobal, and shut in the plac.;e on the
northern bank of the rivcr, The rest of the infantry 1 encamped
as a support of the besieging force in the woods between
Badajoz and Albuera, but the cavalry still remained in southern
Estremlldura, and Colborne's Lrigade had been for some da)'s
(April 30th-May 11th) executing n. demonstration in the Sierra
MOl'Clla, with the object of keeping Latour-Manboul'g employed,
This last operation, owing to Colborne's skilful manilc"'ement of
his column of fl,OOO infwltry and two squadrons each of Spanish
and Portuguese horse, had been vcry successful. On hearing of
British infantry in his front, the French general evacuated hi~
posts on the crest ofthe mountains, Guadalcanal, Fuente O\'ejunR,
Azuaga, and Monasterio, and feU back south-eastward toward!!
Constalltina on the Cordo\'a road, abandoning the direct line of
l'Ctreat on Seville, which he had hitherto covered. Colbol'ne,
Sl.ftel' clearing all these places, extended his march eastward into
a very wild alld unexplored country, and summoned the isolated
~stle of llenalca.zar, the only French garrison left north of the
Sierra Morena, ,"Vhen it refused to listen to a summons, he
had to leave it, ha\'illg neither guns to batter it nor time to
waste. From thence he returned by a circular sweep through
• Hogllton's brigade of the 2nu Dil'ision, i\fyeTS'~ "Ild H"r\'cy'~ IJrigllde~
of tlle 'l-th Division, CampbeU's brigade of Hamilton's Portuguese dil'ision.
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Campanario to Almendralejo, where he once more was in touch
with the British army (May 11th).
The first episodC!s of the siege of Badujoz werc not vcry
encouraging to the besiegers. On the 8th trenchp-s were opened
opposite all the three points of attack designated by 'Wellington,
the PiClll'ill(l. and Po.rdaleras forti> 011 thc south side, and San
ICl'istobaI on the north. In each cl\.Se the first parallel was
started at about ,100 yards from the wall:;; Dicksoll hud told
off' fourteen !:24-poundcrs and two B-inch howitzers for the
work 011 the left bank, five 24-pounders aud two other howitzers
for thc utto.ck on So.u Cristobal. Mol'c CUCl'gy was displayed ill
this last quarter than in the others, apparently from thc notion
that if this COlllUlUlldillg work could bc suWuctl the rest of the
siege would be an ensy lllutter" But the results wcre disappoint-
ing: on the stony slopes of San Cristobal there was little earth
to throw lip, and the spade gritted agai!lst rock at three inches
from the surface. At the end of the first night's diggillg the
trench was but a seam, amI therc was only olle section ut which
nbout ten men could work under {:over. The rest hud to be
abandollC!d during daylight., for thC! ellemy kept up a fltl'ious
fire, lIot merely from the fort, but from the citu.dcl on the other
side of the riYel", whose flank battery enfiladed the pl'Ojected
trench. Three out of nine engineer offiC€I'S present on this frout
were killed or wounded ill the {il'St twenty-folll' hours, and lImuy
of the workers frOll! Kenunis's brigade and the 17th Portuguese.
It. SOOIl beeame obvious thut the tl'clIches would hu.ye to be built
with earth from a distance and gabions, rather than excavated.
Ne\"ertheless, a battery for Dickson's five Q4,poullden; was
sketchL'{1 out, lUH] begun to be visible to the Cllemy. On the
night of the 10th rhillipon sent up a reserve battalioll into
Sun Cristohul, amI cxccutL>d II sortie upon the British works.
It pelletmted into the trenches, but was driven out after t\.l;hnrp
struggle by the covering part)'. Bnt, pursuing too far, the
British came under the gUllS of San Cristobal, and had tu retirc
to their trenches with lamentably heavy loss 1. Ne.'i:t day the
battery was completed, despite of a deadly fire both from the
I &I D'Uru.'lU'5 diary uuder"May lUh, The 10S'l "'as o'"cr -lOO lllClI, of
11'110111 :!07 were ill the -!Qth, 11U in the 27th, 75 ill tile !.17th, and 3U in tile
litll l'ortuguese. The frendl lust a1J.uut 200 mell Qui}'.
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fOlt and the castle, und opened upon its objective. But it was
completcly ovenllastered, and before night four of its live guns
had been dam~cred or dismounted; three more engineer officers
were hurt, leaving only three sllrvh'ing of the original nine. It
is said that the battery open~d before it had been illtcndcd-
a fault of over-zcal on the part of the Portuguese major ill
command. Beresfotd'f! purpose had been to wait till the other
attacks, on the Picurina and Patdaleras, were ready. before
beginning to batter San Cristobal. '1'hc~e attacks had met with
less difficulty, the ground being easier to dig, and on the evcuillg
of the 11th the trenches in front of the Picurilla were well
advanced, and the battery of ten guns there opened upon the fort
with some, but lIot great, effect.
Seeing thc San Cristobal attack faring so badly, thc cllgincers
got leave to erect a second bnttery on that side, further down
the hill, which was intended to check the enfilading fire from the
other side of the Guadiana. More gUllS were brought up to the
original battery, to replace those that hud been damaged. But
both batteries were O\'erpowered and badly maltreated 011 the
morning of the 1!eth. A few hours later news arrh'ed from the
south, sent by Ballasteros, to the eflcct that the .French were ill
motiou from Seville with a largc relieving army, Rnd were
marching hard across the Sierra l\loremt,just as'Vellingtoll Imd
expected; they had reached Santa 01la1& on the 1Uh, and were
alrelldy in touch with Latour-l\Iaubourg. Since their force was
cstimated at only ~3,OOO mCll-lIot far from the real amount
-Beresford resolved to fight, and sent requests to CastRllos,
Ballasteros, and Blake to concentrate on Albuera, the battle-
ground selected by ·Wcllhlbrton. It was fortunate that Bluke
WIlS now ill close touch and available-he hud reached Frcb'Cllal
Oil the 9th and Barcarrota on the 12th, so that his anival was
c'ertaitl, unless some unforeseen aceident should OCCUI'. 'Vithout
his aid it would have been doubtful policy to wait fot' Soult and
risk t~ gClIcl'ul action; but with his 10,000 Illell ill }jue the Allies
would have wcllnigh S5,000 men availll.ble, if every unit came
complete to the field.
Meanwhile, pending the cOllflrmll.tioll of the news of the
French advallc~, Beresford's engincers asked lCt\.vc to opcn
another parallel, and ] ,400 mcn had been paraded f'ot' the
Batteries~
terra de
San Mi!luel
Fd/se A"dCk(M,y)
'~"~'8 San Pedro ~ \ 1.'
.v. .......,""t-,., "S'CALE °LI ....L ..JIENGLlSH MILE
BASTIONS
I San v,ncente
2 San Jose
3Santlaga
4 San Juan
SSta.Maria
6 San RO'llle
7 Tr/nidad \
[B~A::::::D:;;A;;J~O~Z~c-T_ll.~_--".--T..:..he_1-"wo BritishSieges (May & June 1811)
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purpose of st.arling it, when complete details as lo Soult's
progress Cllme to hand. It had been so rapid that the Marshal
at once ordered all the siege operations to be discontinued,
though the engineers tried to persuadc him to risk two du.)'s'
more work, by the vain promise that they would undertake to
produce two practicablc breaches in that space of time.
Beresford wisely refused to listen to thcm, and ordered that all
the guns and ammunition should be retul"lled at once to El vas,
with such of thc siege stores as (:ould be readily mo\'ed, But
the UlasS of gabiolls and {Ilseines had to be burllt, as thcse would
be profitable to the garrison, ana wOllld certainly be carried into
the town if they were left intact. The troops, English, }>ortu·
gll~, und Spanish (three battalions of Castaiios's infantry hud
comc up from Merida), were ordered to prepare to march for
Albuera ill successive detachments, the 4th Diyisioll aJ1d the
Spilllillrds bcing left to the last in the trcnches, to cover the
femo\'tI.1 of the gUlls and stores.
Beresford's tobl casualties in this mismalla,6red frugmcnt of
a siege, from 1\fny (jth to Ma)' 12th, had been 533 lJritish nnd
200 }'ortugllese, or 733 in all, lost in the trenchel> alld in the
l>ortie. It will bc ~n that the sortie cost far morc lives than
the actual bclcllguering work, All the British loss savc scven
casualties was ill Kemmis's brigade of the 4th Division!, which
la)' 011 the Cristobal side, 1l.IId suRcred both ill thc trcnch·blliId·
hlg and in the sortic, The Portngnese loss wu,.;; parlly ill thc
17th Line, which acted with Kellllnis, partly among the artillery.
l Jj271h l 1/4Oth l and 97th }'oot,
SECTION XXVI: CHAPTER 11
FUElVTES DE oN-ono: PRELIMINARY OPEUATIONS.
APIUL 12-MAY 3, UIlI
'flU: Army of Portugal, sullenly retiring fUI' wi~hill t.he
frontiers of Spain, had been lost to Wellington's sight 011
April 8th, when it passed the Agueda and fell back in diverging
columns towards various towns of the kingdom of Leoll-
Salamanca, Toro, and z.amora-where it went into cantonments.
Gnly Dronet with the two di"i::;iolls of Conroux and ClaparCdc
rClllamed ill observation of' the Allies, with his heau quarters at
San i'Hui'iOi:. The nritish general was well IlWltl'C of the
dilapidated state ill which the enemy had reached his base, tl.lld
calculdcd that it would take llmllY weeks for Massclm to b'Ct
hi!; army into fighting trim again. He considered that he
might even hope to gain possession of Almeida before the
French would be in u position to attempt its rdief, though it
could only fall by famine, since there were no heavy guns to form
a battering-train for its siege nearer than Oporto, Abrantes, or
Lisbon. He had nlrendy inspL'Cled the place, und saw that it
had been put in such a good state of defence by the gO\'e1110r,
Brcnnier, that all external traces of the great explosion of
August 1810 htu! dil>!\ppcaroo, That the town within was ~tjJl
a Illass of ruins, with nearly every house cut off' sheer at the first
story, was of no military importance, when the enceinte and the
bomb-proofs were ill good order.
There WM a short moment during which \Vellingtoll had
:>ame hopes of being able to lay hands on Ciudad Hodrigo as well
as AJllleida, He had learnt t1mt the Spanish fortress wall almost
as depleted of food as the IJortuguese, and that Mnssena's troops
had consumed 200,000 rations from its stoW! when they reached
the frontier; he thought that the extra garrison which JUllol
hlul thrown into it, before he passed ollward, would only BeI'Ve to
exhaust the magdi:illeS so much the earlier. Accordingly he lIot
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only requested that Rctive and enterprising partisan .Juliall
Sanchez, to beset the roads between Salamanca and Rodrigo, in
order that no provisions might get through, but made prepara·
tions to throw some British light troops across the Agueda to
co-operate with him, when the approach of a convoy should be
reported. 'Vilh this object he IUm'ed up the Light Division
and Arentschildt's brigade of cavalry close to the Agueda and
within a few miles of Rodrigo. Their head quarters were at
Gallegos, their outposts extended from the bridge of Barba. del
Puerco on the north as far as El Bodon on the south. It wa<;
intended that, when Don Juliall signalled the approach of the
French, the Light Division should make a dash across the fords
of the Agueda, and endeavour to intercept the convoy. This
plan failed on the 13th of April, owing, as Wellington held, to
the slowness of Sir William Erskinc I, who was still in command
of the division, though news had just arrived-to the great
satisfaction of a.ll the battalions-that its old general, Craufurd,
was daily expected at Lisbon on his way to the front.
Rodrigo having been rcvietualled, Wellington abandoned all
hope of molesting it further; to have im'ested it would have
been useless, when he had no siege-train. But Almeida he
intended to reducc at his leisure, being of the opinion that it
would be starved out before Ma.ssena was in a position to take
the field to relieve it. Nothing short of his whole army would
suffice for that operation-if that c\·cn wcre enough. And
knowing that the troops had just reached Salamanca in a
demoralized and discontented condition, without shoes, without
train, mmost without ammunition, and with the remnant of their
cavalry and artillery horses dying off at the rate of several
hundreds a day, Wellington doubted if his advcrsary would be
able to come out of his cantonments before the summer was far
spent. At any rate, he calculated that he had tl &"000 many
we;ks before him, in which he was not likely to find the Army
of Portugal a serious danger. Accordingly he resoh'ed to put
I Wellington to Beresford, April 14th: <Sir William Erskine did lIot
£eml a detachment across the Agueda in time, as I b:ul. desireu him,
::mu the consequeuce is that the French got their convoy into Cil1u:ul.
ROIlrigo yesteruay lIlorniug.... Tt i~ useless now to keell 311yhodr on
the other slue of the Agueua.' Digpatchef. vii. 467.
Q... II. ,., IJ
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his own host into cantonments also, in such a position as to
block the road to Almeida, and to give it a well-earned rest
while that fortress was being starved out. He had, as we
observed in a previous chapter, no intention of assuming the
offensive against the lrench in Leon till he had organh:ed his
line of communication with his new base at Coimbra, and
established large intermediate depots at Lamego, Celorico, llnd
other conveniently placed localities. The army was living from
hand to mouth,-all the country about Almeida, Guarda. and
Sabugal having been thoroughly devastated,-oll cOllvoys which
were only struggling up at irregular intervals from the lower
Mondego. The horses especially were in very poor order, from
want of proper forage. 'The regiments subsisted on the green
corn, which was dreadful to the inhabitants, and of little nse to
the horses, when they had to work. There was nothing else,
and we had to cut their rye.... How our army has been
carried though this desolateabnndoned country is astonishing1.'
Till there were depOts and a regular service established, it was
impossible to concentrate the army, much less to send it forward
into Spain.
Accordingly the allied troops were spread broadcast in the
villages between the Con and the Agueda. The Light Division
llnd two cavalry regiments 2 were in front, holding the outposts
facing Ciudad Rodrigo, and in touch with Drouet's corps, which
lay along the Yeltes, a stream that runs roughly parallel with
the Agueda, at a distance of from 8e\'en to fifteen miles to the
north-east. The 5th Division was in the villages around Fort
Col}(:epcion, in support of the Light Division. The 6th Division,
with Pack's Portuguese, who had lately come up from the
Mondego, where they had been dropped during the pursuit of
MasseUR S, were blockading Almeida. The main body of the
army, the 1st, 3rd, and 7th Divisions, with Ashworth's inde-
pendent Portuguese brigade 4, were cantoned in the valleys of
'Tomkinson's(16th Light Dragoons) Diary, AprillOth-llth (p. 98).
I 14th Light Dragoons and 1st Hussars K.G.L.
Z See above, I). 199:
• Sometimes called !':lInpIOnll's bngnde in Wellington's dispatches of
this date, Colonel Pamplona 113ving ~n in tem{Xlrary command during
Ashwortl,'s abscucc.
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t.he Dos Casn.s and t.he 'I'mon, tributaries of t.he Agueda. being
dist.ributed between Navade Aver, Fuentes de Oiloro, Pozo :Bello,
and other small places ill t.he neighbourhood. The cavalry,
save that. det.ached to the front, was trying to keep its horses
alive in the poor villages along the Con, from Castello Rodrigo to
Alfayates J. The whole army, distributed in a square of 1I0t more
than twenty milc9, was so placed that. it. could concent.rate at.
any point in onc march. Wellington, even though he judged
l\fassena unable to molest him, was determined notto bec8.ught
with his troops in a state of dispersion.
But considering that thing.~ were at present at a standstill
Oil the northern frontier, and that nothing serious could be
undertaken there, till the line of supplies was organized ami
Almeida captured, 'Vellington now resolved to pay the long-
deferred visit to Estremooura which he projected as far oock AA
the commencement of Massena's retreat. 'At this moment,' he
I\'l"Ote to Lord LivcqXlOl, 'the first. object is ccrtuinly Budajoz.'
Till that place should have been recovered and regarl;son.ed, he
could never feel quite safe on his southern Rank. A diversion
011 the part of Soult ill the Alemtcjo, threatening Lisbon from
the south, would always be a dangerous and tirewme possibility,
until Badt\joz was oill:e more in the hands of the Allies, and all
Estromadura reeovere<1 and held by a competent force. The
future was inscrutable-for all Wellington knew the Emperor
might appear in person, before the summer was o\'er, to take up
the Spanish problem; or, Oil the other hand, the atfilirs of Eastem
Europe might cause him to shut off all reinforcements from the
Peninsula, and to turn his attention to a Russian war. But
whatever might happen, it WM well to haye the Portuguese
frontier properly (.'Overed ill the south. Supposing the French
made another march on Lisbon, it was necessary to be free of
danger in 'the rear. Supposing that they showed weakness, and
dropped the oJlcnsivc, the possession of'Budajoz and Estremaduru
gave facilities for disquieting the Army of Andalusia, perhaps
for raising the siege of Cadiz, which could not be sccured ill an)'
other fashion.
, Barbw;ena's Portuguese on the lower Coo, below Almeida ~ t.he British
1st Hopl!! and l.Oth l.ight DragoOIlA 011 the upper Coa.
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Meanwhile Wellington formulated three possible courses I
which the French might pursue during the next two months,
before Ilew reinforcements could reach them from :Fmnce, or
the Emperor make his appearance-if so he should decide to
do. These three possible courses were: (a) Masscna might call
on Bessieres, and induce him to join the Anny of Portugal at
once with all his disposable troops, in order that they might
save Almeida by driving off the British army. (b) Massella
might allow his troops a long repose in cantonments, relieving
the Army of the North in its present charge of Old Castile,
while Bessieres, with such part of his corps as he could
collect, might ilmwe Galicin, to clear the French right Rank.
(c) Massena might give his troops the repose that they needed,
and, after some inten'al, might pass south into Estremadura, to
join Soult in operations 011 the GuadiallfL, while leaving Bessieres
in eharge of the defence of the frontiers of Lean. It will be
seen that the French actually adopted first plan (a), the endeavour
to Sll.ye Almeida by a jum:tion of the Armies of Portugal and
the North, and then, a month later, plan (c), a concentration
in Estremadura to Stlye Badajoz. Oddly enough, ·Wellington
conceived that the first plan was the least likely of the three,
apparently because he o"er-estimated the time which it would
take Masseua to reorganize his army and resume active opera-
tions. He did not make enough allowance for the old Marshal's
obstinacj', and for the pride which forbade him to allow Almeida
to fall without any effort being made to relieve it. But though
he thought this scheme the least likely for the French to adopt,
he made full provisions for dealing with it, in case it should
be the one they selected. His second suggestion, that Bessieres
might hand over the charge of Old Castile to Massena, and
1 11,e vcry interesting dislll.leh in ",Iliclt "'ellingtoll's fOl'L'CMt is stated
is tllat to Castailos of April 15, written ill French. 'KD pensant a cc
qll'ils doivellt faire dans leurs cirCOllstances actuelles, je trouve que
(1) ou ils felOut l'illvasion de la Galicc avec le corps de Bessieres, pendant
que Massella dOllnera du repos a ses troupes, dans les cantonnement3
OCClljM;!e jllsqu'a present par Be.ssicres: (2) ou ils se joinurout, IKllIr
tomber sur mon corps sur la rrontiere de la Castille-ce qUi n'est pas tr~s
vraisemblallle: (3) ou ils ne reront rien jusqu'.i cc que lea troupes de
Masselll. soycnt reposees et rcmises cn etat, Iln3.1HI i1s rnssemblerunt Ulle
gr;mue amlee dans_l'Esttllmadure.' DilpalcMI, vii. p. 470.
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proceed to iJJVOOC GaJieiu, was founded 011 an insufficient
knowledge of the present situation and difficulties of the
Army of the North. Bessieres, though the gross umount of
his forces was large (over 70,000 men), was much too obsessed
and worried by the guerrilleros to dream ofconcentrating a force
Inrge enough to make u serious invasion of Galicia. ':Ve shall
find him, three weeks after the date of '-Vellington's dispatch,
declaring that he could only collect 1,600 cavalry and oue battel'y
to form It field force, because any movcment of his infantry
would imperil the whole fabric of the French supremacy in
northern Spain. H the objection be raiSftI that this plea of
his was only put forth in order to disoblige Massena, and to
save himself from responsibility, no such objection can be made
to his statement of June 6th-made after Masscna's recall-to
the effect that if he were forced to concentrate 20,000 men
for any purpose, all (:ommullicatioIlS with FruIK'C and Madrid
would be lost, and the whole of the country-side, from the Gua-
dialla to the Bay of Biscay, would blaze up in one general
immrrcetioll I. Supposing that MassClla and Bcssiere!i had bee1l
on the best of terms, and that the former had proposed to
take over the charge of the region occupied by the latter, in
order to set the Arllly of the North fi-ee for /ield operations,
Bessieres lllust have replied that he would not be able to produce
enough men to 'contain' the British army. alId at the same time
to attiLCk Galicia. ·Wellington's hypothesis therefore was faulty;
he undervalued the work of the guerrilleros, who were occupying,
101' his benefit, the attention of a much greatcr part of the
French arm,)' than he supposed. The idea that the enemy might
make a blow at Galicia was inspired by his knowledge of the
weakness of that province, where Ml\hy had put evcr>,thing
out of' gear, and Santocildes had not yet begun the proces.s
of reorgani:r.a.tion. Knowing how disastrous the appearance of
a French corps in this quarter might prove, he feared it more
than was necessary Il.
I Bessi~re~ Lo Bertllier, from Vnlllltlolill, ,rune G, 1811,
t It is possible that there is some diplomatic intention in tlte stress laid
by 'Ve.lliugtou on tile likdihoou of 11 Frcndl illVWS;Oll of Glllicia. He
was writing to Castaiios, and it was bill object to get that general to stir
up the GaHcians. Hence, perhaps, lie exaggcrateu a l'OSSibility which was
not so strong as lie stated.
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If it be asked what were Napoleon's views as to the proper
s.cheme for the French mm-shals to ndopt, under the circum-
stances that existed on April 15, we must not look (of course)
to orders issued about that time, when he was still working on
data thn'C weeks old. As late as Mat'ch 30th he had been
sending instructions to Soult and other commanders on the
hypothesis that Massena's head quarters were at Coimbra, and
that Oporto was very possibly in French hands! 1 On April 9
he was telling thc Prince of' Essling to dc\'Otc his energy to
the armament of Almeida, and to place himself so as to cover
both that place and Ciudad ltodrigo *-orders exquisitely in-
applicable whcn Almeida W!lS alrcady block.uded by Wellingtoll,
and Massena's troops had just crnwled past Ciudad Uodrigo, ill
a state of hopeless dilapidation, on their retreat to Salamanca.
Thc next advice sent to the Army of Portugal was almost
equally inappropriate; having heard of Wellington's flying
visit to Estremadura by intelligence dated April 18th (the trip
hOO begun upon the 15th), he jumped to the conclusion that
the English general must have taken many troops with
him. On May 7th he wrote, 'the translations from English
newspapers herewith enclosed show that Lord \;Vellington had
crossed the Tagus on April 18th. So it seems that 011 the
side of Castile there can now be only half the English army
left. The events which must already have taken place on the
side of Almeida will have shown the generals that this is the
case, and will hMC enabled them to make the proper corre-
sponding move (de prcrulre le parti convenable), viz. to begin
to move towards the Tagus 3,' On the day when this W/Ul
written, 'Wellington, who had 1I0t taken a man to Estl'cmadura,
J ,\IcllIoJ'llnuum for .Berthicr (OQl're8pQndance, 17,531), uated i\larcll ~O.
•Le quartier gemfral ue l'armee de Portugal reste it CO'imbre. Oporto est
~C\lPC par Ull u6tachemcut.... Le I'riucc d'Essling ticnura 1\ Cormbre,
menap.ut Lisbouue, qui sera attaquee apres la. recolte.' At this moment
MassCliIl'S llrlllY \l'llS just reachiug tl,c Sl!'misl. frontier, iu its fiulll retrent
from Guartla!
j (]()rresjlQII<la1lw, 17,51)1. 'Voila fercz cOIllHlitre uu Priuce d'Essling
'.' . qu'i! uoit presser l'armament d'Almcida.... Il doit preudre des
mesUrCll pour couvrir Almeitla et Ciudad Itotlngo, et d'ull autre cote pour
se mettre en communication al'cc Madrid et seville.'
l CQrrclJp.mdallcc, 17,701.
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had been back on the frontier ofLeoll since April !lB, and had.
at the head of the whole of his original army, defeated MassCna
and Bessieres at Fuentes de Ofioro, on .May 5th. As always,
the imperial orders, founded on data that had long ceased to be
correct, or had never been correct at all, arrived too late to
direct the course of the campaign.
One most important measure, however, was taken at this
time, by which the Emperor did succeed in affecting the general
course of aflU.irs 011 the frontier of Portugal On April 20th he
made up his mind to recall Massena, and to send a new chief to
the Army of Portugal. Five days before, Marshal Marmont,
newly returned from commanding in Dalmatia, had received
orders to start at once for Spain, where he was to replace Ney
at the head of the 6th Corps. 'Whether the Emperor had
alrendy made up his mind on the 15th that Marmont was to
replace Massena, not to serve under him, it is impossible to
say. But he at any rate concealed his purpose from the younger
Marshal, who had been some days in Spain before he received
on May 10th the dispatch of April flOth which made him com-
mander of the Army of Portugal 1• Probably the news that
Masscna had failed in his design to hold Coimbra, which Fay
had elaborately explained to the Emperor, and had fallen back
behind Ciudad Rodrigo, had pro\'okcd his mW/ter to dismiss
him from command. Foy's report had caused Napoleon to
believe that Massena eould stop on the Mondego and hold
Wellington in check. The imperial dispa.tch of March 30 (as
we have already seen) speaks of l\ia.ssena's stay at Coimbra as
a settled fact, and states that Oporto is or will soon be in his
hands. On April 9 Napoleon knew that the Marshal had lost
Coimbra and fallen back on Guards. 2, but continued to send
him elaborate instructions. It was apparently ~he receipt of
Masseno.'s dispatch of March 31st from Alfayates, confessing
that he was completely foiled, and that he must retire beyond
the Aguedu, as far as Zalllorn and Toro, since the spirit
of the army was so broken tho.t he dared not risk a general
., This we learu from lI1afluout's letter to Bcrthier dated May 14, ill
which be says that the dispatch reached Mm only on 1\Iay 10, and that its
contents were ullexpected. (Marmont's Mtmoire#, iv. p. 78.)
2 .Corrupondance, 17,591.
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action·, which determined the Emperor to supersede him. This
document must have reached Paris about the 15th or 16th, and
would suffice to explain Napoleon's anger. For a Commander.
in-Chief who confesses that he has lost the confidence of his
army is a dangerous person to retain in power. There was
ample evidence from Massena's earlier letters that he had
quarrelled not only with Ncy but with most of bis other
superior officers; if the general feeling of the army was also
against him, he was not likely to get much good service Qut of
it. Possibly there may have been also a feeling of wouuded
amOltr propre in the Emperor's breast, when he rcRected how,
relying on Massena's assurances, he had informed Soult, King
Joseph, and Hessieres that the Army of Portugal had its head
quarters at Coimbra, and would attack Lisbon in the autumn 2,
so that· a hundred thousand men, using Coimbra and Badajoz
as their bases, would complete the conquest of Portugal, a con~
quest which would drag England into a crisis that would be of
the highest intcrest,' Napolcon did not likc to be madc
ridiculous before his subordinates, by having been induced to
publish an absurd misstatement of fact, leading up to a "ain-
glorious prophecy which appeared most unlikely to be realized.
But though Massclla's death-warrant as commander-ill-chief
was signed on April 20, and may have been decided upon as
early as April 16, there were still three weeks during which he
was to make his lnst stroke for revenge, und to lose his ht.st
battle, for it was not till May ]2th that Marmont presented his
kUru de aervu:e and took over the command,
"Vellington, meanwhile, convinced that he had nothing to fear
for some little time from the Army of Portugal and its corn·
mander, left Villar Formosa on the morning of April 15th,
reached Sabugal that night, Castello Branco on the 17th, and
Elvus by the nOOl) of the 20th, This was marvellous travelling,
considering the mountain roads that had to be traversed, but
Wellington was a mighty horseman, and accompanied by only
I 'Le dl!sir que l'annce a llllmifesti dcpuis lougtcmps d'aller se reposer
ne me laisse 3.ucun doute qu'il serait dangereux d'attendre l'ellllemi
pour reCCI'oir bataille ou pour Ill, lui UOUllcr.'
I All this, of course, is (ram the Great Mcmorandum of Marcll 30, Wllich
Bcrthicr \VIIS to commuuicate to all thc chiefs of tllC Pcniusular armic&.
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a few well-mollnted staff officers flew like the wind over hill and
dale. He remained only four days in Estremadura; during that
short time he surveyed Bado:ioz, and issued compendious direc-
tions for the siege 1; he drew up a plan of campaign for the
united armies of Bcrcsford, Blake, and CnstaflOS, iUld then,
retumillg as rapidly as he had come, retraced his route to the
frontiers of Leon, and was back at Alameda Oil the 29th, having
bttll less than fI. fortnight absent from his army. Tbis rapidity
of movement, as we have already seen, completely puzzled
Napoleon, who, on recei\'ing the intelligence that 'Yellingtoll was
over the Tagus on thc 18th, thought that he had gone with
a strong force to establish himself in EstremadUl'8.. and sent
orders for the Army of Portugal to move at once towards the
south 2, a movement which at that moment could not have been
executed for want of train, transport, alld pro\'isiolls.
During 'Vellingtoll's absence the command of the troops
cantoned between the Agueda and the Coo had been given over
to Sir Brent Spencer, as the senior division..commander present.
\~rellington did 1I0t think it probable that Spencer would be
much troubled by the enemy during his short spell of responsi-
bility, but left him directions that covered every possible
contillgcnc)'. If, contrary to ull ex~ctation, MassCuR. should
make an effort to relieve Almeida within the fortnight for which
the Commander-in-Chief intended to be absent 3, Spencer was
directed to make a careful estimate of the for(.-e of the cnem)';
if it were but small the line of' the Agneda might be held; if
it were great-it was conceivable that Bessieres might succour
Masseua-Spencer was to concentrate, not in front of Almeida,
nor across the road from Rodrigo to that place, but in a defell-
sive position to the south of it, parallel to the Ft-ench line of
advance and threatening it in flank. Only Pack's Portuguese
infantry brigade, and Bal'b~na's cavalry brigade of the same
I For all this see section xx\·i. pp. 279-81, on Beresford's campaign in
Estremadura.
! See above, p. 294.
3 That he did lIot purllQl!c lo he longer away is shown by tILe fact that
he was ah'ead}' at I'ortalegre, on his return journey from Elvas, when
Sllellcer's final warning that J\fa~sCna was on the move reached Ilim.
.Di.Ypatchu, vii. 50.
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nation, were to keep up the investment of Almeida till the last
possible moment. The designated position was that in front of
Jlendo, Alfayates, and Aldea Velh~ which Wellington took up
himself later ill the same year, during a subsequent movement
of the French lo relieve Ciudad Rodrigo. No leave to fight
a battle was given to Spencer, though it was given to Beresford
when the latter was placed in a similar responsible position.
Instead, he was ordered to send constant information to his
absent chief; who go.Yc him a tabular statement of the mileage
of his journey and the place at which he was to be heard of each
day', Wellington intended to return with his own peculiar
swiftness on the first threatening news, and thought that he
could reckon on being back in time, if he was properly advised
of the first ominous movements of the enemy. He apparently
calculated that, if Massen& came 011 in great force, and found
the British army massed in a strong mOllntain position, UPOll
the flank of the route that he must take towards Almeida, he
would be uulikcly to I\Hack it-Bussaco being all lUlplcasant
memory. If the l\tlarshal began to mUlIreuvre he would lose
time, and he himself would be hack before the crisis came.
As &matter of fact it was only towards the end of Spencer's
short period of rc:;pollsibility that matters began to grolV iu-
teresting UPOIl thc frontiers of Leoll, There was, howcver,
aslight alarm on the 15th-16th, just after Wellington's depar-
ture. Massena., not contented with having passed a fin.i: convoy
into Rodrigo on the 13th. had followed it up with a second,
which was escorted by Marchand's division of the 6th Corps-
a unit which had seen more severe service during .March than
any other part of the French anny, yet was considered to be in
better oloder than its fellows. The same phenomenon, it will
be remembered. had been noted with Paget's rearguard division
during Moore's retreat to Corunna. Marchand was ordered,
when he should have lodged the convoy in Uodrigo, to make
a reconnaissance toward the A:.:ava, and try to discover what
was the force of the British in that direction, He got into
the fortress without hindrance, owing to Erskine's usual talent
for bUllgling--01l the approach of the convoy the Light
I See tile three dispatuhes to Spencer 011 pp, 46"-6, 473-4, and 476 of
Dit]HUclle8J vii, dated respectively April 14, April 16, aud April 17. 181L
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Division was concentrated at. Molino de Flares. but Erskinc
refused to send it over the fords, and watched Marchand defile
into the town. Some cavalry wcnt across the Agueda, and cut
0/1' a flanking party of three hundred French, who took shelter
in a ruined village and refused to surrender. Erskine sent no
one to support the Bdtish horse, und presently", French column
came out of Uodrigo and released the blockaded party. All
this took place under the eyes of the disgusted Light Division
on the other side of the water I (April 16th).
Some days later Marchand came out of Uodrigo with a regi-
mcnt of infantry RmI· a squatlroll, to make the recollnais-
sallce which he had been directed to execute. At Mluialva,
five miles outside the fortress, he ran into the pickets of the
95th und 5flnd, and rccei voo such a warm reception that be
turned back at once, and sent the report to Massella that the
British were established in strong force close above the Agueda
(April .QQ 2). After this there were 110 further alarms at the front
till the fl8th, the day on whieh "Wellington retuMled f!'Olll Elvas.
But Speucer's 1;\{.'Count of the reconnaissance of t.he !l:.Qml, which
reached Wellington at Yortalegre 011 the 25th, undoubtedl).
contributed to hurry the return journey of the Commander-in-
Chief, for it W~ accompauied by u report-which was perfectly
correct-that information from the side of Salamanca seemed to
make it certain that Massena was reconcentrating his troops for
CL dash at Almeida, and that Bessieres had been asked to give
help. The Salamanca secret correspondents (of whom the chief
wus DoctOl' Curtis, the head of the Irish College in the Univer-
sity) had always proved trustworthy, so that their repmis could
not be ignored, and "Vellingtoll was glad that the French move-
ment wus reported at the cnd, find not at the commenccmcnt,
of his trip to Estremadura.
The fact was that :Massella was making a last desperate effort
to savc the military reputation of which he was so proud, and to
justify himself to his master. If Almeida and llodrigo were
both to be lost, as the final sequel to his retreat from Portugal,
I 1<'01' details see the Jlmrnat of George Simlllous of the 95th (.4 IJrili~lI
Rijle"'aJ~), pp. ]M-5.
2 Wrongly datcd April 20 by ::iprtiD.'I'liu in his gencrally accurate diary
(V. 4;7).
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his whole yenr's command musl be writl:cn down as a faUure; if
lhese early conquests of 1810 could be saved, he might yet claim
to have added somewhat to the French dominions in the Penin-
sula. His troops had not been a fortnight in their cl\ntomnents
before he was making preparations to reassemble them for a last
effort. In some respects that fortnight had made a great
difference in their condition: Salamanca and Valladolid, at the
moment of his arrival, were full or drafts of men, Ilnd accumu-
lation of stores, belonging to the Army of llortngal, which had
been gathering there for many months while the communications
with that army were cut. At onc moment ill the late winter,
Thiebault, the go\'enlor of Salamanca, had no less than 18,000
men of detachments belonging to Massena's troops in his govem-
ment I _ partly convalescenb, partly small parties which had
come up from the French depOts to join their regiments, and
had been unable to do so, Though some of them had ulli-
mately gone forward with Foy and Gardanlle, many still rc-
mained to be absorbeJ. The numhers of' present under arms'
in the 2nd, 6th, and 8th Corps went up at OUCC, the llIasS of
sick and exhausted men which they discharged into hospital
being replal..-OO by the drafts and l..1)llvalescents, Massena also
took out of the 9th Corps the battalions bclOllgillg to regimcub
of which the main bodies were already in the old Army of
Portugal, and sent them to join their comrades 2. The cadrt,~
of oue battalion in each regimcnt were then sent home to
France, and the olllcr three raised to something like their
original war strength. This redistribution brought up the
divisions of Re)'nier and Loison to a figure which they had
not known for mUll}' months, though it depleted Drouet's corps
to a con·e:;ponding extent: his troops now consisted of only
I TI,ichault's MbnoiresJ voL iv. p. 448.
2 The 6th Corps incorporated one battalion each of the 6th Uger,
25th lAger, alltl tlu~ 27th Ligne from Courollx's di\'isiou, Rud onc cadl
of the 39th, 59th, 6uth, 76th from Claparede's. lbe 2nd Corps got a
h.1.u..1.1ioll of tllC 17t1, J..eger only, besides drafts. SoliKIillC'S di\'ision,
llominally 0,110 bayonets, was shOrt of two battalions (frolll the 15th
and 65t11), or 850 men, left in garrison at Ciudad Itodrigo. III tho same
garrison had been left the whole IUgiment de l'russe (600 men), besides
tlrans. 'nJ(~ junction of tlle isolated battalions frolll Drouet's corps took
place 011 April 27. (Fririoll, p. HIS.)
!Bill MASSENA REORGANIZES HIS ARMY 301
eighteen battalions, 01' 10,000 infantry, all eOllsisting of fourth
battalions belonging to regiments serving in Andalusia. He
had received orders that when the crisis on the frontiers of
Leon was o\'cr, he was to conduct these units to join their
eagles in Soult's army. Drouet was anxious to get away from
Masscna as 50011 as possible, and would gladly have marched
for Seville without delay; but it was obvious that this was as
. yet impossible, and, as he was technically under the command
of the Marshal, he was compelled to play his purt in the ensuing
campaign.
The net result of all the transferences of battalions and
the picking up of drafts was that on May 1, the 2nd Corps
had in the ranks 1,lWO more men thfm it had possessed on
March 15, the 6th Corps ft,OOO more, Solignac's division of the
8th Corps 800 more. On the other hund, Clauscl's division of
the last-named corps, originally composed almost entirely of
isolated' fourth battalions' was practically ruined 1. Massena left,
it behind, when he mobilized the other dhisions of the old
Army of Portugal for the May campaign. But the men avail4
able for the field in the remaining divisions, including those of
Drouet, now amounted to 42,000 bayonets. Their ammunition
had been replenished, they had been reshed, though only to
a small extent reclothed, and they had received at the last
moment several months' arrears of pay. Their morale stilllet't
much to be desired, for confidence in their Commander·in-
Chief had not been restored, and Ney was still regretted. But
a French army. however discontented, could always be trusted to
fight when dnty called, and the Prince of Essling still hoped to
redeem his lost reputation.
But the weak points in the Army of Portugal were the
cavalry and artillery. The greater part of the horses which had
survived the retreat from Santurcm had only reached the plains of
Leon to die. A third of the troopers lacked horses altogether,
the remainder had in many~ mounts which must perish if
asked to do another week's work. '¥hen the cavalry brigadiers
of the ~nd and 6th Corps were directed to send to the front all
mounted men fit for service, Lamotte could only show 319
I It kul sunk on May 1 from :1.11 original streugtll of (;,800 men to
a,Oi3.
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sabres from a brigade which had CQUllted 800 in March; Pierre
Soult (decidedly more fortunate) hnd 600 out of 900, though OIlC
of his regiments (the 1st Hussars) could put only 103 men in
the saddle. MOlltbrull'S division of reserve dragoulllS, which had
2,400 sabres a few weeks buck, came to the front with 1,187.
The most effective cavalry unit in the army was the brigade
of Fournier I, belonging to Dronet's corps, which, not having
sharoo in the winter campaign in Portugal, could show 79'~ men
in good state. Thus Masseun could bring forward for the new
campaign no more than 3,000 horsemen, and these not in the
condition z.
With the artillery the case was even worse, for the class of
horse had been weaker, and the mortality proportionately greater.
As we have seen in a previous chapter, the batteries had for the
most part just succeeded in drttoooging back their guns to the
Agueda, after destroying nearly all their carts and caissons. It
was doubtful whether for an offensive campaign the whole army
could now provide twenty guns with the full complement of
auxilia.ry vehicles, adequately horsed. MIl.'lS~Ila, in stating his
difficulties to Herthier, went so far as to say that each of the
four corps could put about half a battery into the field in proper
order 3. The state of the military train WM quite as bad~regi­
mental and corps transport was reduced to such a state of nullity,
that when the army took the field it would have to be for 1\ fell'
days at most, since, after loading the men with as many rations
as each could carry, the only extra supply was what could be
drawn by a few store cart~ found in Uoorigo and Salamanca.
During the short campaign that was imminent, the troops lived
from hand to mouth, on food daily brought np from the maga-
zines of Rodrigo, after having been compelled to eat the convoy
1 For strange doings of this eccentric hrigadil:1r at Salamanca dnring
the winter, see Thiebault, vo!. iv. pp. 435-7.
~ These figures, differing much from those supplied hy Kocll, are
worked out from the return of !\lay 1 in the Paris Archives Nutionale;;.
'nle total of cavalry mounted and available seems to 11ave been 3,007,
iudutliuK FOllTllier. Sce tables in Appendb: XIX.
• l\Iassena to Berthier, April 30, lUll, from Ciudad Rodrigo. 'Dle
returns 8110\\1 tllat on May] twelve l~~lterjes 11:«1 heen left hel.hul witll 110
horae;; at all, ill order that the live remaining might take the fielLlwith
42,'> horses,
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that they had brought with them for the supply of Almeida.
There was nothing to be got from the country-side, which was
exhausted, by the constant passing to and fro of armies and
detachments, all the way from Salamanca to the frontier.
l?ood at the base existed; when Massena reached Salamanca
he had found there l:onsiderable accumulations, thongh not
near!y so much as he expected or required I. It wns on this
particular point that he had started a lively dispute with
Bessieres the moment that he reached Spain. The Duke of
!stria had been for some months in charge of the wholc of Old
Castile and Leon, and had come to look upon their resources as
so much hi~ own private property that he greatly resented the
intrusion of 40,000 starving men into his governorship. Massenn
complained that he was fed with promises, and that· when sta·
tistics of food placed at his disposal were compared' with what
was actually handed oyer, there was a lamentable discrepancy.
He had been told that he would find at Salamanca 10,000fanegas
of wheat, and that 8,000 more alld 200,000 rations of biscuit
for the garrison of Uodrigo would appear in a few days; he
stated that he could only discover 6,000 fanegas and 39,000
rations of biscuit, and that the COll\'OY sent to Rodrigo all the
13th had only carried 20,000 rations at most. Uessieres replied
that he wa.<; doing his best, that he had his own corps to feed,
that the al'lival of the Army of Portugal was wholly unexpected
-had he not been told only a few weeks back, first that it was
to stay at Coimbra, and ilien that it was going off' by a cross
march to Plasencia and the Tagus? l"or so Mas5Cntl had written
from Guarda at the end of March. Moreover, Old Castile was
dreadfully exhausted, und the guerrilleros so active that every
convoy required an immense escort to guard it. All this was
perfectly true, yet it is probable that he might ha\'e done more
if he hadchosell, and he presently received virulent rebukes from
the Emperor for lack of zeal.
But when recriminatory letters were already passing between
the two marshals on the food question, Bessieres began to receive
additional demands for military help. On April 20th Massclla
wrote that he was bouud in honour to march to the relief of
Almeida, that he would have his infantry reorgani7.ed by the
I Masseua to BcrtllicrJ A!lril nth, from SllllllllliUCU.
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26th, but that his cavalry and artillery were in such 1\ hopeless
state thl1.t he WIlS forced to make It fonmll request for aid to the
Anny of the North. The Duke of Istria replied that his
troops were so scattered, aud the guerl'illeros so llCtivc, that he
doubted if he could give any help at all. On the 22nd, however,
he wrote that by making a great effort he could collect some
cavalry and guns, and would be at Salamanca on the 26th. But
on the 27th nothing had arrived from the Army of the North
at that city. Massena replied in high wrath: 'Vas lettres sont
inconcevables. Je 'lOllS ai demande de l'artillerieet des attelages,
et encore plus positivementde lacavalerie - 'lOllS avez sous cliff(\"-
rents pretcxtcs elude ron demandc. Tontes leg troupes qui sont
en Espagne sont de la meme famille. VOllS etes.jusqll'a ce qu'il y
ait de nouveaux ordres, charge de la dCfense et de l'approvision-
nement des places de Rodrigo et d'Almeida,' &c.
Bessiercs, however, did llot break his promise, as MasseuR had
for a moment feared, he merely executed it a little late, and on
the smallest possible scale. He brought with him two small
brigades of cavalry, making hctween 1,600 and 1,700 sabres, that
ofWathier (11 th,1~th, 24th Chasseltrs acheval,nnd 5th Hussars),
and that of !.epic, which consisted of two squadrons each of the
grenadiers, lancers, and chasseurs of the Imperial Guard. He
had also a horsc artillery battcry of the Guurd, and had brought
thirty teams of glm~horses, which, when distributed to the
Army of Portugal, enabled it to put thirty-two pieces and the
corresponding caissons in the field. Massena had asked for
Bessieres's cavalry aud gUllS, but had not been at all anxious to
see his colleague in person appearing. 'He would ha\'e done
better,' said the Prince to his staff, 'to have sent me a few thousand
men more, and more (ood and ammunition, and to have stopped
at his own head quarters, instead of coming here to examine and
critici7.e all my movements 1.' He got Roool reception, which did
not prevent him from following Massena about during the whole
campaign, volunteering frequent advice, and expressing a polite
curiosity at hi>; colleague's smallest actions. Apparently he
wanted to have credit for being present at n victory-if one
1 So l\larbot, ii. 457, If Marbot's talents as a rt/c<mltllr make Ms
autllOrity douhtful, we may point oui t1lat lllicooult, the gOl'ernor of
Salamanca, tells much the same story ill his M~w:rirt', il', p, 478.
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should occur-but was anxious to risk as few of his own troops
as possible, and not to take any responsibility, The Emperor,
three weeks later, wrote him a letter of bitter rebuke, sa)'ing
that he could well ruwe brought up 10,000 men without dis-
garnishing any important posts; an infantry division of the
Guard and fo~r batteries might have been added to the 1,700
horse that he actually produced, without leaviJ,g Vatladolid;
Burgos, or the frontier opposite Galicia in any danger 1, If the
two marshals had collected some 55,000 men, it is certain that
Wellington would not have fought, and would have allowed
Almeida. to be revietmilled.
Massena had reached Ciudad Rodrigo on April ~6th, his
four corps concentrated there by the ~th, and Bessieres came
up with his cavalry Oil the 1st of Mt~y. The whole force
assembled consisted of 4fl,000 infantry, 4,500 cavalry, and 38
guns, a total, counting the auxiliary anus, of about 48,000 men 2.
On the 30th Marchnnd was sent out with six squadrons and his
own infantry to make a reconnaissance in force of the allied
lines. He found the Light Division still in po~ition at Gallegos,
with outposts along the Azava, and withdrew to llodrigo aftel'
having stayed for some hours opposite the height of Marialva.
011 the next day hut Olle (May ~) the French llrmy began to pour
in an interminable stream across the Agueda, by the bridge of
Ciudad Rodrigo, di\'idiug into two columns when it had passed
-the ~lld Corps 011 the l\Inrialva road, more to the north, the
8th and 9th Corps on the Carpio road, 1Il0re to the south. The
6th Corps, forming the reserve and crossing late, also took the
left-hand Carpio road. Each column was preceded by its corps-
cavalry. .
Wellington WtlS perfectly well prepared to meet the move-
ment, He had been back with his army since the ~9th of
April, and had becn informed on his arrival that Masseua had
I llertllier to Bessieres, :\Iay ]9, ]611.
2 lufalltry. 2nd Corps, 10,292; 6th Curps, 16,616; 8th COI'l18(l division),
i,7I4; 9th Corps, 10,304; total,42,126. Cavalry. Massena's own, 3,007;
Uessierea, 1,665; Artillery, Sappers, Train, &c., 1,400; total, 48,198.
Masseua would only ackllowledge 3S,OOO men, and put \\'ellingtoll'g force
(wbich was, as we shall see, 37,000 men) at about 50,000. If Wellingtoll
ba.tl possessed 60,000 men, .'UClltcs dc Quora would lu\ve bccn ... vcry
different sort of battle.
0 ....... lV x
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come to Ciudad Rodrigo in person two days before, and that
the roads from Salamanca westward were black with French
columns I. He had made up his mind to fight, though he had
denied Spencer the power to do so in his absence. The battle
position was already chosen, and the army was concentrated
upon it, all save the covering screen formed by the Light Division
and the ctl.\'alry, which was to hold its ground as long as possible
before falling back on the main body. The two ca...alry regiments
which had been sent to the rear in the middle of the month had
been brought up again to the Azav8. on the 9!Sth, so that the
whole of the smn.ll force of that arm was available for holditlg
back the French advance.
Wellington had less troops in line than he desired, mainly
owing to the dreadful depIction in the ranks of the Portuguese
infantry, caused by the inefficient way in which it was fed by
its government, and the slowness with which convalescents and
detached parties rejoined their colours 2. Some of the regimcnts
which ought to have shown 1,200 men in the ranks had only
500 or 100 men, and the twenty-five battalions with the field
army amounted ill ull to no more than 11,000 bayonets 011
May 1st, though they had shown 18,000 in the preceding
December, and had absorbed many drafts since that date. The
single Portuguese cavalry bdgade with thc arlUY WM in cven
WOI'lle state, the two regiments showing but 812 sabres in line,
though they I~d mustered nearly 800 during the winter. The
men were alive, but the chargers had disappeared, owing (as
I l\fassena's 8l'rh'al was known, through deserters, the da)' after it
occurred. Diary of Simmollds of the lJ5th, p. 166.
1 Complaints on this score fill up great parts of Wellington's letters of
the 30th April aud 1st May (DilplJ.icMI, vii. 611-12,516-17). TlJey seem
slightly to overstate the defieieney, eompared with morning states of
May 1 ; hut thi;l comes from Ma }loCrsist.ent Imbit of counting only rauk
and file, omitting officers and sergeants. When he says that the total
infantry (iuclutlillg Puek) was only 11,000, while it works out to over
12,000 when that detached brigade is couuted, we must remember that
he is not reckoning anything but rank and file, \Vellington attrihutell
most of the lo~ to (1) slackuess at the deJ108i/Of (depOts) in fonvarding
drafts, (2) IT131a.dministration of tbe llOspitals, (3) insuffieient food at the
front for those brigades still fed b}' the Portuguese government, alld !lot
taken OD to the Britisll establishmellt.
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Wellington maintained) to bad hOl'se-mastership on the part of
the men and slack supervision on the pe.rt of the regimental
officers. As the four British cavalry corps, which had seen the
same service during the Ins!; two months, were only 200 horses
weaker in May than they were in March, the explanation is
probably correct.
The total force available for a general action on May 1st was
34,000 infantry, of which 23,000 were British, 1,850 cavalry,
including the 312 Portuguese, and 1,250 artillery, sappers, &c.
There were four British and foul' Portuguese batteries, with 48
6'1ms. This total does not include the detachment blockading
Almeida, which consisted of Pack's brigade and one British
battalion. While only 8,000 weaker than Massena in infantry, it
will be seen that Wellington's ann)' had hardly more than a
third of the number of his cavalry-I,850 to 4,500 ; in gUlls
there was a slight superiority-48 pieces to SS. In a mountain
position, such as that of Bussaco, the deficiency of cavalry would
luwc been of no importance, But the country-side between
Almeida and Rodrigo is mostly undulating plateau, practicable
ill most parts for cavalry operations on a large scale. The only
obstacles of importance are thc courses of the three small streams
which cross the high-road, the A1Ava., Dos Casas, and Turoll,
minor tributaries of the Agueda. All three are inJ>ignificant
brooks save after heavy rain, and though there had been adownfall
ill the end of April, they were now going down and remming their
usual proportions. Their waters were now a negligible quan-
tity, but in some parts of their (.'OUTSe they flow in deep-cut
ra\'illeS, many f~t below the general level of the plateau, and
present a serious hindrance to the movement of troops. This is
espccinlly the case ill their lower course; IICRrcr the hills to the
south, where they rise, the ravines as well as the streams grow
smaller, and can be crossed anywhere.
The particular position which Wcllington had selected as his
fighting-ground was the line of the Dos Casas, from the ruined
Fort Concepcion to the village of Fuentes de Onoro, The ravine
of the Dos Co.sas is both wide and steep in the neighbourhood of
the fort-perhaps 150 feet deep-but grows decidedly shallower
towards Fuentes, and above that plltCe is no longer a notable
feature in the country-side. The stream itself is nowhere more~
xi
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than tell yards brood nor three feet deep. so that, when its banks
cease to be high and scarped, it can be crossed anywhere by
infantry, cavalry, or guns. Its valley above Fuentes is.partly
arable, partly meadow-land ill gentle grassy slopes, much more
like an Ellglish tJum a typical Spanish landscape. Standing 011
the higher ground behind the vill~o-e. the observer sees a marked
contrast between the rocky ravine down-stream, and the bwad
undulating bottom to his right. 'rhe ridge, however, on which
he is, standing does not entirely disappear to the south; it still
remains as the watershed between the little basin of the Dos
Casas aud that of its twin-stream the,Turon, which flows exactly
parallel with it less than two miles to the west. Up-stream the
view is closed by woods sUM'Ounding the "ill~o-e of Pozo.Bello (or
Poso"clho as the neighbouring Portuguese call it) 011 the right
or further bank of the Dos Casus, and by the rounded hill of
Nava de Aver, below which the river is flanked on both sides by
ll, stretch of boggy ground, only to be crossed by some invisible
patID!. There l1.tC five miles from Forl Concepeioll to ::Fuelltes
de Onoro village, and this was \Vellington's original position,
en.tirely cov.ered in front by a well-marked ravine. But the
two further miles from Fuentes to Pozo Bello, which he proceeded
to take in for defel1{:~ when the enemy showed signs of turnillg
his right, mny be described as open ground, with 110 protection
011 its flank save the morass by Nava de Aver, which could
obviously be turned by any enemy who chose to make a suffi-
ciently wide circuit, and might be crossed by infantry at sollle
points, after careful exploration of its depths.
Fuentes de Olloro itself stands on the western hank of the
Dos Casas, at the point where the heights begin to sink and
the ravine ceases. Its lower houses arc.almost level with the
stream, but the village slopes uphill to two points a little higher
than the general summit ot: the plateau, one of which is crowned
·by its chmch, the other by a cross on a lmge rock. 011 the
opposite side of the stream there are no buildings but a chapel
and a single .farm-stending. Past these the high-road from
Ciudad llodrigo ascends on a gentle slope, commanded for some
hundred yards by the heights on which the village stands, so
that any force advancing to attack Fuentes comes under fire
early, and has no cover whatever. 'l'~e eligibility of the place
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ag a post is much increased by the fact that the houses are
surrounded by numerous stone walls, making crofts and gardens,
which are of El. height and strength suitable for giving excellent
cover to infantry in skinnishing order. Nor CRn it easily be
turned, since to the left it is protected by the rnvine of the
Dos Cll8as, ever growing deeper down-stream, wbile on the right
the houses trend back for a long distance up the slopes, und the
stone walls continue their line for some distance. In short, it
is an admirable point on which to rest the flank of an army
ill battle order, and '~Vellillgton had weU marked its strength,
und was serene and content, so long as the ~'rench ranged their
forces parallel to his own. ThetroubJe only came when, on the
second day of battle, they extended their southern wing to
PolO Bello, so that l."uentes became the right centre instead of
the right flank-guard of the allied army.
The general positiou behiud the Dos Casas has only one
seriOlls defect: it has in its rear, at a distance of some six or
seven miles, the ravine of the Coa, passable at only a. limited
nllmber of points for artillery and wheeled vehicles, though there
are many more at which infantry Or cavalry can get across. Of
bridges within a reasonable distance from the position there are
only those of (1) Ponte Sequeiro, ten miles to the right rear;
(~) of Castello Born, six miles to the direct rear of Fuentes
village; and (3) of Almeida, eight miles to the left rear I. If the
army should be constrained by any misfortune to retreat, its trans-
port and artillery would have to pass over one or more of these
three defiles, of which the first is inconveniently placed because it
is too far off'to the flank, while the third had been broken by the
French and only hastil}· repaired. It may be added also that it
was dangerously close to Almeidn., though out of sight ot' that
fortress, and completely beyond the range of its cannon. But
to have sent bagg!l.e"'C or guns across it might Illwe appeared
a little ha?.ardous. The only really convenient lille of retreat
from the Fuentes position was that across the bridge of
Castello Dam, fl. structure of no great breadth, alld liable to
become congested or blocked in a moment of hurry. It; was
only wheeled traffic, however, that might become difficult; above
I Not to speak of the bridge of SabllgalJ sil< miles above tile Ponte
Sequeiro and hopelessly out ou the t1auk.
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and below the Castello Born bridge are good fords for infantr)'
and cavalry at San Miguel and Algeirenos, besides numerou~
other points where troops could get across ata pinch. Evidently,
however, if Wellingtoll fuiled to hold his chosen position, he ran
the risk of losing some or all of his impedimt:nta, supposing that
he were vigorously pursued and compelled to retreat in haste.
A caisson overturned all the descent towards the bridge might
force him to abandon whole batteries, jammed in the narrow
road. or this danger he was well aware, but judged it wOlth
risking, in view of the imporlance of holding the best possible
position for covering the siege of Almcida. No battIe-ground
that was e\'er chosen is destitute of some fault. And, at the
worst, the infantry and cavalry would not be endangered, since
the fords could not fail them, and the Coa (though its ravine is
often steep) is by no means a large river. But Wellington did
not believe that he could be beaten by the force which Massena
was able to bring 8hrainst him, and though he thought over
orders for a retreat, was strongly under the impression that he
'Would never have to issue them.
On May 2nd, as we have already mentioned, the whole French
army tulvam,'ed from Ciudnd Rodrigo, onc eolumn on the
Marialva-Gallegos rood, the other Oil the southern or Carpio
road. The Light Division, and the four cavalryregiment<; accom-
panying it, began to retire. according to their directions, not
making more hastc than was necessury,aud turning to bayocca-
sionally to fight a small rearguard action_ 'l'he country-side wa.<;
somewhat dangerous for a small' detaining force,' being passable
for Cllvalry in many directions and thickly wooded. It had to be
remembered that the enemy, Ilsing the cover of the woods, and
hiding himself behind tIle undulations of the ground, might
easily break through the SCI'CCll of cavalry and light troops
unless great care and caution were shown. Fortunately the Light
Division was well skilled in keeping touch along the line, and in
avoiding risks, and a whole day of skirmishing in retreat led to
no regrettable incidents. On the night of' the ~l1d of May the
covering force bivouacked behind Gallegos and Espeja, both of
which villages were occupied by the advum.'Cd guards of the
enemy.
On the Srd Masseua resumed his advance, and drove in the
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Light Division and the cavalry upon Wellington's chosen
position. They retired skirmishing, till they came to the main
body, when the four cuvillry regiments wheeled into line 011 the
right rear of the village of Fl1ellte!l de Oi'ioro, while the Light
Division, crossing the bridge at that place, placed itself in reserve
011 the heights, behind the front crest. In the aftemoon the whole
.French army became more or less visible from the Allies' position.
It was now in three columns; the right column was formed by
the 2nd Corps, which had taken the route Gallegos-Alameda, and
displayed itself on the heights opposite Wellington's left, facing
towards Fort Concepcion and San Pedro. with the deepest part of
the ravine of the Dos Casas in front of it. 'l11e centl"ccolumll was
formed by the single divisio,n of the 8th Corps (Soligllac), which
posted itself to the left of the 2nd, south of Alameda. The
heaviest and most important mass of the enemy, however, was
on the left, where Montbrun'$ cavalry, which had been engaged
all the 1ll00'lling in pushing back the British horse, came up
directly opposite .l?uentes de Oiloro, and on finding that village
occupied in force by the Allies took ground to its left, facing
the squadrons which it had been pursuing, on the other side of
the Dos Casas. When the cavalry had wheeled aside, the front
of the infuntry of the 6th Corps became visible on the high-
road, division behind division, The 9th Corps, still out of
sight in the rear, was behind the 6th, so that five of the eight
infantry divisions forming Massena's army were (:oncentrated
opposite Fuentes de Ouoro, The front of the French did not
extend for more than a short distance south of that village, so
that it looked as if Wellington was to be assailed precisely in the
strong position that he had selected.
The allied army had been arrayed at leisure on the ground
chosen by its chief, who hOO ample time to make all his dis-
positions while the covering force was being ddven in, His
line was formed as follows: the 5th Division (Erskine) was
posted just to the south of Fort Conecpcion, with llarbnl):ena's
handful of Portuguese cavalry (only 800 sabres) watching its
flank. Next to the south of Erskinc lay the 6th Dh'isioll
(Campbell), in front ofSsn Pcdro. These two units faced Ucynier
and Junot respectively, with the deep ravine protecting their
front. The ht, Srd, and 7th Divisions and Ashworth's Portu-
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f:,'llcse brigade were arraycd on the heights behirlll Fuentes de
Ofioro, and thc Light Di....ision had taken post in their reserve.
The houses and crofts of the village were occupied by a strong
force of picked troops, composed of the light companies of
Nightingale's, Howard's, and Lowe's brigades of the 1st Division,
and ofMllCkinnon's, Colvillc's. and Powcr's (Portuguese) brigades
of the Brd Division-flB companies in aliI-with the flJ83rd
from Colville's brigade in support. The senior officer in the
village was Lieut.-Colonel Williams, of the 5/6Oth. He had
under him about 1,800 men of thc light colllpnnics, all chosen
IIhots, besides the 460 of the ~/8grd. To the south and Tear of
Fuentes, some way behind the village, were the four British
cavalry regiments, only 1,500 sabl'es in gross, and reduced to a
somewhntlower figure bydetnchments 2. It will thus be seen that
Vlellington, like Mas....ena, had strengthened his southern wing.
He had four and a halfdivisions of infantry-24,000 men-facing
the 6th and 9th Corps, with tlIeir 27,000 bayonets and 3,500
horse, in and about Fuentes, while the 2nd Corps was observed
by Erskine's 5,000 men, and the 8th Corps by Campbell with
a similar number 3. In the northern end of the field the
immcnse strength of the position behind the ravine enabled
"Vellingtoll to be economical of troops; if it should chance that
the French made a serious attaok in that direction, there were
ample reserves to be spared from the mass of infantry behind
the right wing.
Massena, having surveyed ·Wellington's position in the early
aftemoon, recognized without difficulty that the "illage of
Fuentes was the key of the whole, und that the northem front
was too formidable, from the nature of the ground, to be lightI),
meddled with. It was impossible to make ont the disposition
1 viz. the light companies of 17 British and 4 Portuguese battalions, plus
4 companies of the 6/6oth, 1 of t11e 3/95t11, and 2 cxtrn ligilt compilllics
of the Ii.G. L. attached to LOwe'g brigade.
~ Both Napier (iii. p. 150) uno Tomkin8oTl (p. lOO) Ba)' tllat the Britisll
cavalry, nominally 1,520 sabres, had only about 1,000 in Hlle tJlat day,
owing to details, orderlies, &c., absent (rom tile rallks. TIlis is probably
all Ol'er-great deduction.
, See tables at end, Appenrlix IX. ]8t Division, 7,W5 men; 3rd Dil'ision,
5,480 men; 7th Division, 4,600 men; Light Divisioll, 3,815 mell; Ash-
worth's Portuguese, 2,539 mell, or 23,999.
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of the allied troops. for (in accordan<:e with his usual practice)
their general had placed his battle-line behind the crest, so that
nothing could be made out save the skirmishers all along the
heights, and the garrison of Fuentes itself, which was sufficiently
visible all the slope. In a manner which somewhat suggests his
old method of Bussaco l, Massena ordered the leading division
of the 6th Corps, Fcrcy's ten battalions, to storm the village by
direct frontal att.s.ek, while Reynier made a mere demonstration
against the 5th Division on the extreme northern end of the
position. The Intter mO\'Cmcllt led to nothing. save that, when
it seemed threatening, Wellington sent off the Light Division
to strengthen his right wing-but, since the ~nd Corps never
closed, it was not needed there, and halted behind the crest till
nightfall.
In Fuelltes village, however, there was a sharp conflict.: the
first brigade 'of Ferey's division charged across the easily ford-
able brook under heavy fire, and got possession of some of the
houses on the lower slope. :F'rom these the :French were dis-
lodged by the charge of the reserves of which Colonel Williams
could dispose. The second brigade was then thrown into action
by Ferey, and, coming all to the British while they were ill the
disorder caused by a charge among houses and walls, beat them
back, and pursued them up to the top of the village. Here the
light companies rallied, by the church and among the rocks, but
the enemy remained for a moment master of all that part of
Fuentes which lies on the slope and in the bottom by the brook.
'Vellington was determined that the French should make no
lodgement in his line, and late in the afternoon sent three fresh
battalions of the 1st Division to clear the village. Cadogall
with the 1/71st, supported by the 1/79th and W~4th, made
a determined advance through the tangle of houses, lanes, and
walls, and at cOIlS.iderable cost drove Fcrey's men right O\'cr
the brook and up their own slope. Massena then ordered the
defeated troops to be supported by four battalions from Mar-
I Thc stntcmcnt madc by sel'crnl Frcllcll authors that l\Inssclla did not
order Ferey to attack F'uentes on the 3rd, alld that Loison and Ferer
acted Witllout on.lers, is tlirccUy contrndicted by tlle i\1ursllul's own
dispateh, in which he takes all respollsibility : 'J'esperais enle\'er l'uentes
ct m'y maintcnir; je le fis nttaquer, et il fut bientlit occuIlC".'
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chand'!i divisiOll, and with this aid they once more advanced and
got possession of the chapel and the few other buildings on the
east side of Dos Casas, but could not make their way across the
water again, or into the main body of the village.
The combat only stopped with the fall of night, though the
fusillade across the brook was of course objectles·s, when neither
side mndc nny further definite attack. It had cost Utc French
65~ men-mostly in Ferey's division I, of whom :3 officers and
164 men were prisoners, taken when the village was re-stormed
by Cadogall. The Allies, being on the defensive, and under
{.'O\'cr, save at the moment of their counter-attack, only had
259 killed and hurt, of whom 48 were Portuguese. Colonel
Williarns, the original commander of the village, was Severely
wounded, but 110 other officer above the rank of captain was
hit 2.
I But some in Marchand's, whidl mllsthave been fairlr lleavily engaged,
judging from the casualty list of officers in Martinien.
2 For an excellent account of the first day's fighting in Fuentes "i1lage,
see the diary of' J. S.' of the 71rrt in Constable's Memorial, of the late War,
i.87-9. 111e regiment charged rigllt IIIl tIle Frellch slope after reool'erillg
the place, and was attacked ineffectually br cavalry. i\Iarbot (ii. p. 4S0) has
n stor)' tllat Ute second nttack of tile French would 11a\'e succeeded if Ole
HallOI'erian Legioll, in its red coats, had not been fired into from the rear
in mistake by the 66th Ligne, which took them for Britislt.
SECTION XXVI: CHAPTER III
THE DATILE OP FUENTES DE ON-ORO, MAY &rn, 1811
MASS.t;NA'S attempt to' take the bull by the horns '-for the
phrase used at BUSSilCO may well be repeated for the attack on
Fuentes village-had failed with loss. It was clear that he had
hit upon a strong point ill Wellington's well-hidden line, and
he had paid dearly for his brutal methods. It remained to be
seen whether he might not also find, as at Bussaco,. some way of
turning his adversary's position by a wide flank movement.
Down-stream the ground looked very impracticable, and the
ravine of the Dos Casas seemed to grow more and more formid-
able as it neared its jUllction with the Agueda. The l\Ial'shal
therefore ordered Montbrun to make reconnaissances in every
direction towards the right, all the side of Pow Bello and Navu.
de Aver, and to report on the roads and the character of the
ground, as well as on the disposition of the flank-guards of the
enemy. The whole of the 4th of May was taken up in thig
fashion-there being no shots fired save in Fuentes de Onoro
itself, when Ferey's troops in the morning exchanged l\ lively
fusillade across the brook with the British regiments occupying
the main block of the village. The firing died down before noon,
neither side being inclined to take the offensive 1.
Montbrun's reports came in during the afternoon, and were
very important. The enemy, he said, had no more than ascreen
of (:avalry pickets to the south of Fuentes, with a single detached
battalion in the village of Pozo Dello. The end of his line
had been found at Nava de Aver; it was composed only of the
I i\lassena, in his dispatch describing the battle, says that on tbe
morning of the 4t11 the Allies made a serious attempt to turn Ferey out of
th~ 110uses beyond the brook which he occupied. But we ha\"e no trace
of any regular fighting in any of the British Darratives; there was
certainly some bickering across the brook, bllt apparcutlY~llothillgmore.
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guerrilla band of Julian Sanche1.. There was nothing to prevent
a frontal attack on Pozo Bello by infantry, though the place
was enclosed in woods and somewhat diflicult to approach.
There was accessible ground between POlO Bello and Nnva
where cavalry might act, nor was the morass by the latter village,
on which the extreme light of the Allies rested, impassable.
On this report MasSCllU. based his Ilew scheme of operations 1.
He resolved to tum Wellington's right with three infantry
divisions and nearly the whole of his cawLlry. while detaining
him in his present position by attacks more or less pressed
home. The slrikillg-force was to be composed of Mw:challd's
and .!\1crmct's divisions of the 6th Corps with SolignClc'sdivision
of the 8th Corps in support, and of all the horsemen MYC the
skeleton squadrons attached to the 2nd and 6th Corps, vi7H Mont·
brun's division of dragoons and the cavalry brigades of Foul1lier,
'Yathier, and Lcpie, a mMS of 17,000 infantry and 3,500
snbres. Hcyniel", opposite lNellillgton's left, was to make demon-
fltratiolls, which were to be turned into a serious attack only if
the Allies showed weakness in this directiOll. But in the centre
there was to be a vigorous onslaught launched against FuClltcs
de Oiloro, when the turning movement was seen to be in progress
to the south. For this, not only E'erey's division, all'eady in
position opposite the vi.llage, was told off, but also Drouet's
two divisions of the 9th Corps. The place was to be carried at
all costs, while Wellington was busy on his right, and a breach
was thus to be made in the line of the Allies at the same moment
that their wing was turned. Fourteen thousand infantry were
concentrated opposite Fucnlcs for this purpose.
After dusk had fallen the French army made the preliminary
movements required by the new plan. Montbrlln's cavalry rode
out far to the south, one brigade to the foot of the hill of ~ava
de Aver, the others to the ground east of Pozo Bello. '1'0 this
latter point Marchand's and Mennet's infantry proceeded, with
SOligl1aC'S division following them. Drouet brought the 9th
Corps to the ground formerly occupied by the 6th Corps, while
Reynier drew in a little southward, leaving one division opposite
}~ort Concepeion, but moving the other to the· position in front
of Alameda lately occupied by Solignac, A large detachment
I See his Orders for the day, in Apl)flndix XIII.
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of sappers went out with Montbrun. to mend the paths across
the morass which his flanking brigade bad to cross.
Wellington had not been unaware that the want of movement
on Massena's part during the 4th probably covered some design
against his flanks, and since his left flank was practically impreg.
nable, he SlISpected that his right might be in danger, a suspicion
which was made into (:ertainty by reconnaissances which detected
the French stirring among the marsh)' woods. The whole of his
ct\\'alry was thrown out in this direction, but the four regiments
could only COVC1' the /:,"TOUlld inadequately, and being scattered
in squadrons along three miles of front were weak everywhere.
The most serious movement that he made WM to detach the
7th Division as an outlying force to cover his right: two batta-
lions were put into the village of Pozo Bello I and the wood ill
front of it; the remaining seven occupied a position 011 the slope
to the wcst of thutlittle place. This was a somewhat dungerous
a'i:pedient-the 7th Division WM the smallest and weakest unit
inlVellington's army-it only contained two British battalions z,
and these were new-comers just landed at Lisbon. It was thrown
out two miles from thc main position, and on open ground not
presenting any particular advantage for defence-indeed, if the
euemy should attack in strength, it would be compelled to act
us a mere detaining and observing r~ther than a fighting force.
For though it was well placed for foiling a mere attempt to turn
the :Fncntes position by a sllltlll detachment and a short lateral
movement 3, yet if the enemy's flanking manreune were made
by a large body and far afield, it was clear that the 7th Division
would have to retreat ill haste towards the main position. This
being so, one wonders that Wellington did not select one of his
best divisions-the Srd or the Light-for such a responsible
post. But he apparently did not foresee the whole plan of
MassenR. 'Imagining,' he writes in his dispatch describing the
battlc, 'that the enemy would endeavour to obtain posseslion of.
l"uentes de Oiioro and of the ground occupied by the troops
1 86th and 2nd Calflldores.
s 51st and 85th, tlleother regiments being foreign (Cho.uerJr81JrUamlique.t
and Brunswick Oels) or Portuguese.
, ltiJ; position, from this point of view, might be compared to that of
Pakellhwll and the 3rd Division at Salamauca.
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behind that village, by cl"Ossing the Dos Casas at Pozo Velho,
I moved the 7th Division tmder Major-General Houston to the
right, in order to protect, if possible, that passage.' But
Massena was set not only on attacking Pozo Bello, but on turn-
ing it, and taking it in the real' by a. wide sweep of his whole
disposable cavalry force. Over ~O,OOO men were on the move,
and Houston had but 4,000 infantry, with 1,400 hOl'Se to guard
his flank.
The other preparation which Wellington made for a possible
battIe on the 5th was to draw back the Light Division at dusk
from the left wing to its original. position behind Fuentes "ilIagc
in reserve. He also withdrew the numerous light companies
which had formed the original garrison of that place, and left
there only two battalions, the 1/71st and 1/79th, with the
~/24th to support them Ilt the top of the hill.
The fighting on the 5th of May begun very early. Just at
daybreak the extreme right flank of Wellington's cavalry screen
was attacked by the outermost of the enemy's tUMlillg columns,
composed of two regiments of Montbrun's d!'B.f,1'()ons I. This took
place under the hill of Na\'ll. de Aver, where Juliall Sanchez with
his guerrilleros had been posted on the Srd, while two squadrons
of the 14th Light Dragoons had been moved. up to hii:l support
on the night of tile 4th. The guerrilleros kept a bud look-out,
and ill the dusk of the momillg were sllrpriiied by the enemy-
they drew off hastily to the south without making any resis-
tance. Not so the two British squadrons under Major Brotherton
I 'nle accusation against i\!ontbrun, made by Napier and gel'eral French
writers, of having waited for two hours aftcr da.wn, allll tllell of llaving
suffered hiftl.'3elf to be delayed for another hour by the pursuit of a mere
Spaniiil1 irregular baud, is clearly grollndle~. 'Ve ha"e tile (liaries of
two officers of the squadrons of the 14t11 (Major Brotherton alld Cornet
F. Uall) 11'110 prove that the attack was made in the dusk of early dawn.
<Just at daybreak,' says tile fonner, • 1 requested Don J uljan to show me
wllcre llis llickets were placed. He pointed nuL to me what lIe said \vas
one of them, but 1 observed to him that in the dusk of morning it looked
too large for a picket, TIle SUlI rising rapidly dispelled tlle f~, alld the
illusion at the same time, for Don Julian's picket proved to be a whole
Freudl regimellt dismounted. 'nley now mounted immediately and
advanced against us.' (See the Diary in Hamilton's History of tlle 14th
HWIflT8.)
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of the 14th, who fought a running fight for two miles, showing
front repeatedly, till their flank was on each occasion turned by
the vastly superior llumbers of the enemy. They were driven
ill at last upon Pozo :Bello, where lay two battalions of the 7th
Division, whose extreme right picket, placed in a wood. stopped
the enemy's pursuit by a volley. The main body of the French
cavalry seems to have started a little later than the flanking force
which assailed Nu.va de Aver, as its leading regiments only
attacked the llritish cavalry screen to the right of' that village
some time after Brotherlon's squadrons had begun to be driven
in, Here the line of obscrmtiou was furnished by a squadron
of the 16th Light DI1\,O'OOns and another of the 1st Hussars of
the King's German Legion, who drew together, and gallantly,
but rather rashly, attempted to stop the enemy's advance at
a defile between two woods. The squadron of the 16th, charging
into l\. lllasS of the enemy, suffered heavily l\.nd had its {.'ommaud-
iug officer captured 1, The Germans then took their tlll1l, bu t were
also driven back with loss. The broken troops had to fall back
ill all haste till, like Brotherton's detachment, they came in upon
the flunk of the village of Pozo Dello, and formed up there. The
French cavalry, extending over the slopes when they were clear
of the woods, appeared in overpowering numbers, and showed
811 evident intentiOll to turn the right flank of the British force,
which they were strong enough to do even when the wholc twelvc
squadrons of 'Vellillgton's cavalry, falling back from various
points of the line which they had been observing, were concen-
trated on the flank of the woods und enclosures of Pow Dello.
Up to this moment, an hour after daybretl.k, only :French
cavalry had been seeu, but the infantry now joined iu. 'rhe
two didsions of Ml1rchalld lI.nd Mcrmct had bccn moved in the
night to a point opposite POlO Bello: when the skirmishing to
the I'ighl of thut place was growing hot, the leading dh'isioll,
that of Marchand, charged in upon the wood in front of the
I Captain Helli, who had joinetl the regiment from Eugland ouly the
uight before. A sergeant and six men were killed in trying to rescuo
hilll. See Tomkinsou'!1 diary, p. 101. This officer of the 16th nccuse!l
Major Meyer of the Hussars of having lost the right momeut for a charge
by indecision. But the K.G.L. narrativcs (soo Scllwertreger) slto\\' tha.t
lUeyer fought hard, aud was all enterprising officer.
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village, cleared out of it the skirmishel's of the 85th .regiment
and the 2nd Ca.s:adores, and then stormed the village also;
driving out of it the two battalions, which vainly tried to main-
tain themselves there against the crushing superiority of the
attack. As they were cmerging from among the houses in great
disorder, they were fallen upon and ridden over by a French
light cavalry regiment, which had pushed round their flank
unobserved. Both battalions suffered heavily: betwccn them
they lost over 150 men, of whom 85 werc killed and wounded
and some 70 unwounded prisoners. It is marvellous that the
two corps were not entirely destroyed-but they were saved by
a charge of two squadrons of the GermM Hussars, and succeeded
in forming up with promptness and moving away in the direc-
tion of the main body of the 7th Division, which was visible
a mile to the west, 011 the opposite slope of the bottom in which
\ Pow Bello lies.
The next hour was a very dangerous one: the }<~relleh infan-
try divisions, emerging from the captured village and the woods,
began to form up in heavy columns, threatening both to attack
the Fuentes de OJ1oro position on its right flank, Md to cut ill
between the isolated 7th Division and the rest of the army.
!\fontbrun's cavalry, displaying regiment after regiment, came
on in hot pursuit of the troops that had escaped from P07,O
Bello and of the British squadrons that were covering them.
They were already outflanking the 7th Division 011 the right,
hy means of' the detachment which had eome from Nasa de
Aver.
Wellingtoll was surprised at the strength of the turnillg force
-its numbers werc far greater than he had foreseen, Md he was
forced to take a new resolution and form a fresh battle--order.
The lIlost important thing was to save the 7th Division from
being cut oU; and to brillg it bl\ck iuto line with the rest of the
army. Accordingly he directed a chosen unit-the Light
Division, now once more under the indomitable Craufurd, who
hadjoincdon the preceding night-to advance frolll its position
in reserve behind Fuentcs, and to move out along the slope of
the low heights to the right, so as to come into touch with
Houston .Md the cavalry, and to help them to get home.
Meanwhile the rest of the centre of the anny-the 1st and 3rd
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Divisions and Ashworth's Portuguese I, forlllL'<l II new Hne of
Imttle. en potence to the original right flank of the British
position. They were drawn up along the dominating ground
between the rocky hillocks that o\'el'hallg the village of Fucntes
nnd the descent into the valley of the 'l'uron brook. This is
the last of the high ground-to the right of it (as has been
before mentioned) the watershed between the Dos Casas and
the 'l'mon eeAses to be composed of fl. commanding ridge, and
sinks into gentle slopes 2. Thus Fuentes de Ol1oro became the
projecting point of a battle-order thrown back at right Ilngle.<;
to the original position-where the 5th and 6th Divisions still
continued to occupy their old post opposite Reynier. Forma-
tions en pot£lwe are proverbially dangel'ou~ because of the
liability of the angle to be enfiladed and crushed by artillery
lire. But in this case the danger was less than usual, since
Wellington for once in his life had more guns than the li'rench,
and the lie of the platet\u wa.'l such that the lower parts of
E'uentes village might be enfiladed, but 110t the ground above it
by the church and rocks, nor the plateau behind it, where the
gl'Ound occupied by the Srd Division was out of sight of the
French on the lesser heights. Indeed, the holding of the houses
ill the bottom was of comparatively little importance to
WellinhrWu, so long as he kept his grip on the upper end of the
stl'&o"'gling village. Here, on the double-headed height crowned
by the church And the rocks, was the real pivot of the position.
'Vellington had ample time to move the 1st and 3rd Divisions
with Ashworth's Portuguese into the new position-none of
thcm had much over a mile to march, since all had been concen-
trated behind Fuelltes when the alarm came. The enemy's
approach was slow, partly because his infantry had to disen-
tangle itself frolll the houses of Pozo Bello und the surrounding
wood, and to form in n fresh front, partly because his cavnlry
became Wholly absorbed in a running fight with the Light and
I 1st Di\'ision ill four brigades all. the right; then Aallworth ; then the
3rtl Division next to Fuentes \·illage.
, Along whieh tile modern railway line is cOlldueted from VilIa.r
Formoso to Ciudad Ilodrigo. Fuentes de Onoro station is a mile from
the village, and onlY:l few Imudred }':I.rds from the Portuguese Cllstoms-
station of VUlar Formosa.
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7th Divi~ions, and had 110 attention to spare. fol' allY other
dircctioll,
Massena's plall, when he had got his left wing out of till:!
woods, soon became clear. He was intending to break in with
his cavalry between the 7th Division and the rest of the arm}',
while Marchand and Mermet were to attack the new front of
the ht and 3rd Divisions, and the 9th Corps, with Fcrey's
division, was to smash in the projecting point of Wellington's
position, by stol'ming Fuentes village and the height behind it.
Reynier, as on the 3rd of May, was to demonstrate against the
allied left, but not to attack till success in the centre seemed
assured. From the course of the action it is evident that the
Marshal's main intention was to beat ,\rcllingtoll by hard
fighting, and to break lip his army~not merely to mallf.euvre
him into a barl strategical position anrl to cnt his more available
lines of communicatiQn, so as to force him into a difficult and
dangerous retreat. If the last hud been Massena's intention-
as some authors suggest-the course of the battle would ha,·!,
been different. But he mane no attempt to send cavalry to
intercept the roads to Castello Bom, stil11ess to detach infantry
against '~lellington's rear, Having turned his enemy's flank, slIlI
forced him to make a new front, he showed 110 further desire to
lllanreU"re, but proceeded to bntter away nt the troops in front.
of him, trusting that numbers and impetus would secure him the
victory.
The fight fell for some time into two absolutcl), distinct
sections-an attempt by Dl'ollet'~ and Fcrey's three divisiom to
carry Fuentes de Of'ioro village and break Wellington's centre,
and an attempt to cut up, by the cavalry arm alone, the 7th
Division and its attendnnt squadrons, Wore they could be
snc<:Qul'ed and drawn back into Wellington's new line of defence.
It was ouly after some time that these two combats became
joined, by nn attempt-which was ne"cr pressed home-to
attack that part of the British position which lay to the right
real' of Fuentes de Onoro.
The fighting west of Pozo Bello ma.y be tukcll fh'St, us it WIlS
n logical continuation of the engagement ill the early mOl'lling.
Here Mont1.lrun had under his. hand four cavalry brigades~thosc
of '''IIt.hicr, l"oul'Ilier, Cunois, and Orllnno-o.bout 2,700 sa.bre;;~
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with Lepic's 800 guard cavalry as his resen·c-though, as it
tUl'lled out in the end, the use of that resen·e Wl\S to be denied
him. In front of him were the two battalions recently evicted
from Pozo Bello, with the British cavalry bdgades of Slade and
Arcntschildt (about 1,400 sabres) and Bull's horse-artillery
troop, which had drawn up to proted: the retreat of the
l'outed battalions towards the main body of the 7th Division.
General Houston with that fOrL'C (OIlC Briti~h uattalioll, two
foreign, and foul' Portuguese battalions 1) was engaged in taking
up new ground, on the slope which is separated ftom Pozo Bello
by the shallow trough forming the valley of the Dos Casas
bwok. Montbrun's object was, of COUfS(', to break the Bdtish
horsemen, and thell to fall upon and destroy the shaken infantry
which they were protecting, before they could cross the ,'alley.
There resulted II "cry fierce Illld IOllg-sustained cllvalry combat,
infinitely creditAble to the four Uritish regiments, who had to
fight a detaining action against numbers about double theil·
OWll. They wel'C bound to retire in the end-and indeed had
110 other intention-but it was their duty to hold ofi-' the enemy
till the illfantr}" behind them had got into order. This wail
done, though at great cost, the regimcnts retiring by alter-
nate squadrons, while the rear squadron at ench change of front
charged, often winning a temporary and partial success over the
enemy in its immediate front, but always forced to give back as
the French reserve came up. < \Vhen we charged,' wrote Cl
participant in this long combat, < they would often turn their
horses, and our men shouted ill the pursuit-but go which way
they might, wc were but scattered drops amid their host, and
could not possibly arrest their progress. We had again to go
about aud retirc 2.' The British cavalry, though losing heavily,
nC"er got out of hUlld, and eould be still used as efficient units
down to the end of this phase of the battle. Of their total
casualty list of 151 neady all lIlust have been lost in this hard
work; it is noticeable that only one oflicel· and four men were
taken prisoners, a sufficient proof that there was no such rout as
1 51st Foot, CJul8uHr8 n,·itanllique8, the iUCOmjllete battalion of lll"uns4
wick Ocls (short of tll'O companies detached), and the ith ami l\h.h
Portuguese, commanded on this day by Doyle, colonel oftJle 19t1l.
~ Ullpublished Diary of Hall of the 14th Light Drngoons.
d
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French accounts dC.'lCI·ibc-fol' a rOllt alwfL)ts implies a .'lCrlons
loss in 'missing.'
Aftel' a running flgh~ the British cavalry WM driven back on
to the 7th Division, which (now joined by the two detached
battalions) was drawn up on the best position that Houston
could select 011 the slope above the valley: his centre was in
a projecting angle among some rocks which crop up in the
genemlly bare hillside-his wings thrown back. and partly
covered by stone walls forming the boundaries of meadows.
The much-tried British squadrons, clearing off to the side. took
position on the left rear of the infantl·y, leaving the 7th Dh'isioll
in face of the now rather confused mass of Montbrun's horsemen,
whose order was none the better for the long and well-contested
oombat in which they had been engaged. The French general
made a serious attempt to break into the 7th Division.: while
skirmishers demonstrated against its front, and a light batter)"
just sent forward by Ms..<>sena shelled its centre, a brigade of
dragoons turm.'<l its right wing and tri<.."<i to roll it up, This
attack was foiled by the Chasseurs BritaJmiqlles, who, drawn up
behind a long stone wall, had apparently escaped Montbrun's
notice; re<.'Civing a staggering VOne)' at close range. just when
they supposed that they hall come upon an unprotected flank,
the oo\'iUlcing squadrons fell ba.ck ill confusion. Another
charge, made against the 51st, was a'1r.o beaten off' by musketry 1.
The french then came to a stand-it was clear that they
wanted infuntry if they were to get any tlllvantage over the
7th Division. which was now well settled down into its position.
But Marchand's and l\fermet'r. battalions had not followed
Montbrun across the valley, but had begun to march straight
3gainst the centre of Wellington's new line, west of l~llentesde
Oi'loro.
At this moment a. new force came upon the scene; Craufurd
1U~d the Light Di\'ision were a.t hand, ma.rching along the higher
slope of the watershed between the 'l'uron Rnd the Dos Casas,
ill order to connect with the 7th'Dh·isioll. But Craufurd hnd
not come to form up and hold the ground where Houston was
already engaged, Wellington's orders were that the 7th Division
should move to its rear, Cl'OSS the TurOll, and prolong, to the
1 Sce Journal of Wheeler of the 6ht, pp. 13-I·j.,
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west of that stream, the new line already formed by the
1st and Srd Divisions. Il was to makc this movcment covered
by the Light Division and the cava.lry, who were to hold the
slope till Houston was well on his way and out of danger. 'lney
were then to retire behind the 1st Division. This ww; a
dangerous task for Crnufurd and his men, but Wellington had
selected them precisely because he knew that they were to be
trusted. \Vhile MOlltbrull was busy rearranging his disordered
brigade;, Houston slipped down the reverse slope of the hillside
where he had been lying, crossed the 'I'uron, Rnd finally drew tip
with one brigade (Sontag's) on the well.marked heights west
of that stream, and the otheL' (Doyle's Portuguese) in the village
of' Freneda, a mile further to the right. Thus 'Vellington had
onL'e more an outlying flank-guard, covering the roads whieh
lead to the Con and the Bridge of Castello Hom. 'Vith the
exception of the two battalions cut lip at the opening or the
fight, the 7th Division had suffered \'ery slightly-apparently
the :French cavalry had 1I0t harmed it, but their attached
battery had caused some cHsualtic~, which cmllc in all to 110
more thall 90 men lout of the 3,800 in tIle seven battalions
which had not fought at Pow Bello.
011 the departure of the 7th ,Divi~ioH ull the peril alltI
responsibility lIOW fell Oll Cruufurd and the ulrendy Illuch-tried
cavalry, who had to make their way back for a full mile along
the open slope of the hillside, to join their comrade~ ill the new
p<mition south of Fuelltes. Montbrnu, though he hud failed in
his attack on infantry in position, thought that he ought to have
better fortwle against men retreating over a rolling upland, so
urgt!d the pursuit with great energy. Craufurd formed his men
in battalion squares, save a few companies of the rifles and
Cu<;adores, whom he threw into thickets and enclosures to the
right a.nd left, where he thought them safe against horsemen.
1 TIle 51st lost 6 men; Brunswick Oels, 18; OJw.l/lleUr¥ BritUlllliqlleg,
MI; 7th Portuguese, 8 men; )9th, 2 men-of these 92 only 19 were
prisoners, so that it is cle.1r tlLat the French cavolry nCI'cr got in IImong
tlJem, or cut them up in the style described by I'det, l,'onrllicr, Fririoll,
or i\lassCuil himsclf, \Vllcn n. bodr of 4,000 illfalltrr ultackcd by cavalry
ha~ onl)' 00 casualties, wc kilO\\' that no Ilart of it call h,(I'c becn ridden
o\'er or scriously broken.
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The main body retreated in u. line of squares, with the cavalry
and the battery of horse artillery in the intern\ls. Whenevel'
the 1;'1'ench came forward, the gUllS played upon them, and the
Bl'itish cavalry chargt.>d by squadrolls to check the onslaught.
So beautifully \\'8S the retreat managed, that MOlltbl'Ull never
got a chance to charge the infantry at adnl.utaf,l"C. 'The
steadiness and regularity with which the troops performed their
movement, the whole time exposed to nCfLnllollade,and followed
across a plain by a numerOU!l cavalry, ready to pounce 011 tIle
tiC) lla!'eS if the least disorder should be detected, was acknowledged
hy hundreds of unprejudiced spectators (who witnessed it fl'Om
the heights) to have been a masterpiece of military e,'olutioll.
lVe sustained 8. ver)' trifling loss from the Ulllllonade l ,'
writes onc Light Division officer. Another (Ntlpicl' himself)
·in more stirring phrases tells hall" 'many times lHolltbrull
threatened to charge Cranfurd's sCJuares, but always found them
too dangerous to meddle with, They appeared but as specks,
with close behind thcm 5,000 [read 3,5(0) horsemcn, trampling,
bounding, shouting for the word to charge. Finecn gUlls were
tip with the French cavalry, the eighth ("OJ'ps 2 WllS ill ordcr of
battle behind them, the woods on their right were filled with
Loisou's skirmishc!'i:!, lIud if that gCllcrul, pivoting up01l l~ucntcs,
had come forth with the 6th Corps, \~'hile Drouet assailed the
,'ill30<re and the cavalry made 11 general charge, the loose crowd
of 1l01l-combatants aud broken troops would havc bcelJ violently
dll:lhcd against the 1st Divisioll, to intcrcept ih fire find break
its ranks, and the battle might havc been lost J,' Dut Montbrutl
knew as well as Crauful'd that intact infantry of good quality
Cl\1I110t be broken when it is securely formed in square, and
any attempt to molest the Light Di\·ision by artillery fire was
checked by the self-sacrificing efforts of the British cavalry
and guns, who fought their best to keep off' the enemy. Dull's
guns \\'CI'C incessantly ulllimbcl'illg and firing a few rounds in
the intervals of the squares, and then retreating rapidly to
It new position. On the ouly occasion when a French battery
I Leach (of the {15th), Iflje f.!(Cl/I Old Soldier, [t, 214,
1 By SQlIle error Napier says the 8th COf(IS, but the oul)' division of
1.li<1.t corps jll'escllt (SoligIHlC) wal' in resenc nu' off.
J Napier, Hi. 152.
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got close up it was charged in front, with desperate gallantry,
by a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons, who suffered
terribly, but won the necessary minutes for the square to which
it was neighbour to get out of range 1. At last the whole
retiring force, horse and foot, came into ~Vellington's lines, with
the French close in their rear, ilnd found safety with thc lst
Division. Two incidents marked the last moments of the
retreat: at one point o<:curred an episode which Napier has
immortalized, with some inaccuracy of detni~ in one of his most
brilliant· purple passages.' Captain Norman Ramsay, with two
guns of Bull's troop, had halted, not for the first time, for a shot
Or two at the pursuing cavalry; lingering a moment too long,
he found himself cut off, just as he had limbered up, by a swarm
of chuslJcurs, who rode in f!'Olll the flank. But he put his gUlls
to the gallop, aud, charging himself in front of them with the
mounted gunners, was cutting his way through the French when
he was brought ofI' by friends. Oil one side a squadron of the
14th Light Dragoons under BroUlerton, on the other a squadron
of the Royals, had turned back when they saw the artillery in
danger. They· fell Upoll the cluL3sew',t before Hammy had
suflered allY hurt, and savcU him and his gUllS, which were
brought into the lines of the 1st Division amid loud cheers
from all who had seen the affair 2,
I See Drotherton's MemoirJ in Hamilton's lli8torg of the 14tfl Liglll J)Y(1-
goomf, pp. 84-/): 'At Fucntl:9 d'Quoro wc IUlll a VCI')' fiue fellow, Captain
Kllille, killoo tllfOUgl, his gallantohstinacy, ifllllay so call it, 'Ve }md, the
night before, been discu.ssillg the best mode for ca\'aJry to attack batteries
ill the open field. He maintaiued, contrary to us all, that they ought to
be c11arged ill frollt, illstcad of by ltlIining their flank alld avoiding their
fire. '111e experiment llext day was fatal to him, He had the opportunity
of ellarging 11 Frellch battery, which he did by attackillg immediately ill
front. Their discharge of round shot he got through with little loss, but
they most rapidly reloaded with grape, and hig party got ll. close "lid
murderous discharge, which almost entirely destroyed it-he himself
rel,:eivillg ll. gml,e shot througll the body.' As iUolltlmm had not got up
I'is guns during the first cavalry l,iharges, this must have been during
Cl'IlufuI'(l's figllt.
, Napier makes two serious errors-he repl'esenta Hamsay as having
a II'hl,llc buttery, illswad of two gUlls ouly : amI be underrates the a~is·
tallCC given by the cavalry, which is detailed ill llrotllertoll's memoir, <'15
well as ill the regilllcntal bistory of the ltoYlIls (p. 118),
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A little to the left of the point where this happy escape took
place there was an episode of a less fortunate kiud. The skir-
mishing Hne of the 1st Division was extended along the foot of
the slope on which its brigades were arrayed. 'Vhen the rolling
mass composed of the Light Division squares, their attendant
cavalry, and the French in hot pursuit, drew near to the position,
the officer ill charge of the pickets of the Guards' brigade
(Lieutenant-Colonel Hill ofthe Srd Guards) directed them to
close up into solid order) for safety's sake: this they did, fon}}·
ing a small square. In this formation they beat off the rather
disorderly eharge of the French horse; but Colonel Hill then
very unwisely extended them again, and thus exposed them ill
the most dangerous order to a second charge ofa .French regiment
(lSth ChasseuT8) which came in from the side after the main
attack WIl8 over. The three companies were taken in flank, rolled
up, and very badly mauled, sixty or cighty men being killed or
wounded, and Hill himself with llnother officer and ninetecn men
being taken prisoners 1. The rest had time to clu b together
and defend themselves, till they were rescued by the charge of a
1 The account or this in Wellillgton'S dispatch is hopelessly obscure,
bet;ause instead of writing < tI,C l!ickctIl or tI,C 1st Division under Licut.-Col.
Hill,' he wrote by a slip or tlte l}en' the -rt!!Jimmt8 of the 1st Division under
Lieut.-Col. Hill.' Hill of course (being a regimental llIajor though
a titular Lieut.-oolollel, after ti,e Guards F}'Soom} did not command whole
regiments, as Wellington's words imply, but simply the skinnishillg liue
or pickets. The racts are made quite clear by Soopney or tIle Coldstreall~~
and Stothert's diary (who calls them' the pickets of the Guards '), Grattan
(who calls them t the advance,' or t tlHllight troops or the 1st Division '),
and Hall's unpublished diary, which gives the whole story in a nutshell:
• TIle enemy made a dart at tIle pickets or the 1st Dil"ision, with the
expectation of sweeping off the line berore our cavalry could support
them. 'I1ley succeeded in part, by coming up unexpectedly, but wllen
tile)' were pCr(ci\'ed UH~ mcn, by collectiug into kuots (or' hiving' Ill;
the)' called it) repulsed them with the bayonet. A troop or tIle 14th Light
Dragoons and some or the Hoyals were ordered out to the skinnish IIl1d
suffered some loss.'
It is this incidcnt which Gencrallo'oumicr, who led thc charge, tran9-
rorms in his dispatch (in the Archive8 de la Guerre) into the breaking two
squares or tile Light Division IInd takiug Gcneral Craururd llrisoller--
" wild story. :Fririoll makes the cllllrge capture' 300 HU!l6IIrs of the
English Royal Guard!' BolII Slty 1I1at lllree lollttaliOlls of the Guard!; Jai,l
down their arms.
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squadron of the Royals under Colonel Clifton and a troop of
the 14th Light Dragoons, which brought off most of thl: sur·
VI rors. The total loss was about 100 men 1.
This was only onc of !ieveral partial attacks made by the
French cavalry against the front of Wellington's new position~.
Montbl'Ull sccms to have thought t1mt he could continue to press
the Allies-llot recognizing that he had hitherto had to do with
troops voluntarily retiring, but had now run against a battle-
line which intended to :;talld. Indeed, he wklhed to try the
effect of a general charge against the fi'ont of the Ist Division,
and with that object sent orders to his reserve, Lepic's brigade
of Guard cavalry, to COllie to the front, alld head all advance,
which the rallied sqnadrons of his main body would support.
LepiCt however, refused to move, saying that personally he was
only too read)' to attack, but that he had received specific orders
not to use his brigade Sllve at the direct command of hi;; inunc-
diate superior, Marshal Bessieres 3• 'While the Marshal was
being sought (he was ultimately found. after much delay, behind
Pow Bello), the moment which Monlbl'llll supposed suilablefol'
a charge passed away.
With this episode the ad\'ance of MontbrUI1's cavalry ended,
frittering itself away on the edge of the new position of the Allies.
Its total ctli..'Ct had been to roll in the t1allking' force whieh
Wellhlgtoll had thrown out, and to gain some three miles of
ground. The 105S of the British had been tt.ppreciablc, but can
1 Deductiug Un, regimeuts in l<'uentes de Onoro (71st and 7!1th) tIle
ht Divisiolllost about 400 men in the whole day, of whom probabl)' 100
iu this petty disaster.
I Oue was repelled b}' the 42nd, which met it illliue.
3 Of this episode, onI)' lliuted at by .Fririou, and !lot mentioned at all
by Masseun in llis officinl disl)llwh, wc 11l&\'C 11 vil'id dcscriptiolL ill l\Inrbot,
which might be doubted if it were not borne out by hints in Napier and
Thi~balllt and by tIle direct statement of Marsl131 Jonrdall in his mcmoirs.
If Lepic had charged, it is hard to see what effect lie could have produced,
for all Pcninsular experience went to prove that infantry in battle onler
on a good position could not be broken by eavalry, however darillg. 'fhe
1st and 3rd Dil"isions were well established on their groull(l, with a steefl
slope below them, and could not have bee" moved. Lepic's refusal to
charge, howe"er, always takes a prominent IlIlr!. ill thc deseri[>tion (If
Fuentcs de Oi1(lro by Freudl wrilel'8, !lol eye-wituesse5, who are all:douo
to IlI"O'"C that Wellington ought to havc losl thc battle.
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hardly be culled severe-lUlder 250 in the 7th Division, about
150 in the cavalry, and !WO in the 1st Division. l\fontbrun's
squadrons 011 their side had 359 casualties, to which may be added
perhaps a hundred in Marchand's division of the 6th Corps, which
fought ill the attack 011 Poze Bello. The strategical advantage
ubtuioed by forcing Wellillgtull to tlu'Ow Lack his right wing,
and to leave the roads towards Castello Bom exposed to the pos-
sibility of flanking cavalry raids, WM considerable. But it was
less important than it appeared, since the mere threatening of
his communications was useless, unless' he could be forced or
llltl.uCEuvred out of his position; and this was not to be donc.
He himself saw this clearly, writing in his dispatch which
describes the battle: • I had occupied POS=0 Velho and that
neighbourhood, in hopes that I should be able to maintain the
communication across the Coa by Sabugal, &c., as well as to
provide for the blockade of Almeida, which objects, as W8.'>
IlOW obvious, werc become incompatible with each other. I
therefore abandoned that which was the less im}lortant 1.' He
then proceeds to show how his new position stilI co,'ered the
blockade of Almeida, and (by means of the troops placed
beyond the Turon) rendered it hard for thc enemy to Illake
any rcal attempt towards Castello Dom-since this could 110t
be done save by an isolated detachment. Indeed, Massena had
still to beat the allied army, and the preliminary operations
now ended had done nothing lIlorc than thrust it back into its
tighting position.
'I'hat, according to Massena's design, the second act of the
battle was to l..'Ollsist in a vigorous attempt to break 'Vellington's
new linc, is clear from his OWll dispatch. And the point to be
pierced was the projecting angle of its centre, in, and to the right
of, Fuentes villtlor1'E:. Here the attack was to be concentric and
enveloping, FereJ's division snd the two divisions of the 9th Corps
being intended to storm the village, after which Marchand's and
Mermet's divisions, supported by Solignac's, were to assail the
heights to its south-west, where Picton amI Spencer were now ill
line. Six of the eight infantry di \·isiolls of the FI'CllCh army were
to attack on It front oCnot mueh over a mile. This was a powerful
combination, but the position which it was to assail was illw
I To Loru Lil'el"pool, llth May. lM1HIJchc¥.> vii. p. 6al.
181l] THE ATTACK OK FUENTES VILLAGE SSI
vcry strong. The village, with its barricaded streets and its
tiers of houses trending up the hill, was susceptible of indefinite
defence. The hillside above it and to its right was a perfect
fightillg-ground-with the ravine in its fron~ tine artillery em-
placements along the sky-line, and a flat plateau behind, on
which the main line and the reserves could stand sheltered, till
the moment whell they were required to deal with an inmntry
attack.
Masseua's plan was to storm the village firs~ and then, when
1"crey and Drollet should hu. \'e pushed through it, and have
got a lodgement Oll the plateau, to deliver the frontal attack
with the other thn.'E! divisions. He did not intend Marchand
and .Mermet to move till the projecting angle of 'Vellington's
line was tnrned. and broken in by the success of the other attack.
10'01' to send forward these two divisions of the 6th Corps for an
assault on the fine position opposite them, while it was held by
intact troops with their flanks properly covered, would have
\"cell to invite a repetition of BUS8aCO. The plateau was held
by a perfectly adequate force, the foul' brihradcs or the Ist
Division (minns three battalions detached to hold FlIentes de
Ol1oro 1), Ashworth) Portuguese brigade, and the whole Srd
Division, over 13,000 Illeu, on u short front, while the Light
Divisioll had now returned to take its place in rescrYc.
Wellington had these troops dra.wn up in a double line, the
bt Diyillioll uext the 'l'uron, Ashworth's brigade ill the cculrc,
and the 31'd Division abovc .Fuentcs, whose defence it was to
fecd, if necessary, by detaching battalions from its second line,
which was formed by Mackinuon's brigade. Owing to the
numerical inferiority of the French artillcry, 'Vellingtoll had
also been able to concentrate a larger number of guns (six
batteries) 011 the criticul point of the battlefield thall his
enemy could brhlg against him, so that the •artillery pre-
paration,' to maul his line before a general attack, was bound
to fail. The :Frcnch guns were ovcrpowered in the contest.
I 2j24t11 and 1/7!lth from NightiuWlle's hrigadc,lmu tlle 1/718t frolll
Ho"'ard's, in all 1,050 bayonets, leaving the remainder of d,e 1st Division
with 6,iOO baYOIlCts, .the 31'11 Divisiou with 5,400, anti Ashworlh witlJ
2,500 as the main line holding the plateau, with 3,700 of Craufllrd's Light
I>il'isioll ill reserl'c.
33:l THE BATTLE OF FUl~NTES DE" ONOUO [~IAY t;
It must lIot be supposed that Masscua wlj,jted for the arrival
of Marcha.nd's and Mennet's infantry in front of the position
before commencing his attack. The troops opposite Fuentes
had been ordered to storm the villa.ge when l\1ontbrun's opera.
tions had begun to develop su<:c~ssfully, but' sans rien hllSaroer \'
i. e. they were not to move if the attempt to turn the Dritish
right failed. Dut when the cavalry were seen sweeping the hill-
sides beyond Pozo Bello, and <!rh'ing the enemy before them, the
attack on Fuentes was begun by Ferey's division, which was
already in possession of the few houses 011 the cast side of the
Dos Casas brook. The assault commenced at about two hours
after dawn, when the combat was already in full progress to the
south, by a brisk attack which drove the defenders of the village
(the 7lst and 79th) out of its lower portion. Two corn·
panics of the latter regiment, barricaded in some buildings lIear
the water, were completely surrounded and forced to surrender,
after all their officers had been wounded. Ninety·follr men
were taken prisoners. The remainder of this Highland battalion
and of its countrymen of the 71st rallkod ill the upper end of
the village, and when joined by the regiment in reserve (the
~/24th) came forward again, and drove the :French into the
lower hou~es by the river. The fight came to a ~tand~till for a
1lI0ment, Fcrey's division (which had already suflcl'oo so severel)'
on the 31'd) being now a spent force so fnr as initiative went.
But Drouet, who had been told to give Ferey his best sup-
port, then fed the light with three iJutu-illo1l& d'elite, cOlllposedof
the eighteen grenadier companies of his two divisions z. These
pieked troops, who were mistaken for men of the Imperial
Guard by their opponents because of their bearskins and tall
I Massiua's dispatch, aee Appendix, 110. XIII. Drouet is tllerefore
\Vrongly Mamcd b)' Frcuch critics \Vho su.y tIlat lIt: attacked 1111 hour or
two late-he had to lI"ait to see the tunlillg movement in successful
progress.
2 British narratives persistently state tllat infantry of the Imperial
Guard fought in Fuentes village. But it is absolutely certain that there
\Vere Ilone of thOlie trooP!! ....itll Massins'lI arm)'. The e.~plallatioll lies ill
the fact tllat the greuadier company ill a l'rellch regiment 1I"0re bear·
skins, amI tllat 3 mass of grenadier companies tllerefore could easilr be
mistaken for Guards. All 71sl aud 711tb diariell speAk of tigl1tillg" with
'the Imperial Guanls' for this reason.
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plumes, came on with great cOl1l'age, and cleared all the middle
$O[opes of the village, driving the garrison up to the summit of
the double-headed hill, near the church and the rocks. The
fighting was very deadly to both sides, but more SO to the
French, who had to dislodge an obstinate foe from barricaded
houses and lines of stone walls. It ended in the establishment
of the attncking force on the brink of the sumlllit, but further
the grenadien; could not go-the head of the vill~tTe and the
plateau above it was still maintained by the 71st, 79th, and
9!4th, and 'Wellington began to fced the defending force by
d1'llning into the upper end of Fuentes, one aft,er another, the
light companies of several brigades of the 1st and Srd Divisiollll-
the ilRme detachments who had defended the village upon May:3
-in succession those of Lowe's German bl"ignde, of' Howard's
hriglUie, of Ashworth's And Power's !lortuguese, were sent to
the critical point, The whole of the 6th Oujadores followed.
But the progt'CSS of the attaek had been so far encouraging
that at this moment-about lloon-llronct resoh·ed to finish
the affair by putting in heavy supports from Conrollx's and
Claparede's divisions for a final blow 1, which should heave the
French line up on to the plateau, clear the allied troops out
of the last few houses of the village, and definitively break
Wellinhrton's line at its projecting point. Eight or ten fresh
battalions charged aeross the brook in column, through the
nA.ITOw streets encumbered by dead and wounded, and, ascend-
illg the slope, drove their enemies out of the church and the
rocks beside it. This was the criticul moment of the day-
the only one at which Wellington lost pos!;essioll of the whole
of the advanced post which so pelofectly defended his centre.
•Such a series of attacks,' writes an eye-witncss 2, • constantly
supported by fresh troops, required cxertions more than human
1 i\[assenfl's dispatcll speaks only of Claparede's division a.~ being l,ut
in, but ag Martinieu's Ihlbil slH)W, Conroux must have beel) still more
lleal'ily engaged, for his division lost 31 officers killed and wounded,
Cbparl'!dc's only 26. Moreover, it was onc of Conroux'lI battalions
(9th Uger) with which t11e OOth were engaged mainly, and this battalion
alone lost 8 officers. About three battalioDs of each division rcmainetl
ill reserve and had few or no casualties, \'iz. the 64th, 88th, 9.5tll, D(itlt,
tOOth, l03rd of tlle Line.
i GraUau of tlle 88t1l ; see lJis Adlienture" &c. J pp. 66-7,
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to withstand: every effort had been made to maintain the post,
but efforts, however groot, have their limits. aut' soldiers had
now been en~oed. in this unequal contest for upwards of eight
hours; the heat was excessive, and their ammunition was nearl)'
expended. The town presented a shocking sight: our High-
landers lay dead in heaps, while the other regiments, though
less remarkable in dress, were scarcely so in the number of their
slain. The French gre.nndiers, with their immense caps and
gaudy plumes, lay in piles of ten and twenty together-some
dead, others wounded, with barely strength sufficient to move,
their exhausted state und the weight of their cumbrous accou·
trements making it impossible for them to crawl out of the
dreadful fire of grape and round shot which the enemy poured
into the town. The Highlanders had been driven to the church·
yard at the very top of the village, and were fighting with the
Freneh greuadicrs across the graves and tombstones. 'rhe 9th
FI'Cnc:h Light Infantry (the leading battalion of Conroux's
division) had penetrated as fill' EIS the church, and were pre-
paring to debouch upon the rear of our centre.'
This part of the British army, the second or resen'c line
of the 51'd Division-whose front line was nearer the edge of
the position, facing Marchand-was composed of Mackinnon's
brigade, the lj45th, 74th, and l/88th. On these troops de-
volved the responsibility of stopping the gap, by re<.'Overillg the
church and the head of the village. The moment for their action
had evidently come. MnckinnOll sent for leave to charge to
Wellington by Sir Edward Pakcnham, who galloped blu:k in
a few minutes, for he had found his chief only a few yards awa)'.
watching fOl' the crisis. 'He says you may go--COIllC along 1,'
was the ptompt reply, alld Mackinnon moved down with the
74th and BBth in column of sections, left in front, leaving the
45th in rcservc on his old position.
There was a fCtlrful clash by the church at the mouth of the
village street, between the 88th, the leading British regiment,
and the 4th battalion of the 9th LCger at the head of Comollx's
column. They met front to front, both in column, and arc said
I This aga.in from Grattan, "'ho tells how his colonel, \Vallace of
Russaco fame, saiol Umt he would rather have to retake "Fileotes t11ail
to cover n retreat tc the Coo.
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to have fought with thc bayonet for somc moments-the rarest
thing in war; it was only in a street combat like this that such
a chance could happen. After a sharp bicker the French batta-
lion gave way and turned back. At the same moment the 74th
charged dowll another lane which led into the village, and all
the broken remnants of the Highland regiments and the light
companies cheered and advanced among the lanes and houses.
The cncmy )·iclded at e'"cry point, seeing their main column
beaten back, and the advance of the British line swept the whole
"i11age as far as the brook: some of the pursuers, going too far,
were killed evcn on its further side. It was impossible to main-
tain the houses near the water, which were too much exposed to
the fire of the French artillery on the opposite bank. But the
74th and 88th made a firm lodgement in the middle and uppet·
parts of the village, and were not molested by any furthel'
attempt on the part of Drouet to expel them, though his
gUlls made their position sufficiently uncomrortable. The com-
mander of the 9th Corps contented himself with bringing for-
ward his IllSt intact lmttalions to the rront, to cover the routed
masses, while they were getting into order again to the rear of
their original position.
The attempt to storm It'uentes had failed with loss, and by
about two o'clock the decisive fighting was over. The 9th
Corps had lost 835 men in the street-fighting, Ferey's division
at least 400 more I. Oil the part of the defenders, the 71st and
79th, the original garrison of the village, had 458 casUAlties,
including] 19 prisoners taken at the moment of the first stonn
-this was a loss of 30 per cent., as they had 1,419 officers and
men on the field. Cameron, the col011el of the 79th, was shot
from a house during the last victorious charge. The 74th and
88th, who finully rccovcrfcl Fuentes by their deeisi\'e charge, lost
\ It is unfortunatel)' i1l1lJo~ilJle to disentangle the losses of tJle various
battalions of the ~tll Corps, as there is no regimental return, but oul)"
a corps retnrn of its losses al·ailable. But some aid is given by i\Iartinien's
invaluable M,te «et t!.f!i<;ierr ttler cl bind' pendant le' Guerre, de. rEmpire,
whieh shows tliat tllO battalions that suffered most \\'ero the 4/9tll Ugcr
with 8 officers hurt ont of 2] present, tl1e 4/63rd J..igllc with 7 out of ]9,
the 4/24th Ligne and 4/2mh Uger, each with 6 out of 17, ami the 4/]6th
I.ager with 6 ont of 16. These, clearl}', were the. units that \\'ere mllf't
cugaged. Some belonged to Conronx'_~, some to t.:laparede's dil'isiou.
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ollly 116 men in doing so. The 2/~4th, with the light (:om·
piLniell and CR{adores who had fonned the earlier reinforcements,
~m to have had about 160 casualties, but it is impossible to
separate the losses of the light companies in the village froOl
those of the battalions to which they belonged, who were drawn
up in the main position and suffered certain casualties there,
On the whole the defenders of Fuentes ~m to have lost about
800 men, its assailants about 1,800, out of the 4,000 and the
7,000 men whom they respectively engaged within it : such is the
value of the defensive, el'en when the fighting comes to close
quarters among houses and enclosures.
Massena hlld evidently considered the capture of the village
of Fnentes as the necessary preliminary for a general attack
UpOIl ·Wellington's line. While Ferey and Drouet had been
l1lakillg their llU;l; crtbrts, Marchand's tl.nd .Mermet's divisions
bad been halted before _the position of Picton's and Ashworth's
troops, while Montbrun's cavalry was facing the 1st Division.
Solignac was visible more to the rear, in frout of Pow Bello,
acting as general reserve. The twenty-four gUlls belonging to
these units 1 were all brought to the front, and cannonaded so
much of the British line as was visible, doing some little harm.
But they were gradually overpowered by the six batteries 2
which Wellington had brought up to his front, and finally
ceased. to fire. The infantry columns of Marchand and J\'Iermet
also suffered appreciably from the !;hot and shell, for they were
well within range, though too far off for infantry fire to tell
upon them a. It is clear that 1I-faSSCIlt\ refused to attack the
front of the 8rd and 1st Divisions till their flank should be
turned on the Fuentes side, and since that necessary preliminary
was never accomplished, the frontal assault was never delivered,
I Si" guns of the cavalry, fourteen of tile 6th Corp9, four of the 8th
Corps.
2 Dull's llOrsC artillery troop, TIlompson's aud UI\\'son's compal.lies, and
three Portug'uese batteries, those of Sequeira, Hosado, and Preoo.
3 r'ririon notes that they suffered more than was neeessary fT()m being
ill dense masses (p, 207). These two divisions had on the 3rd and 6th May
14 officers killed nlld 38 wounded, according to Mllrtiniell's lists. As the
tota.lloss of tIle corps on both days was 69 officers and nearly 900 men, and
we llave to ullow for Ferey'sl0!i8 of 400 men in }'ucntes village, it seems
that Marchand and l\fermet must ha,'e lost at least as many more,
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though three divisions stood ready to make it. The only move
on this side, during the hours after noon, was that on the extreme
left of the French line .some voltigcurs, apparently from Mel"lnel.':;
division, were sent down into the ra.vine of the Turoll, and tried
to push up it, as if to turll the right flank of the Guards brigade.
They were, however, soon stopped by five companies of the 95th
Rifles, whom Craufuro hOO left to block the passnge up this 101"-
lying part of the British position; no serious attempt was made
to reinforce the attack, whieh soon died down into a mere
tiraillade. ./'
i\lassena's account of hi:; l'casollR fOl" refusing to commit him-
self to the decisive attack runs as follows in his dispatch to the
Emperor: 'The Ellgli:;h b'Cllcral had unitctl ill his l:cutrc vcry
Inrge forces and much artillery. I wished to try to pierce his
.centre, and to drive the English army tow81-dS the lower COR.
The spirit of the troops wm. admirable; but I hau to U$ure
lIlysc1f~ before making this vih"OI"OUS blow, Il'" to the :;tatc of my
lllllmllllitioll, fol' during the eourse of this campaif,'ll T had seen
myself ehcckL.J rcpeab..J1y by iusurlllountable difficulties. It
resulted from the report which the offk-er commanding the
artillery .'illbmitted to me, that there only l'cmained ill the
reserve park four cartridges per man, which might gi~'e thirty
shots, counting what was still in the men's cartridge-boxes.
r did not think myself in a situation to recommence the attack
with such a meagre supply, and uecided to send all the empty
caissons back to ltodrigo, in ordel' to bring lip more IUlllmmi-
tion. Meanwhile I took the llcces",ary meaSures to preserve the
advantRe.lJ'C already gained over the eucmy I,'
It is clear that we havc 110t herc the whole of the MUl'shal'~
motives explained. Granting that the reserve of cartridges hOO
run Io\\', the troops with which he had to deliver the decisive
blow were precisely those who had still plenty of ammunition.
Mermct's2 !lnd Solignac's divisions had not fired a shot; Mar-
chuml's hud only Ucell cngl.\6J'cd for u rew llIinute:; ill POZO Bello.
with the two battaliolls of tlle 7th Division whieh it had evicted
, lfassellll. to Nupoleou, FUClltes de Oiioro, .\lay i; thc main loatHe-
l'cllOrt.
" :;a\"c the fell' \'oltigcuj' cOlllpanies from i\Iermet scut dOll'n lo sku'1I1ish
with lhe !15th Hiiles ill thc ravinc of the 'l'uroH, as mentioned just abo\·c.
Olol-'1<. IV Z
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'from that village. It is true that Ferey's, Claparede's, and
Conroux's troops, which had made the su<:cessivc attacks on
Fuent.es, must have been not only exhausted in morale but \'cry
short of mnmunition by this moment. But why had not the
attack by the three intact division~ been made before the troops
to their right had been completely used up? Clearly because
MaSSeUR refused to ucli vcr the frontal assault till the flanking
movement had been successful, tUld '\Vcllillgton's left-centre hlld
been drh'el1 from the villl\,O'C. There were several hours about
noon during which the troops of Marchand, Mermet, and
Solignac remained halted in front of the allied line, whilc
furious fighting was going ou ill Fuentcs. If the Marshu.l did
not let them loose upon the enemy during that long space of
time, it was because he thought the attack hopeless. Thc
explanation appears clearly enough in the narrative of his aide·
dc-camp l'elet; 'The Marshal came to the front when this
sort of defile had become already impregnable; a tiraillade Wati
already established; he threw himself off' his horse, and, accom·
panied only by myself, walked scveral times up and dowl1 the
front of the line, to look for a point where he could break
In. Dut the whole position seemed equully strong; the lire
of the enemy upon Fuentes, and the reinforcements which Ill>
had sent into the village, drew ill that direetion the bulk of tllC
French divisions. Everything had come to turn upon tile
qDaire de poste in t1lO.t direction. It wru; Ilecessary to fon'c
the village and the ravine at its back, where all the ground \\"a~
in favour of the euemy. The day slipped by in vain attacks l .'
If i'lIu.<;.osena did not move his main body at noon, when the
British were waging a doubtful contest in Fuentei;, it would
have been idle to strike after two o'clock, whell the attack Oll
the village had utterly failed. The fact was that he had Shlktod
everything on the cRpture ot' Puentes, and had seen at an earl)'
hour that Iw dared not send forward Marchalld, Mermct, and
Soligllll.c, till the \'illa,!,"C should have b<."ell takcn and Wcllingtou's
Aank turned. Bnt though three divisions had been moo up
one after another ugainst that strong post, they had ftl.iled to
master it. The game Will; up; for to dclivcr the frollt nttack
when the t1allk attack had failed would have been hopele.-;s.
I Pe1ct, Appf:/Illit'C ~ur tu (,'uerrc d,'/;.ipugllf:, p.:H1.
FUENTES DE ONORO.
QUinta de
Albutre
fa
May 5tlJ 1811
British • :
Portuguese .:.J
French ..
f ENGLISH MILES
1811) REYNIEU'S DEMONS'l'HATION 339
The only chance thnt the Mnrshal had of success WM to make
the two attacks sinmltaneons: but he had such a respect for
Wellington's main position that he would not assail it till it
was turned. It never was turned, !lllcl w he ne"cr engaged
the three divisions that werc so long facing it. As II ~llbsidiar)'
reason for his refuSlll to strike home, we l~ust undoubtedly add
t.he fact that he had discovered that he was too weak in guns to
make any proper artillery preparation for an att.aek on the British
Centre. In the eOllrse of a long duel his t"wenty-fom' pieces had
been O\'erpowered by the thirty-six which ,"Vcllingtoll had pla(.'ed
over against them. They were badly mauled, and largely out of
action, by the moment that the fightillg ill :Fuellt.es village WlUi o\'cr.
If the illti.mhy had advanced, it would have been shot to pieces
by'the \'ictoriOll~ British ~lrtillery, before it (;Oll]d reach the crest.
of the strong position where the Anglo-Portugucsc battalions lay
rtmgcd behind the sky-linc.
all the llorthcl'll flank of the British pOSitiOIl, where the
5th Division, about Fort Concepcioll, and the 6th Didsion in
front of Snn Pedro, watched Ueyuier's corps across the steep
ravine of thc ])os Cnsus, nothing or importtlncc happclled
throughout thc day. The opposiug forces were almost equal,
each about 10,000 strollg, amI Reynier had been ordered to
make no morc tlllm 'a ,f,'Cncl'al demonstration all along his Iinc,
to support the attack of the main army.' It was true that he
WtlS also directed to make a pnrnllcl lIlovement nlung the river,
if lVelliugton should dml\' in towards l"ucntcs de OnOl'(} the
troops immediately opposed to him I. But this was never done:
Wellington kept the 5th antI 6th Divisions <11111O.',t in their
original positions throughout the day. A regiment from the
latter (the 53rd) 2 was mov(.'<1 to the edbT() of the plateau at the
north end of' Fuentes village, to keep back lmy attempt to turn
the pltll'C on that side-but such an attempt II'{lS not made, and
I i\laSl'ClIlL'S onlcfs (ArcMwf de b.l G(lcrre) wefe tlmt I!c~'lJicr 'fern
(lOUf secolloer l'attaque tic I'armlEe ulle demoustrolUon ~lIl!rale sur la
IiglLe, et Sllina l'ellnemi dallS lous lies lllouvemcnts-c'est-it...lire que si les
forces qu'il a tlcvant. lui se porteraicut an accoun du gros de l'llnncc
(mnemic, qlli est tlalls la directioll de FU(,'Il\.e$ tfOiioro, illClS suivrait. dallS
l!ll InarclJc. pour le$ pl'cudre pllr la gHuc1Jc.'
: See Hoger~oll's regimental history or the 03rd, p. oB.
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the reil: of the di\'iliion kept its original place opposite Hcynier.
The' demonstration' which that general had been ordered to
make was duly carried out, but amounted to nothing morc than
the sending of the 31st Leger and two guns from Heudelet\
division to skirmish, at the edge of the ravine, with the ligbt
troops of the 5th Division all the other side I, Some more of
the }j'cnch regiment" deployed, but never came within gunshot
The figures of the losses all the two sides show how little
serioll~ was the engagement: the 3Ist Leger lost 4 officers
and 48 mell kiUed or wounded; the light companie:; of the
British S/bt, lj9th, 2j30th, and 9./44th, alld of the Portugue>iC
8th Ca~'tUlores lost 9.7 mcu. The 6th Divisioll hud 110 losses at
all ill its British brigades, llnd only four mcn in thc ]Qth
!'orlugllcsc line, Ueynier has been blamed by some j"rcllCh
critics for 110t pushing forward a pronounced attack, but it i~
hard to see how he could haye done more. He was ordered to
demollstrlite onlYI IIOt to commit himself to a real action, unle;:,
the lIritish should withdraw from his front find go towards
Fucntes. And as 'Vellingtol1 kept ]0,000 mCll in his front all
day, <..'Ovcred by a difficult raviJle, he would only have lost lil'es,
amI gained nothing, by engaging, The two di I'isions opposite
him wcre nUlllcl'ictllly as strong as hilllsclJ~ alld lay in a lllosl
fOl1l1idable position. An attaek would have been beaten oft; while
if he had manremred towards Fuentes to join lJrouet, the 5th
Division could ha\'c crossed the ravine and taken him ill the
rear. Such a movement would also have exposed the L'OIl\"O)'
illtCllllcd for Almcida, which Jay ut Gallcgos, to Ueynier's left
rear.
Thus ended the battle of Fuentes de Offoro: the fight, which
had been hot amI well contested dowlI to two o'clock, dying
dowll into II mere skirmishing between outposts before dusk.
The total losses of the 5th hMl been, on the part of the Allies,
1,452 officers and men, of whom 192 were killed, 958 wounded,
amI !255 taken prisoners. That of the French \\'a~ 2,19:2, uf
whom 2(i7 were killed. 1,878 wounded, and 47 prisoners. 011
I The !lth Cl\~adores, acconling to \\'elliugt<lu's diS!!Rtch, partly cro~ed
U,e ravine amI fougIlt on the oU,er gide. Note that he calls t1,el11 the
• 2nd battalion Lusitaniuo Legiou,' though tiJut bad noli' ceased to be
their official designation.
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both sidei> the hu·ger half of the casualties was incl1l'l'ed in the
street fighting that raged up and down the village of Fuentes
for so many hours; as has been already explained, the Allies
lost here 800 men, the French about 1,300. The remaining
losses among Wellington's men are mainly accounted for by the
hustling of the 7th Dh'ision about Pozo Bello, which cost fl37
men, by the cutting up of the light troops of the Guards
brigade, where about 100 casualties took place, and by the hard
lighting of the cavalry during the early part of the day, while
they were co\'erillg the retreat of the Light and 7th Di\'isions,
in which they 10:,:t HiO men, On the other side the French,
besides their casualties in Fuentes dllage, had 359 officers and
men of their CAvalry put out of action, and some 400 of
:.\larchnnd's and Mel'lllct's inflllltry killcd or hurt, partly in the
storming 01' POTA) llc110, but maiuly in the CfillllOll(l{lc ill the
afternoon, while they were standing in colmnn f:'l.cing'VeIling-
ton's second position, which they were never allowed to attack I.
Of the 255 prisoners lakcn from the Allies, nearly 100 were
lost about Pow Bello by the 7th Division, and 94 belonged to
the two companies of the 79th captured in Fuentes de Oilol'o
during Ferny's first attack, Undoubtedly the most surprising
item in the statistics of the dfl.y is the small loss incurred by the
Light Division during its retreat to the British lines, wherein,
though beset by 8,000 Cfivalry and a battery of horse artillery.
it counted only 67 casnalties~. nut steady infantry, s\lch as the
Light Division, was invulnerable even to the most daring horse-
men, so long as it presel'ved its formation in square.
On the morning after the battle, dawn showed the two armic>:;
still holding their positions of the preceding night. Masscna had
I Marclland's division showiI ill i\Jartinien'lI lists surprising!}' heavy
C:lSlmlties, considering that it WM hut partially ellgagec.l on the 3rd in
support of Ferey, awl on the 3th "'as only actil'ely employed in stormin.g
Pow Bello. H I,ad 13 officers killerl and 31 wOlllUled, wllich ollght to
impl}' at ICll9t 000 or 700 casualties among the rank and file, Apparently
there wa.<; a disproportionate loss in officers, a.~ the 1I'110le e;lslw.ltiCll of the;
Gth Corps 011 :May 5 wcre only 9U men, of whom at least 400 were ill
feroy's dh'ision.
t Only 9 hurt in the 43rtl, 21 in the 52nd, 13 in tIle; Rilles, 24 ill the
two Ca~ador battalions. Anll many of these were undoubtedly lost iu
lIkirmishing, 110t in tho retreat in squares,
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lIot drawl! back, and the line of his pickets was still covering
aU the grollnd taken from the British 011 the 5th. Thedi\'isions
were encamped close behind, ':\:Iarchand's, Mel'met's, and
SolignA.c's in the edge of the wood on the neAl' side of Pow
Bello, Ferey's, Conroux's, and Claparede's on the heights facing
Fuentcs dc Onoro, Rcynicr's far away Lo the right. Nor
had 'Vellington moved 0. Illan; but from several hours before
daylight his troops had hecn employed in entrenching the new
front that they had taken up. This was wellnigh the only
occasion during thc whole Peninsular 'Var whcn 'Vellinglon
llsed field-fortification on a large scale. A trench with the
earth thrown outward was COIl!itructed from neal' Fl1entes de
01101'0 down to the hanks of the Turan-a distance of over
a mile. There was special protection for the six batteries of
artillery distdbulcd down the front, and a great abatM{/ blocking
the ravine of the 'ruran. The vil~fY'Cof Villar rormoso on that
she/un, somewhat to the rear of the line, Il.nd that of :Frcnooa,
011 the extreme right, where the 7th Division lay, had all;()
been put in a state of defence.
Mllssenu, huving failed when the encmy was maintaining
n hastily nssumed position, had 110 intention of nttAcking it,
when it, was entrenched. In his dispatch of the 7th he writes;
, The enemy has passeil the night after the battle in fortifying
the crest of thc plateau which he occupies, There are fivc large
works, mnch artillery is visible, and trenches for the firing line.
He has put up epmdemellts in the ravines and hehind the rocks;
hc has barricaded the upper part of }'uentes de Onoro village,
and ViIlaformoso.; thus he has called to his aid all the resources
of fortifications against an atwck that must be made b), main
force.' The idea of relieving Almeida had vanished from the
)'1arshal's mind-as is sufficicntly marked by the fact that he
ordered the great col1vo)' at Gallegos, which had been collected
tor throwing into the fortres'~l to be distributed for the daily
necessities of the arm)', which would otherwise have had to be
fed by provisions sent forward frolll Ciudad Rodrigo. In his
report of the ba.ttle hc states that his intention is now to
withdraw the garrison of Almeida, if he can manage it, amI to
have the place blown up. There is 110 prospect of dislodging
the allied army by a second general engagement; but, b)'
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manrellvring, a.n opportunity of bringing off' Brennier and his
mell lUay be secured. The primary object of the campaign i~
therefore abandoned; but the new secondary object of saving
the garrison of Almeida may possibly be secured. In this, as
we shall see, the Marshal was to SlICl..OO, owing to the culpable
negligence of some of \VetJington's subordinates. The main
purpose of the expedition of the Army of Portugal had been
foiled; after the battle the idea of retaining Almeida, as a
foothold beyond the frontier, wus gi\'en up.
}~uentes de Olioro hlUl been called the most ha?ardo\ls of all
Wellington's fights, and he has often been censured for fighting
at all. Success is not always the best criterion of it general's
dispositions, and in this case the fact that Masseua was foiled is
not enough to vindicate all his adversary's arrangements. But
when the case against \¥ellington is stated by critics like Napier,
Fririon, or Pelet, it is necessary to set forth his defence, which
seems an adequate one. Napier blames his old chief for accepting
ImUle. 'A mistaken notion of MilSsena's suff'erings during the
late retreat induced "Wellinbrton to undertake two operations at
the !>ame time I, which was aoove hia strength, anJ this error
might have been llis ruin, for llessieres, who only brought 1,500
ca\"alry and six gullS to the battle of E'uentes OlioI'o, might have
IJrought 10,000 men and sixtcen guns.' Hc crred in sending
out Houston's division to Pom Bello, and so extending his line
to an unwieldy length, across ground which, l>eyond Fuelltes,
was suitable for cavalry auu lacked defells.ive slrengtll. By
engaging the 7th and Light Divisions on this tenuin he gave
the enemy' great advantages, which Napolcon would have made
fataL' He took up a position which would have allowed Massenn
to detach some of his numerous sCJuadrons round his right flank,
lJy the Sabugal and Sequeiro bridges, to destroy his magazines
at Guarda and Celorico, brcak his communication, and cut up
th'.! trAnsport in the rear of the n.llied R.rmy. But, SAys Napier,
• with an overwhelming cavalry on suitable ground, the Prince
of Essling mcrely indicated, as it wcre, the English general's
errors, and stopped short whcn he flhould haye sprung forward.'
'1'0 this it llIay be alU;wcrctl, (irstl)', that 'Vellington would
not havc fought.. if llessierCfl had brought 10,000 men instead of
1 Tile blockade of Alrneida and the siege of 8nclajl)"~ by Beresford.
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the two camlry brigades which actually accompanied him.
He states in his dispntch to Lord Liverpool of May 1st that he
is prepared to abandon the blockade of Almeida 'if the enemy
have such a superiority of force as to render the result of contest
for that point doubtful' He also states that he is aware that
Masseua might be reinforced by detachments of the troops under
Bcssieres, which would include some of the Imperial Guard.
On :Mny f2ud 1 his intelligence through Spanish sources \I'M
sufficiently good to enable him to know that w~ry little of the
Army of the North had actually moved, If oue or hoth of the
Guard infantry divisions had marched for the frontier a week
before the campaign began, it is perfectly certain that he must
hU\'e heard of it, for such u force would huve tuken long to
ndvance from Valludolid to Ciudad Hodrigo, or still longer from
Burgos to Ciudad Hodrigo. There were secret agents nt
Salamanca and most of the other towns of the Douro valley, who
would certainly have taken care that such a piece of informatioll
should reach the hands of Wellington. He fought because he
was aware thnt the force opposed to him practically consisted of
the Anny of Portugal alone. It will be remembered that, before
his short \·isit to the Alcmtejo in April, he gave Sir Bl'cut Spencer
elaborate directions as to the position which he was to take up.
in case the French sllould come in overwhelming foree to relic\"e
Almeida during his own absence. Spencer was directed to leave
the road open, and to draw back to a defensive position covering
~he allied lines of communication 2. And this no doubt is the
policy which Wellington would have adopted, if Bcssieres had
brought up the infantry of the lmperial Guard to Massella's
help. Of this the best proof is that he actually followed this
plan ill September, at the time of the El Bodon fighting, when
Dorsellue, llessieres's successor, came lip to the help of the
Army of Portugal with a large fOl'Ce.
Napiel"s second cdticism is of morc validity. The placing of
the 7th Division at Pozo Bello did extend the front of the t\rmy
into indefensible ground. But, as has already been pointed out,
Wellington's intention was not to fight with the 7th Division in
such a position, if the enemy made a wide flanking movement
.with a very large force. Houston's battalions and their cavalry
I Ditpatche" vii. 515. ~ See p. 29B above.
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supports wcre to guard against any attcmpt to tn1'll F'ucntcs dc
01101'0 by a mere detachmcnt, operating Oil tl short circle. }"or
this the force sufficed: that, though it was n.ssailed by three
infalltry divisions and 3,000 ctl.valr)', it came off with a loss of
onl)' 400 men, and assumed the new position allotted to it in
due course, is surely a testimony to the fundamental soundness
of V{ellinglou's tactics, Flanking detachments must withdraw
if hopelcssly outnumbered; but that is no reason for saying
that such detachments must Ilevcr be made. Montbrllll'8
caVAlry sought e\'ery possible opportunity to act against the 7th
and Light Di\'isions, but had no success save in the onc case
where they caught two battalions in scattered fragmcnts cvac-
nating a ,'illage-even there, owing to the splendid 8UCCOUl'
afl'onlcd by the British cavalry, they did not destroy the unlucky
troops. but only cut up 150 of thcm. The moml is thc old onc,
that cavalJ·y unsupported is helpless a..:,crainst a steady force of a.ll
arms, even when it is in movement over open ground, ]nfel,iol'
though thc British horscmcn were ill number, they gave an
invaluable suppod to the infantry, which was never scriollsly
incommoded during its retreat.
Uut, it is urgcd I, the Light and 7th Divisions might ha\'e
been in great peril if Marchalld's And Mermet's illfAlltl')' hAd
followed Montbrun's cavalry with all speed, and pursued the
retiring British, instead of drawing up in front of 'Vellington's
left centre, to the south of :Fuelltes village, Massena seems to
contradict the possibility of this ill his dispatch, where he says
that 'the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the 6th Corps followed the
movement of the cavalry as much as it MU possible for infullt1"'!J
in column to iW,' and again: • This superb movcment [of the
cavalry] was stopped; and btfore 01/.1· infant17J cO"l/ld arrive the
enemy had the time to cover the crest of his plateau with
several lines of English infantry and a formidable force of
artillery 2,' It seems probable that there was actuall)' not time
for Marchllnd and Mermct, coming out by narrow swamp)' paths
from the woods of P07.0 Bello ;;. and forced to get into order ill
I .Both by Napier, Hi. 152, and by Fririoll, p. 207.
! See bis dil!patcll ill the Appendix to Helmas, i. p. 630.
, Moreover, ,'Iarchalld's leading brigade, that of )Jallcllne. must h:ll'e
been in great disorder, after h:l\'illg driven the British :ulvanced guard oul
of the woods :lnd the village, and would lIeed time to re-form.
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the open el'e they could move on, to catch up Crnuful'd nnd
Houston before thcy were safe ill their appointed positions.
MoreO'·er, if they had hurried after Montbrun they would haxe
been making a flank march across the front of 'Ve1linglon's new
line, and exposing themselves to the possibility of a ruinous
counter-stroke, like that deli vered at Salamauca a year later.
Apparently thcn, on MassClla's own showing, the admncc of
Montbrull was too rapid for the infantry to join him, and if so,
the dismal picture drawn by Napier of the cavalry and the
Light Di ..isioll overwhelmed by a combination of Montbrull and
Marchand, and hurled in disorder against the Ist Division ill ibJ
position on the plateau, must be overdrawn. It is rash to
critici1.e 'Vellington as a tactician, when (as in this case) he was
moving troops under his own eye, on ground where calculations
of time and pace were simple. If, from his l.'ommandillg posi.
tion on the edge of the plateau, he had j ll(lged that the French
infantry were close enough to Montbrull to give him effccthc
support, he cerblinly would not have sent out Cmufmd to
!'IlICCOur Houston, but would have allowed the latter to lllake the
best l'etreat that he could towards the Tnron amI Freneda. But
Wellington evidcntly judged that the 7th Division could be
brought off without too much risk, and he knew that Cmnfnrd
and his veterans could be trusted even in the most delicate
situations. No amount of cavalry could harm them, and if tllO
French infantry were far enough aWRy, the operation wOllld be
in reality much less hazardous than it looked.
When once the Light and 7th Divisions had got to their
appointed places in the !lew line, it is hard to see that Masseua
could have done anything against Wellington'S front, which was
-well established on a commanding ground, with 11 steep slope in
front, and n superior lu-tillery ranged along the crest. The Marshal
himself, as we lune seen, after inspect.ing the new position in
person, thought that Fuentes village was the crucial point, and
had turned Ulrcc divisions against it. Undoubtedly, if he (.'Ould
have taken it, the position of the Allies would have been much
altered for the worse. But it was a ver)' strong post-as i.~
sufliciently shown by the faet that 4,000 men held it ngninst.
nearly double numbers for six or seven haUl':'. Indeed, its
importance ma)' be compared with that of Hougoumont ill the
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battle of ·Waterloo-it forced the attacking party to USE! up
a disproportiollate number of men against an olltwork, whose
occupatioll was absolutely IIcecssary ns a preliminary for the
general attack which was contemplated. The infantry of the
French left oould not assail the ht and Srd Divisions with any
reasonable prosped of success till Fuenles was carried, and~ as
it WitS llc\'(!r carried, thc attack L'Quld not be delivered.
As to Napier's snggestion that )lR..'\.~nt\ might lut\'e lL~ed
some of his superabundant cavalry for a raid against thc
Scquciro and Sabugal bridges, and the cOlllmunicaliollS of the
a..Ilicd army, it is clear that the mo'"c WM fCll$ible, but there is
110 reason to suppose that it would have been effective. The
IllOlllcut tlmt the force-SllY It couple of brigades-got to thc Coa
it would have been ill the narrowaud difficult rOMs of the mOU1l'
tains-liable to be ..topped by the breaking of the first bridge,
or the barricading of the road by the first bands of Ordenan~a
that it rall against. Cavalry raids to the rear muy be cffectivc
in thc plains, but in a country like northem Portngal they are
of yery doubtful expediency. The military historian will re-
member how fruitles:l in the end were all the brilliant expeditioll.~
of .f. E. B. Stuart and Morglln ill the Americnn Civil 'Var:
thOllgh they did mllch damage to trains and ooI1\"o)'s, they IlIul
practically no cfli..'et on the h"Cllcrul result.; of the campaign.
1\1oroover, nny expedition to places so remote as Cclorico 0\'
Guarda would have taken many days, and l\fasscna had no time
to waste; consideratiotls of supply pre;,;sed him to make a speedy
cnd to the Cll.lllpaign. On the whole, Nllpicr's critici~m seems
unconvincing on this point.
As to Pclefs and Fririou's tUld Dclagl'ave's carpings at
Wellington, they seem to be based on a radical ignoro.ncc of the
lorce which he had at his disposal. He may be pro\'cd as rash
or as timid as the critic pleases, if it is presupposed that he
hud 50,000 men, AA somc Prench writers ll.sscrt, or hOl'i;Cmen
!:uperiol' in numbers to his enemy, a~ others have the face to set
forth 1. If the allied arm)' had possessed an adequate cavalry,
I Pelet tlliuks tlmt < l'exces.<!h·e Ilul>eriorite flu general Imglllill lui
UOllllllit le mo}'en ue tout entreprendre. 11 Il'ellt mOlltre, dam cette
.::ampaglle, et meme llilleul'B, fort t:trallger it la strategie comme a la
betique,' He concludes that Welliugum with his superior numbers
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or two infantry divisions more than it actually contained, wc
may be sure that the fight would have taken a vcry different
aspect. It wus the balance of numbers which forced Wellillgton
to assume a purely defensive position. The critic who urges
that Massel1ll. might have left the 9lnd and 9th Corps alone in
{I'ont of the allied position, and have marched with 15,000 men of
the 6th and 8th Corps on Castello Bom, taking Freneda on the
way, is perhaps the most lUlrcasonable of all_for he would huve
had tile Marshal divide his forces into two groups separated
from each other by mallY miles, with nothing to close the gap.
This would surely have led to prompt rlhm.steI', It is clear that
"'ellington could have overwhelmed the containing force, or
have crushed the turning force, at his choice, This plan ignores
the serious chance of a counter-attack 011 the part of the British
general-a possibility which does indeed seem to have escapl>d
the imaginations of many a H'Cnch general down to the day of
Salamanca. It wall deeply rooted in their minds that he was
a fighter on the defensive; they had .ret to learn that when the
chance Wall given him he could be AA formidable on the ommsive,
Sl'Ollld 1l3ve att.'lcked tl1c Io'rench centre or Reynier! He lI'a~ {plu.~ forl
des deux cinqui~mes que les Frau'f8is.' (Appendice Bur tu GlIerrt d'E6[J(lgne,
1111. 340-2.) Fririon st.'ltcs as an incontestalJle fact that tlH~ Frencl, Clll'l.lry
was in(erior to the English in numbers (Journal hi8tQriqUIJ de la Oampllglle
de Por/lIBI//, p. 20i). Murhot, 011 ti,e OtllCf I'fllld, thinks tlmt Welliuglon
was over rash ill 6ghting at all on such a position (,lft'moirt8, ii. 4GO),
coming to much the same conelugion as Napier. Belmas's arguments,
like those,of Pelet, are all vitiated by his giving Wellington 45,000 men-
!J,OOO morc than he actually possessed. Uelagr.we· thinks, like Pelet,
that Wellington 1;110wOO 'timidity \\"llich passed into cowardice.' Yet he
allow~ that Massena had 41,000 infantry and cavalry, without counting
gnnnerg Of sappers, lInd ,rellington onl}' 40,000 (p. 239).
SECTION XXVI: CHAPTER IV
1:HtJ<:NNn:R'S ESCAPE FROM ALMELDA
'i'm, 6th of May lI'ent by without any sign of movement
all the part of the l<'rellch. V{ellingtoll watched with anxiety
for the iudicatiolls of UIl extension ot' the enemy's fronl to
north 01' south. But not even (l cumlry picket \I'U:; showl!
Lo the right of Nava de Avel', or to the left of }'Ol't Concep-
cion; reconnaissal1LOC 011 the f1auk showed that the l:'rclIch
rClIlnincd com::cnh'ntcd ill their old positions. It was clellr!y
improbable that l\lassellA. was about to risk another frontal
attack: and if, as WIIS more likely. he was intending to try
~ome other way of reaching Almeida than that which runs
through Fllentes de OHoro, it was odd that he should not
start UPOll it at once. On the 8th, however, it bCt'UlllC ob~'ious
that the enemy considercd himself beaten, and WOJj o1rclldy
rctreating; at dawn it was found that the 6th and 9th Corps
had disappeared from ill front of }'mmtes de Ojloro and the
cl1trellched position to its right. Only part of the ~lId Corps
was still keeping its ground in fl'Out of Alameda. The colu11llls
of Dl'ouet llllU Loisoll were dctected by exploring officers in
the woods towards ]~speja and Gallegos; Ileynier was acting
as It covering force to protect their withdrawal, and would
have v8nh;hcd at Olll'C if he had been attncked ill fOl'l'C.
MassenEl, in fact, had only lingered on the fighting-ground
during the 6th and 7th in order to organize his retreat. He
had ordered the great convoy of food, which hud been brought
lip to Gallegos, to be distributed among the corps, since there
was no· louger any hope of throwing it into Almcida, and
had sent bn.ck his artillel'y cnissOlls to Rodrigo to be refilled.
They were not to return, as he intended to pick them up during
his retreat. But the llJllill rcusOll why the Itrlll)' had rCllIailled
near Fucntcs Jor two days was that an cAbrt had been made
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to conulIullicatc with GeneI'm Brennier by stealth, since forCl:'.
had not availed. By offering Lt reward of 6,000 francs, the
:Marshal had succeeded in finding three soldiers who \'olunteered
to attempt to pass through the British lines by night bearing a
cipher dispatch. Chance luts preservl>{l their lIames, Zaniboni,
Lami, aud 'fillet. The first two disguised themselves as Spanish
peasants, bnt were both detected Md shot as spies. The third,
a. private ill the 6th lAger, ret.'linoo his Illlifo1"l1l and crawled for
some miles down the bed of the Dos Ca..«aS ra....ine in the dark,
only emerging from it when lIe got some way beyonu :Forl Coli-
ccpciol1. l~rolll thence he made his way tu Ahneida before
dawll, by creeping 011 all fours though fieJd~ of corn. The
dispatch whieh he bore to the governor directed him to evacllate
the place Rlld escape as hest he could; he W8.'l recommended
lo lry a northerly line, and to lllake for the bridge of Barba del
Pucrco, where Ueynier's corps WM to be plaeed from the 8th
onward. By taking this ronte he would avoid the main bodyof
the allied army, as there seemed to be nothing but cAvalry
\'ooettes north of Fort COllcepcion. Brellllier was instructed
to acknowledge the receipt of the llIcssngc, by firing three
heavy salvos at five minutes' intervals from his heaviest
gUlls at 10 o'c1oek at night. This he did, and it was their
sound which enabled l\Iassena lo retreat during the dark houn.
which followed, with t\. knowledge t.hat his orders had bccn
rccci"ed and that the garrisoll would try to escape. During the
!Iext day (May 8th) the 6th and 9th Corps recrossed the A7.11.la
and retired to Ciudad Uodrigo. Reynier with the 2nd Corps,
modng Inter, aud taking a separate route, marched by the bridgc
of naroo del Pnerco, further down the Aglleda, and placed him-
self at San :Felices., just beyond the stream.
W·ellillhrtoll, 011 seeing the French fall baek to their point of
:;;lartillg, thought that Ahlleida und its garrison were noli' his
own-and so they should have been if his subordinates had acted
with commOIJ ability. He pushed forward his advanced post:;
to the A~\:,a and thc Agucda in fucc of the rctiriug ellelll~',
but sent buck the whole 6th Division to relieve l'i1{:k's Portu-
guese in the task of blockading Almeida. General CAmpbell
took over the command from Pack on the 10th, and disposed
his three brigades round the place in what he considered Il
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satisfactory and scientific fashion. It appears, however, that
he cantoned them, for convenielU;e sake, much too tar out, Md
neglected the usual precaution of pushing pickets close up to the
walls every night, to watch the garrison during the dark hours.
The regiments were placed in yillages three or four mile.~ from
the town, and the connecting screen of pickets between them
was thin. Pack's Portuguese wcre moved by Call1pbell to Cinco
Villas, four miles north-west of Almeida. Of Burne's brigade
the ~nd regiment was nearest Almeida, 011 the road that goes
out towards the north, the 36th ((t Malpul'tidu. cloSl.: b)'. TIll.:
other nritish brigade (Hulse's) was facing the south side of the
fortress at a considerable distance; the Portuguese of the division
(Madden's brigade) were lIt or llear Juncu. 011 the cw>t frollt.
Hl'ellllier wa.<; determined to do his very best to mrry out
the dangerous t!lsk which had been set hill!. Not only would
he carry ofl' his gtu'rison, but he wOll1d lcal'c Alll1eidu u wreck
behind him. The 8th and 9th of May were employed ill driving
mines into the whole of the enceinte, alld ill disablillg as much
of the artillery fIS was possible in the time. Some of the pieces
wel"e merely spiked, others had their bOl"es ehoked also; man.r
were disabled by the ingenious plun of firing severul pairs of
j,,'llIlS simultaneously, with the muzzles of some placed at right
angles to those of the others, so that while half the shots flew
outwllrds, the other half struck and tli!mbled the gUllS against
which they were aimed. The besiegers had detected that there
was something odd in these salvos, but thought that they were
lligllals to MW:lsCllU-as indeed the firing on the night of thl! 7th
had actually been.
At about 11.30 011 the night of the 10th, the French came
out of thc uorth gate of Almeida ill two colullIns, one formed
of the battalion of the 8Jl!nd Line, the other of the prol'isional
oattalioll, artillery, and sappers who forlllctl the hlrger half of
the 6>'l1rrisOll, whieh numbered something over 1,800 men. The
two columns, which marehed elose together, parallel with each
other,struck the cordon of the blockading line near the point where
the pickets of the ht Portuguese, belonging to }Jo.ck's brigade,
joined with those of the 2nd Queen's of Burne's. Uushing
\'iolcnlly on, they picrt'(.oU the lillC, with nothing more lllUH U
splutter of mU!~ketry from the few Portuguese sentries inllllc·
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diately opposed to them, who were trampled down or dl'h'Cll
ofI'. Five minutes after, a tremendous series of explosions frOIl1
Almeida startled the whole of the blockading force: the miucs
left behind by Brenllier had worked, and the greater part of
the eastern and nOlthern fronts of the place had been blowlJ
up. On the south side something had gone wrong with the
flISCS, und little damage was done: but the fortress wllscffectively
ruined.
13rennier should have been caught if tbe officers entrusted with
the blockade had shown ordinary wisdom, for he was plunging
into the mim.tof 6,000 men, and, if Welliugton's orders had been
properly carried out, he could never have reached hisdcstinutiull,
The Illuin b1ll.mc for his sllcL'CSSful cvusioll sccms to rest 011 the
shoulJcrs of Coloncl Ircmougcr of thc Qnccn's regiment, and
General Er~kille. The former, who was nearest of all the
blockading battalions to the point of Brennier's exit, merely
Pllt his men under IU'IllS, amI scut out patrols both towards
Almcida IInd to right and left. They camc hack after loug
dcla)', reporting that the town seemed to havc bccn c\'acuatoo j
and that the l"J:ench had apparently got oA:' to the north and
were out of sight. Even at dall'n Colonel lremonger had maue
110 movemcnt, yet his battalion of all the division had the Ucsl
l~hallcc of pursuing thc encm)·. Erskine's responsibility is still
heavier: he had been direLioo by a written order, on the after·
1100n of the lOth, to extend the line' of the 4th Division as fur
as the bridge of Baroo del Puerco, amI in purticulaI' to :selld
the 4th regiment lUldcr Colonel Bevan to thc rocky defilc
which overhangs that bridge. I Having. apparently, recci\'cd
1 Wellillgton says (to Lord Liverpool, .\[ay 15): 'Sir W. Erskillc \i'1I.
dining with Sir Brent Spencer at lumd quarters, and received Ilis ordeT$
about 4 o'clock. He says that be sent them off forthwith to the 4UI
regiment, which was stationed between AlUe.'\ de Obispo and Barba del
J'uero.:o.... The 4th regiment, it is said, did not re<:eh'e their orllel'3
before midnight, aud, thougl1 tlley l1ad only 2! miles to nmrcll, lni.~Ctl
the road, and did 110t arrive at llarba del Puereo till after the J'·rcllch.'
(Dillpat;;hf:8, vii. 000,) 'fomkillsoll'S eoutempor':H}' comment 011 this b
«(Jp. 102-3 of his diary): 'The ort!er reached Sir W. Er.skillc's lluarters
about:.! II.m. : he put it ill llis pocket, ami tli(t lIot tlislllLtet1 the letter lo
Coloncllkl"au before midnight, and to cover himself, whell required to
explain by Lord 'YCUing-lOll, said tilat L1le -lth ullfortunately,missed it.
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the dispatch at four o'clock, he detained it (unopened accord-
ing to some accounts) till long after dusk, when he forwarded
directions to the 4th regiment to move to Barba del Puerco.
Colonel Bevan, not receiving the order till late at night, took
upon himself the responsibility of ordering that the battalion
should only move at daybreak. 'Wherefore there were no
troops holding the defile at the el'iticnl moment.
For the first few miles of his retreat Brennier was followed
ouly by General Pack, who had caught lip eighty men of the
main picket of the Ist !)ortuguese, and hurried after the
retreating columns, after sending word to Campbell at Malpar.
tida of the ellellly'~ hl'(:lleral direction. Pack kept lip a running
fire for several hours, and took lnauy stragglers and all the
l;'rench baggage; but, by the orocr8 of their commander, the
retreating columns did 1I0t wait to beat oft' the teasing force
which pursued them, or evell fire a shot ill return. 'l'oward,,;
daybreak Pack found himself near Villa de Cien'o, with only
t~ major and eleven mell left in his company, but ,,-till close 011
the heels of the French. In this \·illage there was El. troop of
the 1st Ro)'ills, watching the line of the Agucda; they turned
out Oil hearing the firing, demonstrated against the /lying enemy,
and detained him for El. few useful minutes; but fifty dragoons
could do nothing ahrainst two battalion columns. However, with
the growing light, more British troops were seen hurrying np.
General Campbell, on getting Pack's message, had come on
rapidly with the 36th regiment from Mulpurtidu, uud wllS
within a mile of Brellllier, when the latter turned down to the
defile which leads to the bridge of Barba del PlIerco. At the
same time the 4th, so unhappily absent up to this momcnt, were
perceived approaching from the south, parallel with the course
of the Agueda, while a squadron of Barbavena's dr8l:,"OOHS and
somc Portuguese infantry were visible in a north-westcrly direc·
way, which was not the caRe.' Mauy years later (IB36) in hill COllwrsatioll'
Idlh Lord S(n.llhopc (\\'lliult see, IJ, 89) Wellington r;aitl tllat lie believed
Bevan had his orders' about four or five in the afternoon, but tile people
about Ilim s."\id "011! you uccd not march till daybr<lllk," nnd 80 Ily his
fault the .French got to BariJa del Puerco.' Napier (llilllor.IfJ iii. IJ. 166)
S.1yS plainly that < Erskine seut uo orller to tile 4th regimeut.' Colonel
Bevan always maintaiuClI that he got nothing from Erskille till llcarly
mhllliglJt.
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·tion. If Breuuier had allowed himself to be detained for half
tUl hour longer, at any moment in his retreat, he would OO,·c
.been a lost Illall. But, as it was, his leading column was nearing
the bridge before the British got within touch of him.
General Campbell had ordered the 36th to throw off tl1eir
packs and run, when he saw holV close the French were to safety,
and the regimcnt, followoo by the 4th, which came up a minute
later, struck the second French column just as it was descending
to the bridge. l"ired upon and charged on the steep roan, the
battalion broke, and many men, trying to find short cuts down
the precipitous hillside, lost their footing, and fell do\\'n the
rocks. There were SOllle brokcn necks and many broken 1illlb~,
while other fugitives fell into the river and were drowned.
Metlnwhile a heavy fire was opened on the pursuers from the
opposite bank. Reynier, who (as he had been ordered) kept
a good watch on the bridge from San Felices, had sent down
three battalious oC the 31st Ugcr and SOllle guns to receive the
flying gani.son. They had lined the bank, and were ready to
defend the defile. Colonel Cochrane, of the 36th, without
Campbell's orders, took upon himself to try to force a passage
through the (.'Overing force, and led a mixed mass of his 011'11
regiment and thc 4th across the bridge, and up the opposite
slope. They were repulsed with loss by the 316t Uger; the!
casualtiC'Ji in this rash enterprise were the only ones suffered by
the British that morning, and amounted. to eighteen killed auu
wowlded, illld all oflicer uud sixteen men tHoken prisouen;. PllCk's
Portuguese had lost some Jifteen men when their picket line
was forced at midnight, so that the total casualties of the AlIie~
were about flfty.
Brcnllier's columns had of (,'Ourse suffered far more-but it
was lL scandal that lL single man hnd escaped. Hc states his
loss in his report to Marmont at 360 men out of 1,300, of whom
over flOO were prisoners and 150 killed or wounded. The com-
mandant de place of Almcidll. a.nd twelvc other ofliccrs wcre
taken. lteynier says that when Gcncral Campbell had with-
drawn his troops from th.e water's edge, and up the cliff, out of
the rall&re of the French cannon, he sent a. WIty across the
bridge to bring in thc wowlded, and that they found quite
a heap of meu with broken limbs at the foot of the precipice,
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whom they dragged out from among the dead and brought
back with them. There were some few English and Portuguese
in this ghastly pile, who had lost their footing in reckless
pursuit of the flying ellemy and had fallen with them 1.
Wellington gave it as his opinion that the escape of the
garrison of Almeida was 'the most disgraceful military event'
that had yet occurred to the British army in the Peninsula, and
it is easy to understand his wrath. CampbeU had been warned
that Breullier might very probably attempt to e;cnpe; Er:;kinc
had been told to gllllrd the defile of Bnt'ba del Pucrco. The
former kept his troops too far back fmm the place, and so dis·
po:;cd them that there W/lS nothillg dire,:tly behind the em·doll
of pickets, at the point where llrennier broke out, save the
main-guard of the lst Portuguese. He also watched the wuth
und west sides of Almeida with Ullnccessury numbers-for it was
unlikely that the govemor would choose either of those point.,>
for his sortie. But he clearly did his best to pursue when the
uJurm camc, and was thc first to appear fit Barba dd PUCl'CO
with the 36th. The colonel of the 2nd regimcnt was mnch
more to blame than his chief, since he was close to the origi nal
point where thc French appean't1, but merely collected his
bl\ttalioll at its head qunrters and made no attempt to pursuc.
III his exctllpatOl'y letter to General Campbell he 'thinks that he
has explained everything satisfactorily 2,' but he clearly does not
show that he madc an adequate at.tempt to face the situation.
which demanded a rapid pursuit. An extnwrdinary chance
happened to another regiment of the 6th Division: Colonel
Douglas, with the 8th Portuguese, was at Junca, some way to the
east of Almeida. He started off at the first alarm, and with
proper military instinct marched for Barba del Puerco. Having
good gllides he reaclled the bridge before daybreak, but could
Sl.'e nothing of Brennier (who was still some miles away near
Vilia de Ciervu). Finding the defile all quiet, ami no French
visible save Uc)'uier's cavalry picket on the other sidc of the
1 Marbot's well-known nl1rrative of tlLis disaster (ii. 4i3) errs in exag-
gcrating the lIumbers, but Heynier's uispatch shows that there was a solid
founuation for what might otherwise Imvc aplJearOO a mUlcr lurid }Jicturc.
~ COlollcllremollger to Campbell, printed in Hjgtory of the :1imt Regt.,
\'01. Hi. p. 100.
356 BRENNIER'S ESCAPE FROM ALMEIDA [Mu 11
water, he concluded that he had come upon the wrong tmck,
and turned back across the Dos Casas to look for the garrison
elsewhere 1, If he had been a trifle less prompt, he would lm\"c
found Brcllnicr running into his nrms. This was sheer bad
luck. But clearly the main blame lay with Erskinc, who kcpt
an important order back for six or seven hours, and was the
person directly responsible for the fact that the bridb"C of Barba
del Puerco was not watched, according to the preeise din:elioll
isslIed b)' the Commander-in-Chief.
Wellington Slimmed up the affair in a confidential letter to his
brother ~ with the bitter words: 'I begin to be of the Opillioll
that there is nothing so stupid as "a gallant officer.... They (thl!
blockading force) had about 13,000 mens to watch 1,400, and
011 the night of the 10th, to the infinite surprise of the encmy,
they allowed the garrison to slip through their fingers nUll
escape.... There they were, sleeping in their spurs even, but the
French got off.' The two officers who bore the brunt of their
chiers wrath were not-as might have been expeeted-Erskinc
and IremOlJger, but Cochrane and Bevan. The former, for his iIl-
advised attempt to cross the bridge, got a withering rebuke in
no general order. The latter found that his statement that
En;kine'fi dispatch did not reach him till midnight WllS dis-
believed: threatened with being brought before a court of
inquiry, he eOlllllJitted suieide at ))ortalegre, while the arnl)' was
011 ib; mareh to the south a few wl.'Cks later. Public opinion in
the army held that he had been sacrificed to the hicrarchical
theory that a general mllst be believed before !\ lieutenant-
cQlonel 4•
, Wellington to Lord Liverpool, vii. p. 606.
2 SUppkTTlI:IItary J)j8/IU/cM8, vii. I'. 123.
, Counting the 4tll Di\'isioll, which was Ilardl}', llOwever, l13rt of the
< blol.:kadillg fOTl.:e.'
• I,'or statements sllOwing that ever)' one believed f:rskine 10 lie the
responsible person see Stepne)', p. 105: < instead of promulgating the
orders tile geneml, it is S<'lid, put tllem in llis llooket and forgot tllCIlI.'
Gcorge Simmolls (p. li4): • .Bevan was too late owing to 8ir W. Erskine,
h)' accillent, not sending him all order in time.' CJJarles Napier (Dillr.,,,
11. liS),' It is said that Sir Wm. Erskille is to blame, and next to him
General Cilmllbcll.'
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It will have been noted that Brenniel"s report of his ha7.nrdou!l
exploit, for which Napoleon w!ry deservedly promoted him to
the rank of gcnerul of division, was sent in, not to Massena
but to Marmont, The IJrince of Essling had ceased to com-
mand the Army of Portugal a few hours before the explosion
ut Almeida, It will be remembered that the Emperor had
made up his mind to supersede the old Marshal on April !i!:O,
Md had entrust.cd. the dispatch to General Foy, who (travelling
with his usual headlong speed) reached CilldlUl Uodrigo 011 the
afternoon of May 10th. Marmont, who declares that he had
110 idea that he was to take ovcr any charge greater tlUl.ll that
of the 6th Corps, had reached Uodrigo two days before, and
had reported his arrival to Massena when the lattcr entered
thc fortress on May 8th. 'Vhen l~oy delivered the fatal
dispatch to his old chief, the latter vented himself in loud
outbursts of wrath, and declared that he had been maligned to
the Emperor t. He accused Foy of haviug given an ill account
of his late campaign to their master, and so of hltving caused his
fall. And he added insult to injury by pointing Ollt that the
envelope of the dispatch was torn, und illsilluuting t1mt the
benrer had picked it open, in order to read its contents on his
journey. Aghast at theseaccusatiolls, \\'hich seem to have been no
morc than the augry illspil'ations of the momcnt, Foy wrote a long
letter of remonstrance and self~justification to the Marshal, but
got no satisfaction thereby. Massena's own character was such
lhat it was natural for him to 8USpeet double dealing and dis-
honourable conduct on the part of others. 'I'he reltSons which
probably brought about his recall at this particular moment
have been explained ill an earlier chapter~. They were the
Emperor's verdict on the campaign of Portugal. His lieutenltllt
had failetl and had lost the confidence of his army, therefore
he must be recalled. MassCnfl. had done far more than any
other general could have accomplished, and he had, in effect, been
sent to essay the impossible. His master fill' more t1um himself
was responsible for the failure; but this the Emperor could
not, or perhaps would not, see. The recall was now Ilt..>cessary,
I See .Foy's Vie Mititafre, p. 114, Ilnd Appendix 110. 4!).
, See lIP. 295-6 above.
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for the old Marshal's bolt was shot, and it was clellr that nfter
I!'uentes de Olioro he could not have got any more good work
out of his arm)'.
His successor, Marmont, was a far younger man, aged only
thirty-six, and promoted to his marshalship so late as 1809.
He was one of Napoleon's earliest followers, and had seen his
first service under him as lieutenant of artillery at Toulon.
Having fonght aU through the Italian campaign of 1796-7, he
had followed his (~hief to Egypt, and had been oue of the few
officers selected to accompany him in his surreptitious return to
}'rance in 1799. He had served in the campaihI'J1S of Marengo,
Austcrlitz, and Wngram. but not in the Prusso-Russian War
of 1806-7, dllring which he had be€n acting as Governor of
Dalmatia. It was his good service both as general and
organizer ill that province which had won him his Illyrian title
of' Duke of Ragusa.' Personally Marmont \Vas the exact anti-
thesis of his predecessor in command: he was no rough and
unscrupulous ad\'enturer. but a well·educated and cultured
gentleman, whose ancestors had served the old monarchy ill the
army and the law. Of all thc marshals, hc and S1. Cyr arc
the only two whose writings give the impression of real literary
ability. His autobiography displays his character in ull its
strength and weakness; it shows him brilliant, active, ingenious,
and plausiblc, but absurdly vain and self-satisfied. The Spanish
chapters of it form one of the best and most convincing indict.
llIents of Napoleon's policy in the Peninsula, and he supports
every deduction by original documcnts in thc true historical
method. But he is such a whole·hearted admirer of himself
ami his achievements that he can never realize his own faults
and failures. Nothing that he ever did was wrong-even the
loss of the battle of Salamanca, entirely his own work, call be
shifted on to the shoulders of his subordinates. And he h3.'J no
sympathy and admiration for any other person in the world. As
a bitter critic remarked at the till.lC of the publication of his
bulky memoirs, 'Marmont is not only autolatrolls, but his auto-
latr)' is exclusive and intolerant. Many conceited men are not
incapablc of re<:ognizing merit in others; they can adjust them-
selvcs to thcir equals and respect them. Marlllont gets irritated
and allgry whenever he runs floO't\.inst another man of parts. Hc
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is a self-lover who has become a generalmi!lanthrope; the icono-
clast of the reputations of all other notable persons.'
Hut Marmont's jealousy was reserved for those who were
important enough to be considered as rivals. To his sub·
ordinates and inferiorg he was kindly mid considerate in a
patronizing sort of manner. The diarists who served under
him speak with amusement rather than anger of his grand airs,
hifl elaborate parade and pomp, and the ostentatious splendour
of his field equipage 1. He was elctl.rly not disliked llS M~ena
had been, for he took care of his men as well as of himself, and
was not considered a hard master 2•
The military capacity of tbis clever, vain, ostentatious young
marshal has often been under-valued. He wns all excellcnt
strategist, who could grasp and face a situation with firmness
and rallidity. He could form a good plan of campaign, and
mtmreuvrc his troops skilfully, as WllS suflicicntly shown in his
movements in June 1811 and July 181~. As an organizer he
cannot be too highly praised: the way in which he refitted the
Army of Portugal within a month of Fuentes, and made it em·
eicnt for a long and difficult march across central SptLin, wns
deserving of the highest approval. His weak point was ill tactical
execution, When he had got his army to the striking point, he
was seized with irresolution, which contrasted strangely with the
skill and decision which he had shown up to that moment. In
personal courage he was the equal of any of his colleagues-but
he could not keep a clear head on a battle morning, Foy, who
served under him during the whole of his command in Spain,
sums him up as follows in his diary: • Bold and enterprising till
the moment of danger, he suddenly becomes t'old and apathetic
when the armies are in prcSCIl{.'C, In discussion he will not face
the difficulty, but tries to evade it. He is a good, estimable,
1 'Soil tapis c111Ugl'i de pUtes et Il'nutrcs pieces froidcs tr1:s belles, serds
sur des plats d'argent, etait eutoUte d'assiettes, de gobelets. de couverts
du mema m~tal. On dimL debout- cc qui ne suffit pas pour donm~r 1\ cc
repas de luxe un caractkre suffisammeut militaire: Thi~bault, h'. p. 514.
! Parquill, who servc<l for some time in Ilia escort S<luat!.roll, calls him
'trios aime pour les soins qu'i! prenait du sol(lat' (MbnQiru, p. 290), amI
rather admires him for having uuthing but silver plnte with llilll when 011
camlmign.
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and respectable man, but he himself' (and many others) have beeu
entirely deceived ~ to the value of hi~ talents. He was ne\·cr
horn to be the f,"Clleral ofan army. His face expresses too faith·
fully the hesitation of his mind. Hc asks ad\'iec too often, too
publicly, and of too many persons. A witty friend said to me
in 1806: •• Marmont is like Mont Cenis: in good weather his
brow is high and imposing, in times of storm the clouds wrllp
it completely rQund I.' . .. Yet so mobile is his imagination that,
when the crisis is over, he forgets all his indecision and mental
anguish, he effaces from his memory past facts, and turns to hi~
profit and glory all that has happened, even events that wcre
unfortunate and disgmceful 2.'
Marmont had commanded an army corps with credit; he had
even conducted a little campaign of his own against the Austrians
on the Dubnatiull frontier, in 1809, so as to bring. it to a satis-
factory conclusion. But he was very far from beitig fit to cun·
tend with "Vellington, who WIlS ai; good a strategist as himself
and a practical tactician of a very·different class of merit. He
lacked both the imperturbable coolness and the iron resolution
of his opponent-and the first time that they met in seriOlIS
comhat he was' found out,' and dashed to destruction.
Meanwhile Marmont's first seven weeks of l:ommaml were
infinitely crcdituble to him. He reorganized the Army of
Portugal with a rapidity that disarranged 'Vellington's calcula-
tions, and he led it to the strategical point where it was
needed, with great swiftness and skill-as we shall presently sce.
The Emperor, in the dispatch which explained to Marmont
his duties, had bidden him drop the organization into corps on
which the Army of Portll&1'I\1 had been hitherto formed, and scnd
home the super/luous corps-commanders, and any other genernL~
whose absence he desired more than their presence. Such
advice ~quareU with the Duke of Ragusa's own ideas, for he
disliked to have about him officers who were too high in rank
and seniority to be his humble assistants. Junot and Loison
went back to France at onee, and with them nearly all the old
divisional gcuemls: l\'larmollt worked the army with promoted
brigadiers. 'Ve hear for the future nothing more of man)'
I ,",Oy'8 Vie "vi/it/lire, 11. 171. 2 ibitl., 11. J77, llote (1).
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fumiliar Ilumc::i-Marchand, Merlc, Mermet, Heudelet, &c. Of
the old divisional commanders only Clausel and Solignac
remained. The rest of the new divisions, into which the old
eorps were redistributed, wcre given to llICIl who had entered
l'ortngal in 1810 at the head of brigades only-l?erey, Dren-
nier, Sarrut, Foy, Maueune. Reynier stopped a few months
more with the army and went ofI' in July, there being no place
for him in the new system. Of the old superior officers only
Montbrun, commanding all the cavalry, remained with Marmont
till the end of the campaign of ISll-there was 110 onc who
could bc substituted for him in command of that firm.
In the reorganization of the army the old regimental asso-
ciation in brigades and divisions were mainly adhered to. The
two scnior divisions of the 6th Corps (Marchand's and Mermet's
original commands) simply became the 1st and 2nd Divisions
of the Army of Portugal, uncleI' Foy and Clausel. The two
divisions o£ the 2nd Corps (late Merle's and I-Ieudelet's) became
the 4th and Srd Divisions of the new organization, under
Snrrut and Ferey!. The 8th Corps and Loison's original
division of the 6th Corps were amalgamated, and made into the
5th and 6th Divisions (Maucune and Brennier). A few small
abnormal units, such us the Legion du Midi and the Hanoveriall
Legion, horse and foot, were disbanded, and ceased to exist.
All the isolated fourth battalions of the old Sth Corps had gone
down to skeleton units of 200 or 300 strong-their rank and
file were drafted into other regiments, their cadres scnt home
to France to recruit. In each Line regiment i\farmont reduced the
number of field battalions to three or two, and, having filled them
lip to a strength of 700 men each, sent back the cadres (uld the
small remainder of rank and file from the junior battalions to
their depOt->. A fortnight after Fuentes there were not more
thrul 28,000 infantry with the engles in thc Army of Portugal,
hut there wa.~ It great mass of convalescents in the ba.~e hospitals,
and of newly arrived draft'> in the governments of Lean and
Old Castile, whom Marmont strove, not at first with great
success, to draw to himself and embody in their regiments. It
1 But, for reasons unknown, the 17th Uger, from the original dh'ision
of Helldelet, changed places with the 20tll Line from Loison's old division,
:md went into the new lith Dh'i;;ioll.
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wall hard to get them forward, when every offi(,.'er commanding
a small post in the rear detained drafts to strengthen his
garrison, and whcn the Gm'crnors of Salamanca and Valladolid
wanted to keep as many recovered convalescents with them as
they could retain, becaWlC their governments were under-
manned.
The cavalry units were in a far worse state than those of the
infantry. Already at Fuelltes most of the regiments had
shown only two squadrons for want of horses, and had left behind
them in their cantonments dismowltoo men ill vast numbers.
Marmont, seeing it was impossible to find chargers for them
in Spain, was forced to send them all back on foot to Bayonne,
to draw horses from the interior of France. In June he could
put only ~,500 mounted men in the field. The artillery in
1\ similar fashion was hopelessly short of teams: it could produce
only 36 guns (six batteries) properly hOrsL>U., though Massena had
started from Santarem in March with more thalllOO. Marmollt
says that the army returns showed that Massena had entered
Portugal in 18]0 with 4,200 artillery horses-of these only 1,400
survived the retreat, and of them in May only 400 were tit for
scrvice I. As to the train, it had vanished altogether, so fa.r as
horses and waggons went; the Marshal Stl.)'S that precisely four
waggons were fully horsed and ready for work when he took
over the (,.'olllm3nd. But rest;, the return to 3 land where food.
was to be got with ease and regularity, and the opening up of
the depOts of Salamanca and VaUadolid. where uniforms, boots,
and pay had been accumulating, soo11 did wonders for the army,
under the Marshal's careful and judicious supervision. By
June he was able to take the field with an army that was
restored in morale, and fit for good service.
1 Marmont to Bertl,ier, May 14, from Salamanca.
SECTION XXVI: CHAPTER V
AL8UEUA
SoUL'f, it will be remembered. had quilted Estremadura, and
handed over the charge of the troops left therein to Mortier, on
March 14th. He received the news of Beresford's irruption
into the province and of the combat of Campo Mayor on
March 30th, so that from the beginning of April onward he
was aware that it would be incumbent on him to support the
6th Corps Md to rclic\'c BadajO'.l within a few weeks. That he
was not forced to march bnck from Seville to the north at once
was due to the breaking of the Jerumenha bridges, which (a~ we
ha\'e seen) de1aj'ed Beresford's advance and the im'estmcllt of
Badujoz for many days. But by the cnd of April the danger
had grown pressing: Latour.l\faubourg had been thrust out
of Estremadura, and (deceived by the movements of Colborne)
reported that the Allies were about to invade Andalusia also.
He had fallen back to Constantina, well within the limits of
that kingdom, and not over forty miles from Seville. Nothing
definite had been heard of Badajoz alld its garritlOu, since the
communications between that fortress and the south had been
cut by Beresford's cavalry on April 10th. Though itsf,1Overnor,
Phillipon, was known to be a Illan of resource, and though
provisions and military stores (the leavings of Imltz) were
abundant, }'et the garrison was small for such a large place, and
Soult was lIot aware how far the damaged fortifications had
been repaired since his dcpartw"C. It was clear that he must
strike at Beresford without delay, or the Hews that Dadajo7.
had been attacked and captured might come to hand some black
morning.
The Marshal's situation, therefore, on May Ist was not
unlike what it had been at the end of the preceding December,
when by the Emperor's orders he had been dircctetl to make
his first irruption into Estremadura. He must once more collect
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from the 70,000 men of the 1st, 4th, and 5th Corpl:l a force
sufficient to beat whatever number uf troops the Allies had
placed in that province. The task would clearly be more
difficult than it had been in January, for, instead of 16,000 or
20,000 Spaniard~, there were now in Estremadura some 20,000
Anglo-Pol"tugucsc, besides the 8,000 men of whom llallnsteros
and CllStafios could dispose. Moreover, there was Blake to be
taken into consideration; but the Marshal-badly informed as
tu the movelllenbl of that general and his corps-thought that
he was gtill so far from the rest of the Allies that he would not
be Il.ble to join Beresford for battle, if the attack upon the
latter was pressed with great swiftness and decision. The only
favourable feature iu the situutioll was that Badajoz was 1I0W
in French hands, and could not be used (as in Febnlary) for
a general rallying-place for the Allies. Ca.mpo Mayor and
Oliveuba would be of little or no use to Bcres£ord, and, if he
made Elvas his llOint d'appd, he must first evacuate ull that lay
011 the south bank of the Guadiana. 'l'he only alternative
for the British general would be to concentrate and fight at
some point where he eould cover the siege of Badajoz. 'fhis
was the probable course for him to adopt, and Soult had to
calculate the force that he would require ill order to make
victory reasonably certain. He fixed it at about M,OOO men-too
low an estimate, as it turncd out. It is intel'ffiting to note that
at the very moment when Soult was ordering his concentration
at Seville, a dispatch was on the way to him from Napoleon at
Paris, dictating the course which he ought to pursue under the
exact circumstances which had now arisen. ',"Vellington,' wrote
the Emperor on March 30th, •has only 32.000 British troops:
he cannot make a detachment of more than 8,000 or 9,000 of
thcm, with 5,000 or 6,000 Portuguese added. It is necessary to
keep permanently about lladajoz the value of 15,000 men of all
arms, in good state and of the best regiments, so that at the
Icast movemcnt of thc English on this side the Duke of
Dalmatia, taking with him 8,000 or 10,000 men, should be able
to concentratc in Estrcmadura a total of from l!5,OOO to 30,000
men. If this exceptional crisis arises, only a corps of observation
must be left on the side of Granada, and it must be placed under
the Ol-Uerg of the Duke of BellWlO (Victor). 'l:he Duke of
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Dalmatia must keep in correspondcnce, via Madrid, with thc
Army of l 'ortugal and the Army of the Centre. The King
ought always to keep a division of 6,000 men between theT~<J'Us
and Badajoy't ready to unite with the Duke of Dalmatia, if it
becomes necessary to resist a movement of the English against
Andalusia. But to arrive at this result it is necessary that the
country-side should be entirely disgarrisolled, that all hospitals
lllld mU&'1lZilleS should be concentrated in Seville, and that Cadiz,
Seville, and lladajo7. ~hould be the only points to guard, with
a corps of observation at Granada. In this case the Duke or
llellullO would take command of the troops at Seville and
Grll.uadu, us well as of the force besieging Cadiz. and the Duke
of Dalmatia would only ha.ve charge of the army opposed to
the English. Counting the division from the Army of the
Centre, he call easily unite 30,000 to 35,000 men...• In this
case he would be able to resist even 30,000 English, if Lord
Wellington marched against him with his entire army. But
this supposition can never be realized; because, if it happened,
the Prince of Essling (Mnsscna) would be able to march on
Lisbon, and the English would find themselves cut off from that
place, and between two tires I,'
From the first part of Napolcon's calculations it is clear lImt
he thought Soult would reqnire about 25,000 men-the ]5,000
who were to be left about Badajoz and the 10,000 who were to
be brought up from Andalusia: they arc increased to 30,000
by erroneous addition ollly. As n. mattel' of fact Soult, in order
to co\'er Seville and to rescue Victor, had left only 11,000 men
ill Estremadura 011 March 14th, and 3,000 of these were now
shut up in Badajoz. But 011 the othcr hand he collected from
Amlalllsia (including Maransin's column)2 16,000 men, so that
his fighting force was within a few hundreds of the ~5,000 named
by the Emperor. 'l'he 35,000 spokcn of in It later sentencc would
only 'IX! required, ro Napoleon thonght, if Wellington came down
to i1lYade Andalusia with all his British troops. We may point
oul, b.y the way, that thc Imperial calculations were tlU wrong
in detail, as was bound to be the case whcn they WCI'C made at
I Memorandum from Berthier of March 30.
. I Whiclt helonged to tIle 5th COJ:p6, and joined it before 80111t con-
cctltratcd at Seville.
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Paris on data lllany weeks old. ,'"ellingf.oll, owing to the rein-
forcements which had lunded at Lisbon in the first days of
:rt.Iarch, had 1I0W nearly 40,000 British troops. He had detached
19l,OOO of them under Beresford I, and these were accompanied
not by 6,000 Portuguese at the most, as the Emperor guessed,
but by a fuUlO,OOO. There was therefore 1\ serious miscalcula-
tion. We may add that if Wellington had taken the unlikely
step of concentrating his whole army against Andalusia, he
would have had not only 38,000 British troops with him, but
nearly ~5,OOO Portuguese troops of good quality 2, ~'hc united
force could have smashed up in one morning's work the 35,000
]?rench under Soult, whom the Emperor thought enough to
restrain them. But., as Napoleon truly observed, it was practi-
Cillly impossible for 'Vcllington to make this move, so long w;
"Massena's force was still opposed to him in the north. It was
only when the Army of Portugal moved down to the Guadiana
ill J tlnc that thc British f,l'CllcraI conccntrated practically his
wholc force in one line, behind the Caya, iJ-l the southern sphcre
of operations. And when he had done so the Armies of Portugal
and Andalusia united, though about 60,000 strong, did not dare
to attack him. Hut of this more anon.
III early May Soult, undcr.valuing Beresford's fighting force,
thought that 25,000 men would suffice to sweep him behind the
Guudiana, cycn when he had the help of Castaiios and Ballaskros.
The force was collected in the following fashion: Latour-
I\laubourg at Constantina. had 8,000 men, who had just been
rcjoiued by Maransin's column, thus the 5th Corps was once
morc concentrated and complete (with the exception of fi\'e
I Including Altcll's brigade, added later.
'I The force under Beresford comprised (figures of March): Britisb-
2nd Dil'isioll, .'i,WO; 4th Division, 4,200; Alten's brigade, 1,100; Cal'alry,
1,200; Artillery, &c., 000. Total, 12,500. Portuguese-Hamilton's
divisioll, .5,000; Harvey's brigade of the 4Ul Division, 2,900; Collills's
brigade (au extemporil:ed uuit of which more anon) 1,400; Otway's and
Madden's cavalry, 1,000; Artillery, 250. Total,1O,550. TIle whole, there-
fore, was about 23,000 instead of the 16,000 011 which Napoloou calculated.
At Albuera there were absent from the above one Dritish brigade
(Kemmis of the 4th Divisiou) aud oue !'ortuguese cavalry brigade
("-Iaddeu), nearly 2,000 men in all. Yet Beres.rord put 20,000 Anglo
J'ortugucse iu linc,
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battalions ill Badujoz, and one or two more which Soult was
bringing up from Seville). ""rhcn all came in, thc corps amounted
to 10,000 men of all arms. The remaining part of the expedi-
tion was made up by requisitioning from Victor's Ist Corps and
the lines before Cadiz four battalions and two regiments of
cavalry', and from Sebru;;tiani's 4th Corps four battalions and
three regiments of cavalry 2. Of the independent division under
Godillol;, which garrisoned the kingdom of Cordova, Soult took
nearly the whole-nine battalions and two regiments of cavalry s.
'rhe borrowed troops were divided into two large brigades (one
might better have been called a small division) under Generals
GvdillOt alld Werlc", and three provisional brigades of cavalry.
They took five batteries (thirty guns) with them, to add to the
eighteen guns of Latour-Maubourg, and some companies of
sappers and train. The total fOl'ce available came to just under
25,000 men, unequally divided in !lumbers between the 5th Corps
ft,lld the AndalllSian reserves. The cavalry WfIS very strong in
proportion, about 4,400 sabres 6.
It will be noted toot Soult had (as in January) refraiuL-d.
from adopting the general plan which Napoleon favoured, that
of abandoning all Andalusia Sll,ve Seville and the Cadiz Lines,
and leaving only a corp~ of observation at Granada. It is true
that the Duke of Dalmatia took very little fl'Om Victor, and
left the Ist Corps almost intact in the lines, but Sebastiani's
4th Corps was also left only slightly diminished, and was
expected to huld duwll all ca.stern Andalusia, instead of being
I viz. 16th 1.cg1l1' (3 hatts.), fjrc'wdilJrs 7'(!lmw (1 hatt.), 4UI amI 14Ul
Uragooos. 'l1Je 2nd Hussars and 26th Uragooos were already with
ultour-Mauoourg, Ilcvcr having roturnctl to tile lst Corps silwc .1anuary.
The STenadiers rellllU were formed of the six grenadier companies of the
.15th, 63N1, ,Lull 96th of tIle Line.
t viz. 68th Ligne (3 batls.), one battalion of grenadier, reunig (Poles),
1st lAncers of tile Vistula, 20th Dragoons, and 27th ChaS8eUNJ.
3 viz. 12th UgCI', 61st and 55th Line (3 batts. each), 17th and 2ith
Dragoons.
, Uodinot had the 16UI UgcI' aud 6lstLiue, Werll'! the 66th, 68th Line,
~lId 12th LegeI'. The b'o grcnadier battalions made a gcncral reserve of
1,000 mCll.
~ N.lt-For further u.elails as to tlJC composition of Soult's army sce
Aplteudix XVI.
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requisitioned for 10.000 lllClI 'md reduced to a flying colullllI as
the Emperor would have wished. The unit that had been most
heavily dmwn upon was the garrison of the kingdom of Cordova,
and the re::;ult of this was that (as in January) very few troops
could be detailed for the defence of Seville, since nearly all that
had been in itl( neighbourhood were summoned oft'to Estremadura.
The great city which formed Soult's base wa;; once more left
inadequately defcndt.,<l b)' depots and dmfts. and JI/ramellladn8
of doubtful fidelity. The Marshal had lately misoo some corn·
pnnie~ of s(Hfl,lled Swiss I, deserters of all nations, and these
were also utilized, But thc total left undcr General Darieau
was dangerously small. So keenly was this realized that the
go\'ernor W&f! directed to retire within the great fortifiedenc1osure
of the Carthusian convent (La Cartlya) if pressed, and all the
military stores had been p~d in this immensc building, which
had been surrounded with a. bastioned enceinte, a.nd armed with
cannon, so as to form a sort of citadel. The Castle of the
Inquisition at Cordovl\ in a similar fashion had beeu fortified,
and converted into a work tha.t cou1cl be held against any
irregular force, and similar precautions had been taken at Jaen,
Andujar, Ronda, Alcala Real, and Niebla, to provide centres of
resistance lloO'J.\inst possible assault<; by gucrrilleros, Probably,
however, Napoleon was right, and if the minor places and eastern
Andalusia had been evacuated, Soult might have brought 10,000
more infantry against Bercsford, in which case the latter would
never have dared to fight him, and must have retired behind the
Guadiana. There would have been no battle of Albuera-but
on the other hand all the evacuuted districts would have flared
lip inb{ insurrection, and it is difficult to see how Soult could
have reconquered them, since he was to be for several months tied
up in operations against the British. fr01ll which he l'Ould not
have \\"ithdrawn a mun,
But having taken another decision, and resolved to surrender
nothing. the Marshal hud ouly gathcred 12,000 mCll to reinforce
I J canllot find any proper account of tllese <compagnies hell'ctiques'
who were not part of the orgallized Swiss troops in t'rcllclo service, Hul
lhe)' arC several times mentioned ill narratives of 1811. See for example
LaI'ClIC, p, 238. PresumalJly tlJcy were ill King JoscI,IJ's service.
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the 5th Corps. They required many days to concentrate, and
it was only all May 8th illst he reviewed them in their new pro-
visional brigadillg at Seville,and delivered an allocution in which
he announced to them that they were destined to save Badajo1.
and drive the British from Estremadura, and that the force
would march at midnight on the lOth I, This threat did not
escape the Spanish patriots in the city, who passed the news on
so swiftly that Ballasteros was able to forward it to Bercsford by
the afternoon of the l~th.
Having once stnrted, Solllt hoJ:MXl to surprise his enemy by
the swiftness of his movements. The head of the column which
march<..>d at lQ: p.m. on the night of the 9th-10th was at Santa
Ollala, more than thirty miles away, on the 11th. The pace
had to slacken in crossing the Sierra 1\Iorena, but on the 12th
head quarters were at Monasterio (fifteen miles further on) from
which Ballastel'Qil's scouts withdrew. Latour-Maubourg and the
5th Corps, far away to the right, had advanced at the same time
from Cazalla and Constantina, and driven Castaiios's advanced
posts from Guarlalcanal and then from Llerena. On the 13th
the two French forces joined at Fucnte Cantos, and their lending
cavalry squadrons reached Los Santos, from which the 13th
Light Dragoons retired. As Wellington had directed, nearly
a mouth before, in his Elvas memorandum, the Spaniunh mude
110 attempt to check the advance: their cavalry withdrew as the
.French pushed forward; their infantry were prepared to fall
back on the rendezvous at Albucru.
From the 13th the British cavalry as welt as the Spanish
were in touch with Soult; General Long had been lying about
Villafranca and Los Santos till that day, with three British
and four Portuguese regiments 2. He retired to Fuente del
Maestre, and then to Santa. Marta, contenting himself with
reporting the successive advances of the French to Beresford,
I "'01' details of the allocntion to tlle officers' ranges en cerele; see
J..apene, p. 146.
I 1 cannot e.xactly make out 011 what day Madden's weak cavalry
brigade (4 squadrons 5th and 8t11 Port\lKUese) joined Beresford. It wag
not with him at Campo Mayor on :\larch 2.5th, but was up by April 10.
Probablr it joined before April 1st, (l.9 it had been at Elvas since t]IC
battle of t]IC Gebora.
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who was apparcntly not over well contented with his operations
on this and the two following days, and thought that he might
have gone back more slowly, and have compelled the lending
squadrons of the enemy to deploy and lose time. At F\lCmte
del Maestre the allied cavalry split itself up, Madden with two
Portuguese regiments covering the roads to Almendralejo and
Solann, while Long and the maiu body stayed on the high-road
to Badajoz via Santa Marta and Albuera I.
Having such long warning of his adversary's movements,
Beresford wn.<; able to carry out the concentration ofhis fighting
force at leisure. There was still some uncertainty as to which
road the enemy might choose, three 2 heing open to him when hi~
advan<.'e had reached Los Sautos, viz. (1) the obvious L'eutral
and shortest routc by Albnera-Dndajoz, (2) the castern route
Solana.-Talavera Real-Bailajo7., (3) the western ronte AJmendral-
Valverde-Badajoz. The former was rather circuitous, its main
advuntage to the French being that it was all across open flat
cotlntry, where their superior cavalry would have had excellent
ground; but the Albuera route was 1I0t perceptibly inferior in
thi~ respect, as subsequent operations showed. 1.'0 take the
third or western road, that by Almendral-Valverde (though
this is not so long as that by Solana) would have forced Soult
to execute a flunk march across Bercsford's front, and (what
probably weighed more with the French Marshal) would have
fixed the decisive spot, where the fate of the campaign would be
settled, nearer to thc point towards which Blakc's army was
known to be marching: and Soult still hoped to fight his battle
in that generars absence.
On the 13th of May Beresford marched out from his lines ill
front of Badajoz to Valverde, a point convenient for occupyiug
a position across two of the possible roa.ds, and not very remote
from the third and least likely one. He took with him the
2nd Division find Hamilton's Portuguese, with thrce batteries.
The rest of the army remained before BadAjo.z, covering the
removal of artillery and stores, hut ready to come up at any
1 }'or these movements the best authority is Long's journal, on pp.
109_11 of C. B. Long'g VilldiooliQn ofllig relatil·C.
~ D'Urban in his llarrative points out seven, but four of these werll
prnetieally impossible.
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momcnt. On thc samc afternoon I.e had R conference with
General lllake, who rode over from Barca.rrota. On the
following day Soult's movement seemed to be growing much
slower-the heads of his columns only reached l"'uentc del
Maestre and Villafranca. The fact, duly reported to ~rcsford,
that part of the French army had reached the latter place,
which is off the main chall88~e to the right, seemed to make it
possible that Soult was, after all, going to move by Talavcru
Hcal. lleresford waited for a more precise indication of his
adversary's final route, and sent pressing orders to Madden to
cover with his scouts all the open <:ountry between Tala\"era
Ileal and AImcndralejo. lllake on this day, finding that his
cavalry could discover no signs of the French in his front, to
the west of the great cllauam, drew in from Barcarrota to
Almendml, as he promised to do when he met lleresford at
Val"erde on the BUh.
It being perfectly dell!" by this time that the French were
not' about to take the western route, Bcresford on the 15th
marched the 2nd ])ivision and Hamilton's Portuguese to Albuera,
where they were joined by more troops from in front of Badajoz,
Alten's Germail brigade, and a provisional brigade of Portuguese
under Colonel Collins I. Only the 4th Division and the Spanish
brigade belonging to Castanos, lately arrived from Merida,
now remained in front of the fortress-all 011 the south bank
save Kemmis's brigade of the first-named Ilnit, The last of the
stores were moved on this day from the trenches to Elvas,
aud the flying bridge opposite the Ulouth of the Caya was
taken up. This last proved a mistake-it was intended that
Kemmis should join the army by using a ford below Badajoz,
which had been practicable for the last ten days; but on tho
night of the 15th-16th the water rose, and the brigade was
forced to march round by the next pa."5l1ge, that at Jerumenha,
which involved a circuit of thirty miles, and made it late fol' the
•
I This brigade, which appears for the Albuera campaign, was composed
of the 6th Line (2 batts.) from the garrison of Elvas, joined by the 5tll
C~adores, a detached light battalion which had been serving with tile
ca"alry south of the Tagus since last Novemoor (see vol. iiLI). 5.57). This
temporary brigade must not be confused with other units headed by
VoUina before aIllI after.
372 ALBUEHA [M.tv 15
battle. Only three companies, which chanced to be on the
south oollk.oUhe GuadianR when the freshet came dowl1, were
able to march oft' with Cole and thc rest of the division, when
the order came.
About 15,000 men were already in line at Albuera when
Soult's intention at last became perfectly clear: his clul/Jsturs
and hUSSi\rs vigorously ntw.eked Long's horsemen at Snnta Martn,
and began to dri ve them along the c!wl/$sJe. Long made no
stand, though, having three British and two Portuguese regi-
ments (Otway) besides SOllle 600 of Casta.iios's cavalry, he was
in considerable strength. ! He was driven rather faster than
one could have wished, and retiring precipitately crossed the
Albuera stream, and gave up the whole right bank to the enemy.
This haste is a bud thing, because the woods there mask all the
enemy's movements,' wrote D'Urban in his diary. Beresford
was so vexed with him that he that night assigned to the
command of the cavalry of the whole allied army General
Ltunley, who was Long's senior, leaving the latter in Ilomhml
command of the British horse alone. 'Lllmley, though then
in eharge of an infantry brigade in the 2nd Di\'ision, was an
old light dragoon, and showed himself next day weU able to
manage a mass of mounted men 1.
No enemy, save Briche's light cavalry, came up during the
15th-Soult's infantry were far behind, and bivouacked thal
night at Snnb }\farm. Deresford was therefore nble to
complete his concentration at leisure. Blake's army was directed
to march up in the afternoon from Almendral, only five miles
awny; Cole and the Spunish brigade of Carlos de Espaiin,
Castal10s's ani)' infantry force, were directed to break up from
the Btulajoz lines and march ut 2 a.m. to Albuera. The Spaniards,
for some unknown reason, were vel}' late j Blake only arrhed
at 11 p.m., and his troops, encamping in the dark, could Ilol
I In a private letter to Sir H. Taylor, D'Urban uses even stronger
lan~tlage: 'Our cavalry instead of retiring leisurely, lmd fallen hack
(indeed 1 may say fled) rapidly ltefore the tltlVallccd guard of the enemy.
The left bank of the Albuera "''as given up without the slightest attempt
at dispute. 'I1lis error 011 the part of the officer commanding the cavalrr
was so completely of a pieee with his conduct upon more than oue
pre\'iolls occasion, that it became imperatively necessary to relie\'e him.'
(D'Urban MSS.)
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take up the position assigned to them till da}'light. However,
he had arrived, which was the main thing. bringing with
him the three infnnl:.ry divisions of Zayas, llallasteros, and
Lardi7.abal, and 1,000 horse under Loy, but only one battery.
Cole reported that he would be all the ground soon after dawn,
but that Kcullnis was cut off frolll him by the risc of the river,
so that he could only bring two brigades instead of three.
Orders were also sent to Madden to close up with his Portuguese
horsc~but he could not be found, having most unaccountably
crossed the GundiL\lltl to Montijo with tllC bulk of his brigade,
an eccentric and unjustifiable movement. Two of his squadrons,
however, were met, and sent to join Otway that night.
The position of Albucra is not a strong or a well-marked onc,
yet it is far the best that can be discovered across the Seville
Chau,8li(:C for many miles south of Badajoz. It consists of a long
rolling line of low hills, extending for seveml miles along the
brook which takes its num!!: from the \'iIlage. This stream is
in spring an insignificant thread of water, fordable anywhere
by infalltry or cavalry, and allowing even guns lUld waggons to
puss at lDauy points, though there arc occasionally 10llg stretches
of bank with all almost precipitous drop of ten or twelve feet,
which would stop anything on wheels. The ground on the
south·ew;t or French bank slopes up in tl. very gentle rise, and
is covered in many places with groves of' olives, which make it
impossible to take any general view of the country-side, or to
bret more than vague and partial notions as to any mo\'ements
of troops that may be going on in it. On the north-west or
English bank the rolling heights are completely bare ot' trees;
CXt'Cpt at the village of Albuera there is neither house, wall,
1101' bush upon them-nothing taller than a few withered shrubs
three feet high 1, ,.,..--
The so-called heights of Albuera are simply an undulation
along the bank of the stream, which rises very slightly above the
lc\'el of the platcnu that stretches from the position to the
descent into the valley of the Glladialla, thirteen miles away.
This ridge or undulation extends in either direction as far as
I This account of the Albuera positiou was written Oll the spot, and
involved a gootl IIcn! of walking 011 :\ blazillg April day. Sec 1I0tc at cml
of the chapter.
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the eye cau reach, with varying altitude', sometimes only GO feet,
sometimes perhaps 150 feet above the water's edge, There are
therefore many' dips' on the summit of the position. The
main battle-spot was 011 the two slopes of one of these dips,
where, between two of the higher knolls of the ridge, there is
a depression perhaps a third of a mile in width. The back.
.descent of the heights, to the north-west, in the direction of
llndajoz, is even gentler than that towards the Albuera strCllm,
The 'ravine of the Arroyo river,' marked in Napier's and other
maps, is an absurd exaggeration. There is simply a slightly
curvoo. 'bottom,' whcre u lush growth of gruss alollg a certain
line may. indicate the course of a rivulet in \'ery wet weather.
This line has no marked banks, and is as mueh like a high·road
as a mvine: it would not, even after rain, present any obstacle
to infantry or cavalry. moving in milSll 1, and it is a mistake to
make it take any prominent part in the history of the battle.
There is no ravine or 'dead ground' of any kind anywhere
on either the F'rench or the English side of the Albuera. The
slopes are so gentle that any ~pot cun be seen from any other,
But the French side is wo<xted, so that movements of' troops ure
hard to follow, while the other bank is absolutely bare, There
is, however, a 'sky-line' on the English heights, between the
dip where the main battle took place and Albuera village. An
observer standing on the point where Soult fonm.-d his frollt of
battle cannot get a view of the English 1ine near the village--
to do so he must ride sideways down towards the water. to look
along the trough of the depn:ssioJl. Hence Soult during the
battle Cllllnot have seen a good deal of what was going Oil
behind the allied frout line, but Bel'esford, on the sk),*line abol'e
the north-eastern edge of the dip, could make out all Sou1t's
dispo~itioru; whcn the battle smoke did 110t hindcr him.
Albuem is a big. well-built village, with a disproportionately
high church tower. It stands on a knoll of ih own, in front of
1 Either Napier never saw the ground of AIbuera (as Beresford sllgKcsUI
in the Stricltlrt!8 l)/l. Napiltl"8 lli8/()f",'1, p. 207) or eliie lie llad forgotten it.
The onl)' good plan available was d'Urb!ln's, and this Nallicr used (a copy
of it is among Ilis portfolio of maIlS in the Bodleiau Library), memory'or
hypothesis exaggerating into hills allll ravines the "ery gentle lip!! :lI1l1
downs shown on tI,e mal',
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the IIlUill line of the ridge, to which it serves as all outwork, as
Hougoumont did to Wellington's position at'Varerloo. It is
well away from the river bank, perhaps 150 or flOO yards from
it; the bridge which brings the Seyille dtal~$Ce across the stream
is not exactly opposite the village, hut decidedly to the south-
east of it.
The Albuera stream is formed by two minor brooks, the
Nogales and the Chicapierna, which meet a little south of the
village. Between them is a low wooded hill, which conceals
from an observer on the British heights the upper course of the
Nogale:s, and part of the woods beyond, in which the J.<~rcnch
formed their order of battle. It was behind this long low
knoll that Soult hid his main attacking' column. But the
elevation itself is insignificant, and much less effective than
the more distant woods in covering his movement.
Beresford drew up his army on the hypothesis that Soult's
aim would be to pierce his ccntre, by capturing Albucra village,
and storming the heights beyond, over which the high~road
passes. Years after the battle had become a matter of history
he still maintained 1 that this would have becn his advcrsary's
best policy, since the place where the road erosses the position
is the lowest alld weakest part of the heights, and a blow
piercing the centre of a hostile urmy is always more effective
than the mere tactical success of turning one of his flanks, which
still leaves everything to be decided by hard fighting, if the
attacked party throws back his threatened wing, uud stand::> to
defend himself in the new position. The ground on the nllied
right wing he held, on the other hand, to be higher and stronger:
und even if the French got upon the crest of the heights, the
mnge gave, by reason of its successive dips, several positions all
which a new line could well be formed. I leave these con-
siderations to the critic, and am not fully convinced by them.
Bcrestord's line was drown up as follows: on the extreme left,
to the north-east of Albuera, were Hamilton's Portuguese divi-
sion, with Collins's brigade in support, amounting to eleven strong
battalions in two lines. Beyond them, to guard the flank, were
Otwny's weak Portuguese cavalry brigade and the two stray
squadrons of Madden's. The whole made only 800 sabres.
1 Stricture" 011 Napier', Huior.'1, 1'01. iii. pp. 233-4.
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The centre was formed of 'Villiam Stcwart's English division,
the 2nd, comprising the three brigades of Colbornc, Hoghton,
and Abercrombie I, ten battalions. In front of them Alten's
two German battalions occupied Albuera vill8{,"tl. The 2nd
Division was drawlI up acro8S the high.road, 011 thc revcrse slope
of the heights; Bcresford had learned from Wellington to hide
his men till the actual moment of conflict, and, as he says with
some pride, not a man of Stewart's or Hamilton's divisions was
visible, ruld the only troops under the enemy's eye were Otway's
ClLvalry and the two German battalions in Albucro..
10 the rear of Stewart, as general reserve, was Cole's division
from the siege of Badajoz, which had marched at 2 o'clock a.m.
according to orders and rcuched the field at 6.30 in the
morning. There was some error in 'logistics' hcrc, for
Cole ought to have been earlier on the field. He had Ilfteen
miles to cover, and should have been started sooner, for
preference on the precl.'<1illg e\"ening, so as to allow his men
time to rest and cook on rca.ching the position. Having marched
till dawn they then had to lie down ill formation, and eat as best
they might, for the French were on the move lIot very long
after they camc up. Thc division, as already mcntioned, COll-
sisted only ofMyers's fusilier brigade (1 and fl/7th HOYD.lli'usiliers
and 1/23rd !loyal 'Welsh Fusiliers) and Han'ey's Portnguese
brigade (11th, 2Srd, and ht battalion Lusitalliull Legion).
Kemmis with the other British brigade, SIlve three companies
which had followed 1\1yers, was making a fruitless march
against time, round by Jerumellha. 'Vith Cole therc had also
come up Castaiios's sole contribution of infantry-Lhe weak
brigade of Carlos de Esptula, three battalions with 1,700
bayonets 2.
The right Willg of Bcrcsford's position, the part of it which he
thought least likely to be attacked, was held by Blake's U,OOO
men. Having encamped anyhow on the hillside, when they
arrived at midnight, they had to be collected and rearranged
1 'rho took over LUlU!ey's brigade wl'en UUl Illtter WllS promoted to
command tJle cal'alry that mOI'llillg.
~ The remainder of Murillo's dil'isioll of 3,000 men, which formed the
illfautry of the 5th Army, was at i'\Ierida, save onc battalion ill garrison
at Oliv('.nza.
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with much loss of timc ufter morning brokc. Imlccd, they had
formed their line only about an hour before the battle began.
The three infantry divisions of Lardizabal, Ballasteros, and
Zaylls were arranged in sUC(.'CSSiOll from left to right, eu.eh with
one brigadc in first and onc in second line. The 1,100 horse of
1.oy were Ollt 011 the extreme right, corresponding to Otway'i>
Portuguese Oil the extreme left. or the rest of the allied
cavalry, Dc Grey's 700 heavy dragoons and 600 horse of Cas-
tai'ios's Estremaduran force, under Penne Villemur, were in reserve
near Cole's 4th Division. The 13th Light Dragoons, separated
from thc other two British regimcnts, wcre watching the t.'oursc
of the Albuera from the bridge upwards, in front of Blake's
line.
Soult htld come prepared to fight 011 the morrow, as WOIl as
his infantry should arrive on the field. At nightfall only onc
brigade of them was up. The main body had bivouacked at
Sullta Marta, from whence they broke up before dawn and
marched eleven miles to the battlefield. 'VeriC's reserve, forming
the tail of the column, was not closed up till seven or eight o'clock
ill the moming. The Marshal was still under the impression
that Blake had not yet arrived, and tlmt Dercsford could not
havc more than 20,000 men in line opposite him I. It is one of
the ironies of history to read in his dispatch that his great flank
atlttck, which so much surprised Bel'csford, tUld clLuscd so much
(.'OlIfusioll in the allied army at the commencement of the action,
was made with the intention of cutting in between Beresford
and Blake. whom he believed to be still 011 the march from the
direction of Almelldral. some miles to the south. The Spanish
arm)', having arrived after dark, had never been seen; and at
Bcresford's request Blakc had ranged it behind the sky~linc 011 the
crest, so that nothing was visible save l.oy'$ horse far on the
right. Soult thought these were Penne Villemur's squadrons,
I III his dislJatcll to Berthier, writtcu before leaVing' Sevillc, IIC spoke
confidently of cutting in ahead of Blake, and surmised that tIle latter
would fiud himself ill a vCT)' compromising' positiou, when lie arrivcd iu
llOuthern EstrCllladnra, on learning that Beresford llad already been driven
across the Guadiaua. On tlle 16th epicil hrougllt him the stutelllcut'thal
Blake was timed to join Beresford only Oil the 17th. His battie-di,patch
distinctly says tllat his first IlCWS of the jUllctiOll IHiving alrc.'\dy takell
place was got from prisoners during the course of tIle action.
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belOllgillg t.o Castrulo.s, whidl bud been aecompallying the British
C8.\·alry for some days.
The Marshal could make out vcry little of hiii enemy's force
or position. All that could be guessed was that Oh'ay's and
1.oy's cavalry, both well visible, covered the two encl.;; of the line.
Soult's scheme of attack was ingenious, though founded on an
utterly \\TOllg hypothesis. He resolved to demonstrate with one
infantry and onc Cllyalry brigncle ngaill:.i the village of Albucra,
so a$ to attract his enemy's attention to his centre, while carry-
ing the rest of his army far to the left, under cm'cr of the woods
and the low hill between the Nogales llnd Chicapierna brooks, to
fI: point from which they could turn Beresford's right, by crossing
the two streams and ascending the plateau somewhere beyond
the point where 1.oy's cavalry were vhiible.
The details of the execution of this plan were very well
worked onto Godinot's brigade (the 3,500 muskets of the 12th
Uh"Cr and 51st Ligne) marched upon Albuera, flanked by
Bridlc's light cumlry, and supported by the fire of two bat·
teries. They became at once hotly engaged with Alten's German
battalions, and with two battalions of Spaniards whom Bla.ke sent
down to give the vil~oe flank support. A Portuguese battery
above the village swept the apprOll.ches to thc bridge very efl'cc·
ti\'ely I, Meanwhile, on Godinot'sleft, Soult showed two brigades
of drilnrTOOlls and \Verle's strong brigade of 6,000 men drawll up
011 the edge of the wood, and apparently about to attack Blake's
line ill front. Dut deep in the olh'cs to the left the two divi-
sions of the 5th Corps, Girard and Gaziln, were executing a
circular sweep, with a cavalry brigade in front of them, quite
out of sight. They were covered not only by t.he trees but
by the height between the Nogales and Chicapierna brooks.
Heresford and Blake prepared to resist an attack 011 their
centre and right, and felt reasonably confident of giving a good
acconnt of themselves. But the fronml attack seemed somehow
to hang fire, and suddenly a new de\'elopment came: four regi.
ments of l"'rcnch cuvalry, far to the right, galloped out of the
woods, acrOSR the two brooks, and up the slopes far beyond &1'C8·
ford's right. Lay's Spanish cavalry, who lay in that direction,
naturally gave way before them, ImIllL-di!\tcly aftcrw!\rds the
I ·nlC battery W:t.':! t1,at of Captain Arriaga.
181l] SOUL'l"S FLANK l\'IOVEMENT 379
head of a long infantry column came maloching up from the~me
point, making for the heights at n place some way beyoud
Blake's extreme right. It is curious to note that they did not
aim at attacking Blake's actual flank, but rather at getting
Oil top of the heights beyond him, so M to be able to move
ngainst him on the level of the plateau, without having to
climb the hill in face of opposition.
Bcresford rode hastily along the line to meet Blake, and
requested him to den.l with this unexpected flank attack by draw-
illg ofI' one of his two lines, and placing it at right angles to the
original position, across the summit of the heights, He himself
would take care of the frontal att~k. Blake promised to do
this, but sent only one brigade of Zayas's division, tour battalions,
alld his only battery, to execute the required movement. He
Wll.lJ ~jtill not collvilll,:ro that the front attack might not be the
main one. Beresford meanwhile went back to his own troops,
to direct Stewart's division to prepare to support the Spaniards
when necessary, and LUllllcy's cavolry to move of(' to join Lay Oll
the extreme right.
The next half·llOur served to develop the whole face of the
battle in ill! st.'{,'Onu aspt.'Cl. The :Frcneh cavalry at the head of
the turning colulllll spread themselves out on the rolling platean
to the west of the heights so as to flank their infantry. The
5th Corps fOl'lllt.>O itself in a colullln of cxtruordilltl,ry depth 011
the undulating slllnmit of the ridge, and began to move 011
toward Blake's flank. The res[.M>l1sibility for the order of battle
ru:lopk.J Illust apparcntly be laid on the shoulder8 of Girard, thc
senior division-commander, who was placed that day at the head
of the whole corps; Latour-Maubourg, who had led it during
the last two mouths, had been taken away to assume general
charge of the ca~·l\lr)'. Girard, as it seems, intended to beat
UOWI} the hastily formed line of defence, which the Spaniards
were opposillg to him, by the impetus of nn immensely heavy
column. His force consisted of two divisions, each of two bri-
gades, and each brigade compoSl.-d of from four to six battalions '.
I had long sought for all exact description of his array, of which
, The difference ill strength was caused by the fact that two brigades
ha,l contributcd two, mul one other ul'igade OIlC, battalion cad, to tl,c
garrison of Badajoz.
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the French historians and Soult's dispatch only say that it was
a cV[07me serne de batailkm8. At last I found the required
information in the Paris arehh'es 1, in the shape of all anonymous
criticism on Soult's operations, drawn up (apparently for Napo-
leon's eye) by some officer who had been set to write a report 011
the causes of the loss of the battle.
This document says that' the line of attack was fonlled by
a brigade in column of attack [t e. a column formed of four
battalions in column of double companies, one battalion behind
the other]. To the right and left the front line was in a mixed
formation, that is to say, on each side of the central column was
a battalion deployed in line" and on each of the two outer sides
of the deployed battalions was a battalion or a regiment in
column, so that at each cnd the line was composed of a column
ready to fonn square, in case the hostile cavalry should try to
fall upon one of our flanks-which was hardly likely, since our
own cavalry was immensely superior to it in number:
This formation disposed of the nine battalions of Gimrd's
division, which, as we see, advanced with a front consisthlg of
three battalions ill column and two in line. Gazan's, the !lud
Divisiou of the corps, followed very close behind Girard, the four
l"Cb"ments each ill column with their two (or three) battalions
one behind the other. The 2nd Division had been intended to
attack as an independent supporting line, but ultimately worked
up so close to the 1st Division that it could not easily be drawl!
oft" or disentangled, and to the Allies the whole 8,400 men looked
like one vast column, with a front of about 500 men only, which,
allowing for battalion intervals, just stretched "cross the top
level of the heights, which is here about 700 yards broad.
Three batteries of field artillery belonging to the 5th Corp~
accompanied the 1st Division; a fourth, of horse artillery, was
with the cavalry which covered the left flank of the column.
'1\\'0 more were in company with Werltfs brigade. The remain-
ing two stopped Witll Godinot opposite Albuera.
When lllake realized the strength of the turning force, he
began to detach more troops from his front line to strengthen
Zuyas, whose four battalions would obviously be no lllot'C than
I Those at the War .'.liuistry, not the Archive8 N(1.tiQfUl!e~,
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a mouthful for the 5th Corps. They went in haste, four bat~
ta\ions from Dnllt\Steros, two from Lardiznbnl, but failed to reach
Zaps before the fighting began. Meanwhile a majestic movement
changt.-d the whole aspect of the French front. The two brihrades
of dragoons which had hitherto formed the lrench right-centre
wheeled into column of squadrons, and galloped off' in beautiful
order along the side of the Albuera brook till they reached the
5th Corps; passing behind it they joined the cavalry on its left,
which now became 3,500 strong. Latour-Maubourg was with
them in person. At the same moment "'erIC's 6,000 infantry
performed n slower and shorter circular march and joined the
rear of the 5th Corps, to which they now acted as a reserve.
Thus Soult had ull his infantry save GodillOt'S brigade of 3,500
men, and all his cavalry save Brichc's two regiment of light horse,
550 sabres, massed opposite BIll.ke's new' refused' right flank.
The sight of this sweep to the south on the part of the French
caused Beresford to make a complete change in his disposition.
The whole 2nd Dh'ision, one brigade following the other, in
the order Colborne-Hoghton-Abercrombie, marched along
thc top of the heights to reinforcc Zayas. Hamilton's Portuguesc
were to move in, to take up the ground evacuated by the !nd
Division, Lastly, Cole's 4th Division, Myers's British and
Harvey's Portuguese brigades, forming' the reservc, wcre moved
a full mile to the right, and placed behind the English and
Spanish cavalry, facing Latour·l\faubourg's great mass of horse.
It was the sight of thcse eight solid battalions in column,
ready to form square, which alone prevented the French cavalry
general from ordering a general charge upon the 2,300 allied
horse in his front, whom he outnumbered in the proportion of
three to two, and of whom only De Grey's 700 sabres were
British. For the 13th Light Dragoons, the thin! regiment in
the field, was covering the other wing of the new front, dOWIl
by the Albuera stream.
ZUYWl'S Spaniards, having a much shorter way to move thun
the I'Tench turning column, wcrc in line of battle long before
the 5th Corps came up ~<'f8.inst them. But the reinforcements
tardily sent by Blnkc wcrc still coming up, und forming on
Zayas's flanks in much confusion, when the fighting began,
Most of them prololl&reU the line down the slupe of the heights
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entirely concentrated on the work before them. At any rate the
charge took the Buffs in flank, rolled them up, and then swept
down thc back of the other two battalions, and on to Clccves's
battery. It is hardly exaggeration to say that Colbonle's three
leading battalions were annihilated in five minutes. Fifty-eight
officers out of 80, 1,190 men out of 1,568 were slain, wounded,
or captured. The number of killed was out of 0.11 proportion to
the wounded: in the Duff's there were flU dead to fl34 hurt.
This ghastly slaughter is said to have been due to the f,'lCt that
the savage Polish lancers not only refused to accept surrender
from the unhappy infantry, but deliberately speared the wounded
as they lay. Nor can I refuse credit to the general statement of
contemporary British authorities after rcadulg the journal of
Major Brooke, commanding the ~/4.8th, who relates how, after
he had surrendered and was being taken to the rear by two
French infantry soldiers, a Pole rode up to him and deliberately
cut him down, after which the ruffian made his horse trample
over him and left him for dead 1. In the regimental annals of
the 66th two officers are named as having been wounded by the
lance, while already disabled and lying OIl the groWld 2. Penin-
sular tradition tells that the 2nd Division after Albuem swore to
give no quarter to Poles.
But not all the victorious horsemen were so inhumane; 4i9
prisoners, many wounded, were driven off to the French lines.
The brigade lost five of its six: colours; and the four guns of
Clccves's battery, which had accompanied it, were captured.
Only one howib.er, however, was dragged off' by the victors-the
other three were left behind for want of horses. The flIght,
somewhat to the left rear of its comrades, had timc to form square,
and beat off without difficulty the rush of the remnant of the
lancers who got so far as its position. Marking too late the awful
catastrophe on his left, General Lumley sent two squadrons of
the 4th Dragoons to fall upon the flank and rear of the Poles-
but they were intercepted by a French hussar regiment which
Latour~Maubourg sent out to cover the retreat ot' the lalJ(:ers,
I 1 llUblished Major Brooke's diary in Blackwood for 1008, with all
aecoullt of his almost miraculous subsequent escape from SeI'iIle, under
the title of' A j)risoncr of Albuern,'
~ See llilfory Q/ the 6C/h Regiment in Cannon's. Series.
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Narr..-The front linc of the French attacking force ill not correctly represented. It consisted of a column of four battalions ill the centre,
flanked by t\\'O deployed battalions, and with battalions in column placed outside the two deployed battalions on eIther side (see p. 350). In the
French reserve there should be only two, not three, battalions of Grcnudiers. The right flank of Za)'as's line is two battalions too long.
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and were beaten back with the loss of both their squadron
lenders wounded und taken pt'isoners 1.
It may be remarked that the loss of the victorious CAvalry
was very heu\'y, thongh not out of proportion to their snccess.
The llU~ccrs lost 130 men ant of 5S0-the hussars who chargcd
in support at' them 70 out of 300. ]t WM a. curious evidencc
of the headlong nature of their charge that some scores ot'
lh(! Pub;, !\ftcl' passing by and failing to break the square of
the 2J31st, actually rode (lown the rear of Zayas'>; Spanish line,
sweeping aside that general and his staff, and coming into colli-
sion soon ufter with Dcrcsford and his-the Marshal actually
pnrried n lance-thrust, and cast the man who dealt it from his
saddle, and his aides-de·camp had to fight for their lives.
At this moment the head of Hoghton's brigadc was just
coming tip from the rear-and its leading regiment opening fire
on the scattered lancers shot a great many men of the rear rank
of Zayns's Spnnial'ds in the back. Notwithstanding this, and to
their eternal credit, the Spaniards did not break, und continued
their frontal contest with Girard's division, which had not
slackened fm' a moment dUl'ing Colborne's disastruus light 2.
There was a distinct pause, however, ill the battle after this
bloody episode. The leading division of French infantr)' had
OC'ell so much shaken alld drivcn into disorder, by Colbol'lle's
momentnry pressnre on their flank, that the whole colu111n had
lost its impetus, and stood wa\'ering below the Spanish line.
Girurd, rcgurdillg his uwn divisiull ns pl'uclically a spcnt force,
Ql'dered Ill' Gazan's two brigades to relieve it. There was fearful
l:onfusion while the new columns were thrusting their way to the
front, llnd they were ncver properly formed. For thc rcst of the
I Napier is quite wrong in saying that tllis small diversion was sn~
Cessflll, iii. 16i. The prisoners lVe~ Captains Phillips and S!ledding.
2 'j116 II'riter of the StrictureIJ on J.Yupier', lliiltory, "o\. Hi, gh'es as an
eye-witness the following anecdote: 'As a Sllllllish soldier in the rUllk"
close to the Marshal was looking to the rear, a Spanish-Irish officer ill
that service cried to him, "Tu_day is not the day to fly, whcu you arc
liglltillg as the comrades of the British." The poor fellow replied, "No,
sellor, mlls Ius lugleses lIOS tinlroll por atrii.!!.''' 'I1te SllIInish uel'er ut
allY moment fired into the llritLsh, as Napier asserts. The mistake was
remedied by Bercsford's aide-de-t:all1l1 Arbuthnot, who rotlc, 'It great risk,
along the frOnt of the 29th, and stopped their fire.
OWAlI. I" cc
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btlu.Je the two divisions formed a dense mass of 8,000 mcn, whicll
looked likc one solid clump, without much ve;tige of regular
formation.
'While this confuscd change of front-linc was being curried out
by the French, Beresford had leisure to deploy Hoghton's brigade
in the rear of Zayas, and Abercrombie's in rear of Ballasteros,
lower down the slope. He then proceeded lo hring them forwun.1
to relieve the Spaniards. The latter, it is due to them to
explain, had behaved extremely well. Beresford beal"S witness
that Zayas's four battalions, 011 the edge of the undulation which
marked the front of battle' did not even to the cnd break their
line or quit the field, as Napier alleges. After having suffered
very considerable loss they began to crowd together in groups,
and it was then that the second line (Hoghton and Abercrombie)
wns ordered up.' The losses of the two battalions of Irlalll.la,
find the 2nd ftnd 4th Spanish Guards, were indeed the best
testimonial to their brood serviee. They had 615 officers and
mell killed and wounded out of ~,0~6 present, o\'cr 30 per cent.
-all lost by lllllsketry or artillery fire without a foot of ground
having been yielded, in l'L close strnggle that had lasted over
an hour.
With thc coming up of Gllzan's division ou onc side, a.nd of
Hoghton's and Abercrombie's brigades on the other, the second
stage of the battle Willi reached. The clash was confined to the
top of the plateau, the French havillg only a skirmishing line
opposite Abercrombie on the slope, though the t;elllral backbone
of the ridhJ"C ""as crol\"derl with their dense colulIllls. Hence it
may he said tllll.t for the next half-houl" Hoghton's men, assisted
by the 2/31st, the sole survivors of' Colbornc's brigadc alone, were
fighting the entire 5th Corps-a lil;e of 1,900 men two deep
opposed to u. mass of 8,000 twelve deep, on an e<[ual front.
This was the hardest and most splendid fighting done that day.
not even excepting the gloriolls ad\'ance of the Fusiliers half
an hour later. The three battalions, 29th, l/48th, and 1/57th,
absolutely died in line I, without yielding all inch. Their losses
speak for themselves-56 officers amI 9il men killed anti
1 It l1"a8.hel'e that the 57th earned the well-known nickname of the
Dil'-h:lfrls, from their splendid IlIlSIVer to Colonel Inglis's adjurnlioll,
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wounded out of 95 offiteril and 1,556 men present. The best.
account of this pa.l't of the aetion that I know is in the
reminiscences of Moyle Sherer of the 1/48th:-
'lVhell wc ani ved Ileal' the retiring Spaniards, antI formed our
linc to ndvcmce through them towards the cnemy, a very noble-
looking young Spanish officer rode up to me, and begged me,
with a 60rt of proud anxiety, to take notice that his countrymen
wel"C ordered to retire, not flying. Just as oUI·line had entirely
c1cn.red the Spaniards, the smoke of battle was for one moment
hlown aside, by tlte !>lackening of the fire, allll gave to our view
the French grenadier caps, their arms, and the whole aspect of
their frowning masses, It was /l grand, bnt a momentary sight;
It heavy atmosphere of smoke enveloped us, and few objects
conld be disceruoo at all-none distinctly. The best soldier can
make no co.lcnlatiOll of time, if he be in the heat of an engage-
ment; but this murderous contest of musketry lasted long. At
intervals a shriek or a groan told that men were falling around
me; hut it was not always that the tumult of tile contest suffered
me to ~atch individual sounds. Thc constant" feeling to the
eentre" and the gradual diminution of our front more truly
bespoke the havoek of death. "Ve wel'e the whole time pro-
gressively ad"anl'ing upon and shaking the enemy. As we
1l10Vl'(1 slowl)" but ever a little in advaul'c, ouI' own killed and
wounded lay behind us; we an'ived among those of the Spaniards
who had fallen ill the first onset, then amol1g those of the cnell1)"
At last we were only twenty Jards from their front.' 'l'he brigade
had lost nearly two-thirds of itfl numbers, the brigadier had been
killed; of the three battalion commandenl one was killed and
two wounded, The front of' the shrinking line no longer covered
that of the French mass before it. Dut the enemy was in no
condition to profit by the exhaustion of the British. The fit'c
of the line had, as always, been more eflceti\'e tlUIll that of the
column. The front of the enemy was one deep bank of dead
and wounded; the 5th Corps lost 3,000 lIlell that day, and there
can be no doubt that 2,000 of them fell during this murderous
exchange of musketry,
Meanwhile it is straue,te to filLd that both cOllllllandel'S allowed
this duel of the many against the few, Oil the plateau, lo go atl
IIndislurbe(l. Soult had still eleven lmttnlions intnet in resen'e
c c~,
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-\iVerlC's brif,l'flde and two battnlions of gre1Uldiers reull1s: his
cavulry was also doing lloUling. save observe Lumlcy's much
inferior force. Deresford had still of intact t.roops the 4th
Division, the three brigades of Hamilton's and Collills's Portu-
guese, and the 4,000 Spaniards who had remailled on their original
position. NOlle of those forces 011 either side were being utilized
during the crisis of the battle.
The explanation is to be found in the narratives of the two
hostile generals. Soult i:iaYs ill his dispatch to the EmpetOl',
, 'Vben I ascended the heights, at the moment that the enemy's
second line advam.'€d and began la press in our front, I was
surprised to notice thcil' great numbers. Immediately after.
wards] learned from it Spanish prisoner that Blake hOO uln.'ady
joined lleresford, so that I had 30,000 men to deal with. The
cxlds were 110t fair, find I resolved at once to give up my original
projed:, and to aim at nothing more than retaining the ground
already won,' The Marslud therefOl'e changed his plan from IIll
offfmsive to ft defensive battle, alld refused to engage his reserves,
or to bid his cavalr), charge-a most half-hearted resolve.
As to BeI'esford, he was anxious to succour Hoghton, but lIe
did not wish to move the 4th Division, which (he thought) was
playing its part in 'containing' Latour4I\{aubonrg'R enormous
mass of camlr.\', and coverillg the Valverde and Badajo:r. road-
the line of communication of the allied army. He sent back
instead to order up Hamilton's Portuguese to the hilltop-
4,800 fresh infantry, But it took a Illuch greater time to briug
them up than llcrcsford had cXiXlcted. Some of the aides-de-
camp sent to SUlllmon them were wounded on the way; hut the
main delay was caused by the fad that Hamilton, instead of
taking up Stewart's original position, had gone down closer to
Alhuern, to support Alten's brigade at the village ngainst.
Godinot's attack, which had become a very fierce one. It II'fI;;
ollly ufter mUllY precious minutes had been wusted that he was
found, and Fonseca's and Collins's brigades did 110t Rtart for
half an hour after the ordel' had been sent to them. Campbell's
brigade remained to ghe Alten help, if he should need it.
Meanwhile BereRfon:1 was trying to utili7,c the troops already
fit hand; Abercrombie's brigade was told to wheel inward and
nttack the right flank of tile 5th Corps, while the Marshal him-
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self tried to move up Carlos de Espmla's Sp!luish brigade to the
place where Colbornc had fought so unsuccessfully a little carlier,
011 the left flank of the F'rcnch mass. But this brigade, demora·
lil':{.'(1 relics of the lost army of the Geoora, refused to face the
lil"C, though the )'iurshal went to lead it 011 ill person, 8ciz(:d
onc colonel by the epaulettes, and tried to drag him to the front
of his b!l.ttalion. As this brigade only lost 33 men out of
],700 present, it is clear that it misbehaved.
At last Beresford grew so anxious at the sight of Hoghton'f;
gallant brigade shrinking away to nothing, while no 8uC(.'()ur
appeared from the rear, that he actually sent orders to Altcn's
Germans to evacuate Albnera village, Slnd to come ill haste to
strengthen the centre. They were to be relieved by a brigade
of the Spaniards who still hcld the old position alxwe the
,'ilIllclTC. The legionaries were disentangled from the villll{,fC
with some difficulty, and the French 16th Uger got into it
~fore the Spuniat'dli had taken AltCll'll placc. If Godinot had.
been in force, the position here would have been "ery dangerous:;
but he had oBly ~ix battalions, 3,500 men in all, and 'I'M hope-
lessly outnumbered, for Hamilton had left Campbcll's Portuguese
brignde opposite him, and 3,000 Spa.niards came down from the
heights. As a matter of fact Alten never had to bra to the front :;
the crisis on the heights wus over before he got far from the
village, and he was sent back to rdake it half an hour after
he had given it up. This he act:omplishetl with a loss of 100
Illell, 101lg after the morc imporLnnt busincss 011 the heights was
over.
Thc stroke whieh ended the hattle Cilme from a direction
whel"C Dcre~fol'd had. intended to keep to the defensive, and lI'a~
Jclivcred by the onc part of' his army which he had refused to
utilii'.e-the 4th Division. Cole and his eight hattalions had
been sw'uding for an hour lInd tJ. half supporting the allied
eu\'uh'Y, opposite MauboUl'g's threatening squudrons. He was
himself doubting whether he ought not to take a lllOI"C active
plU't, and sent an aide-tie-camp to Beresford to ask for further
ordcrs I:; but this offieer WAS bndly wounded on the way, and the
l This was an AlIglo-Swiss uJliccr, "1"jOl' ROI'Cl'ca, wllOw memoirs loa"C
latclr lJeell lluhlishcLl.
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message was never uelivered. If it had been, the all~wer would
undoubtedly have been in the uegativc.
Bltt at this moment there rode up to the ·ith Dh·ision Henry
Hardinge. then a young Portuguese colonel, and Deputy Quarter-
master-general of the Portuguese nrlll)', He hud lIO Oluers fr0111
Beresford, but he took upon himself to urge Cole to assume the
responsibility of advancing, saying (what was trne enough) that
Hoghton's brigade on the heighh above could not hold out much
longer, and that there were !lO British resen·e~ behind thc
centre. Cole hesitated for a moment-the proposal that he
should advance across open ground in face of 3,500 J"rel,cl,
cavalry, without any adequate support of that RI111 011 his Oll'll
side, was enough to make 1\11)' Illan think twk.'c. But he hat!
nlrend.y been pondering over the move himse1t~ and after a short
conference with Lumley, his collCilgue in eomll1(llld ofthe elwnlry,
determh1ed to risk all,
The 4th Di,·jsion was ordered to deploy fl'01l1 colUl11ns into
linc, and to stdke obliquel)' ut the Frellch Rallk. ]~ulirely COll-
t;Cio\1S of the dallgcr from the b,·cnty-six squadrons of' J.<'rcllch
horse before him, Cole flanked hi!! deployed battaliol1s with SI.
unit in COIUlllll at either end: itt the right flunk, where Hll.rl'e/~
Portugucse brigade WWi drRwl1 out, he plae~d 11 pl'ol'isiol1111 bat-
talion made IIp of the nine light comp..'lnics of all his regiments,
British and Portuguese; itt the left extremity, Oll the flank
of his British Fusilier brigade-the two battalions of the 7tll,
and thc ~rd UO)'al Welsh :Fusiliel"s-was n good Portuguesc
11Ilit-Ha:wkshitw's battalion of the Loyal LlIsitanian Legion 1,
The line made up 5,000 oo)'onets-2,OOO British, 3,000 Portu-
guese, The whole of the Ellglish and Spanish cavalry ndvanced
on his flank and real', Lefeburc's horse-artillery battery accom·
panying the extreme right 2,
The sight of this mile of bayonets moving forward showed
Soult that he mllst fight for his life-there was no drawn battle
I It appl:al'S tl,at the three stmy companies rrom I{Clllmis's 1lbsellt
brigade wlJich bad reached tile lield, were put into the square at the righl
/lank also,
~ What exactly passed between I.:ole ami HIlI'ding-e is thorough!,·
worked out by the correspondence between them Ilrinted iu the Ul!ittd
Seruke Jourll"/ for 1841.
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possible, but only dire disaster, unless Cole were" stopped. Accord-
ingly he told Latour-:Mallbourg to charge the Portuguese brigade,
while the whole IIIne battalions of lVcrles reserve were sent
forward diagonally to protect the flank of the 5th CoI'pS, moving
along the tipper slope of the heights so as to thrust themselves
bctwC€1l the Fusilier brigade nlld the flank ofGiral'd Rnd Gazan.
Soult had now 110 I'esel're left except the two battalions of
grenadim's 1'~I/1!i3, which he held back for the last chance, on
his right real', keeping up the connexIon with GodinoL
The story of what happened at the right cnd of Cole's line is
simple: LatoUl'.Mauoourg sent fOlll' regiments of dragoons at
the middle of the Portuguese ul'ig!l.de, thinking to brenk it dOWll,
as he had done often befol"l:l with deployed infantry in Spanish
battles. Hut Harvey's four batwliolls, keeping absolutely
steady, delivered a scl'ies of \'oJlC)'S which completely shattered
the advance of the chal'ging squadrons, It \\'o.s n line achievc-
lllCllt fm' troops which had never before taken part in the thiek
ofn uattle-for the 11 th lllld ~3rd Portuguese Line Imd not beell
engaged at UIISSIl.CO or any previo1l8 fiction of illlportan~. Owing
lo their excellClll belul.\"ioul' the flank of the Briti~h brigade \\'tl.~
kept pClfcctly sufo;: from cavalry ussuu} ls during tile !lext half·llOur.
i\!ycrs's tlu"ee .'"nsiliel" battalions, therefore, with the Lllsita·
/liun Legion battalion that guarded their left rear, came iuto
collision with \Verlc's threc regiments without any inlcrferencc
from without. The)' werc outnumbered by over two to one-
Q,OOO British and 600 Portuguese against 5,600 n'cl1ch. Bul
Werlc had adopted thc SlUUC \'icious forlllatiou which had
already hampered the 5th C0'l).<;-his nine battfliiollS were ill
three columns of regiments, eadl with a front of only two com·
')!luies and a depth of nine, i. c, he was opposing in ClIch casc a
front of about HlO men ill the first two ranks, capable of using
their "muskets, to a front of about 500-the fact that thel-c were
]6 mcn ill depth, bchiml the 120 who could fire, WllS of 110 profit
to him. Three separate regimental duels followed-the flSrd
find the Ist alld 9lnd battalions of the ith li'usiliers each tackled
a COlUlllll, &; Blakeney, the eolonel of the last-numed unit,
tells in his letter I. In each cnse the shcss for the moment
1 Quoted in tll(l Cole-I-lardinge corresJKIutlenr~ in the Unil~d &rrirp
Jourllal for 1841.
pJ.w 1(;
general
ALBUERA
Blakeney may be quoted fOI' itswas tremendous.
character :-
'l~l'om the quantity ofsmoke,' he writes, 'I could pcn..-eivc vcr)'
little but what went on ill my OWI1 front. The 1st battalion of
the 7th closed with the right column of the French: I l1loroo
on and closed with the second; the 23rd took the third. The
men beha\"ed most gloriously, never looillg their rank, and
closing to the centre as casualties occurred. The I,'rench faced
us at a. distance of about thirty or forty paces. During the
closest part of the action I saw their officers endeavouring to
deploy their columns, but all to no purpose. For as soon us
the third of a company got Ollt, they would immediately run
hack, to be covered by the front of their column.' This lasted
for some minutes-possibly twenty-when suddenly the enemy
broke, amI wellt up the hillside in three disorderly clumps,
which presentl,}' splayed out into a mass of running men. The
Fusiliers followed, still firing, until they CTOwnerl the ridge:
the end of their movement was under a terrible artillery fire
from Soult's resen'e batlel'ies, whieh were used till lhe lw;t
possible moment to cover the flying infantry. The fusiliers
lost more than half their llumbers-l,045 out of 9l,0l5 olfil:;cr~
and men, Their gnUunt brigtldicr, Mycrs, was umOllg theslaill.
'Verlc"s three regiments had casualtics of well over 1,800 out of
5,600 present-a bigger total bllt a mueh smaller percentage
-one in three instead of the victors' one in two.
The rout of the French reserves would have sellled the
fate of the battle in uny case; but already it was won 011 the
summit of the plateau also. For at the same moment whell
the Fusiliers closed, Abererombie's brigade had wheeled in llpon
the right of the much-disordered mass that represented the
5th Corps, and, when they followed up their volleys with Il.
ch.arf:,"C, Girard's and Gazan's men ran to the rear along: the
heights, leaving Hoghton's exhausted brigade lying dead in line
in front of them. The fugitives of the 5th Corps mingled with
those from WerJe',~ brigade, and all passed theChicapierna brook
in one vaste horde.
There witS p,'nctically no pursuit: Laloul'-Mnuoourg thl'ew
his squadrons between the flying mass and the victorious Allies
aut! the British and Portuguese haltt>d on the height~ that they
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had 1'1011. Soull's lw,--t infulltry I'C:;Cl'VC, the two gl'clmdier
battalions, were alw drawn out on the nearer side of the Chica-
pierna, and suffered severely from the artillery fire of the Allies,
losing 370 Illen out of 1,000 in twenty minutes. But LumleY'l:I
cavoJry could not meddle with Latour-Mnubourg's double
strength, and it was not till some time had passed that BeresfOlu
brought up three Portuguese bl'ihttulcs in line-Collins, Fon-
~cn, and I-Ial'vey-alld finally pushed the enemy over the
brook. By this moment Soult had got nearly all his artillery-
forty gUlll:l-in linc Oil the hcight betwccn the two brooks, tlml
their fire forbade fnrther progress, unless lleresfolu were prepared
to storm that position with the Portuguese. He refused to try
it, and wisely; for though the enemy's infantry were completely
ont of ac.:tion, it is a formidable thing to deliver n f1'Ont.'l1 attn.ck
on six batteries flanked by 3,500 horse.
So finished the fight of .Allmeru; ll. drenching ruin, tiimillll'
to that which had been 80 deadly to Colborne's brigud~ ended
the day, and made more miserable the lot of the 10,000 woundcrl
who ltly scaLtel't:~d over the hilbides. The British had hartlly
enough sound men left in half the battalions to pick up their
011'11 ble<..aing comrades, much less to bear off the mounds of
Prcllch \\'oWldL'<1, who lay along the slopes of the gentle dip where
the battle had raged hardest. It WM two days before the last
of these were ga.thered in. ---
Tlmt Albuera Wall the most bloody of all the I1ghts of the
Peninsular'Var, in pmportioll to the numbers engaged, every-
body knows. But the exact tahle of the losses all each side has
lIever, I believe, been fully worked out. After titudyillg the
1~l'ellch returns in the Archivcs of the Paris Ministry of War
and the Spanish figures at Madrid, 110 less than Bcresford....;
report, we bret to the results which I have pl'inted in the XVth
Appendix to this volume.
Summarizing. them, we filld that the British, including Alten's
German battalions, had 10,449 men on the field. Their total
loss wns ~06 officcrs and 3,953 men. Of' these 882 were killed,
j!,733 wounded, and 544 missing. Of this frightful c:asnalty
list no less than five-sixths belollb'Cd to the three brigades of
Colbol'IIC, HogMon, and Myers, for the cum!ry and al'lillcl'y,
with Altcn's and Abercrombie's brigades of infantry, thongh all
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seriously engaged, lost but 6] S out of nearl~' 4,500 lllell present.
The remaining 3,50!i! casualties all came ham the ranks of the
three first-named brigades, whose total strength 011 the field was
but 6,732, Colborne's brigade lost, ill un insliUlt us it were,
under the charge of the lancers and hussars, se'·en-tent.hs of its
numbers, 1,400 Illell out of !i!,OOO. Of the 600 who were left
standing, nearly half belonged to the !i!j31st, the battalion which
wus not broken by the ctlvRlry charge, IUld survivcd to join ill
Hoghton's adnmce. The bl'igades of Hoghtoll and Myers were
not, ~ike Colborne's, IUlnihilated ill olle awful moment of disaster,
but used up in continuous fighting at short musketry range,
with Ull enemy of far superior numbers. The forlller (~9th,
]/48th, 2j57th) took 1,650 officers and mell into the field, amI
lost 1,044. The latter (the two battalions of the 7th Royal
Fusiliers and the 1st battalion of the 'Velsh }i'usiliers) had
2,015 combatants prcsent, llnd lost 1,045, HoghtOll'S troops,
therefore, lost five-eighths, Myers'sollc-half of theirstt'Cngth, and
these were victorious nnitll which hardly left a single prisoner
in the encmy's hands, and finally drove their ad\·er~llries from
U.c field ill spite of I~ twofold inequality of IlUmOel's, Truly
Albuem is the mOi>t honourable of all Peninsular blazons Oil
a regimental flag.
Of the 10,000 Portuguese, oul}" HUl"ve)"s brigude was seriously
cngaged; it hud o\'er ~oo casualties lout of the 389 :;uffcrcd on
that day hy troops of that IlfLtion, and established a most
honourable r~cord by its defeat of Latour-Maubol1rg'ii dragoons.
The other llIen killed or hurt were distributed in fives and km
over the battalions of FOllSCCIl, Collins, and Cllmpbell, whieh onl}
came under fire in the last st.Rncre of the battlc.
The Spaniards returned 1,368 casualties out of 14,000 present,
of which (us we Illwe already seen) no less than 615 were ill
those fonr battaJions of Zayas's division which held out so
stubbol'llly 3.oaainst the 5th Corps, till Hoghton's men mme up
to relieve them. Of the rest, Bullasleros's und Lardi".abal'~
dh'isions, with undcr 300 casualties enrh, had only suAcrcd from
1 Of which 110 less tlJall 171 were in the battalion of tl,c Lusitalliall
Legion whiclJ formed Colc's nlluk-gll:lnl on tI,e 11'ft : it sllfl"tTell t.errilJly
from artillery fire.
ALBUERA . NQ 2 (About 11.30 am)
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NOTE.-There should be only two, not three, baUnHons of Grenadil:lS placed 'IS tcSCrve behind Girard and Gazan's troops.
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I<kimlishing or distant artillery fire. The losses of Cnrlos de
Espmla and the cavalr), were insignificant.
The FJ'cneh losses can be made out with I'eu.sonablc certainty
allcr careful compariS<)ll of different returns in the Paris
Archil'es. Soult had the shamelessness to assert in his dispatch
t.o the J~llIpcmr tllat he had onl)' ~,800 killed and wounded!
But tl. h~rdily prepared and incomplete list drawn Ill' on July 6th
ti'1we 6,000 casualties, of whom 900 were llIi~sing-woulldcd
prisoners left. on the nllied positioll. UnforhlJltttcl)' this .dum,
(Ill examination, turns out to be t'A.r from su.tii<fadory. Soult
gil'es 9.!69l officers killL-d, wounded, or missing, but the regimental
reLurns \\"1Iell <'"olllpiled show a much higher figurt:!-359-und
call1lot posi'ibl)' be wrong, since the nallle flnd rflllk of every
officer hit is carefully recorded for documentary and oflicial
purposes. J But if ~W~ casualties tIl110llg officcl':i co.'J'C1ipol1d (as
t.he retUl"ll of July 6th states) to 5,744 llnlOng the rank and
file, then 36~ oflicers hit must imply 7,900 men disabled, /111(1
Lhis, wc muy (''1lJlcludc, wns \'ery nctlr the real figure. llelmus
and Lapcne, the most trustwOIthy l"rench historians ot' the
eftlllpuigll, agr(,-'C in gil'illg 7,000, It thousand more tlUIIl Soult
l"onceded in his tardy flud illcomplete retUTll, This proportion
out of 24,,000 men pnt ill the field i~ suffieientl), hea\"y, though
exceeded 80 terl"ibly by the 4,150 mcnlost out of 10,450 UlIlOllg
lhe British troops. The ulIih which suflcred most helwily were
the two dhrisiollli of the 5th Corps, which must have lost Ilearly
4,000 out of 8,400 present; 'Verl{>,:; rescn'C had probably dose
ou 2,000 ctlSualtic8, oul of 5,600 ooyonets; Godinol\ colulllll
aud the ca\"uh''y had rery considerable losses, but were the onl)'
lroops fit for action next da)'. The 5th COI'pS was absolutely
wrecked; in SOlllC battaliolls therc were only llu"Cc or four
officers unhurt, and the losses were similar to those in Myel'8's
or Hoghton's British brigades 2. Two or three others had fared
("'1llJlptll'atil'cly \)ctter, luwillg 00;11 in the fhmk or 1"Cl\l" at the
time when the desperate musketry duel in the fmllt was in
progress. But the corps as a whole (''1ll1Id not ha\'c been put
ill Rction 011 the 17Lh,
011 the morning of that day each army sullenly formed line on
, :-See Appendix XVI.
~ For th,tails see Appendix X\'!.
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its own side of the Albuera brook, but made no further move-
ment. Beresford was prepured to fight another defcllsi ve battle,
in the unlikely event of its being fOl'Ced UPOIl him 1, bllt wa~ not
willing to attack an enemy hidden behind it screen of WOOd8,
and possessed of a superior and still effective camlry and
artillery. Such all atlflck must have been dcli\"ercd mainly by
the Sp.'\llish and Portuguese hlfantry, since of the British only
Abercrombie's and Altell's five battalions were fit for immt.uiatt:
scnice. The missing brigade of Kcmmis arl'i\"cd during the
day, after n. fatiguing march over the Jernmenha bridge, and
added 1,400 bayonets mor~ but even so there would have been
only 4,000 British illfmltl')' ill full fighting trim; the sud relies
of Hoghton's and Colborne's brigades were organized into two
provisional battalions of 600 mcn each, wherc whole regiments
were reprei>Cuh...J by onc, two, 01', ut the most, thr!.;e companies.
Myers's brigncle had 1,000 men left, so was octter on~ but 110
general would have dreamed of l1sing any of these troops for
oflcnsi\'e action on the day after the battle. An attack would
have hlUl to be delivered by the 9,000 Portuguese infulllry,
backed by the Spaniards and Abercrombie, Alten, and Ke111mis.
l3eresford refused to try it, even though he knew that Soult's
losses had been greater than his OWll, so far u..-; IHere numbers
went; probably, he argued, Solllt would retire covered by his
cavalry and artillery if he were assailed. Covered by the woods,
he could get off us he pleased. But Soult was certain to l'ctire
in any cnse, as news hud 1I0W (.'Ollle to halld t1mt "Vellingtoll was
coming down to Elnls with two divisions 2, and might he
expl.:cted there immediately-he actually arrived on the 19th;
the head of his colulllll had marched 011 the 14th, mid l'CtI.C]lt..1:!
Eh'as on the ~3rd, '1'0 risk anything in order to get SOlllt 011
the move a few days earlier was not worth while.
The Fl'cnch Illursl,al wail even fUl'thcl' than Dercsford 1'1'0111
1 IYUrbllu ill l,is diary umler th~ lith first speaks of 1111 attack br Soult
1J.eing possible, and then concludes it impossible; L\emmis's arril'al l,e
tliiuks will hll"e I,:ureu the l\1arsl1ll1 of !Iny idea of rctunling to the fip;!lt.
~ His intention to COIllQ ap]lI?ars in his letter to lleresford of May 13th,
received !lIar 17th. Tile stntcment tllat the 3ro Dil'i~ioll and othor
trOO]IS 11ad actually starred for Estremauul'a is in his letter of May 14th,
1'Ci;eil'cd May 18th, IVclli'lg/lJr1 Di~patC"CII, vii. .549 (Ind 5,')5,
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the idea of renewing: operations on the 17th; he had $hot Iti~
bolt and failed-the battle, so he declared, 1I'0uld Ilc\'er hnve been
fought if' he had known that Blake had joined the British 011
the night of the 15th. His main object in keeping his ground
for a day was to organize the transport of u column of 5,000
wounded 011 to Seville; if he had retired at once, the greater
part of them would have had to be abandoned. As it was, his
transport was used up, and J:;eveml hundreds of severe Cllses hud
to be left to the merc)' of the Allies, in and abont the chapel in
the wood of Albllera. Bere,:;ford foulld them there on the
morning of the 18th, for Soult commenced his retreat before
dawn, some thil·tJ-six hours after the battle was over. Gazttll
(himself wounded) and some Q,OOO men from the regiments which
had been most cut tip guarded the convoy (which included the
liOO British prisoners) t, southward along the great chau88l:e.
Sonlt himself, with the rest of the army, no\\' reduced to 14,000
men at the most, retired by a more circuitous rOllte, by Solana
and Fueute dell\laestre towards Llerena and the Sierra l\forena.
Beresford's cavalry followed, but was unable to do anything in
face of Latour-Maubollrg's preponderant squadrons. The allied
infantr)' remained behind to resume the siege of Badajoz; Oil
the 18th Hamilton's division and Madden's cavalry were sent
hack to iJwest the place, which was ,;hut in again at dawn on
the 19th, aftel' having been relieved of the presence of the Allies
fur only three days (16th-17th-18th May). Gcneral Phillipoll
had emplo)'cd this short respite in the nseful task of levelling
the allied trenches and batteries outside his works. He found
nuthing in them of which he could make booty, save the hea\'y
wood employed for the gUll-platforms before Sfill Cristobal. The
more valuable stores had all been rcmo\'ed to Elvas, the gnbions
and fascines burnetl by the 4th Division before it gave up the
imestment on the ]Jight of the 15th Ma)'.
That Albuel'a, with all it;; slaughter, was a battle in which
both sides committed sCl'ions errors is generally acknowledged;
but few are the general actions in which thcrc is nothing to
critici7£ on the part of the victor-much more of the vanquished.
I Of whom more tlUlll 200 e:scapl'd, autl joined their rcgime.nl.<! dlll"illg
tile Ilext fOIlT lIays, for their guards were too exhausted to keep good
watch.
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We must, however, protest against Napic,"s liweeping RSscl'tioll
that' no general CI'cr gained so f,'l'eat it battle with so little
incrensc of military reputation as Marshnl lleresford 1• His
triumph was disputed by the very soldiers who followed his car.
Their censures have been reiterated without change and without
abatement to this hour, amI a close examination (while it detects
mallY ill-founded observations and others tainted with malice)
lelwes little doubt that the general feeling was right 2.' Napiel'
then proceeds to argue that Beresford ought to have refused
hattlc, and retired beyond the Guadiallu, that his COIlt'clltratiOll
11'1\8 over-tardy, and that, considering the doubtful quality of
Hlake's troops, he was too bold ill fighting. I-lis tactical disposi-
tions were bad ; • he occupied the position sO as to render defeat
almost ccrtain'; he bl'ought up bis rescrvcs in Il. sllccession of
separate attacks, and he'sitated too long to move the 4th Division,
• Hardinge caused Cole and Abercrombie to win the victory;'
the guidallce of Ho cOillmsllding milld was nowhere seen.
~apier was Bcrcsford's bitter enemy. and it is clear that his
eloquent dellullciationsofthe "Marshal were inspired by a personal
animosity which clouded bis judgement. His account of Albuera
is OllC of the finest pieces of military writing ill the English
language, but it bristles with mistakes. many of them worked in
so as to throw additional discredit 011 his enemy's capllcity 3.
, If llll}' ono wants all e...ample of sut;h 1I battle, he ma.y take the tirst
great fight of f'rederit;k the Grellt, who llad been (lriven ten milCil olt· thll
hattlefield witll the wreck of his cal'alry when news cal\le to him that bi~
infuntr)', in his ahsence lllld without hi.~ Icadershill, hud wall the hattle
for him.
~ PelliWfI1!ln' Wu,., iii. 1" ] 'if!,
I Suell a!l the statement that 7.a)'as llad gil'en way before Colborue
arril'e<l at the frOllt, whicll the el'idellCll of Reresfonl himself, ,1'Urb:m,
Schepeler, ]\loyle Sherer, and Jnan}' other witnesses proves to be quile
wrong, Also the tale (I). 167) that the Spalliards fired iuto the British
(see Strictures, pp. 247-8, llllil Schepeler). Also the statement that Lllmley'~
cavalry divorsion to help Colborne was suceessful-wllen it merlJly resulte,l
in the repulso of tIle two squadroll9 that made it, with the loss of their
t\VO commanding officers (Captains Speddillg and Phillips) taken prisonen;,
An astonishing bit of arithmetic is the nolI' (iii. p, Illl) tlmt 011 Ihe
night of the battle only 1,800 ullwollllded British infautry were left
st;l.nding-the real figures heing: Abercrnmbie, 1,200; :\lten, 1,]00;
remains of M)'IJr$'!1 brigade, 1,000; remain!l of Colborne'!1 hrigmle, 000;
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Onc turns naturally to investigate WelHngton'~ ohservations on
the fight, made when he had ridden over the field on May 21st,
only live days after the battle. Tn onc private letter he writes,
'We had a very good position, and I think should have gained
:l complete victory without any material loss, if the Spaniard8
could have manreuvrcd; but unfortunately they cannot.' III
another he says, 'The Spanish troops behaved admirably, I under-
stand. They stood like stocks while both parties were firing
into them, but they were quite immovable, and this was the
great ClLUSC of all our losscs. Afl;cr thcy had lost thch' position,
thc natural thing to do wOllld have been to attack it with the
nearest Spanish troops, but these eould not be 1110\'00. The
British troops [9.!nd Di\'isioll] wcrc next, and they \\'ere brought
up (and must in such cases always be brought up), and they
suffered accordingly.'
"'ellington's opinion therefore was that BJake's slowness in
gUaI'ding against the flank attack WllS the real euuse of all the
trouble. Considering the gallant way in which Znyas's four
battalions fought, when once they were in line, it certainly seems
that if thrice the foree which that offieer wa:, given had been
thrown baek en potence across the height~, as llcresford desired,
at the moment that SOUlt'ii movement was detected, they would
have held their Own so effectively that the British Qnd Division
could have come up at leisure, and in order, la support the
Spaniards. As it was, the reinforcements sent over-late by Blake
to help ZIlYas arrived by driblets, and gave him little help,
falling into a mere timillade with the l~rench light troops on
Zayas's left, instead of engaging in the main battle.
After Blake';,\ 8l0wlless the main cause of loss was lVillialll
Stewart's O\'er-haste. lleresford had given orders that the whole
~nd Division was to form tip in a second line behind Zll.yas, and
go into ndioll simultanL'Ou;;ly, outflanking the massed 5th Corps
Oil either wing. Slewart, eQlllbining over-zeal and want ot' di~·
ciplille, attacked with the first brigade that enme up, while the
~oond and the third were still remote. He ah.:o, if several eOll-
temporaries are to be trusted, refused to listen to Colonel
Colbome's request to be allowed to keep a unit in square Ol"
ditto of Hoghton's, 000. 1'otnl,4,500, Napier h:1l1 app.uently forg-otlell
.:\bercrombie anti Alten.
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ooh1l1111. to protect the flan k of the 1st brigade when it started
out to make its attack 1, and it was the want of this flank-guard
alone which made the charge of the Polish lanecrs so effectivc.
As llcresford's vindicator writes, •The Marshal had directed Sir
Willialll Stew8.rt to form the second line; he couM lIot distrust
an officer of his experience, zeal, and knowledge of the service.'
That his subordinate should be struck with sudden oo.tlle-fnry,
and attack the French flank with one isolatel:l brigade, contrary
to his ordel's, cannot be imputed as a crime to Beresford, who
was in no way responsible for it. The lllo~·e, and the disaster
that followed within a few minutes, took place without his
knowledge, As he was endeavouring to put in line the
Spanish battalions which were coming up to reinforce Zayas, he
WllS surprised by being charged in thc midst of his staf}, by a knot
of the lancers, who a minute before had ridden ove.' Colbornc's
men on his right. It is elear that if the three brigades of the
2nd Division had becn properlyarrauged and put into action
simultaneously, as Beresford intended, the 5th Corps would have
been driven from the heights an hour before it actually yielded.
Gu'ard's division had already weJllligh exhausted itself UpOll
Znyns's stubborn resistance, and it WM only the interval in the
allied a.ttack, caused by the destruction of ColbOl'ne's brigade,
which permitted Gazan's troops to get up into the front line, in
sllch order as they could, ill time to light HoghtOll and Abcr-
crombic. If Stewart's admnce had becn mnde at the proper
time, he would have come upon the two French divisions at the
very moment when they were making their confused chnnl:,'c of
front, They could not ho've resisted the flssault, considering the
dison:ler in which they were mingled. Soult. who had just made
lip his mind to discontinue the offensive battle in which he was
engaged 2, would certainly have used 'YerlC's rcsen'e only to
oo\'er his retreat, alld would have withdrawn from a position
which lltld become desperate, covered b)' his cavalry.
'l'he one point in which Napier's charges uguinst Bcrcsford ha\'e
1;00ne foundation is that there was undoubtedly much delay in
putting CoIl' and the 4th Division into action, This, as we
have shown above, was CllllSOO by Beresford's wish to strike the
, StrictI/nil, p. 24<3. 2 See p. 380 aOO1'e,
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final blow at the 5th Corps with Hamilton's Portuguesc, whom
he had ordered to the front after Colborne's disaster, and who
did not make theiL' appearance, partly because the first aide-de-
camp sent for them was wounded on the way, partly because
Hamilton had challged his positioll, and was nut found at once
by later messengers, \Vhen it became evident that the delay
IV/LS growing dangerous, Beresford would ha\'e done well to send
Cole ordel'll to advance at once, and to have directed Abercrombie
also to charge, ~apier is right ill suying that' Halxlingc caused
Cole tu win the victory,' fOl' Cote's advance was made without
Bcresford's orden<, aud eveu contrary to his intention, since he
had sent for Alten and the Portuguese to makc the final stroke.
But while they were being collected, Hoghton's brigade had
b~l1 practically used up, and there was nothing but Zayas's
reformed butexhaustcd battalions in Hughtou's real', to form the
l~llied centl·e. It is truc, however, that, supposing the last relics
of the I Die-hatxls' and theil' comrades had finally recoiled, there
would hare beel] no plL'>h or impetus left in their opponents of
lhc 5th Corps, who were a spent fon,-c, in completc disordcr, and
with hanlly one man in two left standing, While they were
disentangling themselves for a final effOlt, Collins'sand I"onseca's
Portuguese, perrectly trustworthy troops and absolutely fresh,
would have bccn getting into positioll. It is practically certain
that Soult would have made no further attempt to go forward.
His own dispatch states that he h~d abandoned all offensive
intentions. This much Bercsf01"d's advocates lIlay plead; but it
remains true that the Illoral impression of Albllcra would have
been very different if the charge of the Fusilier brigade had
!lc\"er takcn place. It was their triumphant sweeping away of
WCI'll"'" reserve which sbuck dismay into the cnemy. If it had
llC\'Cr oecllned, Soult would have retired, foiled indeed, but in
;£ood oluel', and with two OL' three thousand fewer casualtics
than hc actually su/lcl'cd.
rn cl'itici7.illg the operations of the Prcnch, the main point
which sll'ikes us is that Soult stauds self-convicted of hesitatioll
and divided purpose in the cl'isis of thc battle, His attack had
been admirable; the movement which t111'CW four-fifths of his
IlI'ailablc fON;c t1llcxpech.><1ly on to Bercsforo's flank WWl beauti-
fully dcsigllccl and carried out. But when, in thc check and
OllU. IV D cl
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pause that followed the incident of Col borne's disasterl hc
realized (as he himself says) that he had 80,000 men and nol
20,000 to fight, and that 'the odds were no longer fair/ lIe
should have made up his mind either to withdraw under cover
of his splendid cavalr)" or else to risk all, and throw his infantry
rcsctves straight into the fight l before the enemy's line was re·
formcd. He did neitherl butl as he saySI 'gkillg up his original
project, aimed at nothing more thnn retaining the ground already
won.' '''hat use was half a mile of hillside to him l if he had
failcd to break the Allies Rnd drivc them of!' the positioll which
co"cl'ed the road to Hadajm:? He desel'ved the beating that ]lC
got ("Or this extraordinary resolve,
All ~o the details of the French tactiClll Gil'!l.rd was respollsible
for the densc'ordcr of the 5th Corps, which told so futnlly Oil
his men. Bllt in arranging them as he did l he was but adopting
the method that most other l''rench generals were wont to use,
A{:customed to brcak through the lines of Contiuental anllies by
the impetus of n solid mass l ami not by musketry fiT(', he pre"
pared to cmploy the normal shock-tactiCil of the' column of
divisions.' It Illay be even noticed that, more cnlightened than
llIany of his comrad{.'S1 he u&.'ti the ord1'c 1ui:l'le recoUllllended
by Napoleoll l in which some batt:'llions in three-deep line were
in~rsperserl among the columns, His array was better than
that of Victor al Barr051l or Talaverlll or that uf' Re)'uier amI
Ne)' at llnssaco, But he had ne'"er met the llritish linc before
-thi;; was the first time that the 5th Corps saw the red-coat:;;-
ulld he did Hot know the unwelcolllc truth tlmt Reille told
Napoleon before \Vaterloo: 'Sirel I'infautcrie anglaise en duel
c'est le diable.' There Wa..~l 110 doubt, extra confusion caused by
thc Ji.let that the 2nd Di"isioll of the corps closed up too llCIll' tu
the first, 50 that the passoge des ligne81 when it was brollght up
to the front with the idea of passing it through the iutet'vuls of
the shattcred n:gimcnt!l of the vall, WllS even more disordcrly
than was nccessar)'. ]lut the crucial mistake, repeated bye\"cry
l''rench gencral throughout the war, was to come 011 in COhllllll
at all ugnillst the British Hllc. Girul"d did HO worse tlum his
contemporaries, and the gallant obstinacy of' his troops enabled
him to inflict very heavy losi>CS UpOH the victors.
Lutolll'.Maubourg has sometimes been accused of lIl11kiug
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insuflicient use of his great mass of cavalry. But till the last
stage of the battle he had in front of him not merely Lumley's
squadrons, but the whole 4th Division, '1'0 attack a fort'C of all
ltrlllS, ill a good position, with cavall'Y ulotic would ha\'l' heell
dangerous, If he ha~ ~uil.ed, the flank of tIle 5th Corps would
have been laid open ill the most disastrous fashion, Probably
he was righl lu be ,mlislied ill' containing' with his 3,500 horse
7,000 men, 5,000 ot' them good infantry, belonging to the ellemy,
His brilliant stl'oke at ColbOl'ne's brigade is enough to save his
rcputatioll as a battle-general, though (as we have said before) he
WitS no stmlegisl. By this alone Ill' had done mOl'e fo\' Soult
lhflll lU1y other Frellch officer upon the field.
'fhe real hero, lllOSt lwdoubt...uly, of the whole fight \I'm; Sir
Lowry Coil', who showed us mueh moral t'OlIl'Ilge fn l>t!'iking ill,
nn his own rcsponsihiJit)" at the critical mOIl1(mt, as he (tid
practical skill ill conducting his two brigades agaillSt the ellelllY
uppused to him-a most formidable (ld\'crsury who showed
twenty-six sqlludrollii of cavalry opposed to OIlC of hii; wings, and
the 5,600 bayonets of 'Vel'le's infantry oppo~ed to the other,
'Vith Hal'vey's POl'tuguesc he drove oil' the cavlllry charge, with
~Iyers's Fusiliers he bent to pieees t he heavy colU1l1ns of the Frelwh
rcscrve. It was a great achievement, amt the G~neral \\'a!i worthy
of his soldiers, no less than the soldiers of their General. I-le
11'1\8 well seconded by LUlIlley, who justilied in the most splendid
way his sudden appoinbllCJlt to the cOl11mand of the t:a\'alry of
the whole army only a fcll' hours before the tmttle.
NOTE
TII"; rc:mlt of 11 four hours' \'isit to thc field of AIIJucl'a, 011 11 \'cry hot
lIar ill April lOOi, was to prove Ul mc tl1a1 Nallier had 110 idea of its
tOl'ogmphy, while llcrcsfOl11 ill his litriC/tlI'CN 0" Colourl Nllpier'8 lli8tory,
1l.l3J, uest:riocli it \'ery \\·ell. I could sce no tr.lce of scveral 1hillgll 011
\\"llit:11 Nallicr lays ~tr~, espedally the '",vine' IJchilH.l the British
positioll. Nearly the whole of tllC fielu is 1I0W ara1J.le-it was covered
thickly with small red llOppies, when I visited it, ill which (our 1,loug-lls
were cutting long S<!ams, turning up a t1Lill soil of a choeolatc brown hue.
SECTION XXVII
WELLINGTON'S FIRST ESTREMADURAl\
CAMPAIGN
CHAPTER I
THE SECOND RRITTSH SLEm; OF BADAJOZ, i\I,\Y-JUNF'. Jail
TnE short. lcn.dllY campaign of l·'ucntes de Olioro had 110l
been without important resnltSt but it had left the general
~trategit:al aspect of aftidrs ill the Peninsula unaltered.
Almciull hud (ullen, amI it had been dClllollslmted that the
.French Army of Portugal was not strong enough to force back
\VeIlingtoll from the fronticl', where he had taken post. On the
other hand, it \\'"S equally cl~ar that WellulbrWn WIiS far too
weak to dream of taking the otlensivc in the valley of the
Douro, 01' marching on Salamanca. Such a movement would
ha\'c brought 20,000 men from the Arm)' of the North to the
aid of the Arlll)' uf Portub>ul, aud the allied army on the
northern ti'onticl' was barel)· superior in numbers to the latter
alolle, even when the 9th Corps had departed for Andalusia. To
provoke the enemy to concentrate would have been illSllue; jf
he were left alone, however, it was improbable tlmt he would
prove dangerous fOl' lllany a day. J'.larmont had to complete the
reorganization of the t!rlll)' which he Imd just tllkclI over from
:MflSsena; it would be some months before he could repla(.'C the
lost cavalry amI artiller)', fill up his magazines, and fini~h the
reclothing of his tattered regimeJlts. &sieres was so much
occupied with the guerrillcl'Os that he would not draw his troops
together, unless he were obliged to do so by an advance of the
Allies towards his territory. He hud, moreover, to keep covering
forces out to north and west, in order to wnt.eh Abudia\
Galician army, and Longa ami Porlicr, who still made head
B.bJ'ftinst him ill the Calltabriall Mouutaills. It wa~ probable,
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therefore, that the ~''rench in Leon and Old Castile would keep
quiet for some time unless they were provoked. 'Vellington
resolved to leave them unmolested, and to endeavour to strike
a blow in the south.
On the day when the battle of l"uentes de Onoro was fought,
Ekresrord, with the !:lO,OOO men whq had been detached to
Estremadura, was, B.8 \Vellingoon knew, just about tocommellce
the ~icge oflladajoz. It was certain that this enterprise would
bring Sonlt and his Army of Andalusia to the succour of the
fortress. The line of conduct which Beresford was to pursue
whcn Soult should appeal' hau been already settled-he was to
fight if the cnemy wcre weak, to retire behind the Gnadiana if
he were strong I. But meanwhile it was now possible to
reinforce BCl'esford with 10,000 men, sim:e 1\1arlllollt and
&'SSicres would be out of the game fot' many I'-ceks. Lca\'illA"
nendy 30,000 men on the Dos Casas and the Con., to protect
the Portuguese frontier and to guard the repairing of Ahneida,
\Vellillbrton could march tu join the Army of E~tremadurawith
thl:! balanee of his army. Hc thought that two divisions could
he spared, and chose the Srd and the 7th. Ifhe marched rapidly
across the Beira with this force, he might arrive in time to
join Bcresford for the battle against Soult which was inevitable.
It might take plaee south of' the Guadiana, if the E'rench
Marshal had delayed his advance, or north of it, if he had come
up ill great for,,-c and Imd compelled Bcresford lo give back
toward Eh'lls, and to abandon the siCc.cte of Badajoz. liut in
either case Beresford's army, reinforced by 10,000 men, would
be strong enough to beat Soult. The ollly possible contingency
lo be feared was that the Duke of Dalmatia might abandon
Granatlll. and the Lines before Cadiz, concentrate 50,000 men,
and let Andalusia shift for itself while he nuu'ched on Badajoz.
Wellington judged, and rightly, that it was most improbable
that he would make this desperate mo\"e. and evacuate three-
fourths of his viceroyalty, ill order to make ,,'Crtain of saving
Ondnjoz. Knowing the strength of Bel'csfol'11 und CastatlOs, ht.!
would come with the 20,000 or 25,000 men that he could collect
without disgalTisoning any points of primary importance. In
such a case, supposing that he mmc with the higher figure.,
I Se~pp, 28()-.1.
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Beresfonl had ~OIOOO Anglo-1J oJ'tugl1e.'>e, 101000 more were
I.:oming down from the Beira, and there were the Spaniards of
Blake alld of Castllfios t.u be taken into consideration. Soult
would find himself faced by 45,000 men, and could not possibly
prevent the sie6re of Badajor. from proceeding. If the pll\<'e
could he taken promptly, there would be no time for reinforce-
ments to reach the Marshal from the Arm)" of Portugal 01' the
Army of the CentJ'e: and should he finally resolve to draw up
fmiher forces from Andalusia, he mnst abttndon either the
kingdom of Granada or the Cadiz lines, or both. To force him
to gh"c up his grlLSp on cither of these points would bc a great
end in itself, and a sufficient reward for a sllccessflll campaign.
But everything depended on swift movement and the economy
of time. Should Soult refuse to fight, and rcsolve to appeal for
help to the other French armies, it was certain that 50,000
men might be gathered to his aid within a month 01' five weeks,
All the Anglo-Ilortuguese troops combined, supposing that
e\"el'Y llUHl were drawn in from the north to join Bcrcsfol'u,
would not make up over 60,000 sabres and bayonets, On the
other halHl, fl. junction hetween the Armie... of Andalusia And
llortugl11, wit.h aid lent by Bessieres and the Army of the
Ce'lltre, could certainly produce 80,000 mcn, pcrhaps more.
Wherefore it might be argued that if Badajo1. could be taken
in a month a great success might be scored. But if the siege
were to linger 011 o\'er that lime, the enemy would be n.ble lo
conccntrale in such force that the enterprise might become
impracticable. The game was worth trying.
"relliflbrton's dispatches to Lord Lherpool llnd other eorre·
f'polldellts between the 14th and the 25th of' May make it
perfectJy clear that these were his viel\'~. ' Fortuna.tely for me;
he wrote, 'the French armies ha\'c no communications, and OllC
lll'lll ,y has no knowledgc of the position or of the circulllstam,:es ill
which the others are pll\ced, whereas I 11I\ve a. knowledge of ull
that passes on all sides. From this knowledge I think I ma."
draw tl'00PS frolll Bcira for my operations Ilgainst Badajo1.,
Hut I cannot venture further south till I shall gct Ciudad
Rodrigo, without exposing all to ruin I.' Again,' I do not
think it possible for Ille to ulldertakc 1lt0l'e in the ~ollth, undel'
I To Loru LiI'Crl)Qol, i\Juy 23,
1811] \,\'ELLINGTON'S l'LANS 407
existing circumstances, than the siege of Badajoz, I cnnnot,
by all)' cffort I can make, increase the British and Portuguese
[in thnt quarter] beyond 30,000 men, to which the Spanish
force may add 8,000 or 10,000 more',' Hc was perfectl)' aWilrc
thnt a concentration Rgainst him WItS possible, but that it would
take a long time to come about, • I do not know when l\'1armont
call be rendy to co-operate with Soult; however, as the siege of
Badajoz can be mised with casc and without loss, whencver it
mny he neccs~ary, I have thought it best to lose no time, and to
ndopt every means to get that place, if I can, before the enemy's
troops can join. If I cannot /:,"Ct it, I may raise the siege and
fight a battle or not, as I may find most proper, according to
t.he slate of OUl' respective forces 2,' It is clear, .then, that
Wellin/:,'ion's utUlost ambition was to Lake Badajo:'., and that
he (ore>ilw thnt he must take it within n limited time, unde!'
penalty of seeing the scheme fail owing to the concentration of
the enemy. His letters show that he knew that Dronet nnd
the 9th Corps had sl:.ttrlcd for Andalusia immediately nftel'
Fnentes de Olioro, and in calculating Soult's utmost a\'ailable
force in ,June he takes Drouet into account 3, though he some·
what uudcr-values his numerical strength.
The garrison of Almeida. had made its escape 011 the night of
May 10th-11th; the French army had drawn back beyond
Ciudnd Uodrigo, and dispersed ihelf into cantonments, on
:\II1Y 12th. .As early us the morning of May 14th the column
destined for Estremadllra set out lIpon its march. It consisted,
as has been already mentioned, of the Srd and 7th Divisions,
with the artillery attached to them. For the purpose of
pl'O\'irlillg camIry for seouting and cxploration, the !l!nd Hussars
of the King's German Legion were attached. This corps was
the lirst ca\'ah'y l'cinfon:emcnt that lVellington had rCl"Cived
for more than a year. It had lauded at Lisbon in April \ and
had Illarched lip to Celorico; from thcnce it was ordered to
strike across country, to join the Colulllullmrchillg for the mUey
I To Dere8foru, May H. The 30,000 toto'!l allows for Rllencer anu fonr
dil'isiolls being Jell in the North.
2 To uml l,il'erIKKll, :'oray 24. 3 To Lord l.il'erllOol, May 23.
• Apparently Oil April 10, aecortling to Schwertfeger's llitt()ry of till!
(,'ermcl!t l~i()l/, i, 329.
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mile~ brolld, a c1mo~ of pllsses and ravines. CouutlC!lS expedi.
tions against them had led to no final result. Like the holy
men of old, when perseCllted in onc region they merely fled to
another. It' the flying columns and petty garrisons were with·
drawn for a moment, they would be at the gates of Burgos or
&i.llbllldcl' within two days, alJ(l the higIH'u~lds llurgos-Vittoriu
and llurgos-Vnlladolid, the main arteries of communication witll
J:rallce, would be cut.
There was soon to be a fifth division in Be~sieres\arnJY, but it
had not yet arrived from France-that ofSouhalll, which formed
(along with the divisions of Cuflhrclli and Rcille) the great reiu-
forcement poured by Napoleon into northern Spain during the lak
sumlller of 1811. But in June it was only beginnhlg to march
up from Marseilles, Turin, and Spezia, the distant garrisons
from which it was to be drawn I, Before it urrived ill Spnill
llessicres had ceased to command the AImy ot' the North, llnd
Dorsenne had takeH his place. Hence (though 'Wellington was
!lot aware of the fact) the months of June alld July were excep-
tionally favourable for a move o...uninst the French /lank ill this
direction.
III aflditioll to his fOllr infantry divisions, BeSSiCl"CS possessed
Wathier's brigade of light cavalry, aHd Lepic's brigade of guard
camlry, together with some lInbdgadcd units such as the 13mh
of the Line (the fixed garrison of Santander) 2, the battalion of
Neuch.ltel, which he ha.d Illored forward to Salamanca, a Humber
of squadrous of gendarmell, Ilud Il '1t1tllltity of drafts for the
Armies of l'ol'tugal and the Centre, which had been fitopped 011
their way south ill a. surreptitious fashioll, by various post-
cOlllmanders who WtlllteJ. to streugthell their depleted dehu:h-
ments, In the autumn ~hU'1ll011t succeeded ill extmctiug liD less
than 4,000 of his own Illen from the territories of the Army of
the North, 1I0t without much frietioll with the locld olJicers who
wished to detain them 3.
I For details of its movements see Kapoleoll's Ourrellpt'Jlldlllwe, 11,ilW,
,TUlIe-8tll, \811.
'I This was a uewly created l'egimeut, forlllcd out of a numbcr of pro-
visioual battalions, whicll Imd been doillg gtl1"l"isoll duty ill Distay for the
last year.
S Dessieres grossly underrated his own Corce in a letter to Berthier of
June 6th, ill wbieh he stated tllC whole at only 44,000 men,
-•
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Guarda, but southwards. firstly to the position before Alfayates
which had ulready been marked out in April, then to a second
position at Aldea. Velha and Uendo, then to a third beyond the
Coo. III case Mannont should push even further, the line
of retreat was to be from Snbugal to Bclmollte, and finall)' by
the mountain road of the Estrada. Nova toward'! the Zezere.
'But the strong country between Belmonte and the Zezere
must not be given up in a hurry 1.' All this was pure precaution
against the improbable: \Vellingtoll was collvillccxl, and quite
rightly, that Marmont wonld be incapable for some weeks,
probably for some months, of any serious offensive action
against Portugal. To invade the Beiea he would have to
collect a store of provisions such as the e."(hatlsted kingdom at'
Loon could not possibly give him. His magazines were known
to have been empty after Fuentes de Oiioeo, and his troops
had been dispersed because there was no possibility of feeding
them while they were concentrated. Spencer -could be in no
possible danger for many a day; so strongly did Wellington
feel this, that when he .reached Elvas hc wrote back to his
lieutenant on May 24th that he intended to borrow from him
Howard's British and Ashworth's Jlortllgnese brigades, and
thought that this could be done without any risk. But if.
'notwithsllmdillg my expectations to the contrary: MIU'mont
seemed to be on the move, the brigades might be stopped 2.
Jmt before starting on his ride from Villar Formosa to Elvas
Wellington received BCl'csfol'd's dispatches of May 12, which
informed him that SouIt (as had been expected) was on the
march from Seville to relieve Badajoz, and that, according to the
instructions that had been given, the allied army of Estrema-
dura would fight him, if he were not too strong to be meddled
with. Tt '1'11.5 the news that bttttle was impending which made
the Commander-ill-Chief quicken his pace to fifty mileH a day,
in hopes that he might be in time to take charge of the troops
in per5Cm. He galloped ahead, and on the morning of the
19th heard, between NiZf\ and Elvas, that there had been a pitched
battle on the ]6th, and that Soult had been repulsed. The
I lIlemorandlllll for Spencer, dat~d May 16th, th~ night befOTI'
W~llingtoll's dep:lrtllr~. Dispalclltl8, vii. }I, .'iCl7.
2 To Spencer, May 24, Dispaichu, \·ii. p. 602.
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details met him at EIVlU" where Arbllthnot, Beresford's aide-de-
camp, handed him the Albuera dispatch. He read it through,
and struck out some purugruphs before sending it on to the
Ministry at home. The reason for these erasures wns that he
considered thl\t Beresford's tone was a little too desponding, find
t.hat he had laid too much stress on the tenible loss of the
Bl'itish hoops, und too little 011 the eomplcte check to Soult\
designs 1. He wrote to the Marshal to hearten him np, 10
t.ell him that. the refill]t achieved had been worth the eost.
•You could not be successful in such an action without a large
loss, ilnd we must make up our mind to affairs of this kind
sometimes-or gi\'e lip the game 2.'
With the military situation that he found in existence on
May 19th ''\'ellillgtoll professed himself satisfied. Hamilton's
Portuguese division had reinvested Dadajoz on the preceding
day. Soult was in full retreat, with the allied cavalry in pursuit
of him. It was uncertain whether he would fall back 011 Seville
or halt at the line of the Sierra Morella; but at any riltc hi,
bolt was shot: lie could gh'c no trouble for SOllle weeks, and
wou1rl only become dangerous if he strengthened his army by
calling up Sebastiani and Victor, and evacuating the Cacliz Lines
amI Gralluda, This 'Vcllingtoll rightly believoo that he would
not think of doing. He would mthel' cry for aid to his neigh-
boll~ and it. would take a long time for reinforcements to reach
him from the Army of Portugal or from Madrid. There Wail a
1ll0llUl in hand, and Badajoy. lllust be euptun..-'<1 if possible withill
that space.
The first thing necessal'y was to push Soult as far back as he
would go, nnd from the ~Oth to the ~6th Bel'esford was cngagetl
in following him up. At first only the cavalry was available
for pursuit: Hamilton's division had been sent back to Bndajo~;
the ~Ild amI 4th were allowed five days of repose 011 the battle-
ficld of Allmcrtl. Not only wcre they absolutely exlmusted, bllt
1 This is mentioned by \\'ellington himseIr (Stanllope's OOIllJerIWlio/lil,
p, 90): 'He could not stand the slanghter about him and the vast
Tl"'llOllsibilily: tl,e letter was quite in a ,lcsllomlillg tone. It \\'(I.S brought
me by Arbuthnot while J was at diunel' at Eh'as, and I said, "This WOll't
do: write me down a victor)'." So tIle dispa~h was altered accordingly,'
~ \\'cllingtoll to Beresford, ;\fiY 19, 4.30 p.m.
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all their transport was cu&"U&rcd in the heart-rending task of
fot'lvardiug to Eh"ns convoy liner convoy of British wounded.
The French, of whom the last were not collected till three days
after the battle, were packed in an e.'(temporized hospital at.
AlbuCI"a village, where they suffered much for lack of slll'geons.
It would hllVC been possible to send make's ann)' to support the
Bl1tish cavalry if he had posse;.<;ed provisions, bllt he l-eporte<l
that his men were starving, and that he must disperse them to pro-
cure food; accordingly they were SCllt to Almclldrnl, Burcllrrotn,
and the neighbouring villages, to gather stores /l.'l best the)'
might.
Soull meanwhile gave back slowly/ being hampered by his
immensc convoys of wounded. On the flOth he retired fmlll
50lnnil to Almcndl'ftlejo and AzellcbnJ. on the 2ht to Villafmncn
and !,'ucnte del i\laestre; on the 2211£1 he was in march for Usagre
alld Llcrcna, so that it was evident that he was retiring Oil the
Siel'l'a Morella by the Llerena and not by the i\1onnsterio road.
It was only 011 this lnst day that Beresford's infantry were Il.hle
to swrt in support of the cavalry advancoo guard, which had
been cautionsly following on SouIl's track. TJIC AlbueJ'a divi-
sions were sad wrecks of their fOl'mer selves; the 2nd had hnt
!!,500 bayonets in its three brigades, the 4th about 2,200
Ilritish and 2,500 !lorluguese; Alten's German brigade was less
thall 1,000 strong, so that the whole did not make Ill' mllch more
than 8,000 men, But Blake was requested to mo\'c on Feria
and Zllfru, parallcllo the I.ldnmce of the British <:oluHllJ. and
(lid so, hfwing collected n few dnys' prO\'isions in hili canton-
ments. The whole force was sufficient to mOl'e Soult back,
sinc:c his troops were ill a dcspolldellt humour, and did not
f1lllount to more than ]:3,00001' 14,000 men, fot· he had been
forced to detach a bl'igade undel' Gaznn to esCOlt his imlllell~e
tmin of wounded back tu Sc\'illc. But lhc nlliC<1 iurantr), nc\'e.'
('l\llle np wit.h the retreating French; by the time that it had
l'Cached Villalba and FlIente del Maestre Soult was nt Llerenu,
thirl)' miles ahead,
The 1:'Ilit day of hi~ l'etretl.t W,'IS marked h)' a \·jgorons cll\'fdr)'
action, the most satisfactol')' of its kind that the Bdtish horse in
t.he Peninsula had bt.'C1l engaged in since the combatsofSahagUlI
and Benaxente. Having 1'eL\ched Llerellu., where he intended to
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stop if he were allowed, Soult determined to find out what \I'M
the force which was pursuing him, and more especially ifit were
accompanied by infantry. He instmcted Latour-l\Iuubourg to
tum back, to attack the allied horse, and to drive it in upon its
supports, Accordingly the Frcnch cavalry general took the
four brigades of Bron, BoU"ier des Belnts, Vinol, aJld Briche \
some 3,000 sabres in all, and hegan to advance along the high-
I'oad. He found in Villa Garcia the enemy's adl'allccd \'edettes,
compused of Pcnne Villcmur'g Spaniards, drovc them out, nnd
pursued them for five miles, till he came to the town of USl\,llTe,
where he caught a glimpse of supports in position. He had nm
against the main bod). of the allied horse, though he could 1I0t
make out either ih strength or its intentions.
General Lumley, who wns thus tllrown upon thc defensil'c,
had with him his three original British CAVJlll'y regiments (Srd
Dragoon Guards, 4th Dragoons, 13th Light Dragoons), foUl'
small regiments of Madden"s and Otway's Portuguese 2, and a
detachment of Penne Villemur's Spanish horse under GenerAl
Lay 3, about ~,flOO sabres in all, so that his position was a clan-
b"CI'OUS one. But the fighting-h'1'Oulld was propitious. U3agre
lies 011 the south bank of the strearn, which flows ill a wcll-
marked !'a\"ine; on the north bank there are two rolling heights
a few hundred yards b.'l.ck from the water, with a definite sky-
line. Troops placed behind them were invisible to all enem),
, coming up from the town, and the J!'I'Cllcb, if they wished to
attack, would have to defile on a narrow front, first through the
main street of Usagre, and then acro!;S the bl'idh"C.
On hearing of Lntour-l\faubourg's approach, Lumlcy sent the
13th Light Dl'agOOllS and Otway's Portngue'>e across the ravine
to the left of the town, and Madden's Portuguese in like manner
on the right, each using a ford which had been previollsly dis-
covered and sOllnded, The heavy dragoolls remained facing the
l !Iron's brigade was compof'Alu of the 4th, 2Otll, 20th Dragoons,
Hou\,ier's of the 14th, lith, 27th Dragoons, Vinot's of the 2nd HIlS-"ars
:md 27th clw.&~elJ.r~, Uric-he'" of the lQtll J-111i;sars alll121sl dUlI/Belllw.
t 1st, 6th, ith, 8th of the Line, only!) squadrons altogether, :11111
iligiltly over 1,000 sabres.
s Apparently 3 squadron each of Borhon and Re}'na, the rest of the
Sp:l.l1ish cal'alry beillg on the Monasterio Roau. Penile Villemur \\'35
!lick at Villafrauca. Strength about 300 sabres.
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town, behind the sky·line, with Lefebure's battery, guarding the
high-road. Both the flauking forces reported that the enemy
was coming up·the road in great strength-Lumley was told
tha.t thirteen regiment.'! had been counted, though there were
really only ten. Wherefore he ordered Olway and Madden to
recross the stream by their fords, which they did without loss,
81ld to watch these PM~l7CS, while keeping well under cO\'er
behind the sky-line.
Latour-M!mbourg could Ilotmake out the fOI·(.'e 01' the illten·
tions of the Allies; he had seen clearly only the Spallish vedcttes
which he had dri\'cll ont of Usagre; but Madden's and Otway's
squadrons had /lot escaped notice altogether, though they retired
eurly, so that he IVas t1.wnre that a hostile force of some strell/:.~h
WIllS lyiug behind the heights. He therefore resolv€(l not to
debouch from UsagTc along the high-road with llis maill body,
across the defile at the bridge, till he had got a flanking force
across the strealll, to threatell alld tUt'll Lumley, if he were intend·
ing to defend the line along the water. 13riche's brigade of
light horse was told off fOI' this purpose, with orders to bro to
lhe l'ight, down-str~m, and to pass the river !\t the ford which
Otway'sPorlnguese had been seen to use ill their retreat.
Meanwhile the other three French brigades waited in Usagre,
deferrilll:{ their advance till the cha38CII,TS should ha\'e time to
get on Lmnley'il flank.
The two fol'L'CS did not keep touch. Bridle \\'enl for a mile
ulong the river, und. found the ford; but Otwu)' was guarding
it, and he did not like to try the pa,,~age of a steep ravine ill lace
of an enemy ill position. 'Vhel'efOl'C he moved further ofl~ look.
ing for u luore pnu:ticublc and unguarded crossing; but the
llItnks grew steeper and steeper ilS he rode northwu.rd, and he
fOllnd that he was losing time. He was long absent, alld
apparelltly cOllllllitteJ. the illc-xcusuble fault of omitting to semi
ItllY report explaining his long deJay. After waiting for more
than an hour Latour.Maubotu·g became impatient, and fell into
an equally gruvc military error. Taking it for granted that the
(hlUlSCllr,t must now be in their destined position, he ordered his
di\'isioll of dragoOlls to dcbouche from the lown and cross the
~trealll nnd the delilc. Bron's brig!\dc led; thc two regimcnt.'!
in front, the 4th and 20th, trotted over the bridge, and deployed
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011 the other side, on an ascending slope, to cover the pass80rte of
the remainder of the division. The third. regiment of the bri-
gade, the 26th, was just crossing the bridge, when suddenly the
whole sky-line in frout W90S covered with 0. long line of hOfS(!lllcn
charging downwards. Lnmley had waited till the pl'QpitiollS
moment, and hAd caught his enemy ill a trap, with one-tllird 01'
his force across the water, and the remainder jammed in the
defile 01' bridge and street. The 4th Dragoons charged Broil
sh'uight in fl"Out, the 3rd Dl'a';'l'Qon Guards took him somewhat
in flank, while 1\ladden's Portuguese supported on the right,
and Penne Villelllur's Spaniards on the left. The two deplo)'e<l
Frcllch regimcnts were hurk'{l buck 011 the third, at the bridge-
foot, find all three fell into most lamcntable confusion. The
A1Iie~ penetrated into the mllS;;, and broke it to pieces, with
great slaughter. The sUl'\'ivors, unable to pass the encumbered
bl'idge, dispersed right and left, tilt' along thc banks of the
stt-eam, where tlley were pursued llnd hunted dOll'n in detail.
Latour-Maubourg could do no marc than dismount the leading
regimcnt of his second brigade alld :sct them to (ire from the
houses alollg the water-side, while fOllr horse artillery gllll~
opene<l upon the enemy's main body. Hut the gUllS were
promptly sileneed by Lefebure's battery, which Lumley hltd
put in action ou the slope abovc, and Latour-3i!ll1bourg had lo
watch the destruction of llron's brigllde without being able lo
gi\'C cftCd.ive hclp. More than 250 dragoons were killed or
wouuded, and () officers, including the coloud of the 4th, with
i2 men werc led away prisoners I. The British loss was illsigllifi-
callt-not twenty troopers-fol' the enem)' hild bccn caught in a
position ill which they could offer 110 effective rcsisUUl(''{l. LUlllley
made 110 attempt to attack Usagrc towu, which would indeed
have been insane, and drew oft' at leisure with his prisoners.
I Lumlcy in his very modest tlispatch (Wellington, Supplemtntary 1Ji8-
p(jlc1u:~, xiii. PI'. O,,4-H) 1lI111er-estimate.q tI,e damage he had done to the
cnClllY. He states his 78 prisoncrs, and notes that 2'J French dead had
been cOllllted, but onl}" speaks of 50 II'Olllltletl. '11l1lre were really oyel'
~OO. III cUlllbut3 with tl1c anlUJ bfmwlu!, the nwnlJer of killed is ahl'll}'~
"cry small compared witll tlmt of tl,e wounded, wllidl here was aLout
8 IQ l-l1ot lit 11.11 all unusual pl'QllortiQll ill cllvalry fights. A good
account frol11 tlle Frellch ~ide may lte found ill l'icanl's llia/Qirc de III
CUL'f1(crie, 17f)f!-1815, \'01. ii. pp. :no.-Hi.
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Latollr- Maubourg sent to recall Briche, and remained halted
Oil his own side of the stream till evening.
At Us~gre the two nrlllies drew their line of uClll!\rcatioll for
Ilem'l} a month, Soult stopped at Llerelln, since he found that
he was not to be pressed; his advanced cavalry continued to
hold Usagre and ){onastcl'io, 011 the two roads from Badajol,
and SC\'iIIc. Bcresford, by ,.ycllington's orders, did not mo\'c
fmther forward: it was not intended that Andalusia should be
invadcd, 01' a second battle with Soult risked. The ca\'alry
fOl'llJcd !( linc from Hiuojosa to 'Fueutc CUllto~, fndug the French,
the Anglo-Portuguesc forming the left, thc Spanish thc right of
th~ screen, Some of Blake's infantry moved up to Zafra in sup·
port,lmt the main body relllailled fUl'the!' to the real', about Santa
Mm'tu nlld llarcal'l'Otu, The British Qud llnd 4th Divisions wcre
pltlCed fUl'ther back, at Almendmlejo and the neighbouring'
\'ilIu/:,res, with the bulk of Ltlmlcy's cavalry ill front of them at
Hi bcrn, in support of the Icft half ofthe screen, which its advanced
~lllladrolls supplied. On the 27th May jlel'e~ford relillqt1i~hed
the l:olllmand of the separate army of Estremaduru, which had
becn Illcl'g<,'d ill n larger uuit whcn thc 3rt! llud 7th Di\'isioH>;
CAllle np to Cnmpol\layor on the 24th, 'Vellington had
,UlIlotlllct'(l his intention of asstlming permanent charhre of the
fol'<..'e ill the 1$0nUl, which was hClIceforth considered as U1C Illaiu
army, and thc seat of hend qual'ters, while Spencer's four divi-
siom 011 thc frontier of Loon were 110W to be regarded as the
~llb.~idiary force.
111 his letters home Wellington spoke of BcresfOl'd's removal
from active cOllllllalld ill the field as necessary because of the
ullsatisfl:tetory state iuto which the Portuguese army Imd fancll
during his absellce; his strong and methodical hand had beeu
much missed, and matters of detail had all gone wrong. Dut
there cun be no doubt that this wus a secondary considemtioll ;
the real Clluse of his supersessiol1 was that his chief had not beeu
satisfied with his conduct of the Jo:stremaduran campaign in
:\l!l.rch !l.lld April. Though there were excuses and explunatiom;
to be found for each onc of his individual acts, yet the genenli
etlect of his leadership had not been happy. The lx'8t com·
mentary on it wus that cvery Ollc, from 'Vcllillgtou lo the
simplest soldier ill the ruuks, was dclighted to hear that
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Rowland Hill had landed at Lisbon on Ma,Y 24, and was on his
way to the front to resume command of the flnd Division, He
was at Ollce placed in the same position that he hud held in
1810, i, c. entrusted with the command not only of his own
division but of the whole wing of the army which was detached
to the south. The for<.'C put at his disposition to observe SOlllt
and cover the leaguer of Badujoz, consisted of prcci:;ely the same
units that had formed Beresford's Albucn\ army-with the
exception that Hamilton's and Collins's Portuguese hnd been
drawn off' to the siege operations. Hill had charge of the ~nd
und 4th Divisions, Alten's detached Gel'man brigade, and
De Grey's unu Muddcll's cUVltlry, the whole I.bout 10,000 strong.
When he {U'l'i\'ed at ElvlIs 011 :Ma)' 31st., und thcn wcnt forwurd
to establish himself at Almendralejo, Wellillh>ioll felt A degree
of security that he had not known for months. It was certain
that nothing would be risked, that thcrc would be neither delays
!lor mistakes, while this kindly, checrl'ul, and resolutc old soldier,
the idol ot' his troops, who called him in affection' Daddy Hill,'
was in charge of the covering <.'Orps.
Meanwhile 'Wellington himself took the siege operlltiolls ill
hund, and employcd ill them the troops hc had brought from
the Beira, the 3'TI and 7th Divisions, together with Hamilton's
and Coliins's PortllguefiC. The whole, including about 100
Briti$h and Portuguese artillerymen, mainly the same <.'Ompanic5
that hnd scr\'cd in Bercsl'ord's siege, made lip about B,OOO men
-a force even smaller than that with which Sonlt had atl:acked
Badajoz in January; bnt the French Marshal had had to deal
with a garrison of 9,000 mell, while Gcneral Phillipon, the
rcsonrceful governor now ill charge of the place, had but a little
over 3,000-a difference which madc "Vellington's position IIlllch
Illore adnmtugeous than Soult's had b<.'{!n. Thc cavalry which
hnd COIllC down from tllC &im along with Picloll, thc 2ud
Hussars of the K. G. L. 1, \\'aJl sent lo join the rest of the horse,
and went to f01'1ll a new brigade, being added to the 13th Light
Dragoons, a regiment hitherto un brigaded, By Junc 1st thcre
I Ullly two squadrons stl'oug, becausc the )'emaillder of the l'cgiment
was at Cadi7.; it ha'] (as will he remembererl) done good servi<::c limIer
Graham at Hano~.
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was another lIlowltcd corps to hand-the 11th Light Dragoons,!
which also went to join Lumley, 50 that the British cavalry in
Estremadura rose from three to six regiments during the
summer.
There were two deticiencics, however, which made \'VeUingOOn's
task in besieging Badajoz a hard, nay an almost hopeless one.
His artillery material, if not so ludicrously inadequate as that
of Bcrest'ord during the first siege, was still utterly insufficient.
And to this we must add that his engineer officers were still
bolh few und ullpruetisL-'d in theil' art. They repeated the same
mistakes that had been secn in the early days of May. Of
lrained rank and file in the engineering bmllch there were
practically nOllc-only twenty-five 'roJal military artificers.'
The home authorities apparently grudged sending out to
Portugal men of this small and highly trained corps, and pre-
lerred to keep them in England. It is impossible to speak with
patience of the fact that there was not even one company of
them in the Peninsula, after the war had been going on for three
years 2 !
It was the mi;,;calculations ot' the engineers-Colonel Flcteher
was presumahly the responsible person, as Wellington's chief
lechnictU adviser-rathlll' than the deplomble weakness of the
artillery rcsoul'CCS- which made the second British siege of
Badajoz as disMtrOllS as the first. Un taught by the experiences
of the first week in May, the engilll.-ers auvisoo "rellillgton to
(lirect bis cfiorts ugainstthe two strongest points in the defellccs,
the I'()(:ky hill crowned by the fort of Sail Cristobal on one hrtnk
of the Glmdidlla, and the Castle 011 its steep slope upon the
othcr. The urgulllcnts used :;CCnt to have beeu the same as
bctol'c-time being limited, it wlL'luecesSllry to strike at the most
uecish"c points. If either San Cristobal or the Castle could be
orcnch(.-'d and storm(.-d, lhe rest of Wle fortress would be dominated
ami would become untenable. If, on the other hand. one of the
SQuthern fronts, where the French had made their attack, were
I It arl'il'cd by Junc 1st, according to Mr. AtkiusOll'S useful list of
\\"ellingtou's (Iivisional orb'allizatioll •
• Mulcasl.cr's COl1l(lall)', the tirst to itl'ri"e, readIed Sl'lIill some weeks
later. By thc timc of the third siege of lladajOl: ill 1812 therc were so
!IIan~' a~ 1l,j (1) military artili<:<:rs al'"il"J,I<:.
OllU. l~ ~: e
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to be chosen as the objective, the Castle and San Cristobal, fonn-
ing independent defences, might hold out long after the enceinte
had been pierced and carried. Moreover, it was urged, San
Cristobal was an isolated fort, so placed that it could get no help
from the flank fires of other works, save from a few !,I'l\IlS on the
Castle; its other neighbour. the foIt at the bridge-head, was
too low-lying to be of any help.
llraetically the only difference between the engineers' plans
for the first 1 and the serond siege of Badajoz was that ill the
latter more attention was puid to tbe attack on the wuth side,
and the whole force of the besiegers was not concentrated on
San Cristoblll, l\.<; it had been in early May. A serious attempt
was made to breach the Castle, not a mere demonstration or fali'C
attack. Yet, as matters turned out, all the stl-ess of the work
once more fell upon the San Cristobal front, where two deslX'rate
1\fiSB.ults were made and l-epulliicd, while on the C'..astIe front llIatter~
never got to the point of an attempted storm. Summing up the
siege ill the words of n'Urban, Beresford's chief of the stufl;
who watched it ruefully, we can only echo his conclusion' that
the fact is that the engineers began upon the wrong side~.'
Two geological peculiarities of the gronnd were fatal to succef>.~:
the first wus that 011 San Cristobul the soil is so shallow-three
inches only on top of the hard rock-that it was impossible to
construct proper trenches. The second was that the Castle hill
is composed of a clay-slate which does not crunlble, however
much battered, and that the wall there was simply a facing to
the native soil. Its stones might be buttered down, but the hill·
side stood firm when the stones had fallen, and remained per-
pendicular awl illtJ.(;cessible. The latter fuel could not be knoll'll
to 'Vellinglon's engineers; but the former was fully within their
cogni7.ance, owing to their experience in the first siege. There
can be no doubt that they ought to have seleeted for
battering the south front-either the point where Soult worked
duril1g :February, or still better the walls nearer the rivel', by
the bastion of San Vincente, where the ground is equally favour-
able and thel-e is no flanking extcrnul defence like the PardulcrtUi
, ltefer back to lIP, 283-4 for details.
, D'Urbuu's diary under Juue 10tllJ whell the siege WIlS just developing
iuto all acknowledged failure.
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fort. If every gun had been concentrated Oll this sectiOll, amI
c\'cry available mall set to trench-work against it, there can be
little doubt that Wellington would have got lladajoz within the
scant four weeks that were at his disposal.
Though the blockade had been resumed 011 May 18th, the
actual siege did not recommence for some days later, since the
troops frolll the Beira, who were to conduct it. did not get up
till !~ week had passed. Oil May 25th HOllston's division arrived
fl'Olll Campo MaJor, and took position on the heights beyond
San Cl'istobal; they were there joined by the 17th Portuguese
frolll the !:.'llrrisoll of Elval;, aud two regimen!::; of Algarve
Militia (Tavira and Lagos) were nssiglloo for transport and
convoy duty between the trenches and Elvas. Picton and the
3rd Division ClUlIC lip two da)'s later (Mu)' ~7th), crossed the
Guudiun£\. by the ford above the city, and joined Hamilton's
l)ortuguese DU the southern bunk. An earlier alTival of the
llcirn divisions would have been of 110 great use, Sillce it was
olllyon the 29th that Colonel Alexander DicksOll, who had Ollce
more been entrusted with the artillery arrangements, had sent
oft' his great convoy of gUlls from Eh'as. This time that inde~
ftltigable officer had collected a siege-train twice as large as that
which he had prepared for Beresford foUl' weeks earlier-there
were forty-six guml in alII instead of twenty-three. But wlhappily
the pieces were the same as those used in the first siege, or
their equals in age and defects. The large majority were the old
brass M-pounders of the scvcntccuth ccntury which hud ulrewly
given so much trouble from their ilTegularity of calibre, their
tendency to droop at the muzzle when much used, and their
tifL'SOIllC habit of • ullbushiug' (i. e. blowing out their vent
fittilJg). Six iron ship-guns, ordered up from Lisbon, only
arrhed when the siege was far advllnced, and were the sole
weapons of real efliciency with which DicksOll was provid(...(I. It
is clear that head quarters might have done something ill the
lVay of orderiug lip better guns early ill May, the moment that
1 30 hrass 2~I'OHlIuers, 41(j...l)()UnUers, 4 ten-iuch howiueN!J 8 eigllt-illc11
ditto, aCCOl'diug to UickilOll'S letter of May 20, .seo his !W.pCri!J cd, Leslie,
11, all.!. I follow llim raUler thau Jone;:;'s Sit:ges of the ]JtmiJliIUJaJ whcre
tile)' uiffer, as he is a1l;;Qlutcly cOlltclIlponlry authority, uud \l'llS llll~
officer ill c1ml'ge of c\'cl'ythillg,
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the first siege had showlI the deficiencies of the Eh'as museum of
artillery antiquities. The gnnners, like the guns, were about
doubled in number since Beresford'sjiasco: there were no\\' ol'er
500 Portuguese, ant! one company of British (Raynsford's), 110
strong, who Il.rri\'cd from Lisboll Oil the 30th, riding on mules
which had been provided at Estremos to give them a rapid
j0I1M1CJ', To aid the twenty-one engineers 011 the spot, elc\'l!l1
officers from line battalions hud heen taken Oil as a~sistant
engineers, while the twenty-fire military artificers had to train
250 mnk and file, selected from the Srd and 7th Divisions, to ad.
as carpenters, miners, and sappers. The work of these amateurs
was, as might have been cxpccb..'t1, Hot \'cry satisfactory, and the
make of their gabium and fascines left much to be desil-eU.
On l\Iny 29th the siege work began, by the opening lip of the
old trenches opposite the l'ardalerns fort, which the l"rench had
tilled ill Oil the tlay of Allmera. This was merely done to draw
the attention of the garrison away from the real point.'> of
attack, tor there was 110 intention of approaching the place
from the south. It would have been better for the Allies had
this been a 6renuine operation, and if the Castle and Sail
Cristobal attacks had been false! It attrueteJ, us was illtCllC!L'l1,
lIlueh notice from the garrison.
On the night of the 30th the serioHs work began. On the
Castle side 1,600 lllClI from the 3rt! Division eOllll1lellCI,.'([ ut dusk
it long trench, 011 the wme ground lht\t had been dug over during:
Ihe first siege, aml three zigl'.....g approaches to it lrom the rear.
This trench, thc first parallel, was no less than 800 yards from
the Cwstle. The attention of the enemy was so much dmll'n to
other pOillt.S, and the soil was so soft, that by daybreak there
had been formed a trench 1,100 yards long, with a parapet three
feet high, and a depth of thn:c feet in the grollnd: the fipproachcs
were.also well advallcC(l, On San Cristoool, at the other attack,
everything went \'1,.'1')' differently. The ground chosen for the
first parallel was, owing lo the exigencies of lhe contour of the
hill, only 400 ),ards from the fort. The working parlil':S were
discovereu at UIll:C, Ilnd u heaxy fire was directed on them, not
onl)' from Sun Cristohul~ but from the Cuslle, across the ril·er.
Tt WH.'; found that there was no soil to dig in-what little once
c:lt:istcd had heen u:sec.l ill building the old trenches of the tint
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siege, and the French gm·crtlol", during hL~ day::; of I'e~pite.
~1A.y 15-18, hOO ingeniously ordCl1X1 that all thi::; earth shollld
be carted away, and thl'OwlI down the steep toward~ the river,
All thnt could be done was to place a. row of gnbiolls along the
intended line of trench, and to begin to bring IIp earth from
below to stuR'them. At daylight there WAS not more than two
feet of em'th thrown lip along the more important points in the
parallel, where it was intended that three batteries should be
plllccd. The cncmy's fire WOll knockl,.'i.l OVCl' the gllbions, and
the working parti~ had to be withdrawn fl'om a great part
of the front. Practically nothing had hecll m.'complished, [lnd
there had been many casllaltie~.
Things continued to go on ill the SlUlle t:'\shion during the
succeeding days. The parallel opposite the Castle was eu::;il)'
completed with little loss; !\ great battery fo\' twenty gUlls WI\S
thrown up in the middle of it, and l'(!Ceived it.., pieces, sixteen
brass Q4,poullders and fOllr howitzers, 011 the night of the ~nd­
Srd. No attempt was made to begin a second parallelllcurel' \.he
ensUe. from which it coul<l be battered at shOlt mnge, On the
uther hand the San Cristobal attack encountered heart-rending
diflicultics from the want of soil; the scrc<:n of gabiolls was
knocked about, the two bl1.tteries opposite the fort made little
progress, and the only thing completed was a third battery, at the
extreme edge of the hill, which was far cnough awny to escape
destruction, bllt also too far away (1,~OO yard~) to do much
damage. It seemed so hopeless to work on the bare rock that
WCIliIlf,tloll ordcrcd &400 worth of wool-packs to be bought
in Eh'as, alld whell these were brought np Oil .fune ~ they proveU
impermeable to shot, and a solid start could be made tor the
plIrapels of the batteriCli. But the encmy kept dmpping shells,
from Illortars in theCa.~Ue, among the working parties, with gl'ent
aL'CUI'ttcy, ilnd the casualties were many, On .TUlle !!nd two
small battedcs, for five and eight gun,. respectively, had at last
been erected about 450 ynrds from the fort, And n. third behind
them, in support, for four more guns, whieh were to shoot over
the parallel.
At half-PMt nine in the morning of June 3rd the batteries all
both fronts began to play 011 their chosen objectives. 'fhe fire
wn~ at first wild, owing to the (,.'(.'Centric bclla\·iour of the old
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seventeenth~century bl'l\ss gUllS, exel'y one of which had its tricks
and deficiencies. As the gUllllers began to learll and humour
them, some eflect began to be produced, especially Oil the Castle.
Here great flakes of masonry began to fall in the c\'cning, but it
was noticed that behind the ;;tone facing there was a core of
clay.slate, the lJatural soil of the Castle hill, which remained
perpendicular when the masonry crumbled. On Sall CJ'istobal, the
1lOnth·enst front of the fort, the one selected for breaching, was.
somewhat damaged, and the guns nearly silenced by evening.
But the besiegers' artillery had already begun to fall oil' in
strength: only Olle pieee had been disnbled by the French, but
rom others had gOlle out of action owing to their own faults,
'llnbushing,' 'muzzle dl'OOping,' or carriages shaken to pie<.1ls
by recoil. The second day of fire (June 4th) was hardly more
snti5fnctory in its results: ngainst the Castle the gUllS made
better practice so far as accurate hitting the mark went, hllt.
the balls seemed to have no effect: the (.'orc of soil behind the
breached ll1asol1l'~' remained nearly as perpendicular as on the
preceding e,'ening. 'Eight.inch shells fired against it would not
penetrate it,' wrote the disgusted Alexander Dickson, 'but abso·
lutcly dropped back, and burst below llmong thc rubbish I.'
Meanwhile one more gnn in this attack was disabled by the
French lil'e, two by 'll1uz"Je drooping,' and three howibcl'
cnrringcs werc so shakcn that they had to be withdrawn for
·repairs. Only thirteen guns out of the origillAl twenty were
firing at sunset, and 'the failure of the old· brass pie<:es was
becoming so alarming that an intenal of seven to eight minutes
was ordered between each round, to give the metal time to cool~:
A new battery was collsh'ucted at the right end of the parallel,
near the river, at II point somewhato nclll1ll' to the ClIstle thAn the
original battery, in the hope that fire from II distance shorter by
a hundred yards might have better effect, and five gUlls were
moved into it under cover of the night.
On San Cristobal the second day'S fire was a little better in
results, the flank of tlle forl which was selected for breaching
having its parapet knocked to pieces, and mnch debris having
fallen into theditch. BUlunkuown to the besiegers, whose view
1 J)ick'(J"fI. Paper" ed. Leslie, p. 4.05.
2 Jones, Siega of the Pellimru!II, i. p. 54.
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could not command the bottom of the ditch, the French removed
most of the stones llnd rubbish during the night, so that the
accumulation at the bottom, on which the practicability of the
future breach depended, was much smaUer than was supposed
by the British engineers. Two more guns and two howitr.ers
in this attack were out of action by the evening-all owing to
their own defects, Hot to the fIre from the fort. The batteries
were much incommoded by an enfilading fIre across the rivcr
from the Castle, where some. gUlls had been placed on a high
'cavalier' to bear on the slopes below Cristobal.
On June 5 affairs went on much in the same style; the
breaching of the Castle WiIS aD absolute failure; 'the prncticc
\\'Il..~ extremely good, but the bank of earth at the breach still
remained perpendicular 1.' It was discovered, however, that the
}'rcnch were so far alarmed at the result':! of the battering that
they were constructing elaborate inner retrenchments behind the
breach. On Cristobal the prospects looked more promising; so
much of the wall as was visible over the edge of the ditch along
the atl:.acked front was demolished for a distance of many yards.
With another day's fIre it was decided that the breach would be
practicable 2.
Accordingly the batteries on both sides of the river thundered
away for thc wholc day on the 6th, the Castle attack with four-
teen guns out of its original twenty, the Cristobal attack with
seventeen remaining ont of twenty-three. On the former front
the results were somewhat more satisfa<.1ory than those of the
three first days of battering; the seam in the castle wall appear-
iug much wider, and the accumulation of rubbish at its foot
beginning to look appreciable. Observers in the trenches held
that ·a single mau, climbing unhindered, might get tip to thc
top, but of course there was a great difference between such a
scrambling place and a 'practicable breach.' Nothing, at ally
rate, could yet be done on this side in the way of assault. There
were, it must be remembered, SOO yards of open ground between
the parallel from which a storming-column must stalt and the
I Joncs, Sieyea o/·the PeninlWUl, i. p. 37,
~ ·nlis decision was the result of the report of all engineer officer,
Ueutcnullt Jo'orster, who crept up to tIle euge of tile l1iteJI uuring tlle
night of tlle 5th-6th, and ~aw much rubble therein,
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foot of the dumngcd wall, Hot to :opcnk of the muddy bed of the
ni"il!as brook, which had to be forded ill order to rench the
Castle hill.
The Sail Cl'istobal breach, on the other hand, wus judged ripe
for nssnult, though the condition of its lower part WM not accu-
rately known. According to French accounts it was probably
practicable at dusk, but the moment tl18t night fell sixty men
went down into the ditch, and began clearing away the debris
with such energy that there W!l.S a sheer seven·foot drop once
more, at midnight, between the bottom of the excavation and the
lip of the baUen-xl will t1001'e it. The garrison also stulled up
the breach with chevalf:c de !ri.fr, and carts turned upside down
and jammed together, while the sappers in the fort prepared
a qnuutity of fourtccn-inch bombs, to be throwl1 by hand intu
the ditch when an assault should be made, Jt is probnble that.
the deJa,y of over four hours between dark (7.30) and midnight,
when the storm cnllle, just sufficed to provide defcDL'Cs strong
enough to render tbe aU.nck hopeless. Thc gol'ernor of' tIle
Jort, Captain Chall\"in of the 88th Line, desen'es 11.11 (:rroit. for
his admirable activity and resource.
The arrangemcnt of the assault fell to Gcneml HOllston, whose
division was to deliYer it. The regiments from which '·olunteer"~
were picked were the 1/51st, 2/85th, and 17th Portuguese.
The forlorn hope of t .....enty-five mcn was conducted by the
engineer, Lieutenant l"orster, who had explored the ditch Oil
the preceding night, and led by Lieutenant Dyas of the 51st.
The main body of the assaulting column was (..'omposeU of 155
grcllooiers, led by :Major Mackintosh of the 85th; the)' were
divided into two (.'ompanies; the leading company carried ten
ludders, for use in case it should be found that the ditch 1I'a.~
cleared and the asccnt to the breach steep. Detachments 1'11>11I
the guards of the trenches .....ere to mo\'e out, and cut the com-
munication between San Cristobal and the works near the bridge-
head, from which reillfor("'elllents might come 1,
At midnight the stormers broke out of the trenches, and ran,
as fast as was possible in the obscurity, up the 400 yards of bare
hillside which scpumtcd them fl"Om the fort. They suffcroo 110
, Details of the orders for tile assault may be found on pp. GZ-3 of
Jones's S;tgeIJ, \'01. i.
"<:;,
"
""o
"z<
"

lllll] HltST ASSAULT ON SAl\" CllIS·.1.'OllAJ~
great loss in the earl)' I\lOIllCUts of their rush, for though the
garriwn deteded them at once, and plied them both with gra~
and with mUi<ketr>', the darkness WllS a good protection. The
forlorn hope crossed the counterscarp with no difficulty-it was
only foul' feet deep in front of the breach-and leaped down into
the ditch. There they came to a stand at once, for there were
se\'ell feet of sheer !\SCent from the hole in which they stood to
the lowest point of the lip of the breach, and they saw that the
gap ihelfhad been stopped with the carts, C!teVUII:t' tle/rifle all<1
other ohShtCb. Their of!i<:ers called them ofl~ and they were
retiring with little loss, when the main body of the storming
party Cll.me leaping down into the ditch. Getting news that
the breach was impracticable, the officers ill command of the two
grenudier companies made a gnllaut but ill-judged series of
attempts to ei<calade the ll11breached p..'l.l'ts of the scarp with the
ten ladders that their mell carried. The ascent being twent,y
feet high C\'cl'ywhcre, ULtd the ladders only fifteen fl.'et long. it
was bound to fail. But, rcfusing to be discomfited by n first
failure, the stormers Cl\rried the laddeNl round to se\'el'f\l othcr
points of the ditch, looking in vain for a place where the walls
might pr<)\'c lowcl'. The J:~l'cnch garrison plied thcm inccssantly
with musketry, and kept rolling down alllong them the live shells
that had been prepared for the occasion. At last the losses
had growll so great that the weuried ~sailants, aftl'r spending
Ilcurl)' all hour ill the ditch, had to withdraw. Out of 180 men
cmployed therc were no less than 12 dead and about 80 wounded \
1\ sufficient testimony to the obstinacy of the assault. How
hopeless it was ma)' be judged from the fact that the FrCllch
hlld only 1 mnll killed and 1) wounded. Ever)'thiug seems to
ha\'e been miscalculated in this unhappy affair-espeeially the
number of the storillcrs-180 men of all mnks were wholly
inadequate for the assault.
I 51st Regiment: 3 killed,:m officer and 35 men wounded, 3missillg=.t~.
85th Hegiment: 2 officers and llmen lI'oundoo=8.
litb Portuguese: 9 killed, 2 officers and 26 men lI'ounded=3i.
Chllluurl BritunniqlleIJ and 8runswick Oels: 7 1I'0und~.
Engineer;;: I officer mortally wounded. Jones says Ci. G5) 12 killerl
:llld 90 wouuded, but d'Urban gives the number stated above, and UIl'
figures of tile returns bear him out.
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The filil1ll'e aguinst San Cl'istobal convinced \Vellington's
engineers that it Wil.'>' useless to try fof(..'c till the works hrui
been morc severely battered, And three further days of artillery
work were put in, before n second storm was tried. The old gum
from Elvas continued to disable themsehes, and on the 9th only
thirteen were in proper order on the Cristobal attack. Thingll
would have been still worse opposite the Castle if six good iron
ship-gnlls from Lisbon had not come up on the 7th. These were
put into a new battery on the extreme right, and worked very
well. J1llt, including them, there were only twenty pieces playing
on the Castle breach on the 8th and 9th. Ofthe original fOlty-
six gUlls and howib.cI'S only twenty-seven slll'\'ivcd !
The nct result of these last thrce days of bombardment on the
Castle side was still unsatisfactory. '111e ship-guns had at last
brought down a good deal of earth amI rubble, whieh was lying
ill a heap o.t the foot of the battered wall. But on each of the
morningg of the 8th and 9th it was found that the French had,
during the dark hours, scarped the front of the breach, and
thrown aside so much of the dc-l.lI'ill that there was still a pel'pen-
clicular titce of six or seven feet high, between the top of the hC(lp
of broken earth Ilnd mmmnry and the bottom of the seam of
broken wall. This work had been carried out by the garrison
under great difficulties, for the British batteries had been throw-
ing grape against the foot of the breach all night., for the pnrpose
of preventing an)' such activity. Dut the French, trusting to the
cover of the darkness, had contillU<..'<1 to work all manfully, and.
though some men were hit, the task had 011 each night been
more 01' less carrierl Ollt. On the 9th the engineen came to the
conclusion that they dared not advise allY attempt to storm on
this side, considering the enormOllsdistance-(j()() yards from the
wall-at whieh the columns of attack would have to start, even if
they dcbouched from the part of the parallel which was nearest to
the Castle, 'I'here was also the bed of thc Uivillas tu cross, and
the gUlls from that part of the Castle which was uninjured, and
from the Hank of San Cristobal, would cut up the stunners by
enfilading fire. The engineers reluctant!y concluded that nothillg
could bc done a,!;.'tl.inst thc Castle till San Cristobal had fallcn, or
till a second parallel had been pushed forward much nearer to
the place. This was a confession that all thcir original plans
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had been erroneous, and that the immense store of shot and
shell lavisheu 011 the Castle urcach haJ been wasted.
All therefore depended on the result of a second attempt to
storm San Cristobal. Here there WCl'e now two breaches, a
large and El small onf!; the parapets were completely knocked
to pieces, and the fort looked a lUcre battered heap; its fire
hnd been nearly silenced-so much so that lIot 1\ single casualty
occurred in the trench before it during the last twelve homs of
oombardment. Nc\'crthcless the breaches were not vcry proc-
ticable, tor here (as at the Castle) the garrison had, by hard
lI'ork during the night,;, cleared away great part of the debris
below the breach; they could not be prevcllteJ from doing so,
becausc the besiegers' batteries were so far away that they
were Imable to command the dead ground in the bottom of
the ditch. On el\.Ch morning the battered parapet was fonnd
to have been replaced with sandbags and wool-packs, and the
brooch itself stopped with c!levau,t: de ,[rUe. These were swept
away again by continual battering, bot,h 011 the 8th and the 9th,
but the gallant garrison began to replace them 011 each evening
the moment that dusk fell, N01' could this be prevented, because,
contrary to all the rnles of siegecmft, the besiegers had not sapped
up close enough to the walls to enable them to prevent repairs
fl'Olll being carried out. General Phillipon hud doubled the
gttrrison of the fort, which now consisted of two companies
instead of the one that had held it 011 the 6th. The men
were furnished with three muskets each, and a great store of
grenades, firc-ball.., alld li \'e shell, prepared for throwing by hal~d.
had been sent up into the work,
The 7th Division delivered its second assault on the night of
the 9th, three hours etU'licl' than ou the previous occasion, and
ollly ninety minutes after dark had £o.1Ien, This moment had
been chosen in order that the l.'reneh might have lefls time to do
repairs. But nine o'clock was still too late an hour, rough pre-
parations to receive the stormers had already bcen made whcn
theyarriYed, The French narratives state that an nssault by
d.ay.light ill the late afternoon would have bccn much more likely
to suceCCl:P. But this idea, though it had been mooted in the
English camp, was rejected because of the distnnce which the
I T~'1mare, 11. l!:l3.
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nttacking colulIln would ha\'c to advance, fully visiblc in the ()~tl,
under firc, and uphill. Once 1ll0l'C the lact that the parallel wa~
too far from the fort had become all important as a hindrancc; on
the San Cristobal heights approaches could not be driven any
nearer, for want of earth to dig in. This had been known from
the first, and should ha\"e been held sufficient reason for not
attacking at aU upon this stony height.
Geneml Houston told ofl' fOI' the Its;;ault a force twice usgreal
ns that which had been sent fOl'ward on the 6th, 400 men i\l~tead
of 180, Ilnd (a precaution neglected on the previoils occilsion)
100 picked shots were told off to line the outer edge of the
ditch und keep lip a fire against the encmy Iinitlg the ht'ench.
The f1..~mllltillg colullm \\"f1..~ guided h)' Lientenant Hunt, RE.•
ami commanded by Major McGrcchy of the 17th !}ortuguesc I.
The \'oluntcers forllling it were tuken from all the rcgimenb
of Sontflg's brigade, the 51st, 8.5th, Chaastftl"s }Jritmllliquu.
l\nll Brunswick Oels, and also from the 17th Portuguese. There
being 1I0W two bl'Ctlt:hes, the t:OIUllllI WlI.:! to divide into two
hail'cs, one making for that ill the sa.lient angle, the othez'
for that in the curtain. The formel' carried six ladder~, the
latter ten 2.
The men were paraded ill the ravine behind the parallel, slld
cnme out into the open at 9 o'clock. They were seen at once,
and came under a rapid fire of musketry as they breasted the
slope. The guiding engineer, Hunt, and the commander ofthc
columll, McGC€chy, were both killed before the ditch was reached,
with many others. But the fOl'lorn hope flprang down and
mooe fOl" the breaches, followed a moment later by the sup-
pm·h. It nppears that, as 011 ,June Gth, there was foulld to be n
gap between the top of the rnbble in the ditch and the lips of
both breachcs, six or seven feet high. The ladders were there-
fOre brought forward, and many of them were reared; but the
musketry fire knocked over nearly e\'ery man who tried to ascend
them, and the few who got a footing in the breach were met antI
ba)'onetcd by the garrison, who showed splendid courage, run-
ning down the slope of the breach and chargillg any small knot
1 The forlorn hope W:lS I/gaill led by Oras of the 51st.
2 For details see Houston's orders on pp. 77-0 of Jones's vol. i.
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of men who struggled 011 from the llllhlers 1. ~lcllllwhilc the
mass ill the ditch, who could not press fOl'lI'nro to the breuch-
toot. were pelted with stones, hand-grenades, bags of powder, and
fire-balls. l?inall)', after nearly an hour of unavailing effort,
all thc ladders wcrc broken or thrown down, the assailants had
lost 5 officers and 49 men killed, nllrl 8 officers and 77 men
woullded, and the column recoiled to th~ trenches 2. Th,e
breaches and glacis were :>0 strewlI with their wounded that
the nd,illel'y dared not firc to covcr the rctlocnt. and the }'rellch,
descending into the ditch, took up to the fort two wounded
offiC{!rs as prisoners, remoycd the ladders, und thtocw aside much
of the debris, so that the brel\ch-foot was completely cleared.
The losses suttered, onc man in three, and the time for which
the stormers persisted in the attempt, some fifty minutes, prove
that there was no want of courage shown on this disastrous
!light. The fact sccms to be that, as on the 6th, thc brcach Wll:>
lIot really practicable. that an attack could hardly succeed when
the colulllll had to cross 400 yards of exposed ground before
reuching the fort, and that 0. storm should nevcr havc been tried,
when the besieger had not sapped np to the edge of the ditch
and placed himself ill a position to command it. It may be
mcntioned thut such a ditch ItS this, hewn ill thc live rock tlllt!
vcry deep, was particularly hard to deal with. Its C{lges could
7'(Jlaf.
"~o
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;)<J
1I
51st
86th
CMl!Iteurr Britallnique8.
Brunswick Oels •
I7t11 Portuguese .
F.nJrineel"!! •
I FrelJch ohservers in tllC fort noted onc aUClllpt made by mell of their
011'11 nationality, fl'om the Oha8&eur81Jrilalllliqlle.8. A young officer, calling
..re moute, suh'e7~ll1oi; got to the top of tlle ladder with lwo 01' tllree of
his soldiers, rail some feet forward np the lip of the breach, and WIIS then
hllyonetcd. '111is must llllve becn Lieutcnant Dulief of the O.R., tilC
olllr officer of the corps returned as llurt in thc storm. See Lallene's
(,amf/flgl1li tU 1810-11 dflll' le Midi de I'EiI]JtlgWJ, I). 210.
~ The lossel:! were, according to the report;-
Killed. Wounded. llliIf8i"U.
0ffit.:tr8. Men. Qf!icerlJ. Nell. Qdiow. ,lltm.
I ~3 2 31
1 7 1 10
a 1 13 :!
1 ] I;
:! 10 I Hi
Total, 54 killc\\, 3\ "'olluded, all(1 4 lni~ing = 13'J
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not become abraded, and it was easy for the defenders to shovel
aW!l)' the debris that tell into it, because the bottom was solid
and hard, and the Illasonry that had been knocked dowll lay on
it, instead of sinki.ng into its floor.
On the llloming of the 10th the fire against the Castle was
continued with vigour, but OIi San Cdstobl.ll there wus l.l six
hours' trnce, which ,was asked and granted, in order that the
many wounded scattered along the slope below the fort might he
hrathered ill. The French, being able to work unmolested at
rcjJUirs during the ccsslltioll of fire, lmd evcry reason for giviug
a polite and humane answer to the request made by the
besiegers.
Everything seemed now to depend on the attack against the
Castle, since that on the other side of the river had cOllie lu
:mch a diAAStrous conclnsion. The fire of the Ilewly Rrri,'ed irun
ship-guns was still "ery eftedive, and the breach looked larger
aud less steep. In fact :Frellch accounts state that it was now
for the first time thoroughly practicable-but it was 800 yards
from the British pamllel, and the artillery on the neighbouring
bastions and even on the Castle itself was still intact. Ilhillipull
was in no wise freed from care by the successful repulse of lhe
two attempts to storm San Cristobal. He had just had toO
roouee his troops to half-rations, and even on this scale there
wcre only tell days marc of food in the place: no provisions lmd
been got in since Beresford's first siege began in April. The
garrison, though its losses in killed and wounded had lIot been
great, had mall)' sick, and the strain of being constantly under
arllls expecting an assault was begimling to be felt. There 'I'M
!lO news from outside, save that brought by two Or three
ueserters frolll the foreign corps in the British 7th Division,
who reported that Soult was still in the Sierra MO!'Clla I, and
that they had heard nothing of the approach of a relieving army,
though there ww; a rumour that Victor was going to raise the
siege of Cadiz in order to join his chief. Phillipou wus fon;ec.l
to contemplate the double possibility of his provisions rUllning
~hort ami uf a successful assuult on the Castle frunt. "Vhcre-
tore he resolved that preparations should be made to brillg oH'
the garrison by a sally, if the worst came to the worst. If llO
I Lamare, p. 17(1.
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relief came, or if the walls were forced, the whole ullailuLk: body
of his men were to eross the ri ver to the Cristobal side uudCl'
cover of the night, and to dash at the lines of the besiegers, in
order to cut their way through by the roa~ to Montijo and
:Merida. But tIlls was not to be tried before the duy of
absolute lIecessity should arrive: the council of war culled by
the governor decided that the topic of evasion need not be
broached forn\'e days more 1. Before those five days had expired
they were out of danger and sure of relief.
It was at noon on June 10th that \Vellington made up his
mind that the siege must be abandoned. Calling together the
divisional commanders, and the senior officers of artillery and
cngill(x:rs, he gave them a short nddress. It had beeu proved,
he said, that it was impossible to storm San Cristobal without
supping up to the crest of the glacis,. which was a practically
impossible task 011 the bare rock. There was 1I0W U. breach in
the Castle, but it WttS too remote from the pamllel, and the
route to it was commanded both by the guns on the flank of
&m Cristobal and those on the lunette of San Roquc and other
parts of the sOllthcl'll cnceinte. It was known thut it had been
elaborately retrenched behind, by ditehes and palisades. But
these were not his sole or the main reasons for stopping the
siege. He had news that Mal'lll011t and the 9th Corps would
both join Soult ill a few da):s: and the allied army must not be
caught in the trenches, and forced to fight superior llumbers in
all unfavourable position. It would be possible to stop five days
more Imd to continue thc battering for that time, but on the 15th
the l~rench armies might be concentmted and a general action
forced upon him. This he would not risk, but had decided to
order the whole siege-train to be withdrawn into Eh'as at Ollce,
while the m·my would keep up the blockade of lladajoz till the
enemy dl'eW near, and would then retire beyond the Guadiana
at its leisure, and take up a position on the POltuguese frontier
which he had already chosen. As soon as it was dark the gUlls
should be withdrawn from the batteries, and the sending of
stores, tools, &c., back to .Elvas mnst commence. He would
have risk<.-d a couple of da)·s 1lI0rc battering' if he had thought
it likely to lead to a storm. Hut it was his opinion that there
I LapCllC, 1/. 212. Cf. Lamare, p. 203.
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was no prospect of immedi<lte success against the place, and he
was therefore resolved to give up the siege evell before he was
actually forced to do so. Rumour add~ that he muttered mor!!
or less to himself that' uext time he would be his 01V1l en-
gilleCl· 1: But he did not speak publicly in censure of the
mistakes of metcher and hili colleagues: the men who had
planned and built the Lines of Torres Vedras were not to be
disgrU(,:(.-d lightly, cnm if they had failed in their last task.
The appronching concentration of the :Freuch armics had
hcen very carefully watched by 'Wellington, who was in constant
touch with Spencer, and had been keeping a Illost vigilant eye
011 all his reports. He had also been helped by several inter-
cepted dispatche;, taken on the way betwcen the Armies of
Portugal and Andalusia, and by reports from the guerrillero
chiefs of Castile and his own secret correspondents in Salamanca,
i\Iarmont had been much more rapid ill his movements, and llad
shown more willingness to help a colleague in distress, than was
usual among the French commanders ill Spain. He was new to
command, und vcry zealous; it is certain that a year later,
when he had gained more experience of co-operation with Soult.,
he would not come so fast and so eagerly to his aid.
The Duke of Rugustl. Imd conducted the Army of l>ortugtLl
back to Salamanca on May 15th, and had (as has been already
related ~) spent the ncxt fortnight in breaking up the old corps
iuto six new uivisiollS of illJi.llItry and five brigades of enmlry.
The regiments had all sent back to France the cadres of their
Srd battalions and their Srd and 4th squadrons. The infulltry
bl~ttulious hud been eOlllplelcd up to about 700 Illeu eaeh: am!
the six divisions had by May 25th about ~8,OOO men present
with the colours a, besides sick and detachments, who were vcr)'
1 See Hurgoyne's f)j(try, i. 11.135; 'Tllcre is an account current that
his Lordship says if he undertakes another siege he will be his o.....n
enginccr. \Vll1ltcver faull>! we,'u o.;omlllitted at Badajoz I suspect he was
not a.wa.re of them, and I think it very doubtful whether he eveD kuo.....s
them IlOW. It a)Jpears to me probable tll30t he did say so, by the mystery
lllfectt.>d about QlIl'" [the eugineer] hCild-quurtcJ'lI rcs!leclillg the siege.'
UurgoyueJ an engineer with his feelings 1IurtJ under-Yalues WellillgtOll'5
intelligence. 1 ::iec liP. ;;0l~2 .
• 'n,csc figures, l:;i\'en ily Mal'llIout ill his ,Iltfll/(Jil'"f!', h'. PI" 40-1, arc
Lornc out It)' lhe officilll ",tales.
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numerous I. There were only ~,500 cavlllry fit for service, and
six batteries of artillery; great drafts of horses were promised
from France, by which it was hoped that the former would ere
long be able to show 5,000 sabreli, and the latter to put 60 gUllS
in the field. Meanwhile there were not more than 33,000 lUen
of all arlllS fit to march.
SOIlIt, before starting on his Albuera campaign, had written
to Massena (whose deposition was unknown to him) to state
that if he f!liled ill his attcmpt to deliver Bmla.joz at the hcud of
his own expeditionary force, he might have to ask for aid from
the Army of POItUgal. This letter was deli,'ered to Marmont
all l\Iny 14th, when he had just assumed command. He replied
(May 16) that he recognized the importance of Badojoz, and
would move all or a part of his army southward if it were really
loe<luired. Soult received the dispatch from the hands of his
eolleague's aide-de-eamp Fabvier at Llerena on May 2ith, and
WlLS overjoyed at its contents. He wrote to acknowledge the
offer in terms of effusive politeness, and begged Mnrmont to
march not with a detachment but with his whole army.lI
'fhough he was expecting to be joined by Drouet and the
9th Corps within ten days, he was doubtful whether that rein·
forcement would make him strong enongh to face 'Vellingtoll.
But, with 30,000 men of the Army of Portugal placed in the
valley of the Guadiaua, there would be a force' amply sufficient to
sweep the Allies back into Portugal. On hearing that l\far-
mont hail started, he would extend his troops toward .Merida,
whcre the head of his colleague's column. coming by Truxillo
and Almo.raz, would probably appear.
Long before SouIt's Llerena dispo.kh came to hand, Marmont
had already begun to move some of his divisions towards the
1 Bes;;ieres writes to .Bertllier 011 ),IIIY 23 that he IIlIS 4,000 men of the
Army of Portugal, convalescents and drafts. in Ius government. who
could he Gent forll'ard if there were officers to take clmrge of tlIC/ll. In
reality the figures were even greater. 111ere were also some 4,000 sick
in tIle hospitals of tile llrmy ut Salamanca, &c.
! 8ou1t to Marmont, May 27tll, printed in Marmont's Mb1lOi1-e8, h'. 93-6.
It contains mucll rllodomont:ule 011 the' successful' nction of Albuern,
to which Marmont appends a caustic note,' Excellente plaisanterie que de
representer comme une victoire une bataille offensive tlontle but n'a Im~
ctc 3tteillt l .
o.u". "
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Tagus, as a precautionary measure, in case his offer should Ue
l\ccepted, llut it was apparently the- llCWS of AlbllCra which
made him resolve to bet&ke himself to Estremadlll'll with e\'cry
available man, and not Soult's appeal, which only reached him
after he had started, He was anxious to hand ovcr the charge
of the whole frontier of Loon, and of the fortress of Ciudad Rod-
rigo, to Dessieres. Bnt the Duke of Ishia protested in the mo~t
vehement style against having this responsibility thrust upon
him. Until he had learnt of the Albuera check, he kept
pl'eachiug to Mortier on thc text that Soult was well ablc to
take care of himself, and ought to draw rather 011 Dronet and
Madrid for reinforcements than on the Army of Portugal.
Marmont might move a di\'isioll to Bafios and :Bejar, and two
lllore to Plasclleia, but this was all that honour and prudence
d£!mallded. The main body of his troops ought to be left in or
near Salamanctt, to obscn'e the British force ill fmnt of Ciudacl
Rodrigo. The Arm)' of the North could not spare a man to
relieve Marmont's troops on the Dotlro and the Tormes, if they
mRrched away; what with the Galicians, the Cantabrian
bandjoJ of Longa and Porlier, am] the guel'rillcros, it had so much
upon its hands that it could not find Qne brigade to occupy
SalanHlllCll.. The Army of Portugal was so mnch in need of rest
and reinforcement that it would perish by the way, or never
reach Budajoz, if its commander persisted in carrying out hi.~
quixotic plan, &C.
All these arguments were hollow: Hessieres disliked Soult,
and not onI)' would not stir a. finger himself to aid him, but
wished to discourage Marmont from doing so. When the news
of Albuera came, llc made shift to protect the frontiers of Loon,
despite of all his pre\'iolls allegations. His estimate of the
impossibility of the march to Badajoz was absolutely falsified;
the Army of POl'tugnll\coomplished it in fifteen days without ullY
appreciable loss in men or material. Marmont descr\'(~s, as he
himself remarks I, great credit for his move, which was made
controry to his eolleuguc's advice, and without auy orders from
Paris. 1"01' Napoleon's dispatche.<;, based, as IlSUal, 011 fact.. thre<'
weeh or II lilOnth old, were coining in at this time with notes lIS
lo the resting find reorganization of the Mmy, and spoke of
I ~\f~moiTd, h" • too.
4SSi\lARMO:"J'l' AND THE EMl'EllOll11l1l]
It bfittlc lIeftr Cilldnd Hodrigo, to keep Wellington fmm besieging
that place, as the next bl~k which would probably fall to the
Duke of HagllAA I. Marmollt had M directions nothing but a vague
precept to 'act for the geneml interc~t of the Imperial armies in
Spain' and to keep an eye on Andalusia, where the progre!5ll of
affairs would be better known to him than it could be in llaris 2.
These directions he most certainly carried out, but 011 his own
responsibility, and without any detailed instructions from his
rtll\Ster. Indeed, his dispatch of May Sht, in which he informed
the Emperor that he was about to mareh for the Tagu!'., bl'Ollgbt
down on him 1\ scolding from Berthier tor moving with only
thirty-six pieces of artillery, and for not having sent back to
Bnyollne a mass of men of the train, who were to pick up horses
there 3, If Marmont htu! waited to procure more teams from'the
rear, he would never hnve joined Soult ill time to raise the siege
of llndajoz. It was the quickne!;s of his movement which tOl'(:ed
the Allies to abandon that enterprise.
\Vellillgtoll hnd been from the first (:olH,jm:eu that Marmollt
wOllld move soutlnrnrd on hcaJ>ing of Soult's chcck at Albucm.
It was for this rell.SOll that he made no scrnple of depicting
SpeUl'CI"S corps of reinfol'(:emellts for the army in Estremadura:
not only detachmcnts, but probably the whole force would ere
long ha"e to be drawn to join the main army. On May ~4th,
as has been already mentioned, he ordered Howard's British ~
and Ashworth's Portuguese brigades to 1I10\'C lowurds him vin
Sabugal, Castello lll'l\IlCO, und thc bridge of Villa Vel ha. Howard,'s
1,500 men were to he taken away permanently from the 1st
Division and added to the se<"'Olld, replacing in it thrcc battalions
which, owing to the carnage of Albuera, had to be sent home to
rCCrtlil ii. By June 8th I-Ioward had reached Talavera Real, near
lludajoz, and had formally been placed on thc roll of the 2nd
Division, which then rose once more to 4,000 men.
In compliance with his chief's general directions that, if the
I Sce especially .Berthier to i\Iannont of lib)' 27.
t Bertllicr to Marmont, lOtll :\Iay, 1811,
:I Berthier to i'lfarmont, June 17th.
, Howard's brigade consi~ted of the 1/50tJ., l/iht, 1/9211d, "rul a ritle
rOlllpany of tile li/60lh.
: The hattalions which went l,olllc wcrc the 2/28th, 2!lth, 2j4Bth, :!j3f1th,
Ff'~
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French Army of Portugal tnrncd fiOulhward, he himllelf was to
make a corresponding movement, Snencer moved the Light and
1st Divisions from their cantonments towards Sabugal, on a
rumour (which turned out to be premature) that Marmont had
already started on the ~6th of May. Learning that he had
been misinformed, he brought them back again to their old
cantonmcnts between the Azava and the Coo. on the 2ith 1.
On the next day there urri"cd detailed and certain news
from secret correspondents in Salamanca, to the cff<:et that
Marmont was concentrating his troops in two bodies, one,
under his own commund, at Salamanca itself, the other about
Alba de Tormes and Tamames. Thc natural deduction
from this information was that one column would march
by the Puerto de Bmios over the mountains to the Tagus,
ulId thc other by Ciudad Rodrigo and the Puerto de Pcmles.
'Vcllington, on receiving thc Spanish notes forwarded by
Spencer, was delighted to find that his forecast 'fag almost
certainl)' right. •Von will see by my letter yesterday,' he wrote
on June Qnd, 'that I did not make a bad guess at the enemy's
probable movcmcnt, as descl'ibt'<1 in thc letters from our fricnds
of the 28th, enclosed in yours of the 318t 2,' His own dispatch
of June 1st, to which he refers, had already told Spencer that
the momcnt Marmont moved he was to bring up his right to
Pellamacor, nnd his left to Sabugal, leaving only a screen in
front of Ciudad Rodrigo, But since it was not quite certain
that the Murslwl might not be projecting a mcrc mid into the
Dcira, eithcr by the Almcida or the Sabngnl road, no definite
mo\'e was to be made till it was clear that the French columns
were heading for the passes, This caution against over·IUlSty
deductions kept Spcnccl' vcry much in his original position till
.June 4th, the day on which Marmont's movements lx.>cnmc
clear.
Thc Marshal had conccntratcU onc division (Fay's 3) and all
his cavalry at Salamanca on June Ist, while Reynier with two
divisions, followed at a day's distance by three mo~moved from
, Light Division diaries (Simmons) show these to be the correct dl)·s.
2 Welliugton to Sl~ncer, 2nd of June, DilIJUJlchu, vii. p. 633.
! i\larmont says only one division, and I follow him here, as the best
:iulllOrity, IllOUgl. Foy .ill l\is MeTlloirff SlIys two llivisions,
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'l'f1lllames for the eastern pass. the Puerto de Banos. On the
3rd the Marshal and the smaller coln,lllu started from Salamanca
011 the Uodrigo road, for the purpose of milking a demOllsu-ation
against Almcida, which was intended to hold Spencer in his
present position, while Reynier and the main body of the French
army should get two or three clap' start. MarmOllt l'cnchcd
Uodrigo on the 5th, and sallied ont from it, cavalry in front, on
the following morning. He was exposing himself to some
danger, since Spen.eel' had four di visions within call, though his
cavnlry was wcak-only two British and two Portuguese regi-
ments '. But, uncertain as to the strcn"gth of his enemy, Spem.,'cr
ga\'c way; the Light Division and Slade's cavalry being drawll
buck from the line of the Azava, while the other three divisions
marched for SabuguJ uuder the eo\'er of this screen. The road
to Almcida being thus left unguarded, }'ack, who was lying
there with his Portuguese brigade, blew tip such purt of the
cllcicuteas remained intact after Brennier's explosion, alld retired
wesbnuil. For this bolh he alld Spencer were blamed b.y 1Vel-
lillgton, who said that thcy should havc waited till the French
actually made a move towards Almeida before destroying it. Us
subseqllent repair was made much more difficult by the supple-
mcntary damage needlessly CllL'ricd Ollt 2.
Marmont's force, 5,000 foot and fl,500 clwah'y, ndvancoo in
pursuit of Spellcer by both the Gallegos and the Cal'pio roads.
It 1I'llS only OH the latter, hO\I'e\'cl', that allY ~I'ious skirmishilJg
()(:curr<.>tl. i\Iontbrun's squadrons in o\'cl'whelming llllmbel'S
pre;;sed hard on the British cavalry screen, composed on this
front of the lst Dragoons alld a squadron of the 14th Light
Dragoons, under Slade. That brigadier, always, if his sub-
ordinates are to be trusted, a little over-slow in movement,
allowed himself to be outflanked while executing a series of
I Slade's aud Barba~ena's brigades. The other British cavalry brigado
(AuSl.ln's) hllll lUarched for the south 011 June 1, and was at this moment
at earia, near Castello Dranco.
~ Wellington was slill lIlore angry with Spencer for aUlhorizing Pack
to bioI\' UI) the place, for the brigadier Jlad "ery properly asked definite
lea\'c to do so from his immediate superior. Wellington argued that
a proper reading of his dispatches would have showed Spencer that the
destrnctiQn was only to be made ill case i\Iarmont actually marched Oil
Almeida. See Diapu/chel, I'jii, I'. I.
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demollstrations to cm'er the rear of the infantry, nud ollly!.tot
oft' without serioUi; loss through the gallantry of a squadron 01'
the RO)'IlIs, who charged the tUl1ling fon..-c at all opporblllc
moment, and gained time fot' the rest of the regiment to retire
with some difficulty across the lllarsh of Kava de Aver I,
A dangerous movement was got o\'er with the loss of only fUllr
men killed und nine wounded.
Spe.ncer's whole fol'l'C had reached Alfuyutes by the night uf
the 6th, retiring before El French column of 110t a third of its
own strength. On the next day he recei red from Colonel "Valers,
onc of lVcllingtoll's great iJllclligCIlCC ofiicers, news which c1can,:\
up the situation for him. Waters, who came in from a tour ill
the Sierra de Guta, reported that all immense French columll
was already passillg the Puerto d~ Btu1us, thirty Illile~ tu tlte
cast, and that the force ill front of the British did llOt apparently
exceed the single division of infalltry I\nd the four brigades of
hOI'3C whieh had been already :reell and noted, There wa~ no
need therefore to retire towards the ZC'l.ere and the Estrada
Nom, for Marmont wa>; not making it serious raid into Portugal,
but onl), cO\'erillg the march of his main body by a demollstl'a-
tioll. The truth of this intelligence 1I'IlS soon \'cri/icd, for the
i\farshal, instead of pn~ssillg the British l'enr 011 the 7th, whcelel'l
eastward, and wellt ofr hy the Pass of Perales, leaving SpelH;cr
eJltirel)' 1l11lllOlcstetl.
\Ve\lington's original ol-ders thus became valid and practicable,
:tlltl Spencer was able to march his whole fOLlr dirisions towards
Uadujoz ulld the IJmill arl1lY, with the cel·taillly that he was
moving pamllcl to :\1armollt's route, and that hc (:ould join his
chief many days before the French colullllls could Ilnite with
Soult. For the invaluable bridl,,"e of Villa Velha llOW hecame of
primary importance. It provided ll. good passage o\'cr the
Tagns, leading straight to Estremadura by a short line, while
the French, having no bridge lower down the ri\u than Almaraz,
were compelled to make a much longer detour, and to spend
several days more than the British in transferring themselves to
the southern seat of war.
The head uf Spencer's lIlarching column was no\\' formed bJ
I See NlIvier, ili. p. 312; Aillslie's lli6101'!J qf the RO,Va{6, JIll' 120-1;
Tomkiu':Oll, I'. 105,
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AlIson's light camlry, who had mOH'd (as it will be rcmembered)
towards Castello Branco beforc the rest of the armyl, Then
came the infantr)' divisions, while Slade remained to cover the
relll', und ouly marchcd 011 when the main body had already
crossed the T8{,'1IS 2, The route lay from Alfayates by Pena-
mSlcor, Silo l\Hgl1el cl'Archc, Castello Brau{,'O, Villa Velha, Niza,
aml l)orWegrc. AlISOII Cl"OSSOO the Tagus at the bridge of
VilIn Vclha on JUlIC lUll, the Light Division 011 June Ulth, the
1st Di\·isioll on the 14th-15th, PR.CI.:'s Portuguese and the 6th
Divisioll 011 JWIC 15th-16th, Sltule's cavalry, who hud waited
behind Ilcar Castello llranco till it should be ccrtain that 110
French were showing in this direction, only came m·el' the river
on the 19th. All this was rough marching, in hot weather, over
lx\{! roruls, and thc hoops suflcroo somcwhat fl'Olll SWlstrokc and
ti-olll occflsionallacl.: of water in the Illmmblins. Hut thc trails·
port worked fairly well in spite of all difficulties, and food only
OlH.."C l'llilcd to be distributed regularly 3. By dint of 1ll0\,jUg
as ftU" as was possible in, the early mOMlillg llnd the evening hours,
the divisions made good tinle, and the distanccs covered exceeded
Oil several days twenty lIlile!! in the twenty-four hours". ....
On the 13th the hCftd of the inflllltl'Y eolulIlll WM at Nizn, only
\ ~oo IJ, ~3i,
t Kupiel' .i'.l}'>l l],;ll :-ll'cneCl' un I,is ~vullll~fll 1113rt,;h ',le[.;It,;!IClI a ,lhisioll
;md his C1l\"alr}' to Coria ;'s Ilaukers' (iii. 312), I think this statement
tlo"l lhe I-\ritish flunk·gu;lnl Wail 111lshe<1 forward iJlto Spain is all error,
l'aused Lr the similarity of llameS between tile :jpanish Coda and Caria in
l"'rlllg1l1, between S"lmgul "1111 Castello Branco. For it is t,;ert.'\ill that
,\U$Qll'S cltl'alry brigade were at CaI'm June 3rtl-9th, !Iud thcn wellt 011 to
<.:astello Branco aud Villa Velba, while Shde's cUI'air)' were from the
ith to the 15th between Alfa)'lltcs 111111 Castello HI'auco, Sell the regi-
mental histories.
, Sl'C Leadl, p, 221,
, Napier's statClllCllt (iiL p. 312) that' the Light Division did not leave
a ~il1gle straggler behind' is contradicted by the note of Leach of the 9lIth
(p. 221) that < 011 June 11 lllallY hundreds of men were left by the wa}'-
~itlll <!uite ex]umste(l by the illtcllse heat, which compelled us to make
frequent halts by day and to proceed by night.' Tomkinson also notes
that Ihe Light Division IOilt men, who fell dead from sunstroke while
marching up the ~tecII ascent to Ni'l.:\. on June 13tl1 (p. lOG). He says
that thc Light Dil'ision nlell were so willing that tlley marched on till the
lu41'ossible Illumcnl, Mid rcelec.l over to die,
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twenty miles from l'ortalegre, and fifty from Badajoz, while iLs
rear ha.d passed Castello Branco and Wai'i nearing the Tagus,
'Vellington was therefore able to contemplate the situation with
screnity. Speneer's whole fOI'<:e would be able to join him
long before Marmont could (mite with SOlllt, He ordered
that each of the divisions, as it reached J1ortalegre, should
take several days' rest before moving on to Campo Mayor and
Elvl\s.
The French army meanwhile had endured a much 1001ger and
more fatiguing march. The head of lleynier's column, moving
by Fuente Roblc, Banos, and Bejar across the chain of the Sierm
de Gaw, rcuchcd ll luscncia OIl the 9th and Almal'az Oll the Iltll.
Marmont and the smaller column which had demonstrated
~rrainst Spencer fell into the rear of the main hody at Mal.
partida near Plasencia on the 14th 1. The passage of the
Tagus at Almaraz took longer than had hC(l1l expected, bccnusc
pontoons which had been ordered down from Madrid had failed
to appear, and the whole army had to be ferried over by driblets
011 the flying-bridge already existing there. But though strung
out over fifty miles of rood by this mischance, the Army of
Portugal at least got the adt'anced squadron:,; of its light cavalry
to 'I'ruxillo un the 14th 2 and to :Mcridtl. 011 the 17th, The
head of the infantry column was a dn.y's march behind, and
reaehed Merida on the 18th, with the main body trailing dowlI
the mountain road frolll l'ru.'i:illo behind it. Soult's ad\'aneed
gU1Lrd WM already ill possession of the town and bridge of
Merida, and the junction of the Armies of Andalusia and
Portugal was secured.
Hut meanwhile ''''ellingtoll had retired from their Ileighboul'-
hood, On the afternoon of the 10th the orders had been issued
for the withdrawing of all the gUllS from the siege-batteries
before Badajoz, and by the next morning mall)' of them were
already en mule for Elvas. All through the 11th and l~th
convoys of ammunition, platforms, faseines. wool-packs, &c" were
being sent to the rear, and by the night of th~ last-named day
] I<'o)"s M/moire" cd. Girod de VAin, p. 14G.
1 According to a report brought to Wellingoon by 1I BritisJI intelligence-
officer ill tha.t direction, as early liS the 13th, But Ulill is probablr all
error of a day. Di8patchu, viii.'p, 37.
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there was nothing left in the trenches or thc camps san: n >SlIltdI
daily store for the troops, who were kept to blockade the fortress
as long as was prudent. F'or it was well thltt thc garl'isoll should
be ~troit1y shut ill, and forced to consume as much at' their provi·
sions as possible; Wellington knew thatthe)' were only rationed
np to the ~Oth, and there was !t bare chance that Soult or Mar-
mont might be delayed by somc unforCficcn mishap. Nothing
uf the kind happened, however, and 011 the 13th Soult began to
stir. He had been joined by Dronet's long-expected corps on
that morning j it had accomplished a most circuitous march
from Vnlladolid, by Madrid, Toledo, the pass of Despel1apcrrus
and Cordo,'a, in which it had consumed more than 0. month
(May 11th-June 13th). All Drouet's corps was composed of
4th battalions of regiments belonging to the ht or 5th Corps,
and the provisional brigade of cavalry which nccompanied him
consisted of 3rd and 4th squadrons belonging to dragoon
regiments of the Army of the South, These were at once
treated as drafts, and amalgamated with the depleted units
which had been so much cut up at AIbuern. The 5th Corps
and the other regiments present with Soult had 4,000 men
drafted iuto their ranks I, and oncc 1II0rc became stwug. There
remained over onc provisional division, 5,000 strong, which con·
sisted of 4th battalions whose regiments were absent with
Victor before Cadiz~, Drouet's arrival gave Soult a total
force of some ~,OOO men, which made him still unable to f!lce
Wellington with his own unaided strength; but he knew that
he could count on l\Iarmont's approach with 30,000 more
within It week.
If he pressed ill upon lladajoz before the JUJlction took plnce,
he would risk the very real danger that Wellington might
lllarch against him with every available man, and force him to
Illlother battle. He therefore first sent cavalry along the high-
I The regimcntll which received no IJ.'1tt."llion were tIle 40th, 6.ah, 88th,
l00th, 103rd, 21st and 28th Uger of the 6th Corps, and the 16th Leger.
'n.e ClIvalry regiments Wllicll received squad rollS were the 4tI1, 14th, 26th
Dragoons.
2 The 4Ul oo.tts. of tltC Stll, 64tI1, 63r,l, 24.tll, 45tI" 9Hh, 95t11, nud
96th Line, and the 9th and 27th Uger. 'There were also odd squadrons
ofthc 1st, 2nd, aud nth Dr3{(oons.
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roads towards Villafranca and Los Santos, and 0I11y when they
reported that there was HO British infantry ill front of them,
mo\·ed lip his main body to Villafranca and All11en<h1l.1~jo (June
16th). UecollnaiSMnces were pushed towards the bridges of
Merida. amI Medellin, where the Army of Portugal was to be
expected. As he kept rery far from \Vellingl.on's fronl,
Soult's march WAA ulllllolested; the llritish general had COIl-
Locntrated the 4th and 9lnd Divisions and Hamilton's Portu-
guese on the old Albuera position on the 14th of June, und
could have brought lip the 3nl und 7th and Ashworth's 1)ortu-
gucsc to join them in a few hours. But he wws not going to tuke
offensive action, and ~illc..-e Sou]t kept well away from him, he
waited till he had news that the two l~rench armies would get ill
touch at l\IeriJa on the 17th, and rctir<:d with his whole aNlI}'
beyond the Guadiullll on that day.
SECTION XXVI I: CHAPTER 11
\\''';I,I.JNGTO~ ON THE CAVA..IVKIWULY lBIl
0:" the morning 01' June 17th the five divisions of the Anglo-
l'ol'luguese arnl)' which had hitherto l"cmuillOO 011 the south
bank of the GuadianR crossed that river, and retired tu the
pusitions along the line Eh'as, CUlUpO Mayor, Ougucllu, which
Wellington hud alrcn.dy selecled for thelll. The water was low.
and the bulk of t.he troops llfie{l the fords between Jerumcnha
mul nru.lajm~ I which are practicable duriug the SllllllllCl' lIIonths.
cx<:cpt l'lfter days of exceptional miu~. Head ljllUrtcrs were
IllM!..,<-l back to the country-housc known ns the Quilll:adc S{io,
JoflO, near 8110 Viccntc, a spot eqllidistallt from Ehas and
CIlIllPO Mayor. The 7th Division, from the north :-:idc of
Blldajoz, Illude a cort'cspomling movement, und fell back into
the samc general liue. Spencer's COIUlllll from the Bcira· \l"a~
HO"· all ucross the '1'ugus, suve Slade's cavulry Ulld thc 5th Divi-
sioll, lllld its hcnd wns resting ut Porhtlcgrc, to which its rcut'
wa;; mpidlJ· coming up. As there are only two nmrche" between
PorLllcgre and Elm~, it was dear that the two sections of the
alliL'tl army were certain of their jUllctioll. l~or siuce OH the
18th i\fRl"lllont's columll-head hud only reached i\1eridu, and
~111t's was at Allllcndralejo, it would take some days for the
two French armies to draw together, amI COllcert further opera-
tions on the llorthel"ll liidc of &dujoz.
Hut there was onc section of the allied forces which Wellington
was anxious not to withchflw across the Guadiana, hut to send
1 I follow Seo'·ell, as all eye-witness, when he says that tIle bulk of the
infantrr crOSS<.'t1 by the forus. Kllpillr suys tller wcut over the flying-
bridge below Uadaj07. (Hi. p. 313). llut l\loylc Sllerer (p. 1(7) sars that
the 2nd DivisiolJ forded the GUlldillua, lIud Vere's M/lrvhef! of the 4th
Didsiol1 (p. 17) sa)'s the same of eole's brigades.
~ "nl<: l,rillcilKl! ford is by ])orta de Coito, but tllerc are lire or ~ix
betwcen that spot and Uadajo%.' Scorell's diary, June 17,
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Oll ullothcr qucst, and all his future movements depended ou the
march of this corps. The moment that SOlllt began to advun~
from Llcrena Oll the 14th, and to edge off in the direction of
Merida and l\farlllont, he had left the western roads into ,Alldu-
lusia UllCOVCretl. Except it trifling detachment at Guadnlcuual,
there was now no force protecting Seville 011 that side. !-'rOlll
the day that he got the news of the Marshal's northerly march,
\Vellington began to press General Blake to retUl·ll at ouce into
his old haunts in the Condado de Nicbln, pussing round the left
rear of the enemy, and to begin to threaten Seville, There
was now nothing to prevent him from doing so, and it was
well known that the Andalusiall capital was left to a scanty
garrison, largely composed of convalescents and untrustll'orthy
Jummentculos. As long as Soult lay at Llerena, he could
easily throw a column to the flank to succour Seville; but
when he hud moved on, this was 110 longer ill his power. As
curly as June 10 vVellington had written to Castallos I that
Soult would ultimately move 011 Merida, and that Blake would
then be able to slip into Andalusia either by the route of
Xeres de los Caballeros and Frcgcllal, 01" if he preferred 4
safer though longer rood, by that hugging the !lorluguese
frontier, following which he would emerge into Spain by
l\i~rlolu. He could 110t be ~toppt..J. 011 either route, ant! his
appearance bc10re Seville would bring back Soult in haste from
Hadajoz, ann Clll"C him of an)' desire to cross the Glladillnll. 01'
to besiege Elms. On June l£th ,"Velliugtoll ordered his com-
missaries to prepare rations at Mertola fOl· the bene/it of the
Spa.niards, who would probably be in their usual state of semi-
starvation, and wrote to Blake to urge him to march at once~.
The Captain-Gencral l,'OIlSCllh..J. to move, but liSh.J for more
food; he was told in reply that he should be fed from Jeru-
mcnha to Mertola while he was on Portuguese soil, but must
rely on his 011'11 exertions while he was in Spain. On the
morning of the 17th Dlake <:fossed the Grw.diana at Jern·
menha with Loy's 1,000 horse, the 10,000 infantry of Zayas
und Ballastcros, Illld two batteries, and started to march dowll-
stream for his destination. He was quite out of touch with
1 Ditpatchel, vii, last two pages of the volume.
~ Diaputchu, viii. pp. 3-4, Hl, 20.
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the enemy, and so well protected by the GuadifullL and the
mountains that it was certain that his movement would be 1111-
observed. Marching fast, he reached Mertola on JUlle2~nd,and
Castillejos, ncross the Amlalusian frontier, on the :"l4th. Thus
'Vcllingtoll was serenely (.'onfidcnt, when the enemy CtlIl)C up
against his front, that he had thrown 8. bomb behind them,
who!\e explosion would cause no small stir, and infallibly draw
back a large section of the Army of Andalusia to defend Seville.
Wit.hout these troops Soult \\;ould be in no condition to attack
him t, cvcn with Mannont's aid. The crisis between Eh'as and
Badajoz, therefore, could only last for a few days.
Meanwhile it had to be faced, and from the ~Qnd to the 29th
of June 'Vellington might have fOlmd himself engaged in £l.
general action on all)' day of the week. Soult and Marmont
had met at l\Ieridu on the 18th-the day after Vle1lingtoll's
army had crossed thc Guadiana. The elder marshal had over-
whelmed the yonnger with compliments-it was the first time,
he said, that the Army of Portugal had done anything for the
Arnl)' of the South; with 8. colleague who was unselfish und
enterprising, he felt himself able to undertake any task 2. It
was settled that the combined armies should march against the
Albuern positions next morning, in three colull1ns. Marmont
lmd llis six divisions would move along the bank of thc Guadiana
by theroncl runnillgthrough I.oboll and Talavera Heal; the main
body of the Andalusiall forces would take the route Almendra·
lcjo-Solana-.Albucl'a. One division detnchcd by Soult (it was
the tell battalions of Conroux, the undi!<tribllted fraction of
Dronet's 9th Corps) was to turn the British line by a flanking
mo\'ement through Almendral to Valverde. Thus just 60,000
mcn were put in motion,l\farmont having brought about 3~,OOO
of all arms, while Soult, including Drouet, had about 28,000.
Expecting un action, for 'Vellington was known to ha\'e been at
Albucra. on the 16th, and his dcparture was unsuspected, the
three columns advanced cautiously, and ready to deploy. But
l See for his confidence in the combination his dispatch to Lord LiI'cr·
pool of June 27. (DiBJ)(uchefl, viii. 11- 6i.)
1 '11 etait dans l'ivresse de la joie et de la reconnaissance,' says i\Iarmont
pUJ1/Qire8, iI'. p. 45). 8o\l\t'8 letters to BertlJier give l\Jarmont:l ll:lndsome
lestimonio\.
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no enemy was fOllnd, and by the evening of the 19th it Wl\~
known that the Anglo-Pol'tugucsc were all hehind the Guadians.
At dusk the head of }[llnnont's light cavulry got in tOllch with
the garrison of lladnjo7., and learnt t,hat the lnst of the Allies
had disappeared from in front of its walls all the 16th. Phillipoll
was ju~tified of his long and obstinate defence: on the ver)'
day before his half-rations would have given out, and at the
moment when he was thinking seriousl)' of blowing up his wor~s,
and making a dash to get away, the expected succours had
appeare<l.
On the 20th Mnrmont entered lladajoz in triumph, amid the
hlare of military music, ann a few hours later Soult arriveO
and exchanged felicitations with him and with the trusty
go\'ernor. The two main eolullllls of caeh of thcir al'lllie~
cOIwcl'ged on the fortl'es~, but llriche's light Cllvalr,V and the
divisions of Conroux and Godinot went to Olivem:a, to see if by
chance the Allies were holding that unlucky and ill-protected
town, H was found"cmpty(JlUlc 21st), the small Portnguese
garrison hltving retired to Elvas on the] 7th.
'Vith 60,000 men in hand (or more, if the 3,500 bayonets of
the Badaj07. garrison arc cOllnlt.'d) and with onc bridge ami
many good fords at their disposition, for the crossing of the
Guadiana, the two marshals had the power to thrust a general
action upon their adversary-unless indeed he should retire far
beyond the Portuguese frontier, and so give them the chance of
laying siege to Elvas. It remained to be seen what was his
purpose, and on June 22nd a general reconnaissance on the
further bank of the Guadianll was carried out. On the len
Godinot's division advanced from Olivell7.1l. to a point opposite
Jerumenha, where, being very visible from the further ballk, it
WItS furiotlsly but ineffectively cunnonaded by the Portuguese
garrison. Two dragoon regimellts under General nl'Oll forded
the river, but found no aUied troops in this direction, On the
right, :Montbrun, with two cavalry brigades of the Army 01'
Portugal, passed the Uadajoz bridge, and marched on Campo
:\'[a)'or, After driving in II cavalry screen belonging to De
Gl'c)"s flnd Madden's rcgimcnts, he found himself feeling thl.'
front of a rlefensive line, which he estimated at two di"isioll
of infantry and ],400 horse, and conld get no further for·
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wllrd 1. He returned to report that 'Vcllington was showing-
fight.
III the centre, where LJ.tour-:Maubolll'g in person, with fOllr-
teen squadrons of dragoons and Polish lancel'S, forded the
Gundiana ulmost in front of Elva.'l, there was hard fighting,
ending ill a petty disR:lter for the allied outposts. Here the
cavalry screen was formed on the right by the 2nd Hussars of
the King's German Legion, on the left by the ]]th Light
Dragoons. The French column drove in the pickets of the
hussars, whu resisted from the water's cdge onward with great
obstinllCy. Presently the main body of this weak corps (on I)'
tll'O SlJuadrons strong 2) came up, Ilnd with more courage than
discretion charged the leading Fre~ch reb"ment, which they
broke. But being outflanked by the encmy's rescrves, they wcrc
surrounded on three sides, and had to cut their way Ollt with
a loss of three officers wounded, two dead, and twenty prisoners.
The remains of the hussars rallied behiud the Quinta de Gre-
mcziu, where they were presently joined by the main body of
the 11th Light Dragoons, The enemy pushed them no further,
but tUnling to the right swept along 'Vellington's outpost line
in the direction of Bada-joz. By so doing they foulld themselves
in the rear of the outlying picket of the]] th, formed by Captain
Lutyens's troop. This little force had, by some mischance, not
paid much attention to the disturbance in front of the hussal'S,
nor had Ilny orders been sent to them by their brigadier (Long)
to bid them be cautious as to their flank. Warned Ilt the last
moment by a German sergeant, Lutyens had just collected his
men, and Wl\.\j about to retire, when he saw a body of cavalry, not
on his flank but directl)' in his rear, cutting him oft· from Elvtls.
Thinking that a bold dash was his only chance, he closed up his
Illen and char/:,red the front French squadron, which he broke
through. But tl second line was behind, and he and his whole
I '1111~ f.'rmmh rUJlortli ~how that "'clliugloll WUl! wrOllg ill tliinldllg'
(Di8Jl1'lchu, 1'01. \'iii, June 22) tllat the enemy got no glimpse of the
Ilritisll illfllntry. 'l11e)' apl)''1rClIlly detected tll0 3rd uull 7tll Dh'isious.
'The remainder under uIajor \'011 Busche was still at Cadiz, It
will he rell\eUlhe~ll 1,lmt it took It di~tillguishecl. 1)''1rt in thl' hattle of
Ilarrosa,
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party of sixty-four sabres were ridden down and co.ptlll'e<ll.
Only onc wounded officer (Lieutenant Binney) cut his wn.)'
through and brought the news of the mishap 2.
Wellington, with his usual clear perception, attributed this
little disaster to the fact that the two regiments engaged had
both landed in the Peninsula only a few weeks before, and were
utterly unpractised in outpost duty. The hussars ought to
have retired skirmishing-it was not their duty to try to fight
five regiments of French. The light dragoon pickets had
clearly not kept touch with the detachments on their flanks, or
they would have heal'cl of the advance of the enelfly in force,
and would not have been surrounded before they were aware
that the French had got welll'Ound their rear. 'Thh disagree-
able circumstance; he writes, 'tends to show the differeuce
between old and new troops. The old regiments of cavalry,
throughout nll their service, with all their losses put together,
have not lost so many men as the fnd Hussars I:Uld the 11th
Light Dragoons in n few da)'s. However, we must make the
new as good as the old 3.' Wellington also blamed General
Long. 'Let him attend to the directions he before received
from Sir Stapleton Cotton, to throw out only small pUqllet, of
ovservatiolt on the Caya and Guudiuna. If he had had his whole
brigade, instead of one large picquet, on the Caya., he could not
have pre\'ented the enemy from advancing..... This principle
is well known and understood in the army, and if it hud not
been acted upon invariably, we should have lost all our cavalry
long ago, ill the way in which Captain Lutyens lost the picqllet
of the 11th this morning'.'
1 The loss was B killed, I officer and 20 men wounded, I officer lUul
35 lllCIl llu\\'UllIlded prisoners.
• There are two good accounts of this skirmisll Ileal' Quinta de Gre-
IllCZill, onc in a lettcr by CUllt."Iill von Stolzcnllllrg of tl1C hllS!lllrs (ill
Schwertfegcr'g llWtory Qfthe K.G.L.,ii. U7), the other by George }armer,
n troOlJoCr of thc 11 tll Lig1lt Drngoons, whosc littlo llutoLiogrn!llly "'ll.~
publislle<.l b}' Gleig in 18il4, under the titlc of 1'he Light DrogQoll, su
vol. L Ill" 92-7. ...·'nmer sa)"9 that the }<'Tcncll dragoons in tllcir rear were
taken at first for I'ortuguese squadrons coming up from Eh'as to reillfor~e
thc linc.
S Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dispatches. viii. p. ,'i8.
• 'Vellington to Erskino (then commanding the <:avalry dh'i~ion to
which the 11th belonged), June 22• .Dispatclltl, viii. p. 40.
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By the evcuiug of the 2211d the two Frellch marshals, as the
result of their wide-spreading reconnaissances, were fully awure
that Wellington lay in force from Campo l\fayor to Elvas, and
had no intentioll of retiring, But they had lIot been able to
lUake out the details of his positiol!, which lay across all undulat-
ing country wooded ill many parts, and not to be embraced ill a
single view from any commanding spot, As a matter of fact
their ad\'ersary had 1I0W got up all his troops; the last division
from the Heira came into touch with the main body 011 the
morning of the 23nL Elaborate orders issued for the conduct
of the llrmy in case the French IOhould advance for battle, show
what were the intentiolls of Wellington I.
His front extended from Ouguell11 near the Gcbora river
almost to ElvlL'i, a distance of twelve miles. Ougnella was a li We
tOWl\ with mediaeval fOlti6catiollS, susceptible of defellce for some
hOll!os, It WllS gnrrisonoo by two companies of Portuguese from
Eh'as, Beyond it rises the mountain of the Dos Herlllallus. and
there is no practicable route to turn it, save by all immense
detoUl' in the direction of Albuquerque, so that the flank was
\'ery Sl'Curc. lletweeu Ouguella alld Campo Mayor lny the 3rt!
und 7th Divisions uuder Picton. Co.mpo Mayor had lx:CIl
rep.....ired since its recapture, and had received a Portuguese
garrison; it had some heavy gUllS (~4-poullders) which would
sweep the level gl'Ollnd in frout of it. West of this tl)!tress lay
the alliecf centre Il1lder Hill, composed of the 2nd and 4th Divi-
sions Ilud Hamilton's Portuguese. extending from Campo Mayor
to the CllyU. Beyond that river ill the direction of Elv!\s, in u.
~omewhat 'refused' position leaning backward to the north-west,
lay the three brigades of the 1st Division, uuder Spencer, form·
iug the right wiug, alld resting all the great fortress as their
!lank-gunI'd, This formed tbe front line. The I'eserves were
the Light Division on the Monte Reguingo in front of Arroll-
clJcs, ready to SUppOlt PictOll, and the 5th and 6th Divisions,
which were on the Portalegre road, echelolllled in advance from
that place, behind Spencer, and able to reinforce the right or
I They exist ill the J)'Urban papers, though llot printed in the Welling·
Ion dl.pntchcs, alll! fall IUw three section8: \\rhat is to Le uoue if tl16
French attack (1) tl,e left (near Campo Mayor); (2) the centre (along the
eaya); (3) the riKht (by Ehas).
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centre. The cavah-y was out ill front, i\Iadden's 110Ituguese ou
the left, Long's brigade on the right, with De Grey's, Slade's,
aJld AnSOll'l$ rcgiments ready in reservc to transfer thelllseln~
wherc the)' should be wanted '. The whole force amilable was
about 46,000 infantry, of which !'l9,OOO were British, 5,000
cavalry. of which 1,400 belonged to the weak Portuguese
bl'iglldcs of l\1llddcu, Otwuy, alld Barba~:e,m, und 14 batteries
with 80 pie<:cs and g,800 gunners. The gross total was 54,000,
Hot including two regular and two militia regiments of Portu-
gucsc forming the gan-ison of Elvas. Thus the allied arm)',
though l$till appreciably inferior ill numbers to the enemy, more
especially in the cavalry arm, was strong enough to take the
defensive ill a good position 2. Eyery available regular unit ill
I This description of the allied position differs, it may be noted, from
Nllllicr's (iii. 1" 314), where it is S:lid that Ule 1st Di\'isioll was rctaiucd ut
Portalegre as a general reserl'e, 1 thiuk tl'Ut this is an error for the
61h Di\'ision-perhllps a I)rinter's error perllCtuSted through man)'
editions-like some others ill his great work. For the joul'lIals of the
l;nards' brigade of the 1st Division (Stotllert, p. 260; Stepney, Il.13O)
show tllat it left. I'ort....legre on tile ]9th, and was at Sallta 011ara Ileal'
.Eh'as on the 23ru, Oddly enough, Lord Londonderry makes the Eallle
mistake (ii, ]70), S3rillg thlLt Sllenccr was kept back at POl'talegre with
his wl101e cOqlS (i, e, ti,e 1st, 5tll, Gtlt Divisions). l;omm's diary (I'. 226)
\'ouches for the 6UI and Gth ueing ncar l'ortJ.llegre 011 tile 24.tIl.
2 'Ilia last lllorllillg states of the ann)", tllOse of mid June, give a total
for the British of 1,843 officers amI 33,205 mell of all arlllS fit for scrl'lce.
Hongl!)y tile deffiils arc: Cal'alr)', 3,000; 1st Division, &,000; 211d Dil'isioll,
4,100; 3rd Division, 3,300; 4th Dil'ision, 3,300; 5th Dil'isioll, 3,200 j
(;lh DiI'i"ioll, 3,1()(); 7tl1 Division (includiug ,\\teu's ul'ig;1I1e),3,000;
Light Dil'isioll, 2,900; Artillery, J..:ngineel"S, &c" 2,300, l'ortuguesc units:
Ulree weak cil.l'<l1r)" hriga.lles (Madden) Ot\I'll}', Baroo.'iena), 1,100; Iliue
,llld a half infantr)" hrigades (Ash\\'orth, I'ack, l'o\\'er, ,spry, COIlillS, l'alllll-
IJcll, FOllseca, }lane)", CoIeman, and Eluer'e Ca\'ar!ores) I'aryillg from 1,:;00
to 2,200 loayonet.s, 17,000; Artillery, 800. 1 callnot lllluerstaud Napicr's
~t"tclllellt Umt t1lel'o were ollly 1'1,000 I'ortuguese Ilre"cnt, 17,000 seemillg
the 10ll'est l)Ossible figure, Welliugton (to Lord Liverpool, June 24) says
that he IJas 4] /lQO effecti"e /'(i.1lk and jtle of infantry; aIMing (as usual) oue-
eighth more for ofli<:crs, scrgeants, and sffiff, we get 46,000 total for infantry,
!\'OIV 20,000 heing certainly British (as br return abo\'e) tIlere must 1Je
17,000 l'ortuguese of all ranks, which tallies witll the figure sool'e. ne
artiller)' (let.1ils are from Ule Dick8Q11 PU1I1!T8, Oil. Leslie, i. p. 407. D'UrbalJ,
under July 15th (wlleu a regiment or two, e. g. the 68th, hailjoiued frolll
Lisoou), sa)"s tllat tlie allied towl of fl.J.1lk and file \I'~: llJfaotry, U,OOO;
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Portugal had been gathered in by the 23rd, even Pa.ck's and
Bnrbaycuu\; ~lllall Portuguese brigades, which had remained dowlI
to the lust possible moment in the Beim. The grotwd was most
formidable for defence, covered by three fortresses, and having
in its front all open plain which, though intcrspcrst.'{l with occa-
sional groves, was sufficiently commanded by the heights 011 the
British flanks to make it impossible for any large body of tmops
to 1ll0\'C across it in au)' direction without being detected.
Wellington had placed observation plu'lies at the man}' • Ata·
lllyu.s,' the old Moorish wateh~towers, which line the Portuguese
frontier, and had arranged for a system of flag-signalling to
convey news from one flank to the other. There were also
W!mtillgs to be given by gun-lire, from pieces detailed for that
purJXl&! at Qllguella and Campo Mayor I. The cross-rrnuls
along the rcar of the position being brood, and the Ca)'a fordable
ill many placcs, Wellington thought tha~ he was certain of being
ablc to trallSfer troops with swiftness and security to auy part of
the line ~hat might be threatened. The only way in which tht.\
C1WIlIY could approach him unseen would be by moving at !light,
and even so there would be ample warning, since the cavalry
pickets were out far in front of the line, and would give notice
bctimes. Moreover, a night-march of some nine miles out from
BlldlljOZ over unktlown ground, towards an undiscovered poSitiOll,
would have little temptation for the enemy. The danger of
bluudering into a trap in the dark would he too great.
But us 1\ llw.tkr of fuct the Fl'Cllch Marslml.!:l were lIot propos-
illg to att.aek. They hacllearnt that Spencer'~ divi~iollswere up,
:;0 Umt the whole of the Anglo-l'ortugnese army was ill frout of
lhcllI, and Ull:)' shrunk frolll cOlllmittiug themselves tu a .b'Cllcml
action. Marlllont wrotc to Bcl'thicr 011 Junc ~lst, Solllt Oll
JWlC ~~lId, and in neither of their dispatches is there the least
iulcntioll displayt..J. of making IUly fllrtheroftellsive move. .Both
state that they intended to attack the Albuera position on the
lUth, ifVVellin.btton had stayed in it. •The enemy,' says Mamlont,
Cal'ail')', .J,200; Artillcry, 2,200 "" 51,000 in all, or addiug ollit;CZ's ami
scrgcanLs, &c., about 57,500, This secms 11 high estimate for the infantry.
but low for thc cavalry and artillery,
, All these details arc scL out ill full ill the Ol'dcriJ l:OlJicd ill 1)'Urooll's
di"rr·
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'retired in haste, repassed the Guadiana, and returned into
]'ortugal, without leaving us any chance of tackling him. It is
tiresome that he would not make trial of his fortune, for a de-
cisi\'c victory would infallibl>' have marked our arrival in thi~
region.' Soult, in very similnrterms, writes: 'The Duke of Bagllila
and I had resolved to give battle, but Lord Wellington prudently
retreated before we could comc up with him. Yet he had
60,000 lllell, of whom 30,000 WCI'C English, iududiug Gellcml
SPCllCCI"S divisiolls just drawlI in from the north, 14,000 Portu-
gucse, l\lld 1(5,000 Spaniards; there were 5,000 CR\'l.llry alllollg
them. It is vexatious that no general action could take place:
our success would lIOt be doubtful But we may hope that
another occHl;ion Ulay prescnt itself, especially if the At'lIl), of
Portugal continues to keep ill touch with the Arm)' of the
South, and communicates with it, as it is now doing. Of that
I have no doubt, from the alacrity with which the Duke of
Uab)'usa marched to join in the relief of Badajoz with all his
disposuble forces.' Soult thell proceeds to stute with great
gravity that Albuera was a signal victory, and the sole cause of
the presermtion of Badajoz-ignoring the fact that he retreated
sixty miles l\ftcr it, and could not move again till he hud balll
joilled by Drouct and Ma.rmOllt I.
]f ~oult walltcd another signal victory of the typc of Albuerll
he. had only to march nine miles towards Cl\IllPO Mayor, 011 the
day UnCI' he wrote this dispatch to Bcrthicr. The telUpttlliotJ
WllS sl1l'c1y great, since the defeat of "Velli1J::'.{ou's /u'lll)' would
havc shakell to its fOllndations the whole defence of the Penin-
sula. '1'0 a&iemble thc force now lying by Badujox, Amlalusill
alld I..coll had been stripped of all disposable troops, and left
cxpose(l to the raids of the Spanish Armietl of Galicia ami
:Murcia, and to the omnipresent f,"Uerrilleros, who had already
t:ut cOlllllluni<:atiolls ill every direction. If 'VellingtolI l:ould be
hellten, the conccntration was justified; if he were left Uti-
molested nothing had been gained, save the reprovisioning of
Badajoz-und the b.)'tulle might go 011 for ever. Battle \I'M 11011'
oflcroo to the l\Iarshals if they chose lo accept it-the n.'<:OIl-
\ '11le1lo tII·o 1I0towortlly l1i~I)llkhe>i 'Ire "C(~iLI(} ill tl,o AI'llelldix to
1'01. i of HcllllllS, to those who have llot time tu I'igit the PlIl'is Arc!Ji,·cs.
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Meanwllile the Allies could not t.ell what. might be t.he inten-
tions of the enemy. Seeing the enormous ad"antage that
a victory would bring the French, and remembering the way in
.which they had stripped all Spuin of troops ill order to produce
the a11uy which now Jay opposite him, Wellington thought. tllllt
lIe was to be nttncked, and continued for some clays to perfect
his preparations. The period of intent waiting was from thc
~3r<l to the ~8th of June, during which llothillg was to be madc
out concerning the main purpose of the French. Petty cavlllry
reconnaissances in the direction of the Albnqnerquc and Montijo
roads, I1Illch moving about of small columns between Olh'enm
and Badajoz, were observed-but no certain doonctionscollld be
drawn from t.hem. 'No judging what he means yct: meanwhile
everything is rcady for him,' wrotcD'Urban, Beresford's chief of
t.he stAff~ in his diary 011 June fl5th. As a matter of fact, the
small mm'ements hithert.o observed were me,'ely matters of
foraging and exploration, and had no occult meaning. On thc
27th, however, therc was somctlling defInite to be learnt; ou
the morning of that day Godinot's division blew up the walls of
01ivenza, and marched to Val"erde. This disappearance of t.he
French left wing might have meant that all the columns were
bcing drawn in for an attack in thc centre; hut it might also
mean that Sonlt was about to send hack troops to Seville, That
the latter was the true int.erpretation was shown on the ~8th,
when Gouinot definitely marchetl not towards Bndajoz, bllt
southward along the cltallssk leading to Andalusia by Los Santos
and Monasterio. It was certain that, if Smut was sending away
men from the front, he could not be intending to attack, since
e\'er~' man would be required, if u. dash ut the Anglo-Portuguese
lines was in contemplation. ·When vVellington had news from
the peasantry of Godinot.'s southward march on the fl9th .Tune,
he could sec that the dic had been cast, and that he need 110
longer look for an attnel, upon his lines. He was soon after-
wards informed that two divisions were gone sout.hward, not.
fortres« unless it hllS proviollsly ber.ten the co,-ering army ill n general
action. Napier suggests that 8o1l1t should push back Wellington's right
and surrol1nd Elms. But tile attempt '/HMI hal'e brought on a general
action, close uuder the walls of Eh-as, in which the Allies would llllvc had
cI'ery adl'antage of po~ition.
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lll\if'..';ll.nce of .Tlme ~:1nd proved that the Allies had tnken IIp
n. position and were standing on it.
But neither Soult nor Marmont would advance. The cause
of their reluctance to engage was undoubtedly a moral onc.
As Napier very truly remarks in a typical sentence" • MaT-
mOllt';; aTmy wall consciolls of its recent defeatll at BUllsaco, at
Sabngal, at Fnentes de 01101'0; the horrid field of Albuera WllS
frellh; the fierce blood there spilt still reeked in the nostrils of
Sonlt's soldiers.' The generals, no less than the rank and file,
felt a qualm at the idea of attacking Wellington in a position
which he had taken up with deliberation, antI where he showed
himself serenely expectant of their aUack. They were aware
that an attempt to dislodge him would be rendered very tire-
some by the fact that Elvas and Campo Mayor protected hL'!
line. They over-valued his forces by the Illunbcr of Rlnke\
army, which, till the 24th June, they wrongly supposed to be
,<;till with him. So contenting themselves with dicl;atblg pom-
pOllS dispatches concerning the importance of the relief of
Badajo;:-which was indeed a notable advantab1'C-the)' went
each upon his separate way. Instead of attempting to inflict
a defeat on Wellingtoll, the Marshals did no more than patch
up a scheme by which they thought he might be contained llnd
held in check for the present. In short, the offensive spirit was
gone: the French armies in Spain found them~lves thrown
UpOIl the defensive; lilld so things were to remain for the rest
of the Peninslllul' '¥ar. The olTcnsh'c, though it Wt\S hardly
rcalhecJ 1\.<; yet, had pnssed to Wellington Il.
I 1'0J. Hi. p_ 316-
, Napier (iii. p_ 317) suggests tlmt since tllQ stores of Eh'a.!l had run
low, and its ammunition reserl-e in especial had boon much del)letC(! by
ll1e expenditure of sllot allll sllell t.eforc H.'UlajlYI-, the 1,Illce was in such
11 dangerous condition that' Soult (had hc knOl11l this state of affflirs)
migllt h:lI'c IWtc;setl t111:l GUlUliallll by tI,e fords, nntl by Illelll\~ of his
pontoons frOIll Urull1jo;\, might hayc ol'erpowered the Allies' right, iu-
vCSled El\'tls, lIl1tl cOI'crC(1 his arm)' by lines, lIule.ss illlleed the EIIglisl1
/(Cueral, allticil)ating Ule attempt, defeated him between t11e Cara and
Eh-a.~. '11Ii;l might not ll11vc hccl! easy illllll 0IJClI eOlintry, which offerell
el'er)' advantage to the overll'llelming cavalry and artillery of the French.'
With all 11Illllililr, I mllst express my doubl~ as to tl,e \I'isdorn ur prac-
ticability of this conrse. An anny of 60,000 men, lI'ith tlllother of 54,000
in its front, cannot, surely, veuture to foml tllO sieg-e of :l. firsklas;o
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lllel'Cly one: but for some time he could get no certitude of the
departllre of the second division, though it was perfectly true
that this unit (Conroux's ten battalions of Drouet's old corps)
had departed almost immetliutely after Godinot.
What had happened was that 011 June 24th, the fourth day
nfter the entry of the two Marshals into BadajO/':, SOlllt had
informed Marmont that he hlld such bad news from Andalusia
that he mllst return at once to Seville with some of his troops,
It was not so much Blake's diversion which WM working I_the
French had learnt of his start on the !=!4th. but did not know
that he had reached the Condado de Niebla-ns the tidings of the
~pread of the insurrection in the Rondl\ mountajns, and of
threatening movements by Freire's Army of Mureia against the
4th Corps. The force in Eastern Andtdusia had lent so much to
801l11's field army 2, and so much more to garrison the provincc
of Cordova 3, that it WM mllch under strength. There were only
9,000 men, or less, left in the kingdom ofGranada, and the Mnr·
ciUll army WM 14,000 strong. Marmollt refused to take 8o111t's
fenrsscriollsly,being(tl.'l he himselftells Ils()comliuced by this time
that his colleague WM wanting to throw all the responsibility of
keeping Bndujoz safc and' containing' Wcllinhrton 011 thc Army
of Portugal. He l'Cplied that unless 80nlt promised to leave
him the whole of the 5th Corpi, and all J....a.tonr-Maubonrg's
cavalry, he should order hi~ troops to mareh for 'l'ru.. ::illo and
Almnraz, and throw the charge of Dndajoz on the Army of the
South, which might keep it if it could.
Soult was forced to assent to this demand, alId took nway only
Godinot's andConroux's provisional divisions,alld three regiments
of cavalry. The 5th Corps, now placed under Drouet~, and six
dmgoon regiments, were left; behind on the Guudianu, to enable
I Soult's Ilispatch of Juuc 24 says that lie has just heard that Blake hlls
gone off southward.
I ,"'our battalions, t"·o cavalry regiments, and a b.'1ltery hUtl been lent for
the field ann}".
S Of the four ~giment8 garrisoning that region tllree ('12th Leger, 51 ~t,
Mth) had joined the Albnera army. Scbastiani had to lend sel'eral
hatt.'1lions to take their place.
• SCe JlUmQ!re8, iv. p, 47.
~ i. e. t\\'o infantry dil'isions, and Uriche's ligllt caYalry, 14,000 men,
since the drafts had come nnde!' Drollet-,
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Marmont to maintain a :;afe defensive against 'i\TelliJlgton. They
made up some] 5,000 mcn, which, with thc S~,OOO of thc Army
of l'orblgal, provided a force quite insufficient to ntl:il.ck the
Allies, ),et large enongh to pre\'cnt I'L siege of Badajoz. For no
general, least of all the cautious commander of the Anglo-
Portuguese army, would uudertake to besiege a fortress of the
fir:---t class, situated on t.wo sides of n brond ri,'cr, with 54,000
men, when a covering force of 47,000 men was supporting it in
the Ileal' vicinity.
i\Iennwhilc, for a fortnight aftcr Soult had departed from
Barl:ljoz for Seville on J llne 28th, Marmont nnrl Dronet on
one sirle of the Guadiana, and'Vellington on the other, stood
observing each other, and waiting each for some mo,'e 011 the
part of his adversary. The British gcneral knew that the
French in his front were no longer strong enough to attack him
on his positions Mound the Cayfl.. But he mllst keep his anny
concentrated, since, if he made detachments ill any direclion,
Marmont might yet make a. dash at Elms; aJld that pint-Cl
though it had been much impl'oyed of late I, during the weeks
when an attncl, all it seemed probable, still left something to be
desirl:..lJ, especially ill the quality of the gUllS 011 its walls-our
old a(:quaintances of the sieb1'C of Badajoz, and their brethren.
As long as Marmont and Dl'ouct remained massed Ileal' Badujoz
the /I.l1ied army could not di~perse.
On the other hand, the French generals were compelled to
keep together for a time, ill order to superintend the victualling
of Badll:joz, whose magazines were absolutely empty [(~ the
moment of it.s relief. If they had drawn back into cantonments,
and scattered their men, 'Vellington might have thrown a light
corps and cavalry across the Guadiana, and have established
once more a blockade of the fortress. Accordingly, from tIle
28th of June to the 15th of July the Army of Portugal and the
5th Corps remained concentmled in the quaJriluteml BaJajoz-
Mcrida-Almendralejo-Ahnendrnl, sweeping the country-side for
provisiom. Each regiment was ordered to deposit in the
I "'llcn a ~iege ~eemed ]Irobablc Gcncrol Leitc I1cmolislled a number of
houses and trees too close to the walls, impro\'ed tlle works by clearing
~he dit.cl. aud streugthening l~rapet.s, am] did Ilis best to draw in all
available prol'isiom. 'Jllis last was Ilanl, when so large a frielldly anny
WBll dose at hand, eating up the country-side.
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mngll.7,iner. of Badajoz a prescribed number of fal1ega.~ of wheat
or mah:e, making in all six months' rations for a garrison of
4,000 men. Xorth of the Guadiana the French cavalry ranged
about the region around Montijo and Torre del Fresno, where
they were in constant touch with 'Vellillgton's exploring
squadrons scut out from Campo Mayor and Otlguella: but no
serious collisions occurred. At lnst, on July 15th it was reported
that Badajoz was fully provisioned, and )'larmont informoo
Drouet that he was about to disperse his army iu cantonments
reaching as far as the Tagus, since northern Estrema.duro. was
wholly exhausted. He would keep a division at TnJxillo, half-
way between Merida and the Tagus, and the rest of his army
could be brought back at the shortest notice. if the Anglo.
Portuguese should mAke a forward mo'·e. Drotlet, after chang-
ing the garrison of Badajoz for new battalions of the same
regiments which had endured the two sieges of :May ruul June,
and confiding its charge onee more to the trusty Phillipoll,
drew back the 5th Corps to Zafm, Los Santos, and i\'!erida,
leadllg Bridle's light cavalry at Santa. Marta to keep the cOln-
municatioll with Badajoz open. The Marshal and the genernl
calculated that if \Vellingtoll should once more come forward,
the)' eould join again at Merida in six or seven days to 'contain'
him. He could do nothing agniJlst Dadajoz in the short time
that would elapse hefore their concentratiOll.
But Wellington had for the present no further designs against
the fortress which bad cost him so much useless lahour. The
moment that Marmont's depmtnre was announced to him, he
too dispersed his army into cantonments, The banks of the
Caya and Guadiana were notorious for theh' fc\'er, and the troops
were already beginning to suffer from it. On the 18th of Jllly
orders were issued for the 3rd and 6th Divisions to march fOl'
Cnstello Branco, the 7th for Ni:w.. the Ist and 5th for POl'talcgrc,
the 4th for Estremos and then for Pedrogll0, the Light Division
for Castello de Vide and Montalviio. Only the ~nd and Hamil-
ton's Portuguese remained in the neighbourhood of Elvas-the
former at Villa Vi~osa, the latter at I<'ronteira and Som:el, a
little further to the 1I0rth-west '. Hill I'etainetl charge of these
I }o;!noo1'llle marclling arrnngements, and timing for all these destina-
tions, are found ill D'Urban'~ diary undel' Jul)' l8.
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two dh'ision!';, which formed the Anglo-Portngllese Army of the
South for the next twelve months. His allowance of cavalry
consisteJ of Barbayena's und Otway's Portuguese bril:,radcs, and
Long's and Dc Grey's British brigades, which arc for the flltll~
spoken of as the' sccond cavalry division' of the allied !\n1lY.
Its command was gi\'cn IlOt to Lumley, who had used the troops
so effectively during the late campaign, for he had just gOlle Oil
sick leave to England. It wcnt to Sir ""Villiam Erskine, of
whom Wellington could find no more to 81\.)', when proposing
him to Beresford for this post, than that he would at any rate
do better than Long, and that, if very blind, 'which is against
him at the head of cavalry,' he was at any rate very cautious 1.
The fact \\'ns that Erskine had given grave dissatisfaction at
Sabugal and elsewhere, and that the Commander-in-Chiefwished
to shunt him 011 to some new line, where he would have less
responsibility. Yet the e.'i:periment of trusting him with two
cavalry brigades 'I'M a risky one!
There was more reorganization carried out in the allied army
during the months of ,Tune, .Tuly, and Augu!;t 1811 than at allY
other period of V\Tellilll,rton's command. Owing to the arrival
of more camlry regimenbi,:l there were by September 1st six
cavalry brigades in existence instead of three, alld they contained
thirteen regiments instead of the origiIltll seven which had served
in 1810 and the early months of 1811. ""Vellington's mounted
strength had been almost doubled-though most of the corp~
arrived too late to be available when the French were showing
such u. preponderant cuvalry force on the Caya in June, But
ill the next campaign 'Vellington was to be, for the first time
I Dilpulcht8, vii. I', ti08.
i The new arril'als were (see Atkinson's' British Aml)" ill the Peninsulll'
in Engli8h Hi8fIJrical Review for 1907): 2nd Hussars lLG,L. (15th April),
lltll LigiJt DnLgoons (by June I), 12th Ligl.t Dragoons (b)' July I),
9th Light Dragoons (by August 1), 3rd Dragoons and 4th Dra,,"'OOlI Guards
(before SeptelllUer I). 111C brigading became-1st Diyision (StaplctQII
Cottou); Slade's brigade, lst llo)'als and 12th Light Dragoons; Anson's
brigmle, 14th IUlll 16tlo Light Dragoons; Altell's brigade, 11th Light
Dragoons, lst HUs.«:lTS 1\.(;.1. ; Le lIfarclllmt's brigade, 3rd Dragoolls
and 4th DTlIgoon Gllard~. 2nd Division (Erskine); Long's brig:ule,
2nd Hussars K.G.L., 9th :1Il11 13th Ligllt Dragoous; De Grey's brigade,
3rtl Dragoon Guards, 4th Dragoons.
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since hi~ arrival in t.he l'eninsnla, pO~lles~ed of an adequat.e p1'o-
pOltion of mounted men.
As to the infantry, the lst Division (as we have ah'eady scenl)
had given a brigade to the 2nd to repair the losses of Albnem,
'The ~nd Division had taken O\'er Howard's brigade from the
1st, and had consolidated the remains of Colborne's and Hoghton's
shattered regiments f!'Olll two brigades into one, The 3rd, 4th,
5th, and 6th Divisions Irere comparati\'ely littlealteroo,f,1'(ltting,
bebl'een them all, only two more battalions on bulonce, after
r~lllcing certain old ones by newly arrived units 2, But the 7th
Division, hithelto coutniuing only one British brigade (Son tag's)
was provided with it second one, by to.killg in Alten's light
infantry battalions, which had fought so well at Albuera,
The net result of all this change was that, when VVellington
once more divided his army into a northern and a southern fon:e
in Angnst, the latter (now under Hill) amounted to abont
9,000 bayonets and Ilearly 4-,000 sabres, This detachment
having four cavalry brigades (five British and four Portuguese
regiments) was able to •cont:J.in' its nOl'mal ach'crsary in Estrc~
llludura, DI'ouet's 9th Corps, which had about the same number
of cavalry and two or three thousand more infantry. Hill'"
regular task was to cover Elvas and to keep Dronet in check,
without committing himself to any large offensi\'e operatioll",
for which his force was manifestly inadequate.
But the Anglo-Pol'tnguese northern corps, 01' main army, 'rRS
now far stronger than it had ever been before, amounting to
I See p. 43,~.
t To go into details, the Ist Division not only ga\'e over Hownnl's
hrigade (50tll, 71st, 92n(1) to Hill, bllt sent liOme tIle 7th Line hattalion
of the K.G,L., whose rauk and tile were drafted into the three senior Line
battalions of tJlat corps. From the 2nd Division the 2/2Bth, 29t11, 2/3.'h]l,
2/4Bth went home, and the 1/4Bth was transferred to the 4th Division:
but the 1/2Bth and l/39th came out to Portugal and joined. 'ne
3rd Division got one Ilew LattaliOIl (77th) ill Julr. In the 4th Division
the l/ith and 2/7t1l were amalgamated, but the number of battalions was
kellt as l.efore by tile lrunsference of tllC 1/48th from the 2nd Di\,;;sioll.
The 6th Division got one ne\\' unit, the 2/32nd. The 7th Division took
Ol'er Alten's K.G.T~, ligl,t 1~\ltuliollsJ and recei\'(,'d liH~ (iSUI, lmt seut
home the 85th, after it had been only seven months in the Peuinsula,
Wellington rcfll.~cd to kl'CII thiq regimcnt, whieh Oil its return to England
went through a ~eries of court-martiaI5, testifring to grl\\'e interual flIHll~,
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some 46,000 men, including 5,000 cavalry. It no\\' became 101' the
first time decidedly snperior in numbers to its special opponent,
the French Army of Portngal, which even after receiving its
drafts and conmlescenb in the Autumn did not Amount to quite
40,000 men, and was very weak in cavalry, of which it did not
possess morc than 3,000. Clearly, then, for the futmc Mnrll10nt
could not possihly tttke the oftensi"e ngain;;t Wellington with
his own forces, Il1Id would have to depend for help on the Army
of the North, if matters came to a crisis. He would be lucky if
he were able to <contain' the Allglo-rortuguese, nnd certainly
cOlud not think of doing more, nnless he were able to get prompt
reinforcements fl'Om Bessieres-or, after that i\farshal'8departure,
from his successor, Dorscnne. Indeed, the Army of Portugal 11'11$
so clearly inadequate to dischnrge the function of protecting the
whole Spanish frontier from the Glladiana to the .Douro, t1mt
tJIC Empe''OI', though in October he once more propo8e(j to
l\farmollt an in\'ll.siun of Portugal, was ultimately forced to
makc over to it 16,000 men from the Army of the North, the
rlivisions of Sollham and llo!lllet 1, Bnt of this more in its own
place. It mllst suffice here to sa)' that the net results of tlle
spring and summer cilUlpaigns of 1811 was to leave the French
decidedly on the defcnsil'c all along the Portuguese border, and
to transfer to "Vellington the opportunity of tr,ying the oftEmsive,
It was to be fil'e months, however, before he succeeded in taking
it up-his ilutUUlIl operutiolls of ISH were telltnth'e, ami led lu
!l0 definite results. }~rom .Iuly to December there was lllt1t:h
manreu\Ting, but little change came of it.
I This was done by ll1l lm~rial decree issued on December 13th through
Hertllier.
SECTION XXVll: CHAPTER III
}WEl\'"TS 1:\' TIlE NOHTII OF SPAIN DUHIN(i TIH~ COKCEJI,'~
TllATJO~ ON 'rilE CAY/I. JCl\I'~AUGUST 1811
IT is often forgotten by English writeI'll that while the armies
of W'cllillgloll, Soult, and MllrlllQul fuct..(l each other lIeur
Badajoz in JUlle-July 1811, only ill the cnd to depart ill
difJerent directions without a battle, there was a second and
minor crisis going on ill the north, which had important couse·
fjUCIlCCS. Wellington had designedly brought it about, because
without it the French would have hru:lmuch lar~,"er forces dispos-
able-for action against Porluhral, and might have given much
trouble by demonstrating against the Beira frontier.
When l\larmont and Sir Brent Spencer, moving in parallel
cOltUllllS, trallSferred thcmsclVel> ill ten days from the bank!; of the
Agucda and the 'formes to those of' the Gundinna, the north·
casterJl angle of' })ortugal was almost stripped of troops. There
rCl1Iailll.:d only the militill divisiolls of Silveiru 1 north of the
I)ouro, in the province of Tras-os-Montes, and of \Vilsoll and
Traut south of the })ouro, in front of GUIl.I'da aud Ce1orico.
The whole did nut !ll1l01lUt to U!,OOO mClI, of infcriOL' CJuality.
Fortullately the French Army of' ]'ortngal had gone southward ell
IIUI8IJe. MurlllOllt had left nothing behind him Sllve the garrisoll
uf Cilldud Rodrigo and tl great depOt ofcon \'alescents, dismouuted
th'agoons, and other odds and ends, at Salamanca. From them
there was nothing to be feared.
Hnt behind Salamanca lay Bessiel'eS'S Army of the NOlth. The
Duke of Istria had, very unwillinglYipled&"Cd himself to Marmollt
to take over the supcrvisioll of the frontiers of Leon, when the
Army of Portugal marched for Badajm:. He had declared,
when asked for help ill Ma)', that he had not a JUan to spare
1 SiI\'eirn had only one infantry rcgimcnl of regulars (no. 24) and two
equlUirons of regular dragoons, as also two butteries of old artillery.
Wil;;oll hud oue squadroll of regular dragoolls.
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ufter pro\·iding for thc duty already incumbent 011 him of hold.
ing down all Old Castile, Asturias, and Santandel'. As the
Emperor kept asslll'ing him, by angry dispatches from J>aris,
this was an exaggeration I. It was in his power to collect a small
field llrmy of 12,000 or 15,000 mcn, wilhout giving up llllY
cssclllilll point in his e."i:tcllsivc sphcrc of operations; and in July
he did so, much against his inclination, and sum~red no harm by
so doing. If such a force had been set to threatcn llortherJl
Portugal dlll'ing the concentration Oil the Cayn, 'Vellingloll
would hltvc felt lIlost 11IlCOlll.fortt~blc. But occupation \\'tlS foulld
for llessieres from anothcr quarter, and this was part of the
British <."Olllmander's general scheme for the defence of the
l'eninsula. 'Vith the consent of General Castafios, :>ince lle
could only SUgj:,TCst und not cOllllllaml !lny ovcmtiolls l.o be
undertaken by Spanish troops, 'Vellington had provided for flU
attack on the flank of Bessieres by a force of whieh we have
heard nothing for many months-the Army of G-alicia~. If
lhreatencd on the Esla and the Orbigo, Bessieres would be ablt:
lo spare no attention for the Agucda.
At this time the Army of' the North was not so strong: ill
HUlllber:> a,; it became a few weeks later, when Napoloon's
'uivisions of Reserve' began to cross the Pyrcllee8. III JUIlt:
Hnl it consisted of only four infantry divisions, those of
Generals Bonllct, Serras, Roguet, and DUllloustier, and of two
brigades of cavalry undcr 'Vathier 11IlU Lcpic. llOllllct':> divi-
sion had becn holding the central region of the Asturias Ullt! the
city of' Ovieuo since it had conque."ed them in January HnO.
III additioll it had occupied a striug of ports frolll Gijon lo
SutltlUlclcr, in OI"UCl" lo h..'ep 011' the English cruisers from thcir
cOllllllunicatioll with the guerrilleros ot' the Ol.lltaurilUl hills.
BOllnct had u. strong force, four full regiments of illlanll"y,
lllUking 8,000 llICIJ, yet could Ilever complete lhe conquest oftht:
A:,;tmia:>. Wherever he struck wilh n strong fon-c he could
I :see espl.'4.:ially .llerthier to Hcssicres, of :\lay HI, fronl Uamool1illet.
, Sce csllcdally ,rellington to General Walkcr (Hritisl. attlldu: with
lhc .'\.rJllY of GaUda), l>i8patchtlJ, vii. p. I)·m, where the siege of Astorgt<
amlllic trouloling of UOllllet ill Asturias are t}le operations recOllunemleo.l.
lAisl.ai'tos Will> still titular Cllpl.aill-Gcllcral ill Galicia ll>; wdl as ill l-:Stre-
ll\adura.
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pcnetrale, but an)' mo\'c far from his basc at Oviedo brougbt
clOWll the enemy UPOll some of his isolated posts, which he had
then to rescue by a swift return. His enemies were on the left
htlud the relics of the old Spanish ArlllY of Asturias, now under
General Losada, who hung about the mountains on the Galician
frontier-oil the l'ight the great partisan chiefs Pot'lier and
Lollga, whose beat was in the sierras above Salltundcr,
On the left of BOllnet la)' Hessieres's second division, that of
SemiS, which had originally been assigned to the Army of
Portugul in 1810, but had remained behind to wntch the Guli-
dun Spaniards. Its head quarters were at Bellll.Vente; it held
A.storga as all udvtl1H:ed post, and Leon as a flank-guard. From
thc latter place it communicated with BOllllet through the puss
of Ijajares. This was an enormOIlS front for a di\'ision of 6,000
men to occupy, and tlmt, too, one not composed of picked troops,
but of miscellancous units. For Scrrns had two ltitlitUl regi-
ments (3~nd Leger, 113th Line 1) and two Polish and two SwiM;
battalions, so that much the larger half of his men were auxiliary
troops und lIot native French.
On the other hand, there was nothing left to be desired ill the
Lwo divisions of Rogue! and DUlllouslier, which held the central
position in lIessicrcs's cantonments: they were all troops of' the
Young Guard, eleven regiments of t'irailleul"s, c!lllsscw',I" and
vvltigcllrs; attached to them were three composite regilllcllts of
guard cuml!"y and tl proportion of artillery-thc whole made
up of 15,000 men of the best quality. DUlIlollstier's divisioll
w~ caulolled withiu the produces of Vulludolid aUt.! Pulcllciu,
Hoguet's within t1l1lt of Burgos. 011 the south they had llO
enemies save the bruerrilleros of the Guadaruma and the Avila
uud Soriu sierms, tiresolllc and elusive but 1I0t formidable foes.
On the north, in the Liebafia and the umtabl'ian hills, Longu
und l'orl.ier were mllch more troublesome amI dallf:,'·cl'ous. Their
bauds werc wcll armed, und organized 011 the prilleiples of u
fCI:,"lllllr army, yet had not lost thc power of rapid lllO\'CUlcut
which was the true strellgth of the pa1't'ida system. The sierras
in which the~' opemled were, including their foot-hills, some tifty
I The 113t11 were a lIew TUseall regiment, raisetl ill 1809, which hau
heel! }Iractieally destroyed ill Catalouia, amI scut home lo recruit. Thtl
3~lLtl LCger was Geuoese.
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mil~ bl'OllU. a c1mo~ of pusses alld l'ft,villes. Couutlcss expedi-
tions against them had led to no final result. Like the holy
men of old, when perseCllted in onc region they merely fled to
another. If the flying columns and petty garrisons were with-
drawn for a moment, they would be at the gates of Burg<ni or
&mtundcr within two days, lIlIel the high-ronds llurgos-ViUoria
and llurgos-Vnlladolid. the main arteries of communication wit11
France, would be cut.
There was soon to 00 a tifth division in Be~sieres'sartl1)', but it
had 1I0t yet arrived from France-that of Souhall I, which formed
(ulong with the divisions of Cuflurclli and Ucillc) the great rein·
forcemellt poured by Napoleon into northern Spaiu during the late
sumlller of 1811. But in June it was only beginllhlg to march
up from Marseilles, Turin, llnd Spezia, the distant garrisons
frum which it was to be drawn 1, Before it arrived ill Spnin
llessicres had ceased to command the AImy of the North, llnd
DOl'senne had taken his place. Hence (though 'Wellington was
not aware of thc fad) the months of Juue aud July were excep-
tionally favourable for a move agnim,t the Frcnch flunk in this
directiou.
III addition to his four infantry divisions, Bcssicl'CS po~sessed
,"Vathier's brigade of light cavalry, alld Lepic's brigade of guard
clwalry, together with somc lI11brigllClcd ullits such as tbc 13mh
of the Line (the fixed garlisoll of Sll.ntander) 2, the battalion of
Neuch.ltel, which he ha.d Illol"ed forward to Salama.nca, a lIUlllbcr
of squaJrolls of ge1l4aT'lJlCII, Ilnd Il qmllltity of dnd'ts for the
Armies of l J mtugal alld the Centre, which had becn stopped Oil
their way south in 11. surreptitious fashion, by various post-
COllllm\lldcrs who wanted to strengthen their depleted detueh-
ments. III the autullllll\lllrlllOllt succeeded ill extmctillg lIO less
than 4,000 of his own meu from the territories of the Army of
the North, Hot without much frictiou with the locII! officers whu
wished to detuin them a.
I For details of its movements see Kapoleou's OorNJJI/Jf.mdlIllCe, 11,i!J..J,
,11I1Ie8tll, Hlll.
'I This wai! a newly created regiment, formed Ollt of a uumber of pro-
visional battalions, whie11 lmd been doillg ganisoll duty in Biscay for the
last year.
, Bessiel'cs grossly underrated his own force in a letter to Berthier of
June 6th, in which he stated the whole at only 44,000 men.
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The whole force between the borl1er~ of ~ltvA.l'l'e and th()f;C of
Portugnl wa.<; in .Tunc and July not less Hum 60,000 men, even
Wore the three divisions of Souham, Reille, and Ca{farelli camc
lip from :Fl'ance. On the other hand, they had an enormous nrea
to keep down, not less than a fifth of the whole surface of Spain.
Ami if their regular encmies,lhe Armies of Galicia and Asturias,
were weak, the)' had nmollg the irregll1nrs opposed to them the
boldest and the most obstinate of all the gllerL'illero chier..~. Any
seriolls move against a section of Bessihl's's long line would caUSe
di~tnrb(ll1ce over the whole of his viceroya.lty, since to collect
a serious force he would hare to cut down the garrisons of many
localitics below danger-point.
It WlIS on this fact thnt Wellington reli(~d when he obtnined
Castaflos's leave to set the Spanish Arm)' of Galicia iu motion.
It WiIS fortunately lcd at this moment by an active and enter-
prising chief, Sa.ntocildes, the hero of the defence of Astorga in
1810, who lent himself eagerly to the plan, though his army
was 110t in good order. The cadres left behind in the north,
when del l'arque moved into Eslremadul'fl. in the winter of
1809-10, were the worst and weakest of the old Arm)' of
Galicia, anll though they hud been (illed up with lucal I'(~crtlits,
till the whole force had n nominal strength of 21,000 men, the
organization was bad, and the want of well·trained and capable
regimental officers vcry noticcable. The Junta of Galicia had
spent more enel'gy in 1810 on quarrels with the Captain-Gen~
eral i\iahy than on the equipment of its army. Its weakest
point was that it possessed only 600 regular camlry-a defect
that Illust be fatal if it left the mountains to descend into the
plains of LcUll. It was for this rellson that lVellington advised
SlIlItoeildes to form the siege of Astorga, to harass Bonnet in
the Asturias, hilt not to quit the skirts of the friendly sierrll.~.
On taking over charge of the wholc kingdom of Leon fmlll
jlrArmont, Hes~ieres came to the conclusion that he mnst drAW
in troops towards the south, lest he should be caught in a posi-
tion in which he had no disposublc centml mass towards the
Doul'O. Consequently on the 6th of'June he sent orders to Bonnet
to eWlcllate the Asturias and fall back by the pass of l)ajllres to
l.eon, in order to place himself in closcl' touch with Sel'l'as. 1 011
1 See llcssii:res to Berthicr of .JlIllC flt11, from V"llru1olid.
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t.he 14th. therefore, Bonnet left Odedo and came Mer the mOUll-
tains with three of his regiments, while tIle fou loth went eastward
parallel to the const, in the direction of Santander, picking up
in its retrent all the small garrisons which hnd been left. to
dominate the A~tllrian ports, and to prevent communication
between Longa and Porlier and the English cl'uiflers. By the
] 7th Bonnet lay at LeOll with 6,000 men: he was just in time
to support the scattered front line formed by Serras's division
against the attack which 'VcllillgtOIl had planned. For Santo-
cildcs and the Army of Galicia had advllllced against Astorgn,
quite without his knowledge, two dnys before he marched south
from Oviedo.
The disposable force ofthe Spaniards consisteil,aftertheweakest
and least serviceable regiments had been told off for garrison
duty at Corullna, Ferrol, Vigo, and other fortified places, of about
15,000 mell. Santocildes brought his reservc from Lugo and
the division of Generul '1'aboadn, nearly 7,000 men and 600 horse,
to Villafmnca in the Vierw, from which hc advanced down thc
pAsses to Astorga 011 June 12th. A SecOllcl division of !l,500
men uuder General Cabrera came forward at the same time from
Puebla de sj1Iabria, as far as the edge of the mountains n!.JoI"c
the Ilia 'l\lerto, and demonstrated against La llnnezn, the half-
way post between Astorga and Benavente. The left wing, corn·
posed of Losada's Asturians, 'I'M wanting: it had followed Bonnet
when he began to retreat and had occupied Oviedo. Losada
remained therc himself, but sent Due brigade to join the main
army by a circuitous route \ since the direct way by the pass of
Plljares a.nrl I.eau was blocked hy Bonnet. This brigade under
Castafion did not get to the front till J line 23rd.
On the 19th of J Wle Santocildes found Astorgtl evucuated:
the small garrison of 400 men had blown up part of the city
walls, and absconded on that same morning. They fell back on
Bonnet at Uon. Meanwhile ScrrD.S sblrtcd to march northwanl
from 13enaxente with 2,000 men, to 'contain' Santocildes., while
BOIIIlet sent forward two I"e{,,-.iments under his brigadier, Valle·
tnux, to assist Serrus. But their forecs Ile\'er met: the column
I I cannot discover which of the passes west (If Pajnres C:l.Otaii(l]\ Il~.
·nle}· are all llifficult.
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from Bcmwcntc got engagetl with Cahrera'f; dh'i~ion near l..a
BRIlC'1.1l, and could not push flll'ther fOl'\l'ard. Thnt from Lcon
found most of Taboada's dh,jsion placed acr08S it" path near
Bene.vides. behind the river Orbigo. nine miles in frOllt of As-
t,orgtt (.Junc ~3). Valletaux, despising his enemy, cmssec:l the
fltream find attncked, though the balance of Ilmnbel'il WAS
Rgainst him, ''Vhen the engagement had heEn for some hOIll~ ill
PI'OgresS, Castailon, with the brigade just arriving from Astlll'ias,
came down on his.flank. The French were beaten: Vlllleblllx
fell, and his brigade lost over 300 men I in the combat. which
the Spaniards name from the ,'illage of Cogordel'os and the
French from that of Quintnnilla de Vallc. The defeated force
fell back beyond the Orbigo, and was succoured by D01lllet, with
the rest of his troops from Lean. Meanwhile Serras retired
towurds Bcnavcnte, and called loudly for help to his chief,
Bessierefl.
Santocildes, seeing that Cabrera had now nothing in front of
hilllat La Baneza, called up his division to Astorga, and wliting
it with the troops of 'l'aboada. and Castaflon marched against
Bonnet on July 2nd. The French general, after trying to
defend for some time the bridge of the Orbigo, found h.imself
SO outnumbered that he must retreat towards Leon. Uut before
he had been driven bflck so far, first Serras from Benavente, and
then BessiCrcs himself, with DUllloustier's division from Vallu-
dolid, came up to join him. The .French, now 13,000 strong,
"dvanced to seek a general action (July 18). Santocildes.
showing great prndellt.'C, refused to light in the pJaill, hllStily
abandoned Astorga und the banks of the Orbigo, smd withdrew
into the mountains south-west of Astorga, where he took post
at'l'oricllzo. The enemy did 1I0t pursue,lmu only tL purty of
light cayalry entered Astorga, which it abandonoo next day.
For Bessih-es Imd received intelligence that his head quarters at
Vallndolid, which was almost ungarrisoncd ill the absence of
Dumoustier's division, had been attacked by the por~idasof the
southcru sierras (July 15). At the same time General Dorscnne
1 The brigatle(IHlthJ 122ml Line) lost fourteen ofliccr.~ on June 2Jrd,
which would argue tot.'ll casualties of about 300 at tile usual rate. Rut
the Spaniard!! sny tllllt lhey took mallY prisoucril au,l give thl' tn!;,}
Frencll IOM at 450.
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reported from Burgos that Mina had crossed into hill go,'ernmenf.
deserting his more usual haunts in Navarre, und had united with
Ilmgn and PorUer. They had a large force and had cut the
communications with Santander. Ou rctuming to Vallll.Oolid
\\"ith the Guard division, Bessieres found waiting there on
Jnly 25 his letters of recall to Paris, The Emperor had
deposed him, partly in eonsequence of complaints as to his
illtructability nmdc by King Jbseph, partly beeausc he was
dissatisfied at the hopeless tone of his dispatches, in which (to
his ma.;,ter's discontent) he kept setting forth the thesis that the
war in Spain was being conducted on a wrong system, and that
the Army of the North was helpless 1, His post wag. given to
Gencral Dorsenne, a lllall of inferior ability, though hi~ opem-
tions pro\'e hilllllot to ha"c been such a conceited imbecile as his
jealous subOl'dinate Thieballlt alleges 2. Indeed, his record in the
north compares not unfavourably with thatofBessier~ and he WIlS
decidedly more ready to aid his neighbours than the Duke of
Istria-which was the main thing necessary among French
generals in Spain.
On the depll.rture of Bessieres for VaJla.dolid, his subordinates
Bonnet and Serras had halted behind the Orbigo, holding La
Ba'ile7,a as their advancM point. Santoeildes, who showed as
much enterprise as prudence during his short tcnure of com-
mand, learning that there were now only 6,000 or 7,000 men in
front of him, came down again from his mountains on Jllly £8th
with all his three divisions, ami advanced against them: they
were forced, after some slight 'skirmishing, to abandon III
BaJ'1e7,a and the line of the Orbigo, and to fall hack on Leon,
Santocildes advanced to the Esla, and roving detal:hments sent
ont from his front pushed fOl'\mrd as far illto Old Castile I"lSSahll-
gUll and })alencia, The lJartida$ got possession of the whole
country-side, and the French !:.rarrisons of Zsmora, Toro, Bena-
vente, and Salamanca were completely cut off frum their
communication with ])orsenne's hend Cjuurtel's at Vnlludolid.
I See especially his disp.'\tch to Bertltier of J Hne 0 : (On filit illl1~ioll
lll''''~lllperellr-toutle Illolllle eOlll1nit le mode videux de nos operation.,
&c:-it is most free-spoken.
s For '11liehunlt'lI clmracwr of DOI'!\CIllle !'cc his M~moireil \'01. iv,
pp, 401_2.
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There was equal trouble ill the proyincesofBurgosand Santander,
wherc Longa and Porlier long held O<.'Cupied the Guard division
of Genel'al Roguet, evading him when necessary, and always
retuming to give trouble when he had passed by.
Unfortunately for the Spaniards, Santocildes was at thi~
"moment superseded by General Abadia, whom Castniios had sent
to take general command of the' 6th Army'. He was ill every
way inferior to his juuior and predecessor, lJeing neither so alert
nor so cautions, and having a Cl'a7.e for lUlIle,,:essary innovatiull
in matters of detail, which might have been harmless in time of
peacc, but was vcxatious whcn carried out during a campaign.
Wellington had at first collceived great expectatiolls from his
intelligence l, but SOOll became entirely disappointed with him.
Just before Abadia replaced Santocildes, the position of
Dorselllle was wonderfully imprO\"ed by the arrival on the Ebro
of thc division of SOulUl.lll, 7,000 strong, which had bccu pro-
llJisetl to him in June, aud had beeulllarching up from Mtlrseill~
for five weeks. The conulIander of the Army of the North at
UllCC turm",J. UI"er the province of BUl'gos to Souham. and 1Il0\'t..u
forwllxd from it the greater part of the Guard divisioll of
Huguet, which thus became free for operations in the open fie1<.l.
Cllfliu-clli's alld Hcille's divisions were uow also present iu Biscay
and Nl1vUJ're, so that the a\'ailable strength ot' the l<\-ench ill
northern Spain was higher than it had been since the summer of
1810, llud DOl'senne thought tlmt his rear was adequately
covered. He therefore marched with the two divisions of the
Young Guard and his two cavalry brigades, to link his opera-
tions"with those of Bonnet on the Esla. Dorsclllle started frolll
Vallndolid 011 August 9th, marching in two columns, Dumoustier'l)
division by Mayorga and Valencia de Don .Tuall, Uoguet'6 by
Villalpalldo and Benavente, so as to converge 011 La Bancza.
BOJlllct, strengthened by some reinfon:emcnts, ud'"tlnccd ut the
same time from Leon against the bridges of the Orbi1:,1'Q aud
Astorga, and Dorsenne, with a small reserve, followed by the
rood Vlllladolid-Vllldcl1l.S. It was evidently intcnded that
Hoguet's division should turn the Spanish right, and drive the
I See Di6J1tlwhes. I'ii.p. 648, for all accouut of Al.Iadia's good illlclIliolLS.
allll. I'iii. 11.128, for Wellingtou's disaPllOiulmcul at thdr lIou-fulfilmcnt.
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whole lu'my northward, alld away from Galicill, while it Irll.S
attacked in front by Bonnet and Dumoustier.
Fortunately for his army. which was now about to he attacked
by nearly 30,000 mell,Abadia listened to the advice ofSantocildes,
and withdrew hastily to the hills when, on August 17th, his oul-
posts were attacked. Cabrern's division retired on its old posl
of l'uebla de ~{,abria, and got into communication with
5il\"eh'a's Portuguese, who had come up to Dragallr.a. CastafiOll
UBi! the Collde de Belveder 1 (who had just relieved 1.'aOOada ill
cOlllllland of the 2nd Division) were drawll back lo the tll'l)
passes above l·\.swrga, those of ':\!anzt\nal and ]?uencebadon.
Dorsenne, dividing his troops, attacked both, and carried thel1J~
not without severe fighting, OIl July ~7th. The Spanish detach-
mellt ill the MllllzlInal puss W!lS bl\dly cut up: that befure
Fucncebudon suflcred less. 'I'he Frcnch lost Gcncral Corsin.
lJehind the passes there are two lilies of retreat into Gnlicin, the
llorthern and more ob"ious is the gl'eat cll(lII,Mee to Conlllllil,
da Villafranca and Lugo, which Sir John l\1oorc folloll'cd ill
Jllllullry IS0n. Tbe ~outhcrJl und lIIorc ruggl..'l.l is that by
l'onferrada, JJolllingo }"lol'es, alld the Vnl de Oncs to Orcll~,
which I.a U01l1a1)a took ill that sa\1lc hi~tol'ic l'etrellt. 'fhi,
lasll'Oad was now chosen by Aballill., for two reason:s: the first
WllS Uml by tukillg it he plucl..'<.! himsclf llpOll the flank of
Dorscllne's advance ngaiust the heart of Galicia, nlJd forced the
enemy either to turn against him, and follow him into IL l'elllote
and desolate (;ountry. or (if he pressed on) to expose his COIll-
JIlunication with Astorga and Leon. The second reason I,'/IS
tlmt he knew that DOr8Clllle had comc lightly equipped, intend-
ing rather to dri\"e his army out of the Astorga regiol1 than to
conquer the whole province of Galicia; the l~rellch would not,
therefore, be !lblc to fced 011 the desolate routc bctwccu))ollfermt!n
and Orcllsc. find would probably tmn back, content with having
cleared the plain~ of 1.e011.
Thi:; argument IVl\:; correct. ])orselllle wellt 110 further Oil the
great dwussf:c lhllu ViIlafhulCu, whieh he :;ackcd 011 August
29th, and then turned 011 his heel, refusing to press deeper into
Galicia, or to pursue Abadia's 111'111)". He llIarched back tu
1 Uur old llctJuuiurnucc of Gil1l1011U!II11d 'I'''IlULltles.
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Astorga 011 the 30th-31st, burning every village of the Vierzo
on his way, and desC€llcled into the plains of Leon. Abadia
followed cautiously, l'eoccupied Villafranca and POllCerrada, and
pushed his out posts forwtll'd ag'tin to the edge of the mountains.
I t was found that the i,'rench were repairing Astorga, which they
once more garrisoned, and held as un outpost till the next year.
The ground occupied by the Army of Galicia W!\S exactly the
same Oil the 10th of September as it had been on the 10th of
June, san:! that all Astmias was still clear of illvade~. It was
lIot till the late autumn that DOllnet once lllore made his
appearance in that oft-iuvaded province.
The reasons of Dorsenue's sudden retreat from the borders of
Galicia wcre llIany and various. It Ulust not be supposed that
his expedition had been taken in hand with the object of con-
qucriug that pro\'illcc, fui Napier seems to sughrest 1. Such u task
would have required mllch longer preparation than he had been
able to make: he had neither collected the stores and munitions
thut would havc bccn required for so great an cnterprise, nor
made the llecessl\ry dispositions for the protection of the \'Ilst
space behind him. ,""hen he marched against Abadia, he left
Bothing between the Ebm and the border of Portugal Sll.\'C
Souham's newly arrived division and a few of Serras's b..'l.ttalions
:scattered in slllall garrisollS at Leon, Bcna\'ente, Valllldolid, &c.
His movement of udvance hud been Illude to chase the Army of
Galieia Ollt of the plaiBs, where it had beell showing itself so
persi.stelltly since June, and to rclic\'c the pre.ssul'c which it hud
brought upon 1I011net and Serrns. There was no purpose of
conquest underlying his march, only a desire to scour the valleys
of the Ol'bigo and the EsJa of tiresome intl·uderll. The
Spallillrds were Wholly mistaken ill supposing that he retiroo
frOlll Vi11afmllca because Ahadia had shown a disposition to
make a 101lg resistance, or because the J untn had called out the
ilIaI'll/as, or general {eVl¥: en 1//(lsse of the province, raised on the
principle of the Portuguese Ol'dellan~R. He could have gOlle
on 'further if that Jllld been his illtentioll~but he had 110 sueh
desire.
I 't..;alicia was helpless, ami UorSCllllC would have taken COl'uila allll
Ferrol if the arr;I,,,1 of Wellington Oil tho C<m had Hot "brmcu him,' ;ii.
11, 330, This sutemeut shows a misconceptioll of the situation.
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.Kot only were his munitions exhausted, but all the news
behind him was unsatisfactory. Though the reinforcements
from France had arri\'ed on the Ebra, Old Castile was ill the
most disturbed condition. There had been a notable disaster at
Santander 011 August 14th-15th, when Podicr, by a sudden cou-
centratioll, had stormed the town, dispersing General Rouget's I
garrison, und had then swept away most of the minor po~b;
Rl'Ound it; only '1'ol'I'claxegll had succeeded in beatillg oft' his
fiSSilult. But when reinforcements came flocking in, the Spaniards
had retired to the hills with gOO prisoners, and were threatening
other points. The gates of Palencia and Valladolid had been
iusulted by pa1"thlas, who showed themselves buldly in sight of
the walls, and established a loose blockade, which could only be
pierced by the moyement of considerable colullll1s. Dut the
most pressing point was Ciudad llodrigo: Juliun Sanchez lllld
cut its communicatiollS with Salamanca, and had defeated slllall
bodies of 300 or 400 mell which had beell seut tu l'Copen them.
A much larger force had to be detailed to throw proYisiolls into
the place in July, but by the end of August stores wefC IIgain
rullning low, and General lleynaud, the governor, whenever he
could pllSS an emissary through the lilies of the parfoidas, kept
\
n~killg for help of all kimh!.
Dut since ])orsenlle started for his expedition against Astorg1l,
the problem of getting food into llodrigo had been complicated
by the appearance of Wellington's army Oil the Coo. and tile
Agueda. On August 12th the head quarten of the Anglo-
Portuguese army had been moved up from the south to I·'uenlc
Gllillaldo, ill the imme<liate neighbourhood of the blockaded
fortress, and already on August 8th the garrison had detected
British outposts-from the Light Division-in their immediate
Ileighbourhood. Now, since Mnrlllont and the Army of }>ol'tuglll
were still in the \-alle>' of the 'J'aglls, and all Leon was still ill
the charge of the Arm)' of the North, Dorsellue found himself
responsible for the re\'ictualliug, indl-'ed for the relief from
blockade, of a fortress which might be beset by 40,000 mell. IL
was absolutely necesSi\ry for him to return from the ooCSCr of
1 This genf:ral is llot to be couCused with Hoguet, the Guard COlU-
malJ(lcr, tllougl, they werc opcrating ill regions close to e;1C1, otl,cr, aud
often get mi:l:ed iu contemporary llarr.ltires.
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Gnliciu, and to concert matters with )1armont for U COllllllUll
mo\'ement against "Vellington. 1-'01' the field force of the Arm)'
of the North, which had just driven Abuditl into the hills, wus
not ovcr 28,000 strong, and obviously could lIot succour Rodrigo
by its own unaided strellhl'f;h.
Returning to Valladolid earl)' in September, with the two
Guard divisions, und lenviug Bonnct Ol\(,~ morc to obser\'c the
Galiciaus, ))orsenne opelled pOIt1]JMlers with Marmont 101'
a general concentration uhraillst 'Vellington, Of this efl-ort wc
lllllst speak ill its due placc.
Meanwhile matters settled down in the northern field of opera·
tions. Bonnet was too weak to lllon~, or to think of reoccupy-
iug his old post in tile Asturias. Abadia's arlllY WllS much
reduced in llI11llbers, both by privations and by desertion: the
IHst days of the late campaign, spent in the desolalc \'n.l de
Ones, had been pllrticulnrl)' trying to the hoops. All English
observer who saw them at l'onfel1'ada described them 1IS 'in
even worse l"Ouditioll than might be expected-half the soldiers
without trousers, and wcariug only capotes-while the clothing of'
tile rest shows great need for improvement. They lire a fine
lxx1y uf mell, standing well, though deeply lIlarked by prhatioll,
and llS badly tmincd as equipped. The best corps call ollly
mallreUl're singly, not attempting movements of the line; the
Toledo battalion broke down ill attempting to change front m
It:llCWn. The cavalry are on a level with the infantry, move
with wide gaps between squadroIlS, and callnot go accurately
through the sword exercise. The horses might each be a Uosi·
lluntc-the artillery as badly manued llS horsed 1.' '1'he numbers
were tcnibly low: it was doubtful whether the whole field fort'C
could produce 10,000 men, and they had !ltarted Oil tht! JUIlt!
ctlmpaigll wilb 15,000.
Dilapidated, however, as the Army of Galicia might be at the
cud of itll operations, it had done well, having kept the French
Army .of the North 'contained' for thc nuUlY weeks during
which \Vellillgton was absent 011 the GHHdiann. Hcssiercs and
Dorsenne had accomplished nothing positive during that time;
and the territory held dowll by the invaders in September
I .From the MmlQirlf of Sir llward 1)Q!lgU.llf, British corumissiouer with
Akuliu's army, PI'. ] 22--3,
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was less than it had been in June by the whole extent of the
Asturias. It is ahsurd of Napier to state that' Galicia with its
lordl), Junta, its regular army, fortHied towns, numerous popula.
tion, and constant supplies from England, had less weight in the
contesLthan the 5,000 Portuguese militia conducted by Trant
and VVilson I" The province, so far from being of no weight
ill the contest, did Wellinf,rtoll most useful serviee. 'rite two
divcrsions carried out by Salltocildes, which twice compelled the
Army of the North to mass all its available field troops on thll
Orbigo, were operations of the most profitable sort, and sine<!
the Galician always retired in time, led to no disasters of the
kind that too often happened when a Peninsular l,"Cucral W!l5
overdaring. But while paying his just due to Salltocildes, we
must praise evcn lIlore the unwcaricd activity of thc chiefs of the
Cantabria.n bands and the guerrilleros of Old Castile and Leon.
It was I.ollga and PorHer, and Julian Sanchez, who, with forces
that were never very great ill IHII1lbers, paralysed by their
ubi{luity and their unceasing enterprise the greater pHrt of
Hessiere>;'s and Dorsenne's troops. If the)' had not been in
exil'01;ellce, the Vrench might have found men enough to c.:Qllquet
Galicia, or to attack 1l0rth·cll8tern l'ortugal ill force. 'l'hi.
l\tIS truc throughollt the whole of ]810 Hnd 1811, alld \\'/lS n
govcl1ling fact ill the history of the reninsular War. Evell
though the Emperor pushed ao,ooo fresh infantry (the divisiolls
of SOUhlUll, Reille, and Caffal'elli) illto northern Spaill ill Jul)'
aml August 1811, he wus never able Lo make the eOUllllHllicutioll
between lla)'olllle and Madrid absolutely safe, or to caH any
region subdued which was 110t held down by a garrison alto·
gether out of pl"Oportioll to its populatioll.
1 1JMQJ'!} rif Ihe P/:lli,181.1li.H· IVllrJ iii. I'. 180.
SECTION XXVII: CHAFfER IV
SOULT'S TROUBLES 11\' ANDALl:SIA.•JUJ..Y-S.EI'TKMllEll 1811
A~'n;R his departure from the Gl1Iulinno. on .Juue 28th, Solllt
found himself plunged into a new series of troubles, which
were t.o continue all thl'Ough the summer lllld autulUll. Just
as he was about to set out for Seville with two cavalry
regiments as CSCOlt, following ill the wake of Godillot's and
Conroux's infantl'Y, he re<:ckcd the unwelcome news that
JJlnke, of whose mUl'ch he had been aware since the 24th, had
crossed the lower Guadiana Ileal' l\Ierlola all June 23 t, and had
ilJHldcd the Condado de Nicbla with nearly 12,000 men. IfBlakc
had struck straight at Seville there can be little doubt that he
would have taken it, for General Daricau, the gal'ernu!',
11H..~lctled, 011 the first !Jews of the approach of un enemy, to shut
himsclf lip ill the fortifit-od Cal'tUjl\ Coll\'ellt, with his ~catlt.r
garrison of cOll\'u,Ie;cclIts, drafts, Illld JUl'alllcll[ados, Hc had
Hut the least hope of maintaining the large and turbulent city
llllder cuutrol. But no onc appearL't1 to molest him, except :;oille
cUI'alry, who were eusily driven oil' by callnon~shot. Bluke,
apparently disliking to present himseJf in the open plllill of the
Guudalquivcr, had not marched Oil Seville, but sat dowll 011
June 30 to besiege the castle of Niebla, the capital of the region
which he had invaded. It was the ouly French garrison left ill
westem Andalusiu, und was held by a bullulioll of 600 •Swiss' in
Killg,Joscph's ser\'ice~n. miscellaneons corps formed of deserters
of nil rnces from the Spnuish and British armies, under a Colonel
Frit~hl\rdt. Blukc lay for five days before the mediaeval castlc
with the division of Zayas, while Ballastel'os, with the rest of the
army, too~ u position to cover him against F'rellch troops coming
1 His troops hau plundereu the Portuguese peasantry freely during
theit' ra!Jil1 lltal'cll, and actually came to skirmishing with the local
OrtlcU!1Wia, For anecdotes by an e)'e-IIitllcss, &;ltepe1cr, sec his Look, i.
p, 304.
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from Estremadnra, who (as was rightly suspected) were not
lOllg in appearing. The siege failed bocause Blake had brought
no artillery with him-oil account of the bad mountain roaUs
he hud scut his guns round from Mertolu by Ayamonte, lIud
they had not come up. An attempt to take the castle by
escalade failed, and the Sp..'\uish general was sitting helplessly
hefore its walls all July 2nd, when the news came that the
l"rench were upon him. Soult, hearing on his way southward of
Blake's raid, had turned both ConrOLL'i: and Godillot against the
innwers, und had continued his own route to Seville with no
llIorc than the cunJl'Y and Olle infantry regiment. While
Godinot marched on Nicbla by Cala and Ara~:el\a,Courollx tried
to cut in between lllakc and the sea by a circuitous route b)'
Fl'cgenal, through the worst of the mountains, aiming tlt the
porls of Hudm and Mogucl'. It \\'US hoped that thc Spauiunb
might be caught between the two divisions-but the quarry Il'as
too shy. Blake departed at the first alarm, 8.11d embarked at
Ayamonte with Zayas\ division; Ballasteros, marching away
illto the hills which he knew so well, cmdcd Conrollx, uml
pusscd for n time northward into thc Sierra de Aroche. The
Cllvalry lUlder Penne Villcmur did not abscond by water, but
returned along the Portuguese frontier to Estremadura, whel~
it joined the skeleton army of Castai'ios, which still consisted of
110 more than six or eight battalions under Morillo alld Carlos
de Espmia, some 3,000 or 4,000 men at most. \VeJlington had
sent it back to Villa Vi~osa during the operations around the
Caya, declining to use it ill the fighting-line till it sllOUld be
reorguuizcd. Bluke, whose cmlmrklltioll ut Ayamolltc 011
July 8th Imd been accompanied by cLrcmmtances of disgrm:eful
panic I, returned to Cadiz with 7,000 mCll. Ballasteros folluwed
him thither six weeks later, having descended from the hills and
cUll.Nu·ked at the mouth of the Guadiallu at the end of August.
Dlake's :\'iebla expedition had been eonductcd with the
greatest timidity and incompetence. Yet it had 6cl"\'cd WeUillg·
I 1"01" which fee ~chCIJClcl', 1',307. Oll a false alarm the trOOllS IJeb'lllJ
tu embark ou the t.rausporW withoutortlcrs, lIud ill greatdisarmy, Blake,
accordiug to Sdlcpeler, made a ridiculous spectacle of himself, by wadiug
<i lOllg way lhrougll slmllolV waler tu get out to II sllIallboat. There ""ere
liO French witJlin many miles,
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ton's purpose llluch as he had intended, since it drew ofI' 11,000
French troops int.o a remote corner of Andaltlsia for some weeks.
It is true that Soult's original withdrawal from the Guadiana
was not caused by this diversion, but it had forced him to scud
away on a wild-goose clll\Se troops urgently needed elsewhere.
For if Conroux and Godinot bad. not marched to Niebla and
AYllmonte, they would have gone straight to Granada, to rein-
force the 4th Corps, which Was, thronghont the month of ,July, in
considerable danger from the Mllrcians. It was not till August
had begun that Soult was able to come to its aid, with the
divisions which had been distracted to the far west by Blake'~
expedition.
Of Freire's Army of Murein we hnye heard nothing since the
unhappy rout of Thua (November 3, 1810). After that shock it
had kept quiet for m/\py !\ uay, Md only dared to move when,
in April 1811, Sonlt began to make heavy requisitions on the
4th Corps, in order to form the army that marched for Albuera.
Further drafts had been culled westward in the end of May, so
that Leml, who succeeded Sebastiani as commander of the corps
about this time, was left with llumbers quite inadequate to hold
down thc broad killgdoms of Jaen and Granada. This, ofcourse,
gave Freire the chance of accomplishing !>omething useful: and,
leaving the frontiers of Murcia, he began to press forward against
the French posts. He hurl ut this time a force of three iufuntry
divisions, tmder La Cuadra, Sanz, and Creagh, and two weak
cavalry dh·isions under Osorio and LadrOll. The whole
amounted, after making ueductiolls fUl' lhe garrison of Cnrttl.-
geM (fl,OOO men) to nearly ]~,OOO bn.yonet.<; and 1,500 sabres 1.
III :\1ay Fl'eire began to push forward cautiously, with his
cavalry and two divisions on the high-road Lorca-Daza-Granada,
find a !lmaller force, consisting of La Cuadl'a's division, on the
side road which leads, by Huescar and Pozoalcon, to the "alley
of the upper GuadoJquivir and the kingdom of Jaen. His pro-
gress was 50 slow that the French were able to withdraw at their
leisure before him, without any loss. Le"al was so weak that
lle made no attempt to stand, and evacuated in sllL'ccssion the
coast lands about Almeria, as far as Motril, the highlands cast
I Sec table of tJIC Army of Murein. (3rt! Army) on June 1st, in
Appendix XVII,
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of Granada, including the town;; of Bfl7.a and GlIfl.dix, 1l11d the
npper valley of the Gundalqllivir. La Cnadl'a's advanced posh
penetmted as far as Ubcda, and bickered with the gurl'isons or
Bae?.&, Linnres, and Jaen. Officers sent ont from the main
column raised the mountaineers of the Sierra Nevada, aml
bands of inslITb,>-ellh began to cut the communications between
Gnumdn nlld Mlllngn. At the head of these irregulars was the
t.tll'blllent Conde de Montijo, of whom we last hool"d when he got
into trouble for conspiring against the supreme JlllltA 1. He i;;
now found more llsefully employed, giving trouble to the enemy
instead of to his own Government.
CUlltious though Freirc had been, his udvallce hud shaken the
hold of the 4th Corps on eastern Andalusia. Leval reported to
Soult that, with the 3,000 or 4,000 troops whom he had con-
r.:cntruted at Granada, he wns quite helpless, and wns wcllnigh
blockaded on every sidc. It was only with difficulty that he
could keep in tonch with the l'oli!lh division, which lay in and
ahout l\Ialaga, or with the garrisons of Jaen and Cordoyaon tlle
other side. He could only collect a force sufficient to attack
Freire by abandoning all his outlyhlg posts, and permission
to do so had not been granted him. He must be reinforced, or
allowed to concentrate his scattered troops and strike at the
enemy's main body.
A few days later the state of affairs in eastern Andltlll~i1l.
became still more threatening. Blake, after embarking at
Ayamonte on July 8th, had two days later returned to Cadit.
with the two Albnera dh'isions of Zayas and Lnrdizabal. He
f;tayed onl)' a fortnight in the island city. and got looye fr011l
the Regency to join the Army of 3furcia. In order that he
might dispose of 1\11 the forces ill thl\t direction, he nsked tUld
obtained the control of the Valellcian army also. and WM made
Captain-General of that province M well af; of l\fnrcia and Am·
gull. Blake landed at Almeria on July 31st with the same troop'
that he had brought back from the west-about 7,000 foot amI
500 horse. From thence he led them to join Freire'f; army Ileilr
Bfl7.8, and left them there, while he himself(taking ZUYlIS llndsome
other officers ,dth him) made It hnst,Y visit to Valencia, to receil'e
I Sl'e \'01. iii. PI" .. :111(1 10~.
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ovel,the t:ommund from the :Marquis del Palacio" and to see
what mellSures were necessn.r.r with regard to the threatening
movement.<; of Suchet on the side of Aragoll.
The two di \·isions under Lardizabal and J oseph O'Donnell
(rice Zayas) had joined Freire on August Srd, and a force of
15,000 infantry and nearly 2,000 horse WllS thus concentrated
near llaza. But Freire, being now only the interim commander,
refused to take any responsibility, and remained apathetically
watching the small French force in Granada, which was (for the
moment) Ilbsolntcly at his mercy. Hc posted the army ill a
very strong position near Gal', twelvc miles in fmnt of HaUl. and
forty miles from Granada. It was covered in front by the ravine
of one of the tributaries of the GuardaJ river, and could only be
turned Oil the flank~ by It very wide movement in diOieult ground.
La Clladra's division remained at Pozoa!con, some thirty miles
away from the main body, observing the kingdom of Jaen and
vexing its garrisons by small incursions.
Soult had returned to Seville after the expulsion of Blake
from western Andalusia, but with no intention of staying there
for long, since it was clearly necessary to rlW!stablish the lo~t
prestige of the French arms on the side of Granada, and to
reoccupy the ground which Leml had been forced to gi\Oe up.
Hnt he hud judged that there was no desperate hurry, since Freire
had shown himself such a sluggish adversary: and though he had
already directed Godillot's provisional division to march on Jaeu
ill the last days of July, he himself was still at Seville when he
received the unexpected news of Blake's disembarkation at
Almeriu 011 the S1st of that month. Since the Army of Murcill.
was thus reinforced, the danger to Leva! at Granada had become
imminent, and it was clearly necessary to rescue him at once.
Accordingly the :Marshal, setting out from Seville Oll August Sed
with four regiments of Latour-Maubourg's cavalry and part
of Conroux's infantry division 2, arrived at GralHtda by forced
Illarches on the 7th. Gotlinot was at the SUIllC time directed to
l The MarlJuis had only taken over charge of Valencia from Charles
O'Donnell a fell' weeks before.
~ This provisional diloisioll of ~th Corps troops (see p. 445) had already
sent off somll of its ltatw.lioJls to joiu Victor herol'C Cadiz, since the units
belonged to the] 5t Corps.
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movc fl'Om Jltcn and Bae7.ll. against La Cuadrn, to drive him off
from l>o;o.oaleon, and then to fall upon the Rank and renl' of
Freire's stl'Ong position near Ba7A,
Nothing could have served Smut better than the chance that
the army against which he was marching was destitute for the
moment of its new Commalldcr~il1-Chief, and left in charge of n
substitutc who shirked rcsponsibility. From Augnst Srd, when
the Albnera di\'isions joined l"l'eiJ'e, down to the 7th, when the
reinforcemenb reached Granada, the small French force in that
city had been in a most dangerous position. But nothing what-
ever had happened during the critical days: the Spulliards had
remained quiescent behind the ravine of Gor. Picking up the
small part of the garrison of Granadn that could be spared to
join his field force, Soult marched against the enemy on the 8th
of August, and was in front of their position on the 9th, with
6,000 infantry and 1,500 horse. Seeing the enormous strength
of the ground, he contented himself with making noisy artil-
lery demonstrations against Freire's line, find waited for the
arrh'll.1 of Godinot, who with 4,000 bayonets and 600 sabres was
due to appear in the rear of the Murcians on the lOth, if all had
gone well with him.
As a matter of fact Godinot had marched against La Cundra
on the 7th from BaeUL, by the way of Jodar. The Spanish general,
who wa,l outnumbered, abandoned his post at Pozoalcon all the
8th and fell back towanls Huescar, nearer the fl'Olltier of Murein,
without fighting. Godillot, therefore, found nothing to prevent
him from falling on the rear of the main hostile force, and
marched on Ba7,A. His approach was reported to Freire, who
detached against him Joscph O'Donnell's division of 4,000 men,
and ordered La Clladra to hnst,en to its aid, and to join in ('over-
ing the flank of the' army. O'Dtmnell took post at the fords of
th~ Guardal river, in front of Zujnr, and stood on the defensil'e,
hoping to be joined by La Cuaru'a during the course of the day,
The latter, however, had gone off too faT to the east for it to be
possible for him to return ill time, and O'Donuell was badly
beaten by Godillot 011 the afternoon of the 9th, and lost a third
of his men-4~3 killed and wounded, and 1,000 dispersed or
prisoners.
By continuing his man::h fur another eight miles, llftel' beating
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Q'DOlll1cll, Goclinot might hnxe seized :llil?.I\ alld ellt off' Fl'cire
from his retreat Oil :Mureia. Dut his men were tired, and it was
reported to him that a new Spanish force-La Cuadra, coming
up over lute in the day-was approaching. -Wherefore he hnltcd,
and only sent out cll.vll.lry to search for Soult'~ flank, ll.nd to
reconnoitre Baza. But Freire, on hearing that O'Donnell was
crushed, and his own rear threatened, silently e\'acuatcd his
strong position in the night, and marched through Baza and
across Godinot's front with all his host. He got away, but
Soult, detecting his retreat at dawn, bade Latour-Maubourg
pursue him with nil speed at the head of his horsemen.
The Spanish rearguard was caught up at Las Vertientes, ten
mile; beyond Baw.. Freire ordered his cavalry, under Osorio
und 1.0)', to face about and protect the march of the infantry.
But a eharge of Pierre Soult, who led the French advanee
brigade, broke the Spanish horse, who fled in all directions,
ullcovering the infanh-y. The latter took to the hills-onc
column consisting of the divisions of Sanz and O'Donnell went
off southward, and escaped without much loss by Oria and
Albox. The other, eontaining the divisions of Creagh and
LnrdiZlLool, turned north, plunged into the Murcian hills,
and made its way by Maria to Caravaca. La Cuadra, making
u separate retreat in a parallel direction,. also arrived at the
last-llamed placel. Such was their haste that one column made
thirty-six miles in the day 011 the lath, the other twenty-sc\·en.
StraggleN were many.
The l\.'!urcian army was thus divided into two masses, neither
of which eovered the main road to the capital of the province,
and Soult, standing trinmphant at Velez Rubio with his U,OOO
mcn united, might have marched on Murein hud he chosen.
But the way was long-some se\'enty miles-and the inter-
vening country rough and thinly peopled. The Marshal resolved
not to pursue Frcire, but to devote himself to the hunting down
of the insurgents of Granada and the southern mountains, while
the main hostile army was out of action. 'Vhen, therefore,
lJlake returned from Valencia to pay a hasty visit to his
I There is a good ,acconnt of this obscure campaign hy Sc11epeler, Iln
eye-witness, in his Sponigclte Nonorchie, pp. li,~a-62, anti :0. longer one in
Arteche, vol, x,
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scattered army, he found it shaken in morale, and weaker by
4,000 men than whcn hc had left it, but not destroyed. Of
the two disjoillted sections, one descended in haste from the
northern mountains, the other came in marching parallel with
the coast; they met at Alcantarilla in front of the city of
Murcia, on August 14th, and began to fortify a position there.
Dut the French had turned back; Soult contented himself with
reoccupying Daza with a permallent garrison, and did not cross
the Murcian frontier. Hence Dlake was able, a few weeks later,
to take off to the north not only his own two divisions, hilt part
of Freire's troops, for service against Suchet on the side of
Valencia. It was a lucky chance for him that the invasion of
Vakmcia from the side of Aragon only began Upoll September 16,
more than a month after Soult had returued into Andalusia.
If it had come earlier, there would have been no succours avail.
able for the oft-defeated and never very efficient '~nd Arm)",
as the Valencian corps was now called.
Soult had not gone ill person further than Velez Rubio,
though his light cavah'y had pursued the flying Spaniard~ man,Y
miles further, as far as the pass or Lumbreras. On August Hth
he turned back I, nnd broke up his nrm)' into several columns,
who were to bunt down the insurgents of the Sierra Nevada ancl
the Alpujarrap. The main body retunled to Granada, a flanking
column occupied Almeria, another swept the valley or the upper
Guadalquivir. There was lIluch plunder and a good deal of
reckless shooting of inhabitants-for the Freuch were exasper·
ated at the rising which had taken place in districts that bad
seemed for the last eighteen months to be pacified. But the
crushing of the illsurb"Cnts tumed out to be a long business-
indeed eastern and southern Andalusia were never so thoroughly
under Soult's control o.s they had been in 1810 and the early
months of 1811. The Count of Montijo 11II;ked persistently in
1 Scllepeler (p. 460) mentiOllS tllat (lnring his sllOrt llalt on tIu) frontier
of Murein, Soult court-martialled and shot a French bnigrl officer in the
Spanish sel'\'ice captured 011 the 9tll-Charles CUry, the SOil of the faithful
servant of Louis XVI, who Wall so lOll/( with his master ill the Temple
prison.. As he llad been out of J.'raJlce for many years, first in the
Austrian and then ill the Spanish army, this was a cruel stretch uf the
idea of treason.
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the monl1tnin~ nnd gnined severnl smnll StlCCCS5(!S OV~l' Gcncral
Godinot, who was in main charge of the hunt. On Augnst fllst
he captured two whole companies of Poles near Motri], and u.
few days later checked u. column of 1,500 men undcr Coloncl
Remand, He himself ultimately got off to join the Mureian
army, but the local guerrilleros continued the strife, which Wa.'!
to blaze up ngaill into It fOl'midllblc conflagration when ll. new
Spanish regular force came npon the scene. ThiFl was the'
di\'ision of Ballasteros, who, as has been already mentioned,
abandoned his old haullts bv the Hio Tinto and the lower
Gllndiana, to land on Septen;ber 4th at Algefirlls with 3,000
men. Calling in the sel"l'al1OS of the Ronda mountains to his
aid, he captul'<ld muny small places, and forced Soult to turn
Godinot's troops against him. Thus the insurgents furthel'
ellst got a momentary respite, and Soult's unending troubles
took a new turn, But the autumn and winter wal"fare in the
extreme south of Andalu1ia mllst be narrated in another place,
Suffice it to say hel'e that Soult was never in the later months of
1811 so free from trouble as to find it easy to send any seriolls
aid to Drouet and the 5th Corps, whose duty it was to check and
contain Hill's Anglo-Portuguese divisions in 'Estrculfldura.
I i ~
SECTION XXVIII
OPERATIONS IN EASTERN SPAIN DURING
THE SPRING AND SUMMER OF ISH
CHAPTER I
FIGUEHAS AND TARKAGQNA
Is the earlier chapter of this volume, which took the affairs
of Catalonia find Aragon down to the month of March, wc left
Snchet making vigorolls preparation for the siege of 'l'tl.I·m~ll11l
within whose walls his master had promised him thAt he S]101l1d
'find his marshal's haton.' \Vhile munitions and food for thi~
gl'eat enterprise were being collected, the unemployed troops of
the Army of Arugon were occupied in scouring the mountains
011 the side of New Castile and Valencia, always driving the
parl1da.~ before them, bllt never able to bring abont their cap-
ture or destruction. Meanwhile, 1I-iacdonald with the active
purt of the French Army of Catalonia, ubout 11,000 strong, lay
in Md about Lerida, • containing' the main Spanish force, which
hEld now p1ISsed under tIle control of the Ilew CElptain-General,
the acti"e but incapable Campoverde. Based on Tarragonll.,
and with his divisions spread out i.1l front of it, this offit-cl'
bickered with Macdonald continually, but had achie"ed nothing
SllhsUtntil\l since his subordinate Sarsfield cnt np Ellgenio's
Italians at the combat of Vans, long weeks before 1. His ambi·
tioU3 attempt to snrprise Barcelona had failed with loss on
1\larch 19th, because it was based on 6UPPOSed treachery within
the walls, which did not really exist. Further to the north, ill the
Ampudam and Oil the Pyrcllcull frontier, Baraguay d'Hilliers
with the rest of the 7th Corps, some 18,000 men, had to furnish
t,he garrisOl16 of Rosas, :Figllera.<t, Gel'ona and other smaller places,
~nd to contend with the miqueletes of Manso, Rodm, 1\fRrtincz.
I See allo1'e, page 243,
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alld otber chiefll. Thcre were pn\Cticlllly no Spanish regular troops
ill this direction, almost the whole of the old regiments having,beell
withdrawn southward to face lIfacdonald, and to defend Tarl'ltl:,"01Ja
all(l the sUl'rouudiug region of central Cawlolliu. Ne\'crthele~s
Bal'agnay d'l-lilliers, as wC!- shall see, had, 110 small task thmwtl
upon his hands. III this province the irregulars were at their
Ix:st, having ill the miqnclcte system nil orgallizatioll which
Illlule them far morc formidable than the palt,ida.~ of central or
llorthcl'll Spain.
On March 10th Napolcon, who had marked with apprond all
Suchet's earlier operations, while he was thoroughly dissatisfie<l
with IHacdonald, resolved to cut up·the old 7th Corps or Army
of Catalonia, by making over nearly hulf of its force to the
Army of Aragon. A decree declared that the three provinces of
Lcrida, Tarragona, and l'ortosa were transferred to the charge
ofSuchet, with so much of the province' of Barcelona as lay eWJt of
the pass of Ordal and the course of the upper Llobregat. Along
with the pro\'inces went the troops stationed in them, viz. the
French division of Ft'ere, the Italian division of Pino, and thc
Neapolitan division now commanded by Compere. together with
the cavalry and artillery attached to them, Mat:donald's charge
was cut down to the region of Bal"{:eIOllll. and the lands north of
it. The 7th COl'pS, or troops of his command, sank from O\'CI'
40,000 to about 25,000 mell. The Sm Corps rose from
Q6,OOO to 43,000 men. 'Vith this augmented fol'{.'e Suchet
was told both to hold dowll his old rcalm in Al'/lgoll, and to tuke
Tal'rab"Oull, flll'llishing Hot only l\ sicb"e army but a coverillg f()l'~
as well. l\lacdonald was no longel' to be the s.hield of Suchct's
opcmtions, as duriug the siege ofTortosu., but was to occupy him-
self 011 a separate and minor system of opemtions-the Imperial
orders directed him to occupy Cnrdona, Bcrga, and U rgcl, thc
centres of' resistance in upper Catnlonia, and to take the rocky
stronghold of Montsel'rat.
IHeauwhile, it was na:essary to trausfer l\fa.cdonald's own per·
son from Lerida, where lay the troops that he had to surrender,
to Barcelona, which was to be for the fllture the centre of his
activity. So danl'.~rous was the passage that he had to be given
an escort of no less than 7,000 infantry and 700 horse, Taking
the way of l\{anresa, he started fl'0111 Lel'ida 011 Mmcb :30th
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Ulld cut his way through the SJW.llilih forces which stretched
across his path. The regular division of Snrsficld, supported
by the 8omatClle8 of central Catalonia, gave him much trouble:
though they failed to hold l\Ianres.'l., which the French stormed
and wantonly burnt, they hung on to the flanks of the man::hing
colulIln, repeatedly attacked its rearguard, and cut off' or slew ill
three days of continuous fighting some 600 men. After reaching
the Llobregat nt Sahadel, Macdonald wellt on to the neighbour-
ing Barcelona, while his escort fought its way buck to Lcrida by
the road of Iguulada, and joined Suchct on April 9th.
Having now got the whole of his new army under his own
hand, Snchet was able to prepare all his arrangements for the
march on 1'arragona. Ample provision had first to be made
for the defem.,; of Aragoll in his rear, where the encmies were
numcrous if not pOlI"crful~:MillaOll the sidc of Na.\'arre, Villtt
Campa. and 'Carbajal in the mountains of the south, amI the
Arm)' of Valencia. beyond the lower course of the Ebro. He
set aside three battalions and a. cavalry regiment to watch
Mina 1, and two battalions each for garrisons at Saragossa and
Cu.lawyud 2; hc pla<..-ed a brigade under Paris at Daroca 3, and
anothcr undcr Abbe at Tcrncl 4 to watch thc southern illsur·
genl". To keep off' the Valenciuns he left a regiment at
::\IOl'ella and Alcaiiiz~, another in garrisoll at 'l'orlosa 6, and
),600 men disposed in small forts along the lower Ebro from
La Uapila at its mouth to Caspe 7. Musnier was gi\'cu chaI"JC
01' all thc troops 011 the right bunk of the Ebro. and Imd orders
to unite Abbe's and Paris's brif:,1Rdes and e"acnate the southern
hill.country if the Va!cl!lcians made a serious advance against
Tortosa.
lOne battalion each of tile 44th and 115tb Lignc and 1st of the Vistula,
alld the Italian Dru!JIJ/Ut ,le NUPQ!C()".
~ At Saragossa one battalion eacll of the 5th Uger and 117tll Ligue;
lit Cnlatarud two LllttaliollS of 14tll LigllC.
, Two battalions of the 44th, two of the 2nd of the Vistllla.
4 Three Lattaliolls of tlle !14th and two of the 121st, with two squadrons
of·cnirassiers.
a Two lIattalioll~ of the 115th Ligntl.
6 Two 1J."lttalions of the 121st Lignc,
1 Olle battalion of the lHith, one of the 3rtl of thc Vistulll, and
apllarentl}' SOIllC of the NcalJOlitans.
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This left Suchet twenty-nine battalions for the e."i:peditionary
corps with which he was about to march against 'l'alTagona-of
which nineteen were French. two Polish, Rnd eight I ta1iaIl. Thc)'
amounted to just undcr 15,000 bayonets, Since the three divi-
sions of the Army of Aragon 119(1 all been thinned duwn by
the numerous detaclullenhc left behind, he amalgamated what
remained of Ulelll with the French and the Italian brigades left
lo him by Macdollald, to make up three pro....isional divisions
for the field, under Habert, Harispe, and Frere. The fin,i; had
OIlC .French and twu Italian brigades (fonrteen battnlions), th("
others two brigades each (six and nine battalions respectively).
There was a cavalry brigade of 1,400 men under Boussard, and
u large provision of artillery and enginL'Crs for the siege (~,OOO
men of the former, 750 of the lattel' arm). Counting the
auxiliary ser\'iccs the army had about 20,000 men-no great
figure for the task before it, for Tarrll.gono. was strong und
Cll1upo....erde had some H!,OOO or 15,000 regular troops at his
disposition-the three divisions ofSarsfield, Eroles, und Courten
-besides such aid as the miquelctes might gi"e, And this lust
resource lVas not to be despised; though they were not always
forthcoming when they were most required, yet they were llot
usually fouud wl\uting. They could never be cl1ught, owillg
to their knowledge of their own hills, and they were nc\'er
discouraged.
It was urrungecl that the mmy should march Oil 'l'al'ragono. by
two separate routes; while the divisions of !,'rere and Harispc
stnrtoo from Lerida by the road of Momblanch, the third divi~
sion, lhut of Huberl, Wt\S to move from II scpnrute bnsc-
'l'ortosn, where had been collected the heavy artillery and the
munitions of the siege. The guns which had taken Tortosa
WCI'<! still lying there, with 0.11 the artillcry reserve, aud it wm;
to escort them that Habel't was detailed to take the southem
route along the sea-cO!!Jlt by the Col de BalagueI'. From this
direction too were to come the provisions of the army, which had
been brought down by water from Saragossa. and l\'fequinell1.a
while the EbI'o was in flood, 1l.IId deposited at Mora-the nearest
point on the riyer to '!'arragona.. This dh'ision of forces WllS
perhaps necessary. but appeared dangerous; ifCampoverdc, when
the French cOlllmenced their movcmcnts, hnd thrown himself
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with all disposable forccs upon the weak division of Hal>erl-
only six battalions-and had wrecked the battering-train, there
l'Ollld have been 110 sic!:>"e of Tar~O'()lla for lllallya mouth to
cOllie.
But before the two columns had started from Lcrida and
Torlosl.l, and while part of Harispe's dh'isioll was out 011 a final
cattle-hunt up the valley of the N0h'l.ICnl, before the CommRllder·
in-Chief had even collie up to the front to join his arllly, a mesS8.bre
arrivoo from the north which might well have stoppcti the whole
expedition. On April ~1st Suchet, still at Saragossa, ret.'ei\'l'tl
the astounding llews that the Spaniards hud CllptUred FiguerllS,
the butwnrk of 1l00thern Ct\lalonia, and the most important place
(with th~ exception of Ual'telona) which belOllbred to the French
ill the whole principality. The disaster had happened on the
night of the 9th-10th, lInd the new.!; of it had been brought by
It spy paid by Mlwdollald, across the terl'itorj· oc-cllpicd by the
Spanish anny: otherwise it would have taken still longer tu
travel, by the circuitous route through France, which was the
only way by which news from Upper Catalonia could reach
Aragoll 1• 1\facdollald find Maurice Mathieu, the governor of
Barcelollll, who added his supplications to those of the l\Itmhal,
begged Suchet to abandon for the moment the projected siege of
Tarragona, and to march to their aid with every lllall that he
could spare. For they Illust collect as large a fort-e ,IS I)()$sible
to recowr Figucras, and a field army could not be got together
fmm the lllllch-reduced 7th Corps, which had to find a garrisoll
of 6,000 men for Barcelonu, and simihll', it' smalle.r, det:n.chmenb
for Gerona, Uosas, Ho"talrich, 1\'[ont Louis, ralalTIos, and other
smaller places. If Culllpoverde should march northward, with
the bulk of his regular divisiollS, to succour :Figueras, there would
be little or nothing to oppose to him.
Suchet weighed the petition of his colleague with care, but
refused to assent to it. His tlecisioll was highly approved by the
Emperor WhCll he C(tmc to know of it, and the rcasons whieh he
1 J)own to this winwr Suchet could oul}' communicate with "ranee up
the Ebro and sent messengers ,"ia Tudela :Lnu 1'lli11peluna, but he had
just openetl a somewhat shorter route for himself I'ia Jaca and OlcrOll}
whiell saved tllree Jars. EI'en so, eommunic,'1tious were iutolernblr slo""
::Sec ::Suehct'g Mcmoires, ii. p. U.
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gave for his alJSwcr sccm comillciug. lL 1I'0uld take, u.s he
calculated, twenty-five days to mMe II didsion, 01' a couple of
di"isions, from Lerida to }'igueras across the hostile country-side
of Catalonia; amI since the di:;a:,:tcr was ulreudyelcHm days old
whcn the news came to hand, there llIust be over a month of
delay between the n,oment when the Spaniards had taken the
fortress and that at which the Arm>' of Al'agou L"Ould inter\'enc.
III that month the fate of aHairs ill the Ampurdam would luwc
been already decided. The SUC(:ours for the garrison of northern
Catalonia must come from France, not from Aragoll. l"iguems
lies only twenty miles from the I·'rench frontier 1, llnd llaraguaJ
d'Hilliers could be helped fIll' more readil~' from l'erpignall,
Toulouse, or Narbollne than from LeriJ,t. National Guards
al1d depot troops could be hurried to his aid ill a few dttys. fu
to Campoverde, he would be called home at once by ll. blow
delirered a!"tainst Tarragolla, his capital and chief arseHal. He
must infallibly hun'y buck to defeud it, at the head of his field
arm)', and MacdOl18.ld and llaragua), d'Hilliers would then have
nothing but the miqueletcs opposed to them. If the 7th Corps,
with the reinforcements from 1"cum:c which it IlJUst iufullibJ)'
rccci\'e, could \lot deal with llovira, :Mal1so aud the rest, it ww;
time to abandon the Peninsular War! The crisis, whichel'er
wuy its results might lean, WM bound to ha"c come uut! Pu.sSt.-tl
lJeforc the Army of Amgon eould be of any \lse. It would
almost certainly have ended in a check for the Sp.'tlliards, sillce
thc Emperor I.:ould pour us mallY men into the AUlpurdnm ws
he pleased. At the WOl-st Fig-uera/; would be beleaguered so
~UOll tU; the reinforccments arrived from FrwlL'C, gild all the best
of thc Spunillros ill Ilorthern Ottalonill would be shut lip in the
place and kept out of mischief. It was elltirely to the advanlaf,rc
of the Imperial m'llls that the enemy should lock np his men ill
garrisons, 101' they werc much more troublesomc when acting us
partisans in the mountains 2.
Accordingly, Oil April5!4th, Sudlet, having sent a direct refusal
to Macdonald's petition, came up to Lerida, and 011 the ~th
I As Sllchet remarks (ii. p. 1i) the Emperor at Paris tiOll!(} 1Iave tile
news of the fall of .Figueras 011 April1l'ith or 16th, while he himself ou!)'
got it 011 April 21st.
: For ,Ill lILese argLllucllL~ alii} others ~ee I:iUdlct's MJmoire¥J H. PI" a-Hl.
490 FIGUEUAS A.L~D TAIUtAGONA [APIIltG
Harispe's and I"rere's divisions lltarted off' for TarragonR b)' th~
shortest road, that through Mombluneh. At the same time
Hlllxrt with thc sicge artillery mo\'oo out from 'l'ortosa for the
same destination along the coast-road by the Col de nalaguer
and Cambri1s. 011 May!fl both C01UIllllS were near Tarragona,
having met with vcry little opposition by the way, for C-ampo-
verde, with the larger part of his field army, had gone ofl'l\ forl-
night Ixtore to the north, with the intention of succouring
Piguerus, und the rest of his regulars had retired into Tarragona
to form its garrison.
Before dealing with the long und bitterly contested struggle
at 'I'arragolla, it is lle<:essary to e>.-plain how E'igueras had come
into the hands of the Spaniards. This place was a new and
wcll-designed cightcenth-l-'Ctltlll'Y fortress, built sixty )'cars oock
by l"erdinand VI, to supplement the defences of the CutaJonian
frontier. Thus it had not the weaknesses of old-fashioned strong-
holds like Gerona or Leridu, where the scheme of the fortifications
dated back to the l\Iiddle Ab"CS. Close to the high-road from
Perpignan to Barcelona, and onl)' twenty miles from the frollti~r,
stands an isolated hill with a Aat top, at whose foot lay th~
original village or small town of Figueras. Ferdinulld VI haJ
fortified this hilltop so as to form a circular bastionoo enceinte,
nlld thus created tlmost formidable citadel, which he named after
himself San Fernando. It dominated the little town below, and
the whole of thc surrounding plain of thc Ampurdam. 'l'h~
slopes below the wall are steep, even precipitous in some places,
3.lId there is ouly onc roud lcildillg up iuto the placc by CUrI'CS
and zig'tags, though there (\re several posterns at other points.
San Fcrnando had been olle of the fortresses which )iapoleou
seized by trellchel'y ill lSOS-a French dewchment, ostensibly
marching through the town towards Barcelolla, had fallen upon
flnd evicted the Spanish garrison I. Sinl--e then it had formed
the most important base for operations in northern Catalonia,
alld Iuul been the magazine from which the sieges of !losus and
Geronn had been fed. A long possession of thrcc years had
made the Imperial generals careless, and the garrison had gradu-
ally dwindled down to a provisional battalion of 600 or 700 men,
mainly composed at this moment of drafts for the ltaliall ano
J See \'01. i. p. 37.
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N\mpolitan divisions of Pino and Compere, detained 011 thcil'
way to the front, 'cL"()rding to the usual system, The governor
was a Brigadier-General Guillot, who seems to hu\'e been a negli-
&'Cut and eas)'·going offi<:er, The rocky fortress was so strong
thtd it nel'el' cntered into his head that his restless neighbours
the miquelctes might try fl blow at it, It was a mere chance
that on the day when the assault was delivered a marching
baltalion of Italian drafts, eSL'Orting Gt:neral Peyri, who was
comillg up to take command of Pino's late division, happened to
be hilleted ill the town below-next day they would have been
&'OlIe.
It was clearly GuiUofs cmclcssncs5, and the smallllumbcrs of
his garrison, which inspired the miquelete chiefs with the idea
of making an attack by surprise on this almost impregnable
citlUlel. Hodra, the mosl acti\'e of them, got into com!llUniCR-
lion with three young Cabtlans who passed as Ajrancc/Jado/J and
were employed by the cOlllmissary Bouclier, who had charge of
the mugazincs, Onc, Juan Marquez, was his servant, the other
two, Pedro and Gines Pons, were under-storekeepers. All three
werc mere boys, the oldest not twenty-one years of age. Marqne;;,
gOlll'llX impressions of' various keys belonging to his master,
illcludillg those of the store-vaults and of f\. postem gate IClIding
into them from the foot of the ramparts, alld made false keys
from them. It wu:> determinl.>d that a picked build of llliqucletes
should attempt to force their way into the pl&:e throngh the
postei'll on the midnight of April 9th-10th, llovira sent the
del.nils of his scheme to Campovel'dc, who, despite of his lale
lil\SCO at llarcelonu, was delighted with the plan, &lld ottered to
come up with his fidd army to the north if the attempt should
suceccd,
The miquelete chiefs conducted their enterprise with cOllsidel'-
able skill. On the 7th of April Ro\·ira collected some !2,OOO
men at the foot of the Pyrenees, north of Olot, und thrcutel1l.>{l
to make a descent illW the French ,'alleys beyond, in order to
distroct the attention of the enemy. On thc 9th he counter-
marched for Figueras, and ut dusk got within nine miles of it.
At one in the morning his forlorn hope,700 men nnder two
captains named Casas and Llo\'era, came up under the ramparts,
found their (:onfederates waiting for them at the postern, and
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were admitted by means or the false keys. They bunt up oul
of' the \"aults, und caught the garrison mostly asleep I-the
gO\'cl'lIor WM captured ill his bed, the lllnin-gut\l"(! at the great
gate was stU'prised, and the few I'nCll who came ,~tragglillgout of
the barracks to make resistance were overpowered ill tlctail.
Only thirty-the men \\'e~ killed or wounded 011 the part uf the
French, not so utUllY 011 the Splluish side, and in all hOlll' or l~
the place \\'i1SWOll. 'l'he captors promptly arlmitted their friclUh
trom without, and ere dawn over ll.OOO Catalans were muullingthe
walls ofthe fortress. The material captured was immense-16,OOO
IIlUl,kcts, several hundred callnon, a great ~iore of boot~ and
clothing, four months' provisions for It garrison of 2,000 mell,
and 400,000 francs in the military chest. Gencral l'cyl'i, with
the Italian bataUlOl~ de marc/le which was sleeping in tIle town
below, wus unable to do anything-there had heel! \'el')' little
/irillg, and whcn somc fugitives ran down froUl 5[\11 FcrllanJo,
it was to tell him thltt the place was completely mastered by the
enemy. He put his troops under arm!!, and drew oft' at daylight
to Bascara, half-way to Gerona, with his 650 mCll, aftcr ha\'ing
sent oA' the bad news both to Baruguay cl'RiUiers 011 ouc side
and to thc go\'Cl'nor of Perpignun on the other~. The former
sent him out & battalion and a squadron, and told him to retunI
loll'Ul-ds Figuerw; aud to place himsclf ill obscl'\'atioll ill front of
it till he was stlccoured. All the disposable troops in northern
Catalonia should join him within two days. Peyri therefore
1 VacalLi, Hi. p. :l.5, says that the best llart of the gll.rrison hI«! been uul
"11 an cXl,cdilioll in tlm Ilills aB till' day, sookillg for tile 1~llIds who
were said to be threatening the French frontier. They returned late at
Hight tired out, amI ~lcllt the sleep of the weary, while ret,:rllits 31111
convalescents were furnishing the few guards considered necessary ill
such a strong plalJe. A l,icket of Neapolitans W]IO werc in charge of the
main gate were captured without resistauce, being attacked, to tbeir
surprise, frOlll the inside of the fortress.
t Napier suggests (iii. 222) tllat Peyri might I1ave tried to assail San
Ferm\lldo before the enemy was properly ~ettled down into it. Thi~
seems a most doubtful criticislll: he 113d only 650 Illell of drafts with
him; neither he nor they knell' the topography of the fortress; it was
pitch dark; the gtrength of the euemy was unknown. The garrison hat!
succumbed in a fell' miuutes despite of all its adl'antages of position. To
(.luu:k 1I'0uld 1,(lI'C rn.:cu foolhardy.
]811] 5UHPRISF: OF ],'IGUEIlAS 49~
reoccupicd Figncras town, and baTJ'icaded himself in it with
1,500 men-being quite unablc to uo more; ·he had to watch
t11C Catalallll introducing reinforccmellb into San Fernando
without being able to molest them, Daraguay d'Hillicrs did
not come to his I<uceour for some days, being unable to leave
Gerona till he had called in some dangerously exposed outlying
posts, and had strengthened Rosas, which was threatened by
some English frigates, who showed signs of throwing a landing-
party ashore to besiege it, He then came up with ft,OOO men
to join Peyri, while a more considerable force arrived from Per-
pignnn under General Qucsncl, who hnd char~ of the Pyrencall
frontier, And appeared with three line battalions, and two more
of Kational Guards of the Gets and Haute-Garonne. Having
6,500 infantry and 500 cavalry conccntrated, d'Hillicrs was able
to throw a cordon of troops round San }'ernando und to COlll-
lllClwe its blockade 011 April 17th.
The place, howe\'er, was now fully garrisoned. Ro\·ira had
lhrowll into it, during the week when free entry was possible,
miqucletes to the llu.mber of some 3,000, making a brigadier
named Martinez, one of his most trusted lieutenants, the
go\'ernor. On the 16th a reinforcement of regular troops
arrived_part of the division of Baron EI'Oles, which had the
most northern cantonments among the unit.<; of Campover<1e's
6cld army. Eroles had marched from Martol'el by Olot, a.nd
had captured on his way the small French garrisons of that place
Il.nd of Cnstelfollit, making 548 prisoners, Campo\'erde sent
messages to say that he would arrive himself with larger for<.'Cs
in a few days. Ha.ving thrown Courtcn's di\'isiou into Tttl'ra-
gOlla, he would bring up the rest of his o.vailable troops-Sars-
field's di vision and the remainder of that of Eroles, with all the
miqueletes that he could collect. Meanwhile the local :fOmlltenes
ofcentral Catalonia pressed in close upon Gcrolla and Hostnlrich,
alld kept Baraguay d'Hilliers in a state of great anxiety, for he
feared that they might capture these places, whose galTisons had
been depleted to make up his small field fOf{'C.
'1'he opportunity offered to the Spaniard was not onc that was
likely to last for long, since Napoleon, on hearing of the fall of
Figueras., had issued orders for the concentration of some 14,000
troops from Sonlhern France, l\ (lh'ision nnder Genern1 Plan-
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zonne from Langnedoc and ProvCllL'C, and fh-e 01' six 0(111
battalions more 1. 'Vhen these should arrive, in the end of
April or the first days of May, the French in northern Catalonia
would be too strong to fear auy further disasters. Blit mean-
while Mncdonald and Daraguny d'I-lilliers had :l fortnight of
doubt anel danger before them. The former proposed to mareh
himself to Figueras, with what troops he could spare from
Barcelona, but since its garrison was only about 6,000 strong,
and the plaee was large and turbulent, it was clear that he could
bring little with him. It was for this reason that he wrote to
Suchet in such anxiety on April 16th, and be&,rred for the loan
of one or two divisions from the Army of Aragon. Till he got
}Iis answer, he did not himself lIlo\'e forth. Hence d'Hilliers
alone had to bear the brunt of the trouble.
There is no doubt that Campm'erde had 1\ fair chance of
achieving a considerable if temporary suceess; but he threw it
away by his slowness and want of skill. Though aware of the
eapture of Figueras 011 April 12th, he did 1I0t start from 'raml-
gona till the ~Oth, nor reach Vich in northern Catalonia till the
~7th, He had then with him 6,000 infantry, mostly of SaI'S-
field's division, and 800 horse. Rovira drew near to co-operate,
with those of the miqueletes of the Ampunlam who luul not
already thrown themselves into the fortress. The force collected
ought. to have ,mfficed to break through the thin blockading
cordon which Baraguay d'Hilliers had thrown round the fortress,
if it had been properly handled. But Call1povcrdc was no
general. On May Srd the relieving army approached the plare,
the rniqneletes demonstrated against the northern part of the
French Hues, while Sarsfield broke through at a point on the
opposite side, near the town, and got into communication with
Eroles, who came down with !!,OOO men to join him. The)' fell
together upon the French regiment (the Srd LCger) on this
front, which took refuge in the barricnded town and defended
itself there for some time. According to all the Spanish Ilurm-
tives the three battalions in Figueras presently offered to
surrender, and wasted tillie in negotiations, while BaragtUlY
1 See Napoleon, CQrte$pQl1dance, xxii. 110, li,644. I'lauzonne's regi-
ments were the 3rt! Uger, Hth ami iOth Line, and four h.'1tt.'1Ii0118 of the
67th Line and one ofthe 16th User also crossed the froQtier.
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Il'HiIlicr.'l was collecting the main body of' his forces in n solid
IllRSS. Screened by an olive wood in his march, the l'rench
general suddenly fell on Sarsfield's flank and rear, while he was
intent on the enemy in the town alone; a charge of dragoons cut
lip two of the Spanish regimell!<'>, and the rest b'8.ve way in disorder,
Sarsfield falling back towards the plain, a.nd Eroles retiring into
the fortress. The reserve of Campoverde and the miqueletes were
never seriously engaged. If they had been used as they should
have been, the fight might have gone otherwise than it did, for
counting the garrison of San Fernundo and the irregulars, the
Spaniarcls had a considerable superiority of numbers. They lost
over 1,000 men, the French about 400 1. During the time
while the blockading line was broken, Sarsfield had introou<:ed
into San :Fernando some artillerymen (much needed for the vast
number of guns in the place), and part of a convoy which he was
conducting, hut the greater portion of it, including a great
drovc of sheep, was captured by thc enemy at the moment of
the rout.
IfCampoverde and his army had been gi,'en no other task
save the relief of Figueras, it is probable that this combat would
have been but the commencement of a long serics of operations.
Hut he receh'ed, immediately after his check, the news that
Suchet had marched from Lerida on April ~8th, and had
appeared in front of Tarragona on May Srd. The cupital of
Catalonia was even more important than J'igueras, and it was
necessary to hasten to its aid, for no regular troops had been
left in the southern part of the principality, save the single
division of Courten, whicl.l had hastened to shut itself up in the
city. Accordingly Sarsn.eld was directed to take ~,OOO infantry
and the whole cavalry of the army, and to march by the inland
to threaten Suchet's rear, and his communications with Lerida,
while Campoverde himself came down to the coast with 4,000
men, embarked at Mataro, the nearest port in Spanish hands, and
sailed for Tarragona, where he arrived in safety, to strengthen
the garrison. Eroles came out of San ]~ernando with a few
1 So the Frendl narratives. i\Iartinien's lists show three officers killed
alld thirteen wounded on Ma)" 3 before }<,igueras. The regiments whicll
suffered most were the 3rd :Illd 23rd Uger, each with one officer killed
anll four wounded.
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hundreds of his uwn hoops, bel/wc the blockade wa!) fully
]'C-cstablished. and joined Uovirn in the neighbouring mOllntains,
leaving the defence of the fortress to Martinez with five regu-
lar battalions 1 and 3,000 miqueletes. Erolcs and Rovira were
the only force left to observe Baraguay d'Hilliers, and since they
had ·only a few thousand mcn, mostly irregulars, they were able
to do little to help the place. For the besieging force was
strengthened in May by the arrival of Plallzonue'.'I division from
FJ'ance, while 1\Iacdonald CAme up from Barcelona with a few
battalions, and took over the command from Baraguay d'Hilliers.
By the end of the month he had over 15,000 men, and had begun
to shut in the fortress on its height by an elaborate system of
contravallations, which he compares in his memoirs to CAesar's
lines around Alesia. Martinez made a most obstinate and
praiseworthy defence-of which more hereafter-and the siege
of Figueras dragged on for llIany months, till long after the
more important operations around 'l'armgonR had come to an
end. But after Campo\'erde's departure for the south there was
never any hope that it could be relieved: all that its defenders
accomplished was to detain and immobilize the whole 7th Corps,
which, when it had garrisoned Barcelona and Gel'Ona, and
snpplied the blockading force for San Fernando, had not a man
disposable for work in other quarters. Thus Suchet had to
carry out his operations against Tarragona without any e:!t.iernal
assistan(.'e, whereas, if Figueras had never been lost, he might
have counted Oil much incidental help from his colleague Mac·
donald. This much was accomplished by the daring e.xploit of
April 10th: if Campoverde had been capable of utili1.ing the
chance that it gave him, its results might have been far more
important.
, The regnlars left in San Fernando were two battalions of Voluntari(l;l
de Valencia, one of Ultollia, lIud two of Alltequeru.
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TilE SIEGE AND FALL OF TAIUIAGONA. i\IAY-JUNE 1811
SUCHl::'f had marc!lI,..d, as has beeu already mentioned, from
Lcrida, with Harispe's division, on April 28th, }'rcre's division
following. On the ~9th the head of the column reached !\Iom-
1.JIWlCh, where hulf u battalion was left behind ill a fortified post,
10 keep open the Lerida rand. On May ~lld the large munu-
facturing town of nells, only ten miles from Tarra{,rona, was
occupied: 011 May 3rd the :French advanced guard, Saline's
brigade, approached the city, and drove in the CtltalalJ UdWUll:t..J.
posts as far us the river I,'mncoli. Dut the siege could 1I0t
begin till Habert's force, escorting the battering-train, should
cUllIe up from Torlosa; alld this all.importaut column was
much delayed. Its roud ran along the seaside fi'olIl the Col de
llalaguer onward, and Codrington's squadron of English frigates
and gunboats ac<.:ompanied it all the way, vexing and delaying it,
by bombarding it whenever it was forced to come within gWI·
shot of the beach. This was practically all the opposition that
Suchet met with: a few miqueletes had shown themselves ill the
hills between Reus and Momblallch, but the)' were too weak to
fight. Campoverde had carried of!' the best both of regulars
Alld irregulars to the relief of l<'igueras, and Courten, who luul
barely 4,500 men in his division 1, had wisely shut himself up ill
'l'urrugona, whel'e every mun was wanted: for thc cnccinte wu~
w:ry long, and the sedentary garrison consisted of only live or
six battalions, The troops inside the walls did not amount,
when the sichtC begun. to 7,000 mell: hence came the weakness
I '111e composition of tile divis.ions of the Army of Cataloui:L was
shifting, nnd hard to follow. but (us far as l call make out) Courteu's
dil'isioll consisted of three hatt.1.lious of Granmla, two each of Almauza,
I\lmerill, :lud America, wllile the sedentary garrison contained four ut
61'e battalions of the Ilew Catalan 'Set,\tiOIl8' at' < local line; besides
a. battalion of Volunlnrios de Tarr,lgoua..
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:shown ill thc early days; it was not till Call1poverde's arm)'
cAme back from the north (May 10) that All adequate defensirc
fOl'ce was in existence for such a large fortress.
'Iarmgona, though some of its fortifications were not. skill"ull}'
planned, WM a vcry strong place. The nueleus of the works was
the circuit of the old Celtiberian toWIl of Tarraco, which after-
wards became the capital of Homan Spain. This forms the
upper city ill modern times. It is built ou un inclined plane, of
whieh t.he eastern end (530 feet above sea-level), where the
cathedrnl1ies, is the higher side, and the slope goes downhill,
and westward: the southern face. that towards the sea, is
absolutely precipitous, the nOl,thern oue hardly less JiO. Ltrb'C:
frngmcnts of the Cyclopenll walls built by the Celtiberians, or
perhaps by the Cartbngininns, are visible along the crest 011
both of these sides. On the west, the! lowest part 01" the old
t.owu, a line of modern fortifications tli\·ided the upper t01l'1l
from the lower i there was u. sharp drop along this line: iu most
},laccs it is very steep, and the road of to-day goes IIp the hill·
side in zig~ags, to a\'oid the break-neck climb I. Below the
fortifications of the upper city, amI divided from them by
a broad belt of ground free of houses 2, It!.)' the port-towlI or
lower city, clustering around the harbour, which is an excellent
roadstend shut in by a mole 1,400 feet long, which runs out
from the south-wl.~t comeI' of thc l)ltl.cc. The lower city Wll~
cuclosed on its northern and western sides by It front of six
bastions; its southel1l side, facing the port and the open sea, had
llOt, and ditlllot need, all)' great protection; it l.1)uld only have
been elldwlf:,"'Crcd by an enemy whose 1,1rcngth was 011 the water,
llnd who eould bring fi fleet into actiOll, There 'I'M a sort of
!:itadel in the port-town, a work named the I"lIel"ie Real! whic11
lies 011 lUl isolated mound inside the north-w~t angle of tllC
walls. About 400 yards west of the most projecting hustioll of
I ,\plJafently there was ill UIII /loroat! of this sort, Ill' the steep slope
above the railway station of to-day; the main chu.u8ICe from Valencia entered
tile upper city at its lIorth'II"Clltcru cud, mul there was llO good road for
carriages up the south-\\·estcru point, as there is !JOW (the so·called
lJespciiapcrrw;).
~ Long since built over. Tile line of the oM forlificatioJls of the uPVCf
t;itr is 110\\' marked by a brllild promClladc, L"~ Ilmnblu de S:l1I ,JUHIl,
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the place the ri \'er Francoli ijows into the sett, at the western
end of the harbour. In the angle betWl.!eli the river und the
port was un outlying work, }'ort l"raucoli, destined to keep
besiegers a)vay from the shipping, which they might easily
bombard fl'OO1 this point, if it were not occupied. This fort
wus eonllcctcd with the lower town by a cover~ way protected
by a long elltlxlnchment contnilling two lunettes.
~lotwithstalldillgthe great streugth of the high-lyillg upper
city, it IUld been furnished with a second liue of tlefelll.."C, outside
its old Homan walls. Low down the hillside live lorbl, con-
llected by a wall and co\'el'oo way, protected its whole eusterl1
fWllt frout the edge of the heights M far as the sea. The
BlIrcdolla rand, crawling ulong the walcr's edge, eutcI'tl the
place between two of these forts, alllI goes to the Lower, Itftcr
scudillg a steep bypath up to a gate in the Upper, city I.
On the west tl.mlllorth-west the high-lying fortress cOlllmands
,Ill the sluoroundillg country-side. But to the due north there is
l~ lofty hill about 800 yards from the walls, called Monte Olivo.
This uomiutttt:s the lower towlI, since it is QOO feet high. or more,
though it is itself'dominuted by the upper tOWll. All cucllIY ill
possession of it has every advantngc for attaekillg thc north
front of the lower town. \'Vhereforc, during the course of the
lust two years, the :>ummit of the hill hud bcen entrenched, alllt
It vcry large hOl'l\work, the Fucrte Olivo, constructed upon it.
This wus a narrow fort, following the shape of the crest of the
hill, with a length of 400 yards, and embrasures for forty·SC\'Cll
gUllS. Its outer front was protected by Il ditch hewn ill tbe
solid rock: its rear was only slightly closed with n. Iow wall
crowned by palisades, so HS to leave it exposed to the fire of the
llppCl' city, if by any chanl..'C thc enemy should get jwsSl,..,,;sioll of
it. Such Itn extensi\'c work required a w.u-risoll of ovcr 1,000
lIlen-a hea\'y proportion of the 6,500, which formed the loml
IOrL'C of the Spulliurds at the conUIlCllcemcnt of the siege.
When Suchet arrived ill front of Tl\l'fI4:,"Ollll., amI hud drivel!
the Spaniards within their w~rks (May 3rd-4th), his chief
cllgiul'Cr and al'tilleryofficets, ROh"iliat und· Vallee, had to conduct
a long IUld calocful survey of the fortificll.tiolls opposcd to them.
I It is it stiff dimu up a I'cry slcujJ asccnt t.o Clllcr'thc uppcr dty loy its
, Uan:elOlla Gate.'
Ji.k~
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They concluded that the 1l0rtherll front of the city was practi-
cally impreglluble, from its precipitous contours, and that tile
eastern front, though a little less rocky, \I'as equally ineligible,
because of the trouble which would be required to transport
gUlls first across the high ground to the north-east, and then
down to the seashore. The south front, being !tU alung the
water's l.'<lgc, was inaccessible, There rcmaillcd only the wl.'Stcrn
front, that formed by the lower cit~" where the defences lay in
the plain of the l"rancoJi, and had no dominance over the ground
ill front of them. There was an additional uJvRntal",re for the
besieger here, ill that the soil W/lS partly river sand, partly thc
well-broken-up loam of suburban market gardens, und in all
Cll~es very easy to dig. But if they were to attack the west
front, the engineers required the General-in-Chiefto accomplish
two prelhninury operations for them. He lIlust take Fort Olh'o,
which t:ollllllallded with its flanking fires much of the grollnd 011
which they intended to work, and he must drive away from thc
llOlthern sine of the harbour thc Anglo-Spanish squadron which
lay there, since its heavy guns would enfilade all works started
fur the purpose of approaching the II'cstcm front of Turragona
ill the neighbourhood of the lllouth of the l"rtlncoli.
This being the programme laid down, SlIchet took lip his
po~itiolls round the fortress-Harispe's division had chuq,fC of
the main purt of the northern front, its French brigade (Sa1mc)
occupying the gl'Ollml in front of }<'OIt Olim, whilc its two
I talian brigades stretched eastward along the distant heights,
curving rouud so as to cut the Ban"C1olla rood along the seu-cow;t
with their extremc dctachmcnt. l'·rcrc's division had thc ccnlral
part ofthe lines, and 1l1yon both sides of the courscoftheFrallcoli
l'iVC1", it:> main force, however, being Oil the left bauk. Habert's
divisioll, which had just comc up frolll TortuSll, was plul:cJ IIcar
the mouth of the river, and facing towards the port; it forlllCt[
the right wing of the army, and covered the siege-park, whil'h
was established at the \-iIlah"C of Canonge, about a mile and a hnlf
from the walls of Tarragona, The maguzincs and hospitnls IYcre
fixed at the large tOlVll of Heus, nine miles to the rear, undcr
a considerable h'\mrd; for though the road from them:t! to the
French IitlClS nUl O\'Cl· the gentle ulldulations of the CORSt plnin,
)'et there was ul \\'uys danger tlml bands of miqueletl.'S might
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tlCflcend from the hills for sOllle during enterprise, Several of
the intcrmooiate villages were fortified, to serve as half-WRY
l'efl1~ for convoys llnd small parties on the move,
Some days were lost to the French in completing the sm'\'ey
of'l'arrabl'()llll, in settling down the troops into their pernl'tlnellt
l'llInps, and in bringing· lip from the rear, mOllg the Tortosa
ronc1, the l'Cffifiinder of the battering-trail] amI its munitions, It.
WIL~ not till May 8th tha.t serious opera.tions began, Suchet's
/irst object was to drive away from the 1I0rtheru end of the
harbour the English and Spanish ships, whose (ire swept the
ground about the month of the Francoli, across which his siege-
lrorks were to be constrllcted, 'Vith this objed It large fort was
constructed on the shot'C, in which "er)' hen")' guns, fatal to
shipping, were to be placed, Commodore Codl'ington, who wa,:;
lying ill the harbour with a small squadl'on of two 74's and two
frib'8tes, assisted by several Spanish gUll-boats, bombarded the
lort incessantly, but what he destroyed in the day the French
rebuilt with additions every night, and on .May 13th the fort
was sufficiently completed to receive its armament of ~4·
pouuders. The ship-guns were unable to cope with them, aml
the "essels of the AJ1ies during the rest of the siege were com-
]JClled to keep to the south end of the port, and could only vex
the hesieger's subsel:lUellt trench-building by a distant and iu-
eAbctivc fire, On the 16th a first parallel, directed ll.gt\inst the
most Advanced Spanish work, Fort Francoli, was begun in t.he
low ground beside the lIew fort,
Before this check to the squadron had been completed n great
chAnge in the situation was made by the arri\'ll.l of (AlmpMerdc
011 May 10, with 4,000 regular troops brought by sea from Mataro
-fractiOlls of the divisions of Erolcs and Sarsfield, though
neither of these generals had come in person I, The garrison
being strengthened up to 10,000 men, and raised in morale b)'
the reinforcement, became very bold and enterprising, Sorties
hegn.n almost at once: I-larispe's division having seized on the
I '11le regiments that landed with ClImpoverde seem to have been the
2nd of S....l'oia (2 battalions), Volllntnrios de Geronfl, amI tll'O of tile Anda-
lusi!,lI regiments wlLich had formed the core of Reding's old Granadrm
(lil'i~iotl, whicll marched 10 Cnlalonia ill 1808, viz, Iliberia and &tnt.... Foi,
the first three battalions strong, the other with two,
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13t.h May t.wo slight. ollllying cnt.renehment$ helow V01't Olil-o,
three battalions sallied out on the 14th and mtlLle a desperate
attempt to retake them, It failed, but Oil the 18th all cqutill)·
,'igorous sortie was mnde against the fort beyond the Franooli,
and the -first parallel near it, by about !l!,OOO men, who drO\'e in
the trench-guards amI destroyed a section of the works, but
were finally thrnst hack into the lowcr city by the arrival of
rcillforcemeut;J led by GeneI'llI Habert. How hot the fighting
had bccn here is shown by the fact that Snchet's dispatch OWIl~
to a loss of OVe!' 150 men, with three officers killed mul ele\'ell
\ronnded. The sallying forcc lost !l!lB, a figure which Suchet
enlarges in his l'Cport to ~50 killed and 600 wounded, On the
20th the Spaniards made n. third sally, on a diffcrent front, fur to
t.he north-east, across the high gronnd north of the Darcclol1a
I'oad, and tried to bl'eak through the Hne of blockade kept lip
by Hariilpe's Italian brigades. This was Oil a ilmaller scale, and
had lIO lllCk; it was appm'Clltly intcnd()(l to opcn up commuui-
catiOIl with Sarsfield, who (marching by circuitous Wltys !U:ros~
(~ntral Catalonia) had reached VaUs l\lld Alcover, onl),ten miles
from TRrragona, on the upper Francoli, with 1,~00 men. This
t1'ifl.ing force was to be the nucleus of an 'army of relief' wllich
was to be collected from nil quarters to threaten Suchct's rear,
Sarsfield made his appearance known to his chief in Tarl'agona
hy lighting bencollS on the mountain tops. Learning that HIe
Spanish force was insignificant, Suchet detached two battalions
and SOllle cuil'l\ssiers to drive Sarstield further away from .r\lcO\"er,
and did so with small loss, forcing him to l'etire to the 1Ilountnil1~
abO\'e Valls.
About this time the 1"1'Ctlch artillery and engineer commanders
reported to their chief that it would be at IctlSt ten days befol"'c
they were ill a position to begin a scrious attack against the
western front of the city, and Suchet I'esol\'oo that the enforced
delay should be utilized for an attack on l~ort Olivo, whose
captnl'e would sooner or later be .'l. necessit}·, if the main opera-
tions against t.he city were to proSpel'.
Accordingly, while the approaches agaillst the lI'est front went
steadily all, ll. sepamte offensh"e advance Rgainst the Olivo was
prepared. Between the !l!2nd and the ~8th of :May b'Cuches
wcre pnshed towards the fort, and bllttcl;CS conmining thirteen
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gUlls crccted to bear upon it. Theil' fire had effected serious
damage 011 the parapets aillI the lIrtillel'y of the fort by the 29th,
yet the engineers reported that they could not fill the ditch,
which was dug in the solid rock, and could not promise to make
accessible breaches beyond it. But they reported that the rear
face of the work, which the French artillery could not reach,
was vcry wcn.k, the low wall and palisade closing the gorge being
no more than nine feet high. There was also 1\ gap in the front
protection caused by the entry, into the right end of the fort, of
an aqueduct which carried water down into 'l'llrrngonn. This
st1'llctuI'e made ll. sort of bridge across the ditch; it had not been
cut. bllt only closed with palisades, which were being rapidly
([cmolished by the French caunonnde 1.
On the night of the ~9th Sllchel made the rather rash venture
of trying to escalade Fort Olivo at the two weak points. One
column \\'8.5 to turn the work under cover of the darkness, and
to elldellvoUl' to break in at tlte gorge in its real'. The othel'
was to try the imperfect breach in the right front, by crossing
the aqueduct. though it was only seven feet broad, if it should
he found that the ditch Wll!! impassable. Meanwhile a general
demonstration was to be made by scattered tiraUleur8 against
the whole face of the Olivo, so flS to distrll.Ct the attention ofthe
enemy, and the batteries down by the FrancoIi were to bombard
the lower city with the samc purpose. Both attacks were success-
ful-morc by luck than by their deserts, for the plan was most
hflj'~·\rClous. The column which had gone round to the I'eftl' of
the fort rail ill upon a Spanish regiment 2 which WllS <ioming up
the hill to rclieve the garrison. The two forces hustled against
eaeh other in the dark, and became hopelessly mingled in fI.
dose eombat just outside the postern gate of the gorge. The
garrison was ullable to fire upon their enemies, becausc they were
intermixed among their friends, and, when the fight sLlrged
against the postern and the palisades, the French 8UCCeeded. in
1 1l1is discovery was tile work of tl,e Italian engineer officer Vacani,
wllOse work ou the campaigll of the Italiall troops of :-.'llpoleoll in Spain
i' OIlC of the most "alnable of our original sonrces. Sec his \'o!' 1'.
pp. 175-G. He was with the assaulting column.
1 Three bnttalions of lliberia were llOlding the fort 011 the 29t11 ; they had
been much tried, and two battalions of the sister-rc,;:iment of Almerb
were coming IIJl to rcliel'e tlICIll.
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entering the gorbl"C, some by scrambling' up the lo\\" aud weak
defences, others by bursting in at the gnte along with the
Spanish l'Cinforcements with whom they wel'e engaged. They
might have been checked, for the defender~ were fighting fiCJrcely,
if the other attack had not also succeeded. But at the right
front of the fort, where the sL'Cond assault wus made, though
many of the fodorn hope fell into the ditch, a despcrnte charge
took the storming~party across the seven·foot gangway of t11e
atlucduct, and over the shattered palisades that blocked it. The
gardson could tell by the noise of the musketry that the cnclIl)'
had entered both in front and in rear, and were stricken by
despair 1. But the greater part of them clubbed togethel' ami
continued a desperate resistau(,'e, which was only subdued when
Suchct sent in all his reserves and the trench-guards to back
the stormers. They were then beset 011 all sides, and finally
overwhelmed.
The losses of the garrison were terrible-of the five battalions
of Ilibcria and Almeria, and the two companies of artillery
which had been cngaged-some 3,000 men in all-very nearly
one-third, a~ it would appeAr, were ~lain or captured 2. The pri.
1 Vacalli is very positive that the stormers at the aqueduct got into the
fort before t]IOSC at tIle gorge.
2 Suc1let says that except 70 officers aJld 1,000 men taken prirollCrs
'tile w]lOle of the n'l~t of tile garrison llad perishet.l' (ii. 60). Bclma~
(Hi. 502) speaks of !l70 prisoners and says tllat 1,200 were killed, but
acknuwlcdgt.'S tllRt 'some of l!le Spanianls' got away. Vae;llli (v. 187)
saYI> that' many' Spaniards escaped, but that the hulk of six battalions
wcrc destroyed, 1,000 being c.'lllturcd nnd 1,200 slain. TIle governor,
Contreras, says that there were 4,000 men in tIle fort, and that sornewlll~re
nbout 2,000 were killed or IvoullIlcd (p. 248). But tlte fig\lr~ must ]1:J.ve
been lower: lliberia was about 1,500 stroog, Almeria abont 1,200: there
were also 200 gUllIICll'9 in tile fort: tIle total garrison therefore was about
3,000. But at the end of the siege, a mOllt}, later, lliberia surrendered
3lJ8 ul1wounded mcn, and Almcria 464. Thcy must Illwe lost many
hundreds during the last sL" weeks of the leagner, )'et were I>till 832
strong. H is itaI'd to sec lhat l!ley Clln luwe lost more tlllul 1,200 or
1,300 between them on May 2!1, and vcry probably Toreno and Artedle
are right in putting tlu:l total loss at onl}' 1,100 amI odt!' lf so, the killed,
including the gunners, must h.we been ollly between m and 400. 111e
el'cr-accurate Schepcler gives 1,200 for t]le totallos8 (p. 433), and Jsuspent
is nearest of all to the truth. Napier, as usual, merely reproduces Suchet's
figures.
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.'loners were about 970 in number, many wounded, including the
commamler of the fort, Colooel Gomcz, who had reccivcdno k'Sll
than ten bayollctstabs. Three or four hundred men had been killed
-the li'rench had given little quarter during the earlier part of
t.he fighting. The remainder of the garrison had escaped into
the city, by climbing over the low wall of the gorge and running
down the slopes, at the moment of the final disaster, The French
loss, ~cording to Suchet, was only about 325 killed and wounded,
and probably did not greatly exceed that figure. The assailanh
lIRe, it must be confessed, c.xtraordillary luck. If the turning
column hnd not become mingled with thc Spanish reinforcements
it might never have been able to break into the gorge; while
the othel' attack could not ha\'e succLoecled if the governor had
takcn the proper precaution ofcntting the aqueduct, which served
the stormers as a bridge-for the ditch proved wholly imprac-
ticable, and the breach could not be approached.
011 the morning after the ru;sault the spirit of the SpaniArds
was 80 little broken that a sortie wa'i made with the purpose of
retaking the OHm, the survivors of tbe two regiments which
had lost it \'olunteering to heail the attack. Campoverde thought
that the French might be caught before they had made new
(lefences to protect the weak rear face of the fort, but they had
lmilt up the entry of the gorge with sandbags, and the assault
-led by Colonel O'Rollan, a Spanish-Irish officer-was beaten
off with loss, though n few daring men not only reached the
gorge, but scmmbled in through its broken palisades to die
inside the work. All the guns of the upper city were then
turned UpOIl the Olivo, and reduced its rear to n shapeless mass
of earth. But this did not seriously harm the l?rench, who
burrowed into its interior and made themselves strong there.
They only wanted to be masters of the hill because it flanked
their projected approaches in the low ground, and did not intend
to use it as their base for any further ~th'e operations.
After the Olivo disaster Campoveroe held a council of war
(May 30th), and announced to his offit'CI'S that the means by
which Tarrngona could be saved was the collecting of a great
army of succour to faU upon Suchet's rear. He was himself
about to depart, in order to take command of it; Sarsfield's and
Eroles's small detachments, all of which he would collect, must
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fOl'm its llucleus, The soma[ellf!,~ of all ccnti'al Catalonia should
be called in, and the province of Valencia had promised to lend
him a whole dh'ision of regulars, So saying, he departed by sea
along with his staff' and a number of the richer inhabitAnts of
the city (May 31st), General Caro, who had hitherto acted as
governor, was sent to hurry up the Valencians, and the commnnd
of the place wax made over to un offkcr newly arrived froOl
Cndiz, Gencral Junn SCllcn Contrcras I, who by no means liked
the tnsk f\.~signed to him. The garrison was still 8,000 strong,
for just aft.er the fall of the Olivo two battalions of I"Cgllla~
arrived from Valencia 2-the first-fruits of the sllecollrs promised
fl'om that province-and a draft of 400 recruits landed from
lIInjorCll. It sccms to have been a mistake of Cnmpovcrdc to
come to 'l'nrrngonR at all-his presence would have been much
more valuable in the interior, where a supreme commander Wfl.S
much wtlnt<..>d, and while he was shut up ill the fortress (from
:Mny 10th to May 31st) littlc had been done outside. The JuntA
of' Catalonin, no\\' sitting at :llontscITat, had becn issuing mRllY
proclamations, but had not accomplished mueh in the WRy of
gathering in the .mrrwt~ne3.
011 JUlle 3rd CllmpovcNc reached Igllaladu, and establisheu
his head quarters there, but found only 3,000 men assembled
ullder Sarsfield. He sent that geneml off'to Tnrmgona, to act
a~ second in commflud to Contreras, and took over charge of hi.,
fell" battalions; by calling in Eroles, and hunting up de!5Crtcl'~
and dctlwhments, lie had collected in a fortnight 5,280 regular
infantry and 1,183 clwfllr)"-all that there were ofmonnted men
in Catalonia. The whole was much too small a. force to justify
him ill attacking SlIchet in his lines--even when the $()Jlwkmf!s
should come in to join him. All depended on the expected
succours from Valencia, ftI1d they were slow in arriving, Chal'ICii
I See his pamphlet on the defence of Tarragonn ami his own responsi.
hilities, IJrinteU in tlte 3rll volulllo of N61JIQiI¥:/f Imr lit GI/C7I¥: d' Evpagne.
2 Apparently 3rrl battalion of Cazadores de Valencia; an.1 1st b.'1ttalioll
of the Pint regiment of 8.woia. This IllSt must be carefully distinguished
from the 1st battalion of the Sec(Jlld regiment of Savoia, which be1on~
10 the ClItlllull urnlY, llnd hud lIlrcady OOCII brought into TarnlS'0na 011
May 10th by Campoverde. See the history or tIle two ill the Comle lIe
CIOlHml's coloos..'1l work 011 IJlc regimcntalliistories of the Spanish line.
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O'Donnell, the newly appointed Captain-General ofthnt province,
had made up It schcme for drawing oil' Sllchct by attacking his
garrisons in southern Arll.gon, and had gone off early in :May
with his main force ~aainst Ternel. This scheme had no effect
whatever; Suchet had fixed his teeth into TarragonR, and was
not to be distracted by any demonstrations against his more
distant dettlehments, Campoyerde grew so desperate that he
offered to give oyer snpreme command to O'Dollllell, ift-he latter
would come into Catalonia with his whole disposable force, and
begin by lIttaeking lIIora, Sllchet's great depc>t on the Ehro.
The ValelleiiUl Capl:ttin-Genernl, though he refuscd to take this
responsihility, finally agrOO'l to semi a division of regtl1nrs
under General Miranda by sea to join the Catalans. Thi's fOrt:e,
about 4,000 strong, appeared at Tarl'lle.lJ'QnR on June 14th, and
came ashore, but was immediately nfterwurds reshipped by
Campoverde's orrlers, alld transferred to Villmmcnl. cle Sitjes,
where it landed, and marched inland to Igualada to join the
'army of succour,' which by its l;I.rrival was raised to nearly
11,000 regular troops.
WJ)ile ClIlllpoverde was s1owl~' beating up his reinforcements,
Tarragona wag ah-eady in grave danger. The formal attack 011
the lower city began on the night of June ht, when VallCe amI
Hognint, the commanders of the French nrtiller}' and engineers,
declared that they had everything ready. The front selected fOl'
atmck was the two south-westerly bastions, those called Sun Carlos
amI Orleans, but as a preliminary task it was necessary to drive
the Spaniards out of the subsidiary and exlernal defence formed
by the outlying Fort Francoli, at the mouth of the river, and by
the long entrenchment which joined it to the city, with the
lUllctte of the Prince, a very small work, inserted in its midst.
For Fort Frnncoli had a positiOll which would enable it la
enfilade the French trenches when they should draw Ileal' to the
ellL'cillle of the city.
On the night of June Ist the French threw up their first
pnrallel at a distance of only a little ovcr 300 yards from thc
bastion of Orleans: it was connected with the entrenchments
Leyond the Fran'coli by a zig.mg trench. On the seeond night
LllC plIll111cl was completed for a length of 600 }'ards, and thrcc
hatteries hegun in it-olle directed agninst the lunet.te of the
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l','ince and the line joining it t,o Fort l?rnncoli, the other two
against the bastion of Orleans and the adjacent curtain. On
June 31'd the besiebters began to work forward by a flying sap
towards the fort, and by the 7th had pushed their front tl'ench
to within twenty .yams of the work, On that snme dll)' the
lU'tillel'j' began to phy ngninst it, not only from the lIew
bA.tteries, but from the old Olles beyond the river, which had
previously been dircetcU against the fleet. The fort was weakly
built, and a pl'llctiClLble breach was made in its lcft face before
the bombardment had been twelvc hours in progress, Serious
damage had also been done to the long entrenchment connecting
FOl-t Francoli with the lower city. Contreras, rightly ~"1I.rding
the work as untenable, ordered its serviceable broilS to be rcmo\·eJ
the moment uJl:el' dusk set ill, and bade its commander, Colone\
Uotell, to dmw 011' the gan·jsoll, two battalions of the regiment
of Almanza. They withdrew at 8.30, and an hour and a half
later three :French columns charged out of the trenches and
seh:ed the fort I, Thcy wcre surprised to meet with 110 rcsis-
tlmce, not having detected the withdrawal of the Spflniards,
Finding themselves Ilnoppo~d, they trierl to push along the
entrenchment from the fort towards the town, but were stopped,
with some loss, by the guns of the Pl'ilJ(:e lunette,
The Spanish enginccrs had assured Conh-erus that the la\\'-
lying Fort l''rancoli would be untenable Ilnder the fire of the
neighbouring bastion of San Carlos, the battery on the j\{ole Oll
the other side of the harbour, and the hellvy guns of the IIlcn-of-
war. A tierce fire was opened agninst it from all these qUfll"t.el'$,
hilt prO\'ed insufficient to stop the French from hurrowing into
the ruins of the fort, connecting it with their trenches, and
finally building in its right frollt a heavy battery, which bore
along the line of the entrenchment and enfiladed the l>,incc
lunette. This work faced 1l00thward, and exposed only a weak
flank to the attack. Fort Frnncoli having ceased to be all
obstacle, the besiegers could now throw ont a. second parallel
from the first, which they had constructed in front of the bastion
, SUc11Ct in his memoirs conceals tile fact that the fort was alreall)'
al13ndolled WIlCO his troops entere<'l (ii. p. 72). Hut the evidence of
Contreras, Schepeler, 1IIill other SJlullish >lutlloritics is c1C:lr aUlI
unanimous'
1811} RAT'l'ElUNG THE J~OWEll CITY 50D
uf Orleans. Five lICW batteries wcrc pltwcd ill it, somc bearing
011 Orleans, some on Sail Carlos, and one ha\'ing the special task
uf beating dowll the Prince lunette. The Spauish guns in the
lower city answered with a fierce fire which cuuseU lUuch damage
IInd took llIany lives, but the work, nevertheless, \\lent on
unceasingly, On June 16th all the lIew batterieJl were ready to
commence their work.
Coutreras had been much chagrined by the t:omplete failure of
the best cftorts of his artillery to hold back the advunce of thc
enemy, and reports that the morale ofthe tmops was disagreeably
affected by the arrival of the Valencian division of l\Iiranda 011
June 14th uml its pl"Olllpt dcpartUl'c,uftcr staying less thall two
days in the place. The garrison had looked Ilpon it as 1\ season-
able reinforcement, and were dashed in spirits when it made 110
slily with them. It Sl.'CIlIS to ha\'e OC'Cll a complete mistl1kt: to
hu\'e brought these 4,000 men to '!'armgollu nt ull: they should
have been landetl at once in Villanueva de Sitjes to join the
unuy of succour,
~c\'erthelcss the governor did his best to delay the progress
of the :Fl'ench attack, and when his artillery proved illeffective,
1>Cllt out two strong sorties on the 11 th and 14th, which did
~OlJle damaf,"e to the trenches I but were dri \'en hack ill the end,
us \\'IIS inevitable, On the 16th all the new l"rench batteries
lI'erc read)', as well us that in Vort !<'mncoli, and the bomhard-
l1Ient began. The ad\'auced batteries were within H2O yards of
the bastiolls which they were attacking, 1\J1l1 hud a tremcndOllS
cllect. ll)' evelling there was the commencement of a breach in
thc left ffLl'C of the Orleans bastion, and sevcl'al other parts of
the C1ll'cilltc were badly duultlf,"cd, ttS was ulso the Prince IUllcttc.
This had not been e/lected without gl'll\'e loss: one 1"rench
buttery had been silenced, a reserve magar.ille had been blown
up, tUIU the loss in men among the artillery had bl."Cll very heuvy.
NC1'crlheless the assaihmts had the superiority ill the CUIlIlOlllK!C,
and were well SIl.tisfied. After dark the columns of stunners
cllrl'ied the Prince lunette by assault, one of the parties having
slipped round its flank by descending on to the beach, where
I The first waS:1 big affair, a,ooo men undcr &'\1'sficltl takiug Illlrt iu it,
lJU~ olhll)' enough it is not mcntionod by Suche~ or Bolmas.
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II fcw yards at the water's l..-dgc had been left uul"ortifh:d. The
bll.ttulioll of the regiment of Abllitnl':!\ which held the work wru;
practicall)' exterminated, Thus the Spaniards lost the last of
t.he outer protections of TarrllolJ'Oua, and thc captured lunette
becamc thc cmplacement of OIlC morc buttery destined to play
lIpon the bastion of San Carlos (June 17),
It was clear that the crisis was now at hand; the l?rench were
IIOW lodged dose under the walls of the city, and had aJread)'
damaged its enceinte. nut to storm it would be n. costly busi.
lICSS, tlud Colltreras showed no signs of slackening in his energy,
lhough his letters to Campoverde and his narrative of the siege
both show that he thought "cry badly of his position. It was
clear that both sides llIust now utilize their last resources: Suchet
had already ordcn..'<1 up from beyond thc Ebro the brigade of
Abbe, which had hitherto been observing the: Valcllciuns, in
order that its 3,600 men might compcnsate him for the heal'}'
losses that he had suffered 10 Contreras began to call on tile
Capttl.ill-Gcueral vcry hotly for help; at his departure Campo-
\'erde hu.d promised thal lhe army of succour should be pressing
Suchet's rear within seven days, und IlOW seventeen had elapsed
and no siglls of its approach were to be seen. He complained
billerl)' that many of his officers were ftl.iling him; even colonels
hud 6"Olle ofl' by sea to VilltulUcva de Sitjes pretcnding sickllcs>,
or absconding without e\Oen that excuse~, Naturally the spirit
of thc rank and file had snffered from this desertion. There is
good mutemporary Spanish authority for the notion thll.t COlI·
lrerllS himself cOlltriuutL'<1 Wlllcwhat to thc discoul'tlf:,'Clllcnt, by
exhibiting too openly his failing hope, lUld stating that
J'al'ragona must fall in a fortnight if the field army did not save
it 3, But so far' as practical precautions went he did his duty,
I Jt seems lo IHwe al'l'il'cU about JUllC :!O, ill time for tile storm Oil
the :::1sto
~ :See his memoirs, po 273, and Arteche, x. 27,1.
, See espceially &hcpelcr (i. 438), Arlcclle (x. 317) grants that he
1",,1 not Ull' irou rcsolution of Ah'arcz, the gOI·eruor of Gc.rOlla, hut thiuk~
tlHlt 116 did Ilis llOllCSl best, and this [ think e~lll llilrilly be denie,1. lJi~
own nllrl'lItivc is simple lIud 1lI0de>t, Lut tloe> 1I0t \;Ollccal U1C fact lllllt he
lI'a~ from tIle lil.,;t tlowlllIClIl'h:ol, <111\1 fc;,l'cU the worst. NIIJlicr (Hi. UO)
calJ~ him '·l\ciIIilliug and deceitful. There ill WIUC fQUllllati';lll fQr the
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strengthened the damaged pluces ill the witH:; w; best he could,
uud demted mllch energy to seeing that the troops were properly
paid and fed, and that the breaches were mined, and protected
to the real' by cuttillgs and trtwerses, Very different was the
conduct of Campoverde, who showed that he was absolntely
unfit for command by his miserable conduct during the critical
weeks, After having ixleu joined by i\1iranda':; Valellcian clivi-
~ion on June 16th he had 11,000 regulut, troops under hi:; hand,
n force insufficient to meet Suchet in the open field, but quite
large enough to give the French gru\'e trouble-indeed to make
the continuance of the siege impossible if it were properly
lUUldlcd. But to bring cflCcti\'e pressure upon the enemy it wa:;
necessary to come lip close to him, and Campoverde for mall)'
tlay~ tried a policy which was bound to fail. He kept far away,
cut Suchet's communication by placing himself at Momblancb,
and sent El'oles and other officers to molest the French detach-
Illents on the Lower Eb]'o and to cut oft' the convoys <..'oming up
from Tol'tosa and Lerida. Apparently he hoped that thesc
tlisw'ut diversions would cause Suchet to draw off' great part of
his army from the siege, in order to SUCCOUr his outl)'illg posts.
But the French general did nothing of the kind, and took lIO
llotiee of the loss of convoys, or the danger to remote depOts; he
~tuck tight to the siege, and at this very time, by calling up
Abbe's brigade from the south to Tarragona, he had dclibemtely
]"iskcd c\·en more than before on the side of Valencia. Between
the 16th and the ~4th June, the critical days in the siege,
Call1povcrde and his 11,000 mell hud uo efleet whate\'er Oil the
course of operations, Yet he kept sending messages to Contreras
promising him prompt assk.'taIlCe, and on the 20th bade him
disJ»lteh Snrsfield out of the city, to t\..SSume commalld of his old
division in the fighting which WAA just about to begin. That
fighting never took place-to the Captain-General'l; eternal dis-
grtLCc-for at the la:;t moment he flinched from placing himself
within engaging distancc of' Suchet. It seems clenr that hi:; true
policy was to push much closer to the enemy's lines, ~ us to
force the Freudl lo collie out agaimt him, and then eithe]· to let
romll:r charge (sce p" ,)13 below), but tilt latter SCClDS Ilujllstihllblc. Thc
ouly evidence brought to justify the accusatiou C1l1l be cxpl'lillcd 'I\..ar
(~cc UJdriugtOll'S lCUC1"S ill thc lIPI)cmlil.: tu Kallicr, vu\. Hi).
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them attack him in some strong position in the hills to the
north-east of 'l'arr8/:,"Ona, where their cavalry would have been
use1es~ or el~ to a void an engagement by a timely retreat wben
Suchet should havc ~n drnwll well away from the fortress. In
either case he would have compelled his adversary to draw so
many men away from the siege that it could not have proceeded.
For it would have been useless for Suchet to march agaillst him
with less than 7,000 or 8,000 men, and tile toW of the besieging'
1t1'1I1y had dwindled down to 16,000 by this time, wllile Abbe"s
reserye brigade had not yet come up. Probably, as Napier
suge,resls, a blow at the French maga~illes and hospitals at Reu:;,
ollly tell miles from Tarr~auna, would lum:~ fon"Cd Suchet to
dralv oH'two divisions for a fight, and Campoverde need lIot
ha\·c accepted it, unless he had fOllnd himself some practically
impregnable position. But to skulk in the hills mUllY miles
away aud send detachments against outlying Frcnch post1i could
havc 110 cffect.
·While Campoverde hesitated, Suchet took the lower city of
'l'arr~aulla by a vigorous effort. At seveu o'clock on the even-
illg of the 21st the assault was delivered by five storming.columns,
composed of the massed grenadier and voUigeur (:olllpanies of
all his French regiment.~ 1,500 strong, and supported by a
hrigade under General Montmarie. There were now two good
breaches in the bastions of SIllJ Carlos and Orleans, the curtain
between them had also bccn much injured, and eyen the l··uerte
neal, the inner stronghold behind the Orleans bastion, had
been damaged by shot and shell which passed over the outer
works. Contrenu; had seut dowlI iuw the lower city 6,000 out
of the 8,000 men who werc still at his disposition, and had
handed over the charge of them to Sarsfield, the officer who had
the best reputation in the whole of Catalonia. But by nu ill-
dllLlllOC there was nctually 110 ouc ill command whell the assaull
was delivered. Campoverde's dispatch recalliIlg Sarsfie:Id to the
field army had come to hand that morning, and COlltreras,
thinkiug himself bowld to obey it, sent Sarsfield a ~sport to
leave the city, and designated General Velasco to take his place.
Sarsfield, whose courage cannot be impeached, but whose judge-
ment was evidently at fault 011 this afternoon, left at Olll'C,
embarking on board a boot in the harbour at three o'clock,
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without going to see Contreras 01' waiting for the arrival of the
officm' who was to supersede him. He merely sent for the senior
Loo!oncl in the lower city, handed over the command to him,
and put out to sell. at n moment's notice, Four hours later,
when the storm took place, Contreras was 110t aware that Sars-
field had yet departed, and Velasco, coming down to take cha~
of the troops, found himself in the middle of the fighting before
he bad reached the walls, or discovered the manner in which
their garrison was distributed. There was clearly something
wrong here-apparently Sarsfield and Contreras were not on
good terms, and the former acted with small regard for the
welfare of the service I.
At seven o'clock 8uchet let loose the storlllers, who were led
by the Italian General Palombiui, while, to distract the attention
of the galTison to other points, he ordered n geneml bombnrd-
ment of the northern front, and showed a column on the side of
Fott Olivo, The assault was immediately sllcce$sful at both
the critical poinbi: thc forlorn hope on the side of the Orleans
hastion, starting from its ditch, went up the breach like n whirl-
wind, losing somewhat from the mnsketry fire of the defenders
but not from their cannoll, foL' all had been silenced. The
SpiUliards wcre clcared out so quickly from the bastion that
, Toreno (ii. p. 544) makes out that the fault was with Contreras, and
Napier, who ul!e{l far morc violent language, f;3ys tlmt he < acted a shameful
part, ... 1be assault was momentarily e~pected, ret he ordered Sarsfield
to embark immediate})', averring that lie lIad Campoverdc's peremptory
commands. Sarsfield remonstrated vainly, saying that tlIe troops would
00 left l.o au inefficient subordinate, hut wag compelled to embark, and
Velasco, coming a few hours later, found only the dead bodies of his
g:J.rriSOIl. Contrcras then llSSUr(:ll Codrington ami tllC Junta that Sarsfield
had /{One without orders, and betrayell his post!' '11lere is much mis_
representation in tllis: (I) Contreras lmd CampOl'erde's r;onlln<l!l(l to
semi him Ssnfield withuut delay. (2) He passed the order on to Sarsfield,
but did not know that the latter had gOlle off, without waiting a moment.,
after scnding him R note to say that Don Jose Carlo~, the senior colonel
in the lower city, was incompetent to take command. Naturally
Contrera.~ thought tllat SarsJicM lI'ouM llRVa waited to see Velasco and
hand over the troops to him. (3) Therefore Contreras was correct in
tariug to the Junta tl,at Sarsfield dcp.'lrtcd <sin COllooimiellto mio,'
thougll he had seut him a passport to leaye the toWII. See Artoche,
ix.288-9.
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they had not time to fire two mines, which would ha\'e
blown up the breach and the storming-column if they had
worked. They rallied for a few minutes at the gorge, but were
drh'en from it by the French reserve, who poured into the town,
At the San Car'los breach matters went almost as rapidly; the
first attacking column was checked, but when the second SU(r
ported it, the united mass carried the breach and burst into the
town; a retrenchment and a row of palisades erected behind the
breach were crossed in face of a half-hearted defence. All the
columns having penetrated within the walls, those who turned
to the left attacked the Fuerte Real, the weak and somewhRt
damaged work which scrved as citadel to the lower city:
it was carried by assault without any great difficulty, partly
because its earthen ramp had been somewhat dam~O'Ed by
the bombardment. and could be climbed at some points, but
more because the gun-isoll defended themselves very badly, and
gave way when they saw that the streets on their flanks and
behind them were inundated by the enemy. The other section
of the stormers, inclining to their right, mm'ed towards the
mole and the large magazines at its base, where they met
General Velasco, who had only arrived at the moment that Ule
assault began, with the Spanish reserve. There was fierce fight-
ing here for a moment, but, turned by a column which had passed
around their flank by the quay tlt the water's edge, Velasl..'O's
men broke like the rest. The whole of the garrison rushed up
the slope, towards the oue gate which leads into the upper city,
and finally entered it under cover of a heavy fire kept up from
the neighbouring ramparts. Contrera!l reports that some of the
pursucrs camc on so 6ercely that thc)' were shot down while
actually battering at the closed gate.
The losses of the two parties were about equal in numbers-
Contrcras reports that he found no more than 500 and odd men
missing when the ba.ttalions from the lower city were reassem-
bled; Suchet gives 120 killed and 362 wounded as his total loss,
The casualties on both !Iides would have been heavier if tllC
garrison had fought better-but it is clear that, when the
breaches were once gained, no serious a.ttempt was made to
defend the Fueete Real, the retrenchments, or the barricaded
houses of the lower city. Only Velasco's resene battaliolls
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made any fight in the streets; the rest fled early, The French
might perhaps have llll\de more captures-they only took 200
wounded prisonerg-if they had not turned at once to plunder-
ing the houses und magazines. But they fell into great dis-
order; many of the unfortunate inhabitants of the quarter about
the port were not only stripped of their goods but murdered,
Ilnd a great number of dwellings were wantonly set Oil fire.
Eighty gUllS were captlll'Cd 011 the walls of the lower city, amI
n great quantity of food and stores in the depots along the
quay. But the soldiel'S destro)'ed more than was saved-espe-
cia-Hy in the wine stores.
Not the least disastrous result of this unhappy affair was that
the haroour was now closed to the Spaniards, The English
men-of-war and the native merchant vessels which had hitherto
sheltered under the west end of the molc had to put out to sea.
The traders went ofI' to ViJlanueva, MinorCil, or Valencia, but
Codrington's squadron sought the bare roadstead off 1\1 ilagro
Point, under the precipitous southern face of the upper city.
Here there werc no quays, and when thc sea was rough it was
impossible to land. But in ordinary weather boats could com-
municate freely with the shore, and Tarragona was not yet
deprived of its access to the water, though that access had
become dHlicult and dangerous. Suchet proceeded to make it
more so on the 23rd, when he erected a battery, near the base of
the mole, to play on the roadstead. Landing, howe\'er, was made
rather exciting than dangerous by these guns, which IIc\'cr did
much harm.
On the morning after the storm of the lower city the French
cngineers began to make suryeys for the attack on the inner line
of defence of 'l'arragona. Its strength lay in its commanding
position, and in the fact that along many parts of its short
front the ground just below it was too steep and too rocky to
allow of approaches being COllstl'\lCted on it. Its wcaknCS:l was
that the wall was weak and old-a seventeenth-centnry work
built only to resist the cannon of that day. There was no ditch
or other outer defence, unless !\ hedge of prickly aloes counted as
slIch, The front was composed of fOllr bastions; counting from
north to south they were named San PabIo, San Juan (at whose
left side lay the only gate), Jesus, and (homlltes. The Inst
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named overhung the precipitolls cliff looking down to the.'!ell
abm'e Milagro Point. The French engineers reported in faxonr
of making the attack on the curtain wall between Sun Juan and
San Pnblo, the ground here being less steep than elsewhere, llnd
showing soil whtch could be dug into; there was also some
cover to be found, in half-ruined houses alollg the road up to
.thc gate. Morcovcr the othcr, or southcl'll section of the wall,
was not only on a steeper ascent, but might be exposed to high-
trajectory fire from the ships in the roadstead below. '!'he first
parallel, therefore, WIlS thrown up opposite San Juan alld San
rabIo, with a communication to the rear covered by the build-
,ings and gardens along the road, and three batteries were
planned in it, and commenced on June ~th. A fourth batter)',
flown in the plain outside the city, was to co-operate by a flank-
ing fire llphill.
This day saw Campoverde's first and last demonstration in
favour of the gnlTison. It was a misemble affair. Driven to
do something by Contreras's appeals, and by the opeJll)' dis-
pla~'ed discontent of his own army, he at last drew in close
to the French lines. On the fZSrd his arm)' marched from
Momblanch to Villarodona, fifteen miles north-east of l'arra-
gOlla. On the Ilext day it was divided into two columlls; the
find. (composed of Mil'allda's Valenciall division) marched oyer
the hills, with orders to fall upon the encampments of Harispe's
Italian brigades 011 the north-east side of the French lineli.
The second, 01' Catalnn division, under Sarsficld, wilh which
\Vent the Captain-General himself, marched by another road
more to the east, and was to come into line 011 Miranda's
left. ::\feunwhile ContrerWl II'US to make a sally out of tIle
castcl"Jl side of Tarragona with 4,000 mcn of thc garrisoll, and
to attack Harispe's rear when he saw his fmnt engaged with
the' army of succour.' Both Campoyerde's columns reached
the points designated for them, Miranda getting ulJopposed
to Pallnresos, and the second division to Cattlar, three miles
further east. Suchet, warned by his outlying cavalry, COII-
L'Cutrated Harispc's and part of Frcl'C's divisions ill the relll"
of his lincs to the }~rellch left of Fort Olivo, leaving Haberl,
Abbe, and the rest of Frere's troops to bold the lower city and
the trenches. His Iinc, composc<1 of some 8,000 men inchuling
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all his cavalry, was plainly visible buth to the Spaniards out·
side ulld those within the cit)" and Contl'ems formed his sully-
ing column ready tornsh down when the first cannon-shot should
he heard. But l\firulldu, 011 finding himself in tOllch with the
enemy, sellt back llIc:lsngt'S to the efloct that he was not sure of
hi:; route, that the French seemed very strong, and that he dared
not advance. Instead of depriving him of his command, and
then bringing up the second column to the help of the first,
Campovcrde, td\c.r SOIllC hesitation, gave him leave to dmw back,
fl1ld both divi.sions retired. that night to Vendrils, ten miles to
the rear, ill the ea~tern hills. Not a shot had been fired, ant!
Contrerns, whose men had been waitiug under arms the whole
anernoon, had to draw them back into the city without having
seen fl single Illall of the relieving army, which, though ollly fOlll'
miles all'ar, wa~ hiddell frolll him by the intervcning hills. So
ended l\, day of gretlt peril for Suchet, who wit.h 11,000 lIlell in
front 01' hilll, tUlJ 4,000 lllorc ready to attack his 1'001', mighl;
well have stdlered a disaster, 01' at lel\St bavc proyetl lltlnble to
prerellt the jUlletiOll of the two hostile forces. :1"01' the Spalliards
wel'C not bound to descend and attack him ill the plain, but
might han! ml\,IlCCUHOO ulong the hills and forccO him to take
the oflimsi\'e ill 1IIlfa\'ollrable ground, nndm' pRin of seeillg
them break his blockadillg line. Codrington sUllImed up the
situation by writillg to his chief, Pcllew, that' thc l\i!lrquis
[Campo\'erde] blamed Generals Miranda and Caro, whilc thc
latter retorted the accmation, and I am incIine<1 to think by
giving full credit to what each says of the other, Ilcithel' will
suller ignominy l~yolld that to which his eonduct Ims cntitletl
him,' For 'l'arragolltl, as Contrcrns 11'1\5 trilly repeating in every
dispatch that hc scntout, was in imminent dangcl', and if the army
ut' Succour did nol; givc it immediate help might fall ut all)'
moment. The city, as a matter offad, was taken 'only fOlll' days
later. ~
Campoverde, however, had now formeJ. the tvnelusion that he
WM still too wcak to attack Suehet. He wrote orders to Colllreras
to send him out of thc city his two best regimellUi, I1iberia and
Almeria, and General Vc!aSt'O to cOllllnalld them, He made a
desperate appeal to the 8Q1lwtenes to rally to his L'()lours, which
had little eflect, for bis reputation wns now gonc, nnd he was sus-
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pectcd of timidity or cvcn of trcasOll, Finally he f,'Ot Hell'S that
there was a small British expeditionary force in CaLalan walers,
and sent his lieutcnant Ero1es to sea, to look for it, and to
im'ite it to land at Villanueva and join him. In a week or so
he would have 20,000 men, as he snpposed, and would then try
wmethillg desperate. Meanwhile, uuj u:slly suspecting Coutreras
of cowardice, he sent secret lctters into Tarragontl to the bri-
gadier-generals of the garrison, bidding them depose and coufine
the goYemor if he showed signs of capitulating, Disgusted
at this move, the generals showed the epistles to Contr~ras,
who was driven still deeper into despair by seeing that the
Captaiu-Gcnerul distrush..-d him, regarded his views Illl to the
danger of the city as exaggerated, and was evidently dcferring
"UCCOUl' for an indefinite period, Nevertheless he coucealed his
knowledge of the plan for his deposition, and prepared, under
protest, to send thc regiment of Almeria. off'by sea; to dispatch
Iliberia also he refused, saying that his f,rarrison was already
insufficient. But rough weather on the 21th prevented thc
regiment fl'OlIl cmbarkillg fl'OlIl the uangerous Milagro road-
stead, which WIlS unapproachable by boats during IUI ellSt wind.
Suchet, frced from a dire l'cspollsibilit:r by the disappearance
of the army of succour on the night of the 24th, resolved to
hurry matters, lest it should prescntly come fQl'ward again ill
greater strength. On the following day the siebre troops pmlled
forward by zigmg approaches to within 150 yards of the wall
of the upper city, and commenced n second parallel in front of
the curtain between San J mill and San Pa.blo. This was done
under n. hot and effective fire which cost many lives; the com-
pletion of the projected batteries, and more especially the haul-
illg of their canllOll up steep slopes and among ruins, took more
lime than the cngineer oflicers had calculated to be necc$sar)'.
It was not till the mOl'lling of the ~8th thut thc twenty-two
heavy guns destined for the breaching had been got into place,
and that the fire was opened.
These thrcc days, the 25th-26th-~7thof JUlIe, were a time of
agony for the unfortunate Colltl'eraS, who \\'1IS distracted from
his primary duty of preparing to receive the ussault by baving
to deal with Campovenle's plot fol' deposing him, and otllcr
problems, The most important of these was the arrival ill the
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roadstead 011 the 26th of a flotilla, which brought 110t only some
small reinforcements from Valencia and Murcia, but about 1,100
British infantry 1 and a half-company of artillery wldcr Colonel
Skcrret. This little force had been sent by General Graham
from Cadiz at the desire of the Regency, which was seeking
ill all quu.rtcrs for help for Tnrrngona. Colonel Skerrct had
Gmham's orders to do everything that could be done for the
place, shOlt of placing his detachment in any position where it .
was exposed to seriou~ danhJ'Cl' of having to capitulate, i.e. he
WRS fOl'bidden to land it if he should think Till'l'f1gona untenable,
unless he judged himself able to bring off the troops by sea in
the moment of disaster. On the morning of his arrival the
woother was so rough that no boat could get in to the shore, and
communication with Contrerns was opened up by a snilor who
Sll'am ashore with a letter. The governor thus found himself
offered the aid of the British force if he would guarantee that it
would be able to escape should the tO\l'l1 jail_a most hamper-
ing collditioll. In the evening, the surf having somewhat
aba.ted, Colonel Skerret callle ashore, and was joined next morn-
illg by illl engineer allJ an Hortillery offit:er, as also by General
Charles Doyle, and by Codrington, the cOlllmander of the
British squadl'Oll off the Catalonian coast. They conferred with
Colltl'eras, who told them that he feared the town was untenable,
and that he intended, ",hen the walls should be breached, not to
make a prolonged defence, but to sally ont of the Barcelona
gate, and to tr)' to cut his way to join Campoverde. He thought
that the sortie Illust succeed, since the French would be intent
on a storm on the westerll side of'the fortress, and would never
expect an attack to be delivered at the same moment from its
easteru side. He therefore invited Sket'ret to land his 1,200 men
and take part in the enterprise. Dut if he prefel'l'ed to join
him in withstanding the allproaching storm by the French, he
might choose whatever point he liked in the enceinte, and
defend it. It is clear that "ttt this moment the goverllOl' was
himself hesitating between the two alternatives, and that it
I 'Ille troops were the 2/47tl" a debchment of the 3/95tl" ami aome
light companies lent by the governor of Gibraltar, 1,147 in all, countiug
t.he guuuerg. See Graltam's dispatclJes to I..ord Liverpool amI to Colouel
Skerret of June 14th, 1011.
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relieved his mind to tlu'Ow the responsibility of choiec on
Skerret.
The British officers, military and llaval, spent the aftel'llOOIl
in going round the city. They agreed with Contreras that the
wall was weak alld likely to be breached without llIuch diflicuHy,
This being so, was it consistent with Graham's directions to
land the troops? "l'he sOltie might fail, and the garrison,
Spanish and English, might be driven hack into the town and
captured. A defence of the breach might also fail, and in that
case it would be almost impossible to get off' the troops by sea,
since jf Skerret's own single boat had had the greatest difficult},
in coming ashore in the surf, it was certain that mallY boots,
hastily Illallned and crammed with soldiers, and escaping under
the fire of the pursuing French, woulJ comc to grief on a large
scale. Skerrct and Codringtoll, after much consultation,
resoh'cd that they dared not bring the British troops asllOrc,
for they could Ilot guarantee that the men could be taken away
agalll. They therefore refused both of Contreras's alternati,'c
offers. Just at this moment Baroll Eroles arrivL"'<1 from ClllllPO-
verde, with an appeal to Skerret to land at Vilhmuenl. de Sitjes
find join the 'army of SUccollr.' 'With Codrington's approval
the colonel consented to do so 1, and set sail northward early ill
the morning of the 28th, It call1lot be disputed that this wllole
business WM most unhappy in its results. That a llritish force
should appear in the roadstead for g6 holli's, and then depart
without landing a man, appeared to the garrison of'l'arragolla to
prove that their own condition was hopeless. If there had heen
a reasonable hope of defending the toWIJ successfully, ttS t1wy
argued, the British would have come ashore. Their depal'tUftj
eaused deep discouragement, and Contreras was no doubt right in
stating that next after Campoverde's conduct that of Skerret
1 'J1Lat Utis represents pretty accurately what happened is, I thiuk,
clear from the CQmpari801l of Codringtoll's very full letter to General
Graliam (see llis Lif~, i. 225), Skerret's report to Graham and the Hegency
(printed ill Arteehe, ix. PII. 544-5), ami Contreras's OWlI uarratil'e of the
siege. This \'crsion.. as it will be seen, differs (rolll tlmt of Kapier, -rho
is much harder 011 Skel'ret than lie deseTl"cs-though the colouelwas 311
unlucky officer amI distrusted loy his subordinates (see c. g. Sir Harry
Smith's autobiography, i. pp. llB-I9).
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was the most acti,'c CUllse of' the dClllOralil',l.ltioll which the
garrison showed on the next day, Tt would have been fill' better
that the expedition should,ne\'er have appeared, Yet it is hard
to blame Skerrct or his adviser, Codringtono They had Gra·
ham's orders that the mcn were not to be placed in n position
where they might have to capitulate, and it could not be
disputed that Tarragona on June 27th was slIch a position I.
It would havc been better not to tie Skerret's hands by any
conditions, and to leave him free t:o aet as he thought best for
the interest of Great llribl.in and Spain, The addition of 1,100
steady infantry to the fOlx:e defending the breaches might '·Cl'y
possibly havc wrecked Suchet\ assault; even if their eflort had
failed, the loss of two battalions would have been 0. lesser shock
la British pre,;,tige in eastern Spain than their withdrawal into
ignominious safety at thc moment of' danger,
Conherus spent the fe\\' hours that remained tu him ultel'
tikerret's departme in hesitation between the idea of cnttillg hi"
way out of TaM'agona along the eastern road, and that of
defending the town to the last possible moment, He finally
rcsohed that he would hold the walb for onc dlly 0111)', and
would evacuate the city 011 the night of the 28th, if the l~rellch
had made any impression during the first twent)'-folll' hours of
the bombardment. The main body of the garrisOll, divided into
three l:ollllnns, was to make its exit from the Hosario gate,
while 1,400 men remained to hold the walls as long as they
could, with orders to save themselves if possible and follow the
rest when the enemy should break in. Ofiicers alld men alike
were informed ot' this, and had their destined positions in the
80rtie explained to them. It seems likely that the knowledge
that they were intended to abscond in a few hours made the
troops less obstinate in their defence when the assault came.
But meanwhile Contl-cras made proper preparation for holding
hack the enemy till the destined time of departlll·e. He told off'
I The critical phrase of Graham's instructions to Sklm'et wa~: 'YOll
will beforc landing your dctachlllC!nt state to tlu:l gOl'crnor tllu1 you Illust,
have at all times free and open communication with his Majestr's ships of
war: aud in tILC cvcn1 of the IJlacc bcillg uuder the nccessity of ISnr-
rCl\(lenng, that you aro at liberty to witllllraw tIle troops on board the
Eaid ships prel'iou.s to t11e cal,itulatioll.' 'Illc onJCrl; arc dau....l JUlle 14..
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his best regiments to the exposed front:, and constrncted a second
line of defence behind it, by barricading and loopholing the
houses of the Rambla, the broad street above the enceinte, and
by blocking the narrow lanes which lead up to it WiUI bllrrels
filled with stones, so that from wall to wall therc was a con·
timlolls inncr fortification. But all this was a tcmp0l'Ury arrange.
ment-the garrison was to hold out till night onlJ" and then
CSClLpe by a great sortie.
Unfortunately the sortie was never made--for Suchet pushed
matters so fast that the bombardment and the assault were aU
over in twelve hours. The twenty-two guns in the breaching
batteries opened at da,vn, and soon began to damage the weak
old walls in the most effective style. The French had originally
intended to make two breaches, one to the left in the curtain neal:
the San Publo bastion, the other to the right nearer the bastion of
San J nail. Dut finding the latter hard to complete owing to the
misdirection of one of his batteries, Suchet had the whole force
of the batterillg tUnJed on to the spot Ilearer to San })ablo, whicll
he regarded as most fllvourable for his purpose. By four o'clock
ill Lhe IlftCI1100Jl there was a breach O\'cr 30 feet brolld Ilt this
point, all the gUllS ill the adjacent flanks of the two bastions had
been silenced, and nearly all those alo1lg the whole front. Tht!
explosion of a powder magazine had completely wrecked tht!
Cenalltes bastion at the other end of thc Spanish linc. Not.
withstanding that the musketry fire pt' the gnrrisoll WtlS still
llllsnbdued, and that the breach was not "cry wide, Sllchet
determined to risk all, by assaulting the place in the later hour'll
of the long summer afternoon. Three columns, each composed
of 400 men of the compoglliu (rt:lile of various rcgimcnts, were
sent forward into the advanced trenches: 1,200 men more under
General Habert crept up to the shelter of the front houses of the
lower city. A separate force of five battaliolls under General
Montmade marched outside the walls, and placed itself in the
low ground facing the Rosario gate, hut out of gUll-shot. This
colulllll was to advance towards that gate if the assault succeeded,
and was to be admitted by the stormers, if they won their WU)'
into the north.west Illlg1e of the upper city, just behind the
breach, from which the gate was not far distant.
At five o'clock the three storming-columns burst out from
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three separate points of the trenches and raced for the breach,
which the,)" rca.clll.'d by 110 lIIC8.lIS simultancollSl>', for two of thcm
were somewhat hindered by the aloe hedge below the wall,
which had 1I0t been entirely broken down by the bombardment.
They receiYed a tremendous musketr>' fire from the whole front,
but onl)' three gUlls in the left side of the San Juan bastion
plied thcm with grape: the rest of the Spanish artillery had
been dismounted or disabled. Contrcrns had filled the breach
with the remains of the two battalions of Provincial Grenadiers
of Castile, a corps which had been serving with credit in Cata-
lonia since the autumn of ]808; in support was the regiment of
Almerin, also reckoned a good unit. The important retrel1ch~ ,
ment in the Rnmbla was held by the regiment of Ahmmm; of
the rest of his force there was a less proportion along the front
of attack, and a gretltcr proportion placed on the unussailcd
south and north flanks of the city thall wns wise, Troops should
ha\'e been heaped ullsparingly upon the breach.
'I'he first :French columll that reached its destinalion came Oil
ill some disorder, got hmf-way up the crumblillg debris 011 thc
breach, and recoiled under the musketry fire from it~ crest, Uut
when the others arrived, and General Habert and a crowd of'
uUler ofiiccrs put themsclves tIt the head of the mass, and iL.J.
a second assault, it was successful. The stormers rolled over
the summit of the breach and trampled down the Provincial
Grenadiers, The regiment of Almeria, which had been placed
behind in colulllll, with orders to charge the enemy with the bay-
onet the moment that he broke through, gave way-according
to Contrerns-without carrying out his command. The main
body of the French then swept down into the street behind the
breach, but some turned to their left to try to opcn the Rosario
gate to Montmarie, and others made to their right and swept the
ramparts as far as the Cervantes bastion. The Spaniards had
rallied at the retrenchmcllts along the line of the Ramblll, alld
made here a better defence ~hall on the fm' more tellable walls.
The assault had succeeded in half an hour I-the strC<!t-fighting
I Codrington, looking Oil from Ili~ ship, says that the storm succeeded
'almost immediately,' and that' from the rapidity with \\<hich they {the
"'rench] Cllwroo, J fe."lr tllCy mct with hut littlc oppoaitioll.' (fA/e, i. 227.)
This is borne out by Contreras's 'narrative.
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which followed wus prolonged aud bitter, Dut when the Freudl
resen'es arrh'ed and entered the upper city, the banicaded
street was passed, the Rosario gate was burst open, so that Mont·
marie's column got in upon the Spanish flank, and the resishuJ~c
went to pieces. Contrcras, manfully trying to bring lip a hat-
talion of Savoia, hi~ last intact regiment, for a charge, WM
bayoncted and takcn prisoner. Olle of the divisional generals,
Courten, bethinking himself of the proposed sortie that was
to have taken place that evening, led out a disorderly remnant
01' 3,000 mcn by the Barcelona gate, and tried to cscape along the
seashore. They had not gotfar when they ran into olle of I-lurispe's
Italian brigades and some squadrons of clw.8s/:1tl"S acheval, whieh
had been set to watch this obvious bolt-hole. 'Vhen checked,
some of the demoralized troops trit.oO to turn back towards the
city, others dispersed ltnd 811'0\'C to get away across thc hill"
some hundreds stripped, (md endctwotll'cU to swim ou1 to lhe
British ships, which were lying in the l\1ilagro roadstell.d 1.
A fail' number of these were :mved by the boats of the Blake
and her consorts, which ran inshol'C to pick them up. Bul
UlUllY morc were cut down by thc French t.1lvt\lr)' 011 the bench,
l.Uld it was somc time before the excited riders would give
CJllarter. and accepted the surrender of Courten and the sur-
vi\·ors. General Velasco, the second-in-command in the city,
had thc luck to cscu.pe 8.Cl'OSS thc mountains lJmo~t alone, and
brought the bad news to Campo\'erdc.
While this ineffective attempt at a sally was hI progress, the
street-fighting in the cit.)' above was still going on. Isolated
bodies of the Spallianls Illude a most desperate resistancc:
Colonel Gonzalcs, the brother of Carnpovcrde, attempted to
hold out in the cathedral with 800 men, but was killed with all
followers after a brave resistance. The fact that many small
parties defended themselves fOl' a time in barricaded private
houses gave the French all cxc~sc for something that almost
amounted to the systematic massacre ot' non-combatants, All
the larger dwellings were broken open, whether shots had been
fired from their windows or IlO, und a b"I'eat proportion of their
inhabitants murdered. Of the 4,000 corpses which littered thc
I For details of this sally see Codrillgton's letter of July :W iu his J,if~,
i. 1" 228,
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streets of Tarragolla morc than half were those of ci vilians, and
nccoroing to the Spanish official report 450 women and children
were among the slain 1. As onc Spanish authority bitterly
remarks, the victorious stormers generally gave quarter to any
mall wearing a ulliform, and let off their fury on priests and
llnarmed citizens. Plunder WflS even lllore gcnerallhan murder,
and there was the inevitable accompaniment of drunkenness and
rape. Knowing what happened at Badajoz in AprilI8H~, it is
not for the British historian to dilate with too great moral
indignation on the doings of Suchet's soldiery. Suffice it to say
that all the atrocities afterwards seen I~t nadajm~ were suffered
by the unhappy people of Tarragona, and that the actual
slaughter of 'lion-combatants was much greater-about 100
inhabitants ate belie\"(!d to have been murdered at Badajoz, morc
than 2,000 in the Catalonian city. Spanish authorities state
that the Poles alld Italians behaved decidedly worse than the
native French. The offieers Illude SOllle attempt to eheck the
orgic, but (like the British at Bailttjoz) they failed; riot and
slaughter went, on nil night, and it was not till the next day that,
order was restored. One of the most dreadful incidents of the
I'oonn was that many individuals, both soldiers and civilians,
tried to escape to the Milagro roadstead by climbing down the
precipitous south front of the city, and, losing their footing,
were dashed to pieces or mortally maimt."<1. ou the beach below.
'rhe gllrdson, owing to the last-rccch'oo reinforcements, was
o\'er 10,000 strong at the moment of the storm; as Suchet
Recounts for more than 8,000 prisoners 2, the actual loss at the
storm canllot have bccn much o\'er ~,OOO mcn. But to the 10,000
Spaniards killed 01' cnptured on June 28th we mnst add the
losses of the galTison during the earlier operations. It seem;;
that thc Army of CatuJonilllost in all 14,000 or 15,000 men in
this disastrous siege. A certain amollnt of the wounded, how-
evCl', had been sent off from time to time on English shipil to
;\[ajorca and other safe destinations, and survived to fight au-
other day, The French casunlties during the siege amonnted
I '111ose who like to sup ordlOrrors may read the original dOl':ument in
Arleclre'g AIlpelldix X to his tentlr \'O!lllUC, PI). 54H-8.
'See taMe XX in Appendix.
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to 924 killed and 3,372 wounded-a tot.aI of 4,296 1• This
was a very heM')' proportion out ~f the ~Q,OOO men 1 who were
from first to last engaged in the operations; and if the sick, who
are not included in Suchet's report along with the wounded, are
deducted iTom the survivors, it is elenr that the army must hll.\·e
been reduced to a dangerously low figure by June ::i!8th, and that
the Spanish authorities 2 who estimate the total loss of their
enemies at 6,000 cannot be far out.
Dut the effect produced WM worth the effort whieh had been
made: nearly two-thirds of the regular troops of the Army of
Catalonia had been destroyed. The great fortress., whieh for three
yeurs had bccn the base of the Spanish resistanee, had beeu taken:
there was now no considerable place left in the handsof the putriots
-Solsonn, Dcl'ga, Cnrdona, Seo de Urgel, and the other towns
which they still retained were of small importance. They had
lost their one fortified harbour, and for the future their com-
munication by sea with Valencia, the Balearic Isles, and the
British fleet, could only be conducted hastily and, as it were,
surreptitiously; for allY port, to which their forces in the inland
might descend for a mOUlent, was always liable to be attacked
and ~eized by a French flying column. How nearly the spirit of
resistance was crusbed in the principulity by the stunning blow
which Sachet had inflicted will be shown in our next chapter.
Meanwhile, having reorganized his troops, and determined
that the upper town of Tarragontl should be fortified and
garrisoned, but the hnrbour tOWll dismantled tllld abondoned,
the French commander was at liberty to proceed further
with his scheme for the conquest of eastern Spain. But
there was bound to be some preliminary delay before he could
deliver his great blow against Valencia. One brignde had to be
told oft' to escort the 8,000 Spanish pt;soners to SamgoSSfl.;
another had to return to the south to deal with the insurgents
of Aragoll, who had been left comparatively unmolested while
Abbe was drown off to the 6iege. Suchet himself-soon to be II
marshal, for the Emperor CArried out his promise that 'he should
find his baton within the walls of Tarragona '-marched with
somc 7,000 or 8,000 men, all that was lcft disposable, to open
I See table XX ill Appendix.
t e. g. see Schepeler, i. 343, alld Arteche, x. 314.
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lip communications with Barcelona. Before his departure he had
11 curious interview with Colltreras: the wounded general, brought
before him on a stretcher, was reproached with having violated
the laws of war by persisting in the defence of an untenable
town when capitulation bud been his bounden duty! 'l'he
Spaniard made the proper answer, that any commander who
surrenders before he is obliged is It traitor and a cownrd. There-
upon 811chet changed his tone, and offered him tempting condi-
tions if he would take service under King J oseph. This proposal
being answered o.s it deserved, Colltrcras was sent as a prisoner
to the castle of Bouillon, from which he escaped afl:er a captivity
of fifteen months in October 1812 1•
I Interesting details of his perilous escape, in company with a French
royalist officer, Bouvet de Lozier, IInd of his filial arrival in Etl~lalltl, may
be fouml in llis Narraliuc, written in 18]3.
SECTION XXVIII: CHAPTER 1II
THE FALl, or" FIGVERAS AND THE AUTUMN CA:\rrAIGN
IN CATALONIA. AUGUST ]811
THE news of the fall of Tarragona, brought by the fugitive
General Velasco, came as a thunderclap to Campoverde and his
'army" of succour,' While the Captain~GelJeral had been
hesitating, marching and countermarching, and sending about
for further reinforcements, the great city cntrnsted to him had
fallen. It was impossible for the simplest soldier in his ranks
to fail to see that the whole responsibility for its loss lay with
Campoverde, and from that moment his authority ceased, and
officers and men alike began to clamoUl' for his rcsigllatiol1.
His former popularity in Catalonia had, most deservedly,
vanished. The newly raised recruit.'! ~0'8.n to melt away from
their colours; the somafmes refused to serve one whom the)'
regarded as a coward. if not aiJ a traitor. On the news that a
French column had started from TiUTagonR to attack llim,
Campoverde abandoned his hea4 quarters at Vendrils, and fled
inland to Cervera, where he at last thought himself safe for the
moment. His departure exposed the depOt at Villanue\'a de
Sitjcs, where his sea-borne stores were lying, and the .French
sei>':ed it on the 30th, making prize of many ships not ready for
Sltiling, and capturing 800 Tarragona wounded in the hospital.
Skerret's 1,200 British were lying off the place in their trans-
ports, just preparing to land and to join Campoverde, as he had
desired. Finding that disembarkation was impossible, and that
the Catalnn army had disappeared, SkelTet took his expedition
back to Cadiz, after a most humiliating experience.
Meanwhile there was high debate at Cervera. The Valencian
gcncral, Mirnndn, dcmanded that Cllmpoverde should at once
dismiss him and his division, and permit them to return home
by sea. They had been lent by Charles O'Donllell for the one
purpose of the relief of Tarragona; and that operation being
now impossible, for the best of reusons, Miranda claimed leave
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to depart. He was naturally anxious to serve no longel' under
such a miserable chief as Campoverde-thoughhis own behal,jour
all June fl4th gave him no right to complain. It was hard to
sec how his request could be refused, yet many of the chiefs of
the Catalan army thought that the departure of the Va.lencian
dh'isioll implied the end of all formal war in the principality.
The proposal to remove not only the Valclleio.ns but all the
regular troops was miscd: Campoverde, feeling his authority
g011e, and willing to throw all responsibility on his lieutellant:i,
called a council of war all July 1st. Dya majority of four tu
three genel"Ul oflicers, the meeting decided in rn.vour of abandon-
ing Catalonia altogether. Sarsfield, the fighting-man of the
army, gave a furious negative, and Campoverde himself made
a more timid objection to the move I. Dut the retreat to
Valencia being 011CC voted, the Captain-General was only too
glad to fall in with the project, and to be quit of the duties
which he had so ill discharged. All the regulars were to sail
when a convenient exit to the sea could be found-at the
moment of the council of war Suchct was 011 the movc in the
neighbourhood of Barcelona, and the small ports usually avail-
able were blocked. It was a miserable resolve, when Figueras
was still holding out, whcn the inland was still intact, and when
Suchet had been obliged to disperse his troops, and could
obviously make no general move for some weeks. Fortunately
difficulties cropped up to prevent the evacuation. The British
commodorc, Codl'iugoon, when asked to prepare transports aud
convoy, replied' that although he would strain any point to
restore to General O'Donnell and to Valencia the tl'OO})S so
liberally furnished by that kingdom, he would not cmbark the
Marquis of Campoverde, or any of the troops belonghlg to
Catalonia, which it WM his duty to assist in defending, instead
of depriving it of that protection which it had 2.' Eroles,
I For tllO wording of lhe vot.es see lllO precis of lho coullcil of "'ar ill
the Appendix to Arteche, YOI. x. pp. .550-2. Caro, San Juan, Velasco,
Bud CarraS(luetlo votcd for embarkation: Sarsficld, Santa Gruz, amI
Campoverde for holding 011 in Catalonia. Miranda would IIOt vote, 'llOt
consideriug himself as belonging to the Cutalun army,' but was ill favour
CIf the evacuatiou. Eroles was absent.
I Letter CIf Codringtoll) in Ms Life, i. p. 23.5.
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Manso, and other local Catalan officers sent in equally strong
protests; they would be glad to be rid of the Captain.(klleral,
but it would be treason to withdraw the whole regular anny.
and to leavc the principality to bc defended by the miqueletes
alone. The spirit of the people would be brought 10\\', and
resistance would die down when they knew that they were
abandoned for ever by the army.
Meanwhile Suchet had spent the days while the Spanianb
werc debating in opening up the cOllllllunicutiOlls betwccn his
own army and Barcelona, which had 80 long been out of touch.
He marched with the greater part of the divisions of I-Iarispe
and Frere, as has already been mentioned, to Villafranca ami
Villanueva de Sitjes, where hc left the bulk of his troops, theu by
thc pass of Ordul to Barcelona itself. Herc GCllcrul l\1uUMcC
Mathieu was ill a very isolated position, for since Macdonald
had taken off all the disposable troop.'! to the siege of Figueral',
the city had been entirely cut off from him, the ,1'omafeneJ
having intercepted the road, while English cruisers maintained
a fairly eJJecth'c blockade OIl the sidc of the sea. Suchet L'O!J-
ccrtcd with the governor a plan fot opening up COllllllllllicatio1\
with Macdollllld, and occupying the port of Mataro, north of
Darcelolla, where the Spaniards still had llll accl.'8S to the sell.
He determincd to bring up Hlldspc alld l~rcre, Illld wcut lmck
Lo pick thcm up. This he did, and retul1lcd with thcm to
Barrelollll 011 July 9th, while all expedition scnt out by Mauricc
l\fathicn seized Mataro.
, Rut Illeallwhile <Aullpo\'erde, rcllectillg that if the little Jlor~
between Tal'ragonll and .llll.rCclona were blocked to him, there
still remained those between Barcelona and ltosas, had made
fL rapid march through the inland, and had arrived at Arcus de
l\far, north of .Maturo, before Suchet returned 10 BnrceloulI.
The bulk of Miranda's division was safely shipped 011' 011 July 9th
by Codringtoll, and trallspOlied to Valcncia l . Blit the cAvll!r)',
refusing to abandon their horses, had turned westward, under
a Coloncl GasCH, alld to the number of somc 900 83\,1..,,1 them-
I Codriugloll saysl1ll1t l,e only emharkcd 2,400 mc/) out of thc 4,000 who
had. come to Catalollia. The canilrr had gOlle another WilY, ami 000 or
800 men 111\d deserted, somc to join tIle tlllllflltllCIf, other! to find their
way llOme to Valencia liS best they could.
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seh'cs by a most extrllOrd.il1ary march. Striking across lIortheru
Aragon, and dodgillg between the l~rench garrisons, they
reached the Upper Ebro near Tudela, where they forde<! thc
great river by the aid of guides lcut them by the great guerrillcl'O
~[illll. Once on thc south bank, they executed another cqlUdly
(Iallgerous march, e,'ading Illany l~rench detachments, and re·
joined Charles O'DonneIl in the end of August, having travelled
in six week8 no le::18 than 740 miles, through the heart of I~ regiolJ
\l'lJich was supposed to be ill miliblry occupation by thc cnemy.
Their loss was only four officeri> and fifty-three mCll, though
~113 horses had perished in the mountains. This achievemcnt
sufficiently shows the super6cial naturc of Suchet's occupu.tioll
of Aragon: he could not prevent so large: a body as 900 lIlCIl
from crossing it twice from end to end.
Cmnpoverde. after shipping off .Mirauda's infantry at Arell.~
tic Mar, had retired inlllnd to Vich, wherc 011 the evcning aftcr
the embarkation his diSilshous captain~generals.hip callle to all
cnd. For he found waiting him there General Luis Lacy, scut
by the Cadiz ref:,rency tu relieve him ill cOllllllll.ud. The lIew
chief WllS a stranger to Catalonia, and the people would lmvc
preferred Eroles to lead them-indeed, 1\ junta of Catnlall
ollil:.'eI'S had already offered to put themselves ulldeL' his urUcrs I.
But Eroles, the most hOllouruble of nIl thc local IClldcrs, refu:>t.'tl
lo commit all aet of indisciplille, and Lacy was l"(!cogllir.cd 1,1..-'
Captain-General, while Call1poverde abscolltk>d ha:;tily by sea.
Il.cjectiug all idCl.~ of eVllclmtillg the prillcipality, Lacy drell'
l~lek into the mountains with the mere wreck of all army which
had I>ccll handed over to him-some 2,000 or 3,000 mell-allt!
e~lublishcd himsclf at Solsona, where the Junto. of CtttalOllillltho
Look rcfuf:,'C. In this place Ilnd the llcighbouring hill-towns he
begatl to reorganize his demoraliy,ed troops, and to gl4ther in
n.-emits llud deserter:;. But he was far too weak to do allythillg
tor the long-enduring garrison of Figuel'as, which was still hold.
illg out, though nearing its last gasp.
I Ai'l~ll·l.mtly while the army wns at Agr-.mlllut llear (:ervcra, Iloout
,July 'llb. See Codriugton's correspondcuce in hi~ Lif!!, i. 236, and ill
Xapier's AI'lllJlldix to vol. iii. I'. 3Vll. ~'or l.estilllonials to the IlOlIoul';.h1c
.1n1l patriotic couduct of Eroles throughout the campaign, free Co(LrillgtOll'~
letters, fHUsim.
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'5uchet, Uftcl' failing to prevent the emhurkatioll of the
Valencian division, had determined to spend some time in open-
ing up free communication between Barcelona and Macdonald's
army in front uf Figuems, as also between Barcelona and his OWIl
base of operations at Lel,jda. He must set matters on a satis-
factory footing in Catalonia, before undertaking the great
invasion of Valencia, which the Emperor had assiglU:... <J as his lIcxt
Wsk. The expedition towards Macdonald's real' WItS tlCCQlll-
plished by 8uchet himself with the divisions of l"rere and
Harispe. One column (Palombini's Italians) marched up the
valley of the Tellcs river, by MOllbuy and Codilll\S, the other
and larger column folJolI'cd the Congost river. Neither met
with oppositiOll, and they joined at the defile of Celltelles IlbO\·c
Vieh. That town was occupied on July 15th, ~Jld flying colullllls
~ellt out from it to Ripol, Olot, and Cnstc1$Ollit. By means of
these detachments Suchet got into touch with Macdonald, who
was foulld to be holding Figueras closely blocked, and to be in
HO nced of help, for though his a1:my was ~ickly, yct the besieged
garrison was known to be ill a desperate condition, and its
surrender was expected to occur at any moment. Determining
that Macd.onalt.l could shift for himself, and would be able to
overrUll all northern Catalonia when his army was set free from
the siege, Suchet turned back from \'ich, with the object of
achieving his second aim, the clearing of the road froUl Bart.:elouu
to Lcdda. This great route was safe for large detachmeuts-
indeed, Montmarie's briga.de had marched along it almost UIl-
molesletl ten days back. But it could not be used by convoys
or slllu.!l parties, so long as the Spaniards were in posscssioll of
the mountain or Montserrat.., which overhangs it for many miles.
'l'hislofty pcak, the projecting angle of oue of the chief Catalan
~ierms, was the nearest point to Barcelona now in the hlUlds of
the patriots. It was occupied at this moment by Eroles and
:lOllle 1,500 miqucletes, who continually made descents into the
plain from their fastness. :l'he Montrerrat is t1 fantastic pile of
rock, whose highest point reaches 4,000 feet above the sea-level;
it is lUainly composed of red slate, a geological formation which
runs to prceipkcs, and at first sight the enormous bulk-iLs
circumference is fifteen miles-looks almost inacL"essible. But
several pat.hs run up among its clefts, and Oil a plat.form
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3,000 feet up lies the sanetuar)' of Our Lady of :Mont'>eM'at,
the oldest and formerly thc richest st\uetuo.ry of Catalonia,
with a great Renaissance church and a large monastery. Most
of the monks had fled to Majorca with their treasure in 1808,
find their empty home served as the hctul qnarters of the local
miquelctes, and the magazine of their munitions. For cargoes of
arms and stores, run ashore on the central CntAlan const, were
generally forwarded to Montserrat for distribution. The
mOllntain was not regularly fortified, indeed it was too large for
fortification, but there were two batteries with ten guns placed
across the only practicable road which led up to the sanctuary
fi'om the north, and the buildings themselves, far above, had been
loopholed and barricaded. Nothing ;;axe its own steepness pro-
tected a minor path which climbs to the monastery from the
l'ilIage of Colbato. Another from Monistrol, which lies in the
plain to the north·west, had been blastcd away in places. The
nspect of the peak WIIS formidable, bnt its strength was more
apparent than real, when it was held by no more than 1,500
irregular troops: fOl' over and above the known paths there wel'C
mallY places where lightly equipped men could scramble, o\'er
slopes which were only precipitons in certain sections. \Vhcn
a very large force delivered a concentric attack on the mountain,
it was impossible for the small garrison to block every possible
point up which active assailants might make their way.
Sllchet had brought up more than 10,000 men for the attack,
including Sl. battalion or two borrowed from the garrison of
Barcelona. Abbe's brigade was to make the main assault along
the road: Montmaric's brigade, now returned from Lcrida, was
to menace the steep path from Colbato to the summit; Hal'ispe
and Frere, lower down towards the plain, watched the Igualada
and Manresa roads, the Barcelona troops the road to the south
by Drnch. On July ~5th the assault was delivered by Abbe's
five battalions: they were scarcely opposed on the lower slopes,
but met with a fierce resistance at the first battery, near the
clmpcl of Saint Cecilia, 1,!WO yards from the monastel'y, HCI'e
the column halted, to throw out swC\rms of skinnishers oyer the
precipitons hillside. Some of them climbed high enongh to
bring an enfilading fire to bear on the Spanish guns,. and as their
uischarge began to slacken, thc grenadier companies charged up
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t.he rood ll11d capt,nrecl them. The mil'Jueletes fell hack on the
second buttery, which was presently captured in the SAme
fashion by the combination of a flanking fire alld a frontal
attack. The Spanish gunners, the only regulars present, stood
t.o their guns to the last in the mO!'lt gallant WELy, Imd were
nearly all bayoneted. Abbe was 1'CJ1.rranging his colulllll for Rll
n.ttaek 011 the fortified monastery above, when fllrious firing Il"nR
heard to break ant in its directioll, and the galTison were
presently ~n fitreaming down the hillflide to the east. A large
booy of the French skil'mishers, thrown out for the first attack,
had found their WRy over the rocks to the back of the sanctuary,
whel'e there are rough tracks leading to !'Iome hermitages which
lie out far from the main buildings. ""Vhen some 300 men had
<:ollcetcd behind the mOllnstery, they delivered an attack Oil it
from t.he rear. The >;mall re.~er\·e placed in the buildings was
panic-stricken by an attack from this side-all the more SCl
because they saw the rest of their comrades recoiling from the
bnl:lcries below, which bad already been taken. They /led, anel·
making no great staml, Rnd,joining the main body, TUshed down
the precipitolls ravines 011 the eASt front of the peak, where a fell'
perished by falls, but the majority b"Ot away safely over grollnd
where the \;ctors could not follow. So fell Montserrat, with
a loss of only ~OO men to the French and 400 to the Spaniards.
The storming of the holy 1Il0lllltuill was u picturesque rather
than a really difficult achie\·ement, but the blow inflicted on the
Catalans was a very severe one: l\fontserrat had been looked
upon liS impregnable, und the protcctioll of its patroness was
supposed to have defended it for the three years during 1I'hkh
the French had been holding Barcelona, which lies so close to it~
foot. The Spaniards had noli' !l0 post left 011 the great road
from Barcelolla to Lerido, and Suchet disposed part of his army
to hold this line. Palombini's Italian brigade beh'lg left on
Montserrat, while FI~re's division lay at Igunwdn, Ulld two
enmlry ftlld one infantry regiments held Cervera and its neigh-
bourhood (the' Llano de Urgel' or flat land of westem Catalonia)
flS far NI the gate> of Lcrida. Abbe's brigade wellt olr wuth-
Wlll'c1, to join Musnier's division (to which it belonged) 011 the
lower Ebro.
\Vith the fall of MontselTll.t ended Suchet's Catalnn CRm-
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plligll. He had subdued all that part of the principalit.y which
ha.d been made over to him, when Napoleon broke up the old
7th Corps and assigned the districts of Lerida, Tortosa, and
Tarrn",<J'Qna to the Army of Aragoll. He had now before
him the long-projected invasion of Valencia, and intended to
take it in hand, so soon as the brigades escorting the Taml-
gona prisoners should have returned to Saragossa, amI the
southern regions of Aragon should have been clealw of the
insurgents, who had flocked down into them from the hills when
Abbe's brigade had been withdmwn to the north in June. For
during the siege of Tarragona Villacampa. had invested Ternel,
ill which a French battalion was shut up, Duran had attacked
Calatayud, though without success, and a partisan named
CllInpillo had raided as far as Cariiiena, only thirty miles from
Saragossa. During the month of August, when Suchet was able
to dispose of the troops set free from Catalonia, flying columns
under Hal·ispe, Compere, and Peyri scoured all southern Aragoll.
1'ernel was relievcd, and Villacampa and his lieutenants were
rll'iven back into their old fastnesses in the sierras of Albaracin
and Molina, the remotest recesses of the rugged land where
Aragou and New Castile meel But the Valcncian expedition
eould not be taken in hand before the month of September
had begun,
Meanwhile the siege of Figueras had lingered on for a month
longer than Ma.cdonaldand Suchet had expected, The brigadicl'
Mnl'tinez, with his 6ve small regular battalions I and his 3,000
miqlleletes, had made a most admirable defence. No assistance,
not e\'en any PI'OSpeet of assistance, had been before them since
Cnmpoverde's defeat all May 3rd. The whole field army of
Catalonia had been drawn away to defend or relic\'e Tarragolltl,
and l\fartinez had no friends near him save the somalellts of the
Ampurdam and the Pyrenean valleys, who were willing, but
weak uud disorganized. Their most popular chief, the fighting
priest Rovirll., had gone off to Cadiz to ask for succour, but
fonnd there that Tarragona was rightly considered a far more
important pla{'"e to save, and that there was no hope for Figuerl1<l.
.'\11 that the aomatelles could do was to molest Macdonald's
lOne of UItOIli:l, two of AntequeT:lJ lst :lnd 2nd of HIe Volulltarios de
\'aleucill,
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convoys a.nd foraging parties. May, June, and July woresloll"l}'
away, and Mal-tinez was still holding out, with a garrison reduced
to half-rations. Yet he WilS doing good service, since he wns
detaining in front of him the whole of the disposable trooflii
of the 7th Corps, not to speak of some battalions of National
Guards from the southern departments of France. No help
from Mu.cdonoJd could come to Suchet during the whole of the
siege of Tarragona, or the subsequent operations about l\{ont·
sermt. Instead it was Suehet who was forced to help Macdonald,
by clearing his rear by the march to Vich.
The Duke of Tarentnm had completed a great eircumvalln-
tion around the rocky fortress of San Fernando, and had pushed
forward batteries to within 500 yards of its walls, but he
never attempted to breach them, or to storm the place. It
is hard to make out why he made no such endeavour, for
thongh the place is high lying and difficult of approach, it is
110t more so than the upper city of Tarragona, with which SUcllct
was dealing in such a prompt and drastic fashion. But from
March to August Figueras was blockaded rather than besicgtld.
Macdonald's proceedings are all the more difficult to under::;tand
because his army was suffering severely from the heat during
June and July-the National Guards and the newly arrived
battalions from the interior of France were thinned by malarial
fevers., and by pestilence bred by long tarrying in nnSllnitar)'
camps. Probably we must ascribe his refusal to open trenches
and proceed to battering.work and assault, to his memory of
what had happened at Gerona. The 7th Corps had all e,'i1
tradition of the repeated failures to storm that city, and of the
loss of life which had aceompanied them. Figuerfts, it was clear,
must fall sooner or later from starvation; there was no chanee
that it could be relieved; was it worth while to waste good
soldiers in taking by force a place that must yield in a week 01"
two for want ofprovisions ? Mlwdonald evidently under-estimated
the obstinacy of the defenders and the amount of their stores,
and may have regretted in July that he had not started It
regular siege ill May. Hut it wn.s now too late to begin it.,
since surrender was inevitablc within a few days, as he snpposcd.
Evideucc of the distressed state of the gafl"ison was forthcoming
on July 17th, when l\1artinez turned out of the fortress, without
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any demRnd for exchange, 850 French and ftalian priSOilCrs who
had been confined in the bomb-proofs since the commencement
of the siege; they were in a half-starved condition, and reported
that (or some days they had hardly received any food at all I.
General Guillot and the officers were not released-they were
uscful hosWgcs, since their lives were ut the disposition of the
governor, in Cllse the French should threaten to refuse quarter
to irregulars, or make other hal":'h demands when the inevitable
~llrrender should draw neater.
The expectation that Martincz would hoist the white flag
within a few days of the release of the prisoners was entirely
falsified. He held out, sufferillg terrible privations, for another
month; he was aware that Tarragona had faUen, that Campo-
yerde's army had gone to pieces, and that he had no hope of
succour. But he rightly eonsidered that it was his duty to
detain the 7th Corps before his walls to the last possible moment.
Meanwhile he kept up the spirits of his garrison as best he could,
by assuring them that it was well within their power to break
out through the adversary's lines by a general sortie, when the
last ro.tiolls should have been issued. By August 16th this
moment had arrived; the Spaniards had eaten not only the few
horses in the place, hut the dogs and rats 2; only three days'
half-rations were left. The plan for the evasion was well
designed; in the afternoon Bm'ira, who had returned with
empty hands from Cadiz, showed himself on the bills nearest to
J?igneras with some jl,OOO $QmatelU~8-all that could be collected;
he made roving demonstrations against the north side of the
French eircumvallalion, in the hope of drawing the reserves ill
that direction, but allowed himself to be driven away without
seriolls resistance. After dark, however, Marlinez sallied from
the fortress Oil the opposite side-tile south~we8t""":in the direc·
tion of the sea, hoping to find the line thin on that front. He
ha.-! brought with him every mall who could march, and dashed
I See VIlClllli, v. p. 313. It will be remembered t11al when Massella
was in a similar poilition at Genoa in 1800, he refll~etl to llil;miss hi~
Anstrian prisolll,~I'S, mid allowed mall)' JlulIdtedl! of thern to die of
Etarl'atiOI1. l\Iartinez was more merciful.
i l Ilasta los insectos mas immUllllos ' as MllrUnez wrote 10 tile Cat<lhm
Junta,
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a.t the cireumvallation in one broad (:olumn, The hostile pickets
and outposts were rolled in, but the Spaniards were hl'ought up
against an impassable nbaUi8, while two batteries 011 each side
began playing against the tlanks of the mass. After vainly
trying to brcak through for some minutes, they recoiled into
the fortres.~, leaving 400 dead and wounded behind them.
Next morning (August 17th) General Baraguay d'Hilliers,
judging that the enemy must lIOW be thoroughly disheartened,
scnt in a pftrlemclIlaire to propose capitulation, Mllrtinez,
aware that his last bolt was shot, agreed to surrender on the
third day, that following the issue of the last half-ration in
his stores. The garrison crawled out and laid down its arms 011
the 19th: it Hlustered something over 2,000 men still able to
stand, and there were another 1,000 in the hospitals. FrolTl
(jr,~t to last some 1,500 more had perished during the four montlt~
and nine days that the siege had lasted, The Fl"ench llad
sldfercd itlmost as bClLvily-4.000 men had diedjll the HnC'> sinL'C
J\Ial'ch, many more from fever and dysentery than from shot and
shell. Macdonald sought eagerly among the prisonel'il for the
three young Catalans who had let their eOlllpatriotil into San
Fernando. Thc two brothers Pons had escaped with Erole.~ in
,June', but the third,Juan Marqnez, WM found, and hanged Oll:l
high gallows on the ravelin of the fortress.
Thus ended iu disaster the story of Figucras. But both the
capture of the place and it..;; defence form a most honollfllble page
in the history of the wa.r. Rovira's enterprise in seizing it ami
l\{artinel,'s o~tillacy ill lludntaillillg it, 10llg after /Ill hope WfL~
gone, were equally praiseworthy. Though nothing callle of the
exploit in the end, they had immobilized the whole l:~rench
7th Corps for the entire summer of 1811, ulId had prevented
Macdonnld from giving a sillgle battalion to help Snchet's altl\Ck
on Tarragona. If CampoYerde had possessed the most or(linary
capacity or resolution, he might have turned the opportullity
given him by the somatene chief" to such good aecollnt as to
wreck all the campaign planned by Napoleon for the subjection
I They hot]l became officers ill the Catalan army, an(l sun'i\'ell fl)r
mau)' yenTS after t],e .....Ilr; the elder died, a retire.l hrilfdliier-geuerlll, in
the year WOO, See Arteche, x, 480. Vacani amI ~apier err in ~arillg
that he \\'IlS ]lauged witll Marquell, who was his cousin,
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of Catalonia. Better mana.,a-ement on May 3rd might have led
to the defeat of Baraguay d'Hilliers, and if he had been driven
off from Figueras, and isolated from l\:Iaedonald, who wrus thcll
far aWlIY at Barcelona, Suchet would hll-Yc had to march to the
help of his comrade~, and the siege of Tarragonll. could nC\'er
ha\'e begun. We are brought back to the point which has
already so often confrollted us-Campovcrde's miserable ineffi-
ciency was the Rnal cause of all the disasters of 1811 in the prin-
cipality of which he was the Captain-General.
Two such blows as the fall of Tarl'agona and the recapture
of Figueras scclllcd to render inevitable the final subjection
uf Catalonia. It is with astonishment thut we find that its
obstinate people maintained their resistance for two years morc,
Il1ld were found still defending themselves when the war came to
1111 cud with the abdication of Napoleon in 1814. The new
Captain-General, Lacy, was a man hal'Sh and unpopular, but he
had at lCflSt the merit of energy. His army WM a mere wreck,
but lle issued orders for a general levy of all men between 18
and 40 to fill the depleted cudres of the few surviving regular
battalions, and despite the ill-will of the Junta-who wished to
lean more on the miqueletes, :md distrusted the old army--,.he
gra(lually collected a new force. Early in August, as if ill
Lmmdo, he burst iutu France 011 the side of Puigcerdu, and
executed a destructi"e mid along tIle valleys of Cerdagne. It'
he was not strong enuugh to help Figueras, or to oppose Suchet.,
he was at least determined to do all the harlll that he could to
the enemy. This incursion threw ~apolcon into a fit of rage,
and, forgetting his own ordel'S to Suchet which prescribed the
inyasiou of Valeneia as the next decisive move ill the war, he
wrote him un angry dispatch on August Q2nd I, ill which he
told the newly appointed Marshal that he ought to have left
l\ strong I<'rench division at Vich, and to have marched with his
lI1ain body agaiust the Catalunian inland, t\iming at Cardonu
IIIlII Urgel und the other llllsubdued places. 'He should have
profited by the panic into which the Spaniards had been thrown,
and might have tcrlllillutcd the war ill the provim:c, while by
making his retrogl'e'lsion to Saragossa he has given the enemy
I Corrt8JK1llda,/C<i, 1'01. xxii, llO. 18,OOli.
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the chance of rallying 011 all sides.' It is sufficient answer to
this accusation to say that, if the Marshal had thrown aU hi~
available troops into the C!ltalan mountains, he would have
become jnvolved in a series of endless marches nnd counter-
marches afte.. all intangible enenly, which would have prevented
him from cnrrying out in the autnmn his great and suceessful
attack on Valencia. The strength of the Catalan resistance did
not lie in the possession of Cardona or Urgel or any other old.
fasllioned stronghold, but in the determination of its people not
to la)' down their arms. There is no probability that the war
could have been •tem1inated' in the way that the Emperor
hoped.
By September Lacy had reorganized the remnants of the old
Army of Catalonia into three weak divisions under Erolcs,
:Milan&, and Sarsfield, each containing only four or five battalioll~.
E\'ery one of the lIew units represented lllallY lost corps-the
single regiment of Baza included illl the remllants of the
Granadan division, whieh Heding had brought to Catalonia
in 1809 fourteen thousand strong. The new Cazarlores de
Catalui'ia raised by the well.known miquelete.chief Manso were
formed from the cadres of six old Catalonian lercioo I-it was tI1C
same with the regiments bearing the local names of l\'lanresa,
Mlltaro, and Ausona. The cavalry, consisting of the few
hundred Catalonian horse who had but joined in Gascfl,'s retreat
to Valencia, amounted to five squadrons ofhussars and cuirassiers.
The whole, including garrisons, may have made up 8,000 meu-
all that was left of the ~5,000 organized troops which had
formed the' 1st Army' on December 1st, 18] O. But there still
remained an Army of Catalonia, and as Macdouald and I\'fanril'C
Mathieu and Decaen were to find, the Clltalans were still ready
to fight.
'~lhell the enemy was nnder the delnsion that with the fall
of Montsermt and Figueras the back of the resistance of the
Principality had been broken, Laey began to take the offensivc.
On September 1l-1fl, aided by English ships, he drove the
1 An interesting study of the reorganization of tho Cata1:ln an1\)' ill
August-September 11311 is given in Estallela'ij RI BlI/ljlloJl fie Jl03/lllridl
(Madrid, 19(9), an account of tlle fortunes of Manso's new (Jllzulfort3 de
CataMia in 1811-14,
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French out of the MOOas Islands, at the mouth of the Ter, and
built 011 the largest of them a fort which gave him a secure
point of communication with the Mediterranean Squadron.
But this was a side-issue: in October he accomplished some-
thing far more important. DC!iCcndiug Oil the line of garrisons
by which the French kept open the road from Barcelona to
wida, he took ~oo men at Igualada on October 4, captured
a 1arb"C convoy Ilear Ccrvcra three days later, aud 011 October 11
took that town with 645 prisoners, and the neighbouring
Belpuig with 150 more on October 14. The chain of forts
was broken, and to the inteuse joy of all Catalonia the French
dismantled the monastery of MontselTilt and evacuated the Holy
:\[ountaill. Half of Suchet's work ill the summer had been
undone. A few days later Macdonald was recalled to Paris
(Octobel' 28); he was the third marshal whose reputation got
110 profit from his CatalOllian campaign-his failure was as bad
as that of Augereau, and he had not even got the small credit
that St. eyr won in battle. The command of the 7th Corps
fell to Gencral Dccnen,
SECTION XXIX
WELLINGTON'S AUTUMN CAMPAIGN
OF 18H
CHAPTER I
\HLLINGTON'S BLQC1{Am: OF C/UDAD HOURIGU.
AUGUST-SEl''1'EiHl}fo~1t Hill
\'\1 HEK i\larlllont, before the cnd of the secoud II'L'ek of July,
had takell his departure from the valley of the Glladiana, 11Il!!
Imd begUIl to disperse his arlll}' in cantonments on botll sides of
lhe Tagus, "VeIling-toil Wllij aule tu review his own situation at
Ici8urc, and to think out a new plan of' operations. The Arm,'"
of l'ortugnl had settled down in a central position, from which it
cou.ld transfer itself with equal facility to reinforce the 5th Corp'!
ill Estrcllladura., if the Allies should make another lllO\'C agaill!;l
JJtldajoz, 01' the troops ofDorsellne in the kingdom of Le<.m, if any
nttclllpt were made to strike at Ciudad Hodrigo and Salamanca.
lHttrlllout Imd plated onc division (Fay's) and a mval!')' brigade
aL Tru..~illo, to keep up the COllllllunication across the lJI011ntailh
with the 5th Corps. lie had established his OWI1 head qUHl"tcr,
at Navalmol'al, near Almaraz, and had three clivisiOllS 1 in hi·
illlmediate llcighbolU'hood along the Tagus. The rcmaillitlg two,
which cOlllplch,'(/ his army, IVel'C placcd, ouc at Plascllciu, Hw
other in the provim:e of Avila 2, somewhat more to the north, so
as to COlllmand the passes into the kingdom of 1.0011, by which
the army would have to movc to join the Army of the North,
supposing that vVeJlington took the offensive on the Agueda
and the Tormes. In this position the Marshal remailloo, ill Rll
cxpectallt attitude. for some le!} w~ks. The period of rcpo>c
was \'ery grlltei'lll to him, sincc he had taken his Imuy to the
relief of Badajo1. ill haste, before it was fully reorganized, ami
1 Tl,ese divisions WC'"C 1110,,0 of i\1;Hllmuc, Sart1i1, ami Fere)'.
~ Clause!'s di\'isioll in the province of A\"i1a, Brellllier at J'lascllcia.
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was an...iously expecting the arrival of thc ch·a.fts and l'Oll-
valescents whom he had left behind him, and-what was still
morc important-a great supply of remounts to strengthcn his
depleted cnvo.lry, and of gun teams to bring his batteries up to
the total of eighty pieces, which had been prescribed by the
Emperor as his pro~r complement. He was UWI.ll"l:: that orders
had be<ln issued from Paris that the Arm}' of the NOl·th was Lo
makc o\'cr to him 500 artillery horses, and that nearly a thousand
camlry were coming from Bayollnc, whither the Srd and 4th
~qUadrOlls of each of his dragoon regilllcllw Imd been scut back
ill Mu)' to piek up Dew chargers. General Vandcrmo.csen, as he
Wll~ informed by a dispatch from Berthier dated July 10th, was
to IJc at Burhros by August 15th, with 850 remounted dragoolls,
1,100 artillery horses, and 6,000 drafts and recruits for the
infantry. But, as so often happened in Spain, this great rein-
forcement had not turned up e\"Cll by the middle of Scptember;
lor though thc troops had started from Bayonnc, great numbers
of them were detained on the way, not only by .oorsellnc, but by
mere post-commanders and chiefs of small garrisons, who pre-
~UUll.-d to lay hands on t.hcm because they thought theUlseh"es
threatcned by some movement of the Naval'rese or Cantabrian
guerrilleros 1. Vandermaesen got to Burgos, but could not collect
Il\orc Hum half of the COIUlllll which he \\'11..5 dircelcd to lakc tu
t.he ArIllY of l'ortllgal, and so did lIot start. The divisions ill
t.hc Aeld re<:eiYed uo appreciable rcillfofCemCl1ts till SClltembcr
\\"ll$ far auralleed. Meanwhile IHurmollt USl.>d the troops which
lay illlllledia.tely rOllnd his head qunrters to con:;truct all i11lporUuIt.
group ot' permanent fortifications about .A.lmul'l.l.i1, the chief
pa:;suge of the 'l'l.1.gu.s. The f1yillg-briclt,rc there WilS rcplal-cd by
a strong bridge of boats, prot.ccted. at each end by It closed work,
pttrlly ill stone, partly in earth; the one 11'1.\8 called I,'ort Uagnf;a,
thc othcr Fort Napoleon. In addition, the defile in thc
lllolllltuill~. by whieh the road descends ou to Almaraz, was
protected by a third structure called Fort Mirabetc, frOll! the
ncighbouring village. This group of works gave the l?rench
I For JlU illtcrcatiug account of the CX1lcricncC8 of all otlio.:er scnt tu
I!\;rape top:ether drafts and cOllI'alcsccllt! dell/ire of the petty gOI'crnor;;,
'"CC the lliary of Sl/r[iugliu, Jlll. 484-6. 1·le Jlad 8.1)Ccial difficulties ""itlt
Thi€bault, the GOI'eruor of Salamanca.
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Il. 8tron~r hold 011 the ccntral 'l'agus than they had erer
possessed before, and the permanent bridge waS invaluable, since
it permitted troops to go south or north at a much greater rate
than had been possible when, as hitherto, they had to be ferried
over on a mere pontoon worked with ropes. Orders came from
Paris that Il. similar passage, protected by a fortified. post, WllS to
be established at AlCllntnro., sixty miles further down the river,
where the broken Roman bridge 1 invited repair. Blit this was
quite beyond l\farlllont's power-the position was far too near
the Portuguese border to be maintained sa,y€ by a large garrison,
which would 11ll\'C required revictuallillg at frequent interval.,
fol' the neighbouring region, always desolate, was Ilowabsolutcly
depoopled. When Wellington had large bodies of troops at
Castello Brau(,'O and Portalegre, while there was lIO solid forte
of the Army of Portugal nearer than NavallOoml, it wuuld ha.ve
becn too ris.ky to cxpose a detachmcnt at Alcanmrll. The ruilled
remains of the mcdiaeval fortress there, which had been knocked
to pieces ill the old War of the Spanish Successioll, could not
have been patched up so as to resist artillery of the lightest sort.
Marll\ont had the brreatCllt difficulty ill mailltaiuing hi~ army
ill thc region which it now occupied. The II'cstel'll purt of the
kingdom of New Castile was (as Wellington had found in the
'l'ala\'era campaign) almost incapable of feeding a large force.
The Vera of Plasellcia was the only di:;triet which sufJiced for itself
evclI ill time of pcucc. Normully food would IllLVC bccn drawn
from the direction of Toledo, Aranjuez, alld Madrid. But this
district was in the occupation of the Army of the Centre, alld
Kiug Joseph protested iu the most lively fashion at being
exp(dcd to furnish all the supplit;s J01' Marmont's force, uver
\I"hieh he was denied control, and with which he seems to hm"c
felt himself little concerned 2. New Castile barely suflieed for
his own needs, and when un Imperial decroo proclaimed that tIle
districts of Toledo, Avila, Ilnd Talavera were removed from
his sphere of command and placed at the disposition of the Army
of Portugal, he considered that his brother had broken thc
1 Corrcspolldenoo frolU Berthier printed in i\Carmont's Autobil)gmph!l,
h', p. 122.
2 See Joseph to i\Iarmont in the corrcspondence of the latter, ir.
pp. 150-ft
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pledgcs which had been made to him during his short Yisit
to I'l\ris, for in this bargain it had been stipulated I that l\rmie>;
entering his sphere of acti"it), came under his command.
Ucforc evacuating the ceded districts, he withdrew aU the
lllorable stores and munitions; Marmont declares that at
Toledo the royal officials sold all the corn in the magazines to
primtc persons, just before the lu·rival of his own cOlllmissaric,;,
Ilnd handed over empty vaults to the new-comers 2.
Even with the resources of the provinces of Avila and Toledo
at its disposition, the Army of Portugal only lived from hand
to mouth, ami WM unable to accumulate magll.7.ines of any
importance. The transport of the food.stuffs was the great
problem; the army had practically no vehicles left-as ~o(a.rmollt
observed in one of his dispntches to llerthier, he had received
over from Massena about ten waggons only-all the rest that
had belonged to the three corps that had marched into Portugal
had been left behind on the mountain roads between Santarem
Ilnd Sabugal in March 3. Country carts might have been requi-
sitioned in the valley of the Tagus at an early swgc of the war,
hut by 1811 they had entirely disappeared, along with the oxen
that had drawn them. The population had mostly \'anished,
and the fraction that remained was in a condition of abject
misery from Talavera as far as the Portuguese border, Marmont
culls the country from Almaraz to Merida' a horrible wilder-
ness 4,' He calculated that the whole of the Avila-Plasencia-
Talavera region could barely feed 15,000 men, and that the rest
of his army only subsisted by drawing 011 the comparatively
intact Toledo district.
Of all this trouble Ol! the purt of his immediate adversary
Wellington was aware, through intercepted dispatches, llS well
as through the reports sent in to him by the Spaniards. And
the facts that Marmont hlld been forced to dispersc hhl army
into cantonments extending from Truxillo to Avila, und had no
magazincs of any size, formed important data in his calcula-
1 See abo\·e, p. 219.
I i'IInrmollt's Mtmoi7eJ<, iv. p, 68.
, Intercepted dispatch from Marmont to Berthier of August 6th,
printed ill Suppleme/ltary 1V1i/linglon Dilpalclwl, xiii. 11. 000.
, MlimrJirea, iI'. p. 5,1.
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tions. It would clearly take many days to assemble the whole
Army of Portugal-whether it were required on the G:undiall&
or on the Tonnes. At the same time Marmont, by his Dl!l.rCh
in June to join Soult, had shown himself a general of energy
and decision, aJld it must be taken for granted that, if there WAS
good reason for him to move, he would do so, as quickly M the
difficulties of supply would permit him. His force, whicll
Wellington very necurately calculntcd at about 80,000 inmntr}·
and 3,500 horse, or some 36,000 men of all arms 1, WM the
central fnet in all future operations. Clearly it would be mOI,ed
south or north whenever necessary.
As to Soult, he had now so much on his hands in Andalusia
that he WllS not to be feared for the present. It was known
that he had left nothing ill Estremadura save the 5th Corps,
1I0W under Drouct, and five or six regimentS of dragoons. The
troops drawn from Cordova and Granada had been taken back to
Andalusia. Bnt two divisions were hunting BJake Md BallasterO!l
in the Condado de Niebla. The disposable remainder must be
very small. Soult therefore might be neglected as all enemy
capable of taking the offensive. If, however, the Anglo-
Portuguese army were to invade Andalusia, an operation
which some of Wellington's subordinates had suggested to him
as a possibility 2, the Duke of Dalmatia would certainly raise
the siege of CtLdiz, probably abandon Granilda, and marchngninst
the Allies with 8. force which, including the 5th Corps, would
be 60,000 strong. Wherefore offensive netion in this quarter
could not be thought oP, all the more 50 becausc ?llarmont,
if nothing was left opposite him on the Tagus, might come
down by Merida, threaten Elvas and Abrantes, and perhaps
take the Allies in the rear after they had crossed the Sierra
MOL-cna.
Nor was the idea of renewing the siege of Badajol'') during
Soult's abscll(''C, tempting. The place could certainly be beset:
1 See Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Di8powhcB, vii. p. 116.
~ D'Uroon in his diary often harps upon this project.
s < We shoul(} meet ill Audnlusill tlw wholl;l force which IlItely obliged
us to raise tIle siege of 13aflajozJ with the arldition to it of ti,e force wllicb
was left before Clltiiz..•• An attempt to relieve Cndiz 1I'0ul11 cert.1inlr
not succeed.' DispllIchfJ8, \"ii. p. llB.
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but in tcn dn)'~ or SO Marmont and the ]~,OOO men of the 5th
Corps 1V0uld have united to relieve it, and their joint force
1I'0uld be nearly equal in totnlnumbers to the Anglo-Portuguese
and snperior to them in c.a.mlry. 'Ally success which we might
derire from a general action, to which I might bring the Army
of Portugal and the 5th Corps, would not be very decilli ve; 011
the other hand the loss which we would sustain by the heat of
the weather, and by the length of the marche~ which we should
be obliged to make would be very great I.' But the main
objection to El renewal of the siege of Badajoz was not the pros-
1>l'Ct of 11 pitched battlc, but the impossibility of sitting dowll
to It leaguer in the valley of the Guadiana at a time when it was
known to be absolutely pestilential. Already on the Caya the
anny had begun to suffer fwm the well-known Guadiuna fevel',
Ilnd its spread had only been stopped by moving the troopfl
back to the healthy towns in the highlands.
Wellington therefore ruled out of the list of possible opera-
tions any movement to the south of the Tagus. Thcl"C remaincd
only the chance of making another attempt on Ciudad Rodrigo,
and frum the end of July onward this was the project which was
engrossing his attention. To make l\ move in this direction
would certainly draw :Marmont from the Tagus, and Muse him
to unite with the Army of thl:! North for the relief of the for-
tress. But ''Vellington thought that he would prefer this com-
bination among his enemies to the other one, which would
eusue if he were to make his stroke in Estremadura. He gave
three reasons to Lord Liverpool for the preference 2; the first
was that in a campaign on the frontiers of Lean he would hll",e
the assistance of all the militia of northern Portugal for sub-
sidiaryoperations. The second was that the grollnd would be
Illllch Illore in his favour-he would have behind him not the
hroad plains of the Alei"!'ltejo, but the rugged spurs of' the SclTa
da Estrella, where st.rong positions abounded, and where t,he
numerous French cav!\l!'}' would be us uselcss Its they Illld proH.'tl
during the campaign of BllSsacO in the preceding yelll'. The
third advantage was that to draw Marmont into Leon sepnl'aterl
I From the same letter to Lord J.,ivcrpool, J)iilfltl!dlt8, ,·ii. JIB-
I See the all-important dispatch of July 10, in which Illese three points
are Sl'l fOI'lh. J)j6ptltChelf, vii. 118.
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him from Soult by the whole! breadth of central Spain, nnd dis-
connected the operations of the two main French forces. for
the Army of the North was a less formidable body than till'!
Army of Andalusia, because it was scattered over Ull evcn greater
extent of territory. Nor were its distractions less than those of
Sonlt: the Gll.licians and Asturians, Longa, Porlicr, and ;\[iM,
and all the gnerrilleros of Old Castile. were in existence to keep
thi.'l l~rench force cOlJ3tallt1y haras.~. In thei., way thcy wcre
lllore effective as irritants than Blake, Ballasteros, lUll! the
Murcians hud proved to be ill the south.
Wellington was not at this moment, the end of July, all'Are
that the Army of the North wa.'! about to receive reinforcelllenl~,
which would inake it far more formidable in the autumn. He
could not yet know that the divisions of Souhulll, Ucillc, 1IlK!
Cnflarelli were about to be thrown across the J'yrcnees, and that
the first of them would be in the front line during the opera-
tions of September. Even by August he was only aware in 11
vague fashion 1 that more French troops wcre expected at
Vitforia. from Bnyollne, and supposed them to be about 10,000
or 11,000 strong 2, while they were really three full dil'isiolls of
over 30,000 men, By the end of the month he WM betlel' ill·
formed-but by that time his operations had begun, ll11d it was
too late to make a change s.
:Even from the first, however, \oVellington 'I'M dispo:;ed to
believe that no great results would follow from a move abrainsl
Ciutlad Rodrigo. •I am tempted to try this entcrprisc,' lie
wrote to Lord Liverpool before he had begull his march, 'bul,
I beg your J..ordship to ob5CT\-e that I lllay be obliged to aoondon
it. '¥hen the relative force of the two armies will be so nearly
balanced tJ,ij in this, and particularly ill an operatioll ill the
Penill.'luln of Spain, it is impossible for me to foresee nil the
events which may lead to this result. But the arrival of rein-
forcclllents to the enemy. or further information, which may
I Di8patchc8, \·ii. 184: 'I should iJnagine that the reports hal'e som~
foundation.' August 9t11.
t J)i8patchc8, vii. p. 194. August 14th.
• By August 21st lIe IU)I; heard that the tith Uger and ol1ler lie\\'
!'(!gilllellts from the interior of France are ol'er the PyroneC!', Di8!Htldp>"
vii. p. 21.5, .
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~ho\\l them to be stronger than I now imagine, or a falling oH'
ill the strength of our army owing tu sickness, would lIet:esslIrily
obli6te me to abandon the enterprise I.' Later comments tlre ill
the same cautious tone: on August 9 'Vellington thinks it
'IllOrc than ever doubtful whether he will be in a situation to
undertake the siege of' Ciudad Uodrigo '-but the movement
IIlay afford an opportunity of striking an advantageous blow,
and cause the enemy. at least, to draw off troops from {,"Ql'Ilers
of the ]'cnillsu]a where they arc badly wanted.
Long before the Jt,rm,}' began to move towards the Aglteda fintI
the frontiers of Lean, Wellington had given the preliminary
order Z which committed him to the project ofattacking Rodrigo.
He had at last received from England the hea.vy battering-train
of siege artillery, which would have been invaluable in May for
the brcuchillg of Badajoz. It was on shipboard in Lisboll
harbour. He directed it to be taken round by sea to Oporto,
sent up the Douro in boats a.~ far as Lamego-where lay thc
limit of river navigl\tion-a,ud then to he sent forwl\nl by
detachments to 'l'rancoso, in the northern Beira, where he
intended to establish his base depOt. Nearly 400 pairs of
tlraught bullocks and about 900 country carts were to be {,'OI~
lected at Lamego tor the transport. The charge of the whole
operation was given to Alexander Dickson, whose euergetic
lll11llugclllent of the vcry ilLcfliciellt siege mtillcl'y at Badujol lllld
inspired \Vellingtoll with 1\ strong belief in his resolll'{,'CfIlIIl1'8~,
und his power of getting the larbrest possible alllount of work
uut of the Portugucsc, military and civilialls alike.
nickson started Il.t once for Oporto, where he fOllnd two COlll-
panies of British artillery 3 which had been sent from Lisboll,
nud picked up solllewlmt later WO Portuguese gunncrs, who
were also placed at his disposition. \Vith their aid he began
~hippillg up to Lamego the gUlls amI ammunition frum the
I Dispotche8, di. 119, July IBth,
1 IL is collt"illed ill tile' Memorandum for Colonels FramptOIl and
~1etcher' ofl9th July, dated the day after the dispatch to Lord Liverpool
which sets forth the whole projoot.
3 Hredill's aud Glubb's, which llad long been lyiug at Lisbon without
hol"SCS, aud had taken 110 part ill the field operations of uno llnd lBIl.
lIolculIlbe's battery was soon afterwards substitlltetl for GlllbiJ's. See
lJickson'l,; lJiarJj (ed, U:3Iie) for mouths of August-October 1811.
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trau.spoI'Ls. So loug' as the transport WIIS by waLer, nULlter~
wcnt slowly but easily, but thc land voyage from Lnmc&flJ
onwllrds turncd out a hcart~rending business, from the badness
of the roads and the difficulty of collecting cattle for draught.
Dickson prevailed upon 'Wellington in the end to make Villa cla
Ponte, rather than '1'ranOO5O, his central depOt-the tOW1I in the
hills proving less convenient than the larJ:,re villRo<7'C fifteen miles
further north. All through August and September material
was accumulating at Villa do. Ponte, but it was never sent for-
ward, because, as the campaign worked out, no regular siege of
Ciudad Rodrigo ever became possible. Wellington would not
show his battering-train until it was certain that he (,'ould tun!
it to good use, and kept it hidden far to the rear of his flghting-
line. It was on1)· gradually that part of it began to be mOI"cd
lip to Almeida, ostensibly to serve for the re-armament of that
fortress, where the damage done by the two explosions carried
out by Brenllier and Pack had been repaired. It was lIot to be
till December that the gUlls landed at Oporto in August were
employed. But all through the autumn 'Vellington's lUorc-
mellts were greatly influenced by thc fact that he had 1lOW a
large and efficient siege~train ready, in a position from wllieh it
could be sent forward the moment that a fair opportunity should
offer itself. It was the existellt'e of Dickson's park at Villa dll
l'Olltc, as llluch, or morc, than any other factor ill the situatioll,
that kept ""ellington on the frontiers of Leon watching for his
chance. It would seem that his caution was justified-the
.French never quite realized that he was ready to utl.ack
Rodrigo in the lllost effective style, when they should give him
thc opportunity that he tucked, by dispersing their armies in a
way which rendered rapid concentration impos.~ible.
'.. '1'he mareh of the seven divisions which were llestined for
service on the Aguedn and the kava began in the first week of
August. The Light Diyision and ArelltschiJdt's cavalry, moring
up from Castello Branco, were at Sabugal on the 8th and occu·
pied Martiugo, beyond the Agueda and close to Rodrigo, on the
10th. On the following day W'ellillgton in person led It I't.'(.'O!I'
Iluissance right up to the walls of the fortress, and drorc ill all
the French outposts. The blockade was then establisbt.Q. by thc
Light Division on the left bunk of the Agueda, and the 3rd
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Divisioll 011 t.he right, the head 1"Juartel's of the former being
ut Carpio, those of the latter at Marli~rro. The road north-
eastward lo SalUlllullcU was only cut by Illeuus of cu.v!\lry posL,;
und Julian Snnehez's guerrilla bands, and the infantry did not
approach within some miles of Rodrigo. Wellington's pUl'pOse
was merely to prevent the entry of provisions into the place: be
had no intention of drawing close up to it and opening a siege,
till he should have learnt that his battering-train should have
reAched 'l'raneoso: and it would obviously be a matter of many
weeks before the gUlls got up from Oporto. It might perhuIJS
be argued that it would have been better not to demonstra.te at
all against Rodrigo, or to call the attention of l\:farmont and
Dorscnne ill this direction, till there WM some possibility of
opening siege-operations. For to famish the garrison must
infallibly lead to a concentration of the enemy at Salamanca I'm'
it.-; relief, alld draw together a large army. Marmont was less
dl\llgeroUS in his scattered cantonments about the Tagus thun
with his forces massed on the Tonnes. And there Wl1$ little
hope of reducing Rodrigo by famine alone; clearly the enemy
would mass and fight, rather than allow it to fall unaided I.
Meanwhile 'Vellillgton moved his hend quarters to Fucnte
Gllinaldo,sixteen miles south ofCiudndRodrigo, on August 12th,
llnd kept them there till September 9!4th. The divisions not
clIgaged in the blockade were cflnwncd at various points to the
rear. The first division lay about 1J ellI\IllUCOr; it was 110 longer
COlllllW.llded by Spencer, who had $0 long led it. He had gollt:
humc, ostensibly 011 sick leave, really because he W/lS annoyed
that General Grnham had recently been ordered lip from Clldi1.,
llUd was for the future to take charge of the whole left wing of
the army whenever the Commander-ill-Chief was absent. This
responsibility had hitherto fallen to Spencer, and Wellington
WIlS not alone in thinking that he had not discharged it over
well 2. The arrival of Graham (August 8th) was welcomed by
I \\'clHngtull saw tllis clearly enough; lie writes to Lord Liverpool on
August 27; 'If we callnot maintaiu tilis blockade, the ellem)' must llrillg
00,000 mcn to raise it, and tllCII thc)' ClIlI lllldcrt.a.kc nothing else this
year, for the)' must still continue to watel! Hodrigo, amI we shall so far
s,wc thc C..'IUSC. MCllnwhilc if tlll~Y offer lIle 11 fuvoun!blc olllmrtuuity of
bringing any of theJi-t to action, 1 s]mll take it.' Di8palcRU, viii. p. 232.
2 iIIr. Io'orteseue scnds me the subjoined note Oil Spencer from a Sll)l-
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all ranks, and for the future hc assumed charge, llominall)' of the
1st Division, really of all the troops in the north which were not
actually under the master's eye. At any rate Graham could
lleVer be accused of dullness of apprehension or indecision,
the two charges habitually made against Spencer by Wellington
himself, no lcss than by many diarists of the time.
Not fal' off from the 1st Division was the 4th, nnder Cole,:ll
J'edrogao, twcnty miles north-east from Castello Dranco. The
5th Divisioll, meanwhile, lay at Perules, Payo, aud NavllS Fri!l.s
watching the passes of the Sierra de Gatn, in case Marmont'3
division at Plascncia should make an llnexpeeted IOl'ward move-
ment towards Loon by the shortest route. The 7th Division
was at VilIar Mayor Ileal' Sabugal and Fuente Guiunldo. Lasl1",
the 6th Divisioll, more to the left and forming the northern-
most section of the army, was cUlltonoo between the Coo und
the lower Agueda, from Nava de A,'cr as far as the bridge (If
Barba del Puerco. Of the c8,yalry, Alten's brigade I wa;;
covering the Light and Srd Dh-isiolls in front of Ciudad Hod-
rigo, while the others, De Grey's 2, Slade's 3, and Allson's ~ wen
Ilressed letter of Wellingtoli to 1'0le at Apsley House, not to be foumj ill
MIY of the ellitious uf tl.w Di8patclU:8. "nle llCrsoll who is 110'" herc;l'
seconll in commanll is ,·ery unfit for his situation. He is a good exocutil"e
officer, lJut has no mind, anti is incapalJie of forming RII)' opiuiollS oHi-
OWIl. lie is the centre of all the vulgar and foollsll opinions of the day.
Thus yOIl lire lI."'ure that, from former e.,,;periences, j CllllllOt llcl'crnl 111'1111
him for a moment, fur anything. lie gi\·es liis opinioll UPOII CI"er)·
sulJject, cllllllges it with the wind, and if any misfortune occurs, 01' tile
act recommended by him is disapprOl·ed of, tllere if! no effort to he looked
for from him.' This "erdkt does not much differ, save in strength of
eXllrcssioll, from tile opiuion of miuor oolltemporaries, slIch ;\S Tornkinsoll
and Stepney, c. g. 'Sir Brent Speucer, a zealous gallant officer, had no
great Illililnry genius. Hc was anxious awl fillgcty when there wa,
notlling to do, but once under lire looked like a Ilhil050pher solviug
a problem-perfedl)' {:oo! and sclf-posscssetl.' (StCpner's IJffit'ell !1'(}1II /l
Diury Qf all Offiur of the (JuardIJ, p. 80.) SCe also in Stepney for lIote!
as to SIlcncer's roscntmcnt at l,is SUIlCrscssioll by Grnhum. '11,i8 has
value, as the diarist was a favourite of the generaJ, who had offered to
make him llis ail1c-de-elmljJ..
I 11th Light Dragoom and 1st Hussars K.G.L.
2 3nl Dragoon GUlIrilll lIud 4t11 DragooIlS. Properly IlClonging to
}:rskille's cavalry division ill the Alerntejo, but liorrowcd.
s ht 141ya!s and 12th Light Dragoons. ~ 14th amllOth Light IJr3J,'lIolls,
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watching the frontier eastward from Castcllo Branco, \rith
obserring parties in the passes but the main bodies placed sOllle
wltY tu the rear. The heud quarters of the sL'(;ond Ll·igade was
at Soita near Sabugnl, that of the last-named at Manha No"u.
These cantonments, it w"ill be observed, were somewhat scattered,
there being no less than eighty miles between Barba del Puerco ill
the nurth and PCll(l.llIa<:or ill the south, but "Vdlington calculated
that he would always ha\'e long notice of ally concentration of
the cnem)' in his front, and three marches wonld suffice to unite
the army un its {:entre, between .Fuente Guiualdo and Alfayatcs,
or four to concentrate it on a wing, if the French (a thing not
"cry probable) shonld show signs of operating either south of
the Sierra de Gata or 011 the lower Agueda.
It should be noted thatl\oout this time Wellington, for the first
time since 1810, obtained the assistance of a Spanish force Oll
the Deira frontier. General CastaflOs, busy in reorganizing the
ruined Army of Estremadllra, sent Curios de :Espafia with the
cadres of sc\'eral infantry regiments to the frontier of Leon, to
lill them up with recruits from the proviuce of Salamanca. The
rest of his troops, under Morillo and renne VilIemur I, were kept
in Estremadura and continued to co-operate with Hill. But
Carlos de EspaJla fb:.Lod himself at Lxleslllu, where he joiuL-d
hands with the grent partisan Jl.Ilinn Snnehcz, and soon l:oUcetcd
some 3,000 men, who though l.l8eless for action, being raw and
not properly flU'llish cd wiUI uniforms 01· Ul'lm;, yet sefl'L'<1 to hold
a position in frollt 01' the lower ~l'Ucda, and gave Illuch trouble
to l'hielmlllt, the govenlOr of Salamanca, by their sallies and
incursions into his district.
For some w{.'(;ks uftcl.' the arrh'sl of the al'my on the Beira
frontier there 'was IittJe stirring. The fact thnt Ciudad Uodrigo
had been cut oft' from communication with Salamanca did not at
first provoke the French to a<:tion, for the place was in no im-
mediate danger of starmtioll, A large COI.l\'0Y had been thrown
into the place only two da)'S before the blockade was formed,
and it was known that the allied army hud 110 siege-train in its
compallY. Throughout the month of August Dorselllle was
lllueh more troubled by the operations of the Galicians than
by 'Vcllington's demonstrntioll, while Ma.l'lllont, knowing that
For II'llose actioll5 see section xxix. p, ,5!.l7,
,
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Uodrigu \I'US pl'Ovisioncd Ill' 1;0 October I, AAW 110 reason for
moving till it shuuld be drawing ncarer to thc eml of it.~
resources. It was only about the middle of September that he
got tardy news that there was a. siege-train making its wRy up
from OpoTto, and that the Briti~h dh;sions behind the Aguooll.
werE: making gabions and fascines. He then was stimulated to
activity, and concerted ajunction with Dorsellne without further
delay-of which marc hcreafter. In August he found full
occupation in the organi7.ation of the provinces of New Castile,
which the Emperor had handed over to him, and was more
worried by the difficulty of raising taxes and collecting ll1!1f::,"U-
:dIlCS, und by incessunt wrangles with King Joocph's officials, tllllll
by miliwJ difficulties 2. All that he did was to move his head
quarters to the neighbourhood of Plasencia 3, and to shift SOllle
of the brigades cantoned along the Tagus to the north of that
river, ill view of the fact that a lllarch to relieve and rcvictulll
Ciudad Rodrigo would ultimately become necessary. l~oy's
division was kept, however, at TnlxiUo-far to the south-till
the middle of September, in order that touch might not be lost
with Drouet and the Army of Andalusia. The Marshal, vcry
rightly, scouted the idea, which some of his subordinates had
formed, that 'Wellington's appearance Oll the Beiro. frontier might
portend a dash at Salamanca~, To gain some further knowledge
of the disposition of the Anglu-Portuguese he scut uut sc\'erul
cavalry recoJlllaiS&\lIces from Pltlsencia towards the Sierra tic
GtlUt. They fonnd British outposts all alollg the passes, ami
could not get forward, though one party succeeded in captllrillg
a picket of the 11 th Light Drl:J.l:,'OOns at San Martin tleTrebejos,
Ileal' the Puerto de Perules, 011 August 14th,
The news that Marmont was shifting troops northward, to-
wards the passes into the kingdom of I.con, induced Wellington
to make a t:or.respouding movement with his own troops, tllld 011
August 2ith the 1st alld 4th Divisions were ordcl'(.'<1 to prepare
I Marmollt to llerthier, Oorrupondance, p. ]05, in the 4th '101. p, IG3
of his 1Ifemoirea.
2 Sce all the August correspondence of ISIl ill his M€moiru, i'"
!lp. 143-02.
, 011 August 26th according to 11i8 narrative, iv. p, 01.
flbid"p.60.
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lo muve fmm Pellamucor and Pedrogao to the Ileighhoudlood of
Fuculc Guillaldu, close to head quarters 1. The notion that the
Arm)" of Portugal would, at some not very distant date, muxcll to
raise the blockade of Uodrigo, was made even more certain by the
CAptUt'C of a dispatch in cipher from Foy to Girard, warning
him that he was under orders to follow Marmont across the
'l'agus and abandon 'l'nIxillo 2. But Foy made no movc for
a fortnight more, and Wellington rightly concluded that he
lla'<1 be under no apprehension /lS to the concentration of the
cnemy, till he had received news that 'l'ruxillo had been evacu-
ated. It W/ls also clear that Mannont intended that Dorsenne
should eo-operale with him, and silH.'C that general, with all the
disposable troops of the Arm)' of the North, was beyond Astorga.
at the end of August., campaigning against the Galicians, there
was no llet.'(} to feelllllY alarm till this force should be known to
have tUrtlt.'(} southward towtlrds the Douro. On the thil·d of'
September things began to look a little more exciting, when
DOI'8enuc was reported to be starting £rom Astorga all his
l'ctmu jOtll11e)': he madc forced marches for Salamanca, WhCl·C
it WI\S known that a convoy for the supply of ll.odrigo was being
organized 3. But proyisions were hard to collect in LeOIl, and
MUl'lllont had refused to begin his march of conccntration till it
should be certified to him that Dorselllle was nearly ready, and
that the (:om'oy had been got together.
Hcnec it wu::; not till September 1nh that thc time of erisi~
OC<';UIl. On this day ·Wellington received the news that :Foy
had evacuated 'l'ruxillo 011 the 15th, and that Montbrun's cavalry
was crossing the sierra by the Puelto de Banos, with iufantry
colulllns following in its rear. On the previous day an intcl>~
cepte<1 letter informed him that the SalamanCl.l convoy was to
be ready Oil September !?lIst 4. If Dorsenne had stopped in front
of the Gnlicinll5, or if l\'larmont had been moving with only part
of his troops, Wellington would have prepared to fight (l. battle
beyond the Agueda. But it was clear from severnl intcreepted
dispatches that the Armies of Portugal and the North were about
I Grallam's (liary in his Life, by Delal'oye, 1'. oi7.
I Ibid., August 29th.
3 Ibid., September 211d, 1" 582.
l Wellington to Gralmm, SCllmmoor 10, Dispatches, viii. 2B4.
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tu unite in full force, and, as the British general remarked ill
It letter which lapsed into unwonted jocularity, 'The de,·il is in
the French for numbers I '. He had got to know that Souham's
strong division had come to the front to join Dorsclllle 2, and
that the guard-divisions, of Roguet and Dumousticr, with their
attendant cavalry and artillery made up 15,000 mCH, and 110t
7,000 as he had hitherto supposed 3, It was possible, nay prob.
able; that the Army of the North would put at least ~5,OOO
Hlen into the field for the combined movement now pClluillg\
und Marmont, if he callle in full fOl't.-e, might bring 35,000 more.
It was impossible to stop such a mass ot' men in the plain east of
Uodrigo, wh'ere the ground was all suited to cilYalry opcration~,
and where no good defensive positions were to be found. If the
enemy were determined to relieve the pluee he eould eerlailll)'
nccomplish his desire.
WeU.illgton had a little more than 46,000 men under his
hand at this moment. The total should have been higher, hut
aU the newly arrived detachments had been in the Walcherell
c-"pL-dition, and the heat of the Spanish summer 11I.ul brought
out the fever whieh lurked in the bodies of the lneH who had
Ben'cd in that pestilential spot. Battalions which had landed
at Lisbon in JWle with 700 or 800 men had gone dowtl to 40U
or 500 ba)'ollet~ in September, though the marches had lIut lJccu
hea"y u. Nor had the old Pcnim;ular n:gilllcllt.-l CSCllpL-d u louch
of Gllndinllfl fever during their stay HCllr Elvns ill Jul.)'. WIH::rc-
fore there were no less than 14,000 sick in the British ami)' at
this moment, and the force present under arms in the !IC\'CIJ
divisions on the Beira fl'Outier was (excluding the Portuguese)
I To Beresfonl, IJu,p'l/c/u:iI, \'iii. p. 97.
'This is mentiollp.d ill his letters to Heury Wellesley of August tt aul1
to CrnllfurU of August 28.
, To Henry \\rellesley Oil August 28 ; cf. to Lord Liverpool or 8.1111e dale.
• To Lord U\'CrIIOol, Diilpa/chu, viii. 256.
A Some typical regimental figures of September 15, 1811, Illay scn'e as
illustrations. TIle 68th (only just Illndcrl) IUIlI 233 sick to 412 clt"cctil'c,
the 51st Oanded in April) 246 sick to 251 effective. 'The 77th landed OH
July 5th with 86!) of all ruukll, but hud only 680 effectil"e on August 5,
and 560 on September 15. The 40th had, on September 15, 791 effeetil'c
aud .'513 sick. The total sick on the last-nllmell till)' were, <present' ],1"20,
'hospitals' 12,517, or 14,237 ill all.
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onl), f!9,OOO sabres and bayonets. Of the Portuguese the !lC\'en
infantry and t\\'o cuvulry brigades SCl'viug with the maill army
made up about 17,000 men more 1. 'Vith 46,000 men 'Velling-
ton refused to offer battle beyond the Agiieda to the combined
}"rcllch forces, which might well amount to 60,000 men, and
could not be less than 53,000 or 55,000. But he was deter-
mined not to retire an inch further from Rodrigo than was
necessary, being convinced that the enemy <,'ou]d onl.y l'emain
l'()m,.'enlratcd for a few tlllyS, and could ha\'e no serious intention
of invading Portngal. Though he might not be able to fight.
in the open plain, he was prepared to defend himself in the skirts
of the mountains, if the French should push out beyond Rodrigo.
Here he had two positions already selected, the first at l~uellte
Guinaldo, where the rugged ground begins, the second by Rendo
and .-'\lfayates, in front of &bugal, which was far more formid-
able: this 11'1\8 the ground which Spencer had been told to take
lip in April, when he had been left opposite MassenB. during
Wellington's absence at Bndajoz. The Guillaldo position, being
les.~ defensible by nature, was to be rendered strong by w'l.
During its stay there in September the 4th Division sketched
out an entrenched camp along thc hills, but only two roooubts
and some long lines of trench had been completed when the
crisis came flt the end of the month.
Meanwhile ,"Vellingtoll did not intend to retire on Guinaldo,
much less on the Rendo-Alfayates position, unless he were forcerl
to do so. He thought it likely that Marmont and Dorsenne would
l'Ontcnt themselves with relic\'ing Rodrigo, and would push 110
further. 'Vherefore he directed that Pict011 and CraufllM, the
!,"Cllernls in command of the two blockading divisions, should
lea\'e the Snlamanca road open, whcn the French appeal'oo in
strength, bllt should not give back from the immediate neighbour-
hood of the fortress unless they were attacked in force.
Craufurd might get behind the Vadillo, a torrent which falls
into the Agueda five miles above ll.odrigo. Pieton was to
occupy the isolated plateau on which lie the villages of El Bodon
and Pnstore~, five or six miles south of Rodl'igo. Here they
I llrigadt'.!I of Pack amI MacMallOll, with the other five brigades incor-
porated ill tlle 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7t11 Divisions, anti tll'O weak cavalry
hrigades uuder Madden. ~ tables in Allpelldix XX.
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were to stand, and to see what the Cllcmy intended to do; PI'Oh.
ably they \1'OuId have to retreat no further. This disposition.
which was founded on a false pSJchological Clitimate of the
character of J\1armont, was to lead to trouble. The i\1sl"lIhal was
more enterprising than Wellington had calculated, and (as afl'ai~
turned out) it would ha,'c been safer to concentrate the whole
anny on the Fucnte Guinll.ldo position the moment that the
Armies of Portugal RIlII the North uppe.'\rOO in front of Ciudad
Rudrigo.
SECTION XXIX: CHAPTER II
F.l, nODON AND AI,I)}o":A n,\ P01'i'TJ:
'rH): long·threatcnt.."C1 adyancc of the French for the relief of
Ciudad Rodrigo begun at lnst on September ~~nd, when Mllr-
1II0llt brought all the infantry of the Anny of Portugal, save the
single division of Foy, across the Sierra de Gata, and appeared
with his vanguard at Tamamcs, the little town on the Leoncsc
side of the mountains where del Parque had beaten :Marchand
in 1809. Foy alone had been left in New Castile, with orders
to demonstrate frolll his base at Plasencia against 1Vellington's
posts between Cnstello Dranco and Sabugal, where (as it will
he remembered) the 5th Division was lying, placed on this side
fur the express purpose of warding ofi' any attelllpt to strike at
the communications of the allied army.
On the day that Marmont with five divisions of infantry llnd
Montbrun's cavalry began to debouch from Tamames, his col-
league Dorsenne hOO brought forward the disposable portion of
the Army of the North to San Muiio1., a long march in front of
Salamanca, and was in easy touch with the Army of Portugal.
Dorscnne had concentrated four divisions of infantry-the two
of the Imperial Guard under Roguet and Dumoustier, Souhnm's
newly arrived battalions, and the division so long commanded
by Scrras, but now under General Thicbault, thc governor of
Salamanca, which had been I),ing about the Esla and the Orbigo
ever since 1809. He had also with him two brigades of cavalry,
J...epic's 800 sabres of the Imperial Guard, and Wathier's cltas-
sew's, The two armie.~ joined on the 23rd, and showed a fOI'-
midable total, larger thall that which MasseUR had collected for
the battle of Fuentcs de Oiiol'o, li'or i\'[armont had brought
~,OOO foot and oved!,500 horse, and Dorsenne a slightly larger
contingent, about 27,000 infantry and 2,000 sabres I. Thi~
I 'I1Mbault (Memoirts, iv. p. (10) gives the total at 48,000 infantry and
llearl)' 4,000 C3\'l\lry, I imagine the ~al tot.,1 to have been a little larger,
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hoovy force of .58,000 men, if art.ilIery be reckoner! in, wa.",
a.~ 'Vellingtoll had always foreseen, more than the Anglo-
Portuguese army eould face. For including the di vision soutll
of the Sierra de Gata, which was protecting the southern com-
munications of the army, 'Vellington had with him as we
have sccn no more than !!,~OO British !lIld 900 Portuguese
cavalry, about 25,000 Dritish and 16,000 Portuguese infantry,
or a totAl Rtrength (including artillery, &c.) of about 46,000
officers and men of aU arms. The risk of fighting in the open
plain in front of Ciudud Uodrigo would clearly be too greal,
though by SI. retreat into the Jlortuguese mountains it would
be possible to find a position which should compensate for the
numerical deficiency of the allied army. If the French should
pt'CSS forward, it would clearly be necessary to retire on to
better battle-ground, and 'Vellington's ready eye had found
two successive positions, as we have already stated, the one at
Fuente Guinaldo 011 the foot·hills, the other between Rendo and
Aldea Velha, in front of Sabugnl, well within the mountains.
Meanwhile it remained to be seen whether the French, with
the large force that they had collected, would content themselves
with throwing a new convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo, a thing that
conkl not be prevented, or whether they intended to press the
allied army hard, and to endeavour to bring it to adion-in which
case the retreat into the hills would becomc I1c<-'cssary. all the
morning of the 28rd Wellington, perfectly informed l\S to the
position of the enemy, and fairly well able to estimate their
number~, wrote to Charles Stuart, 'the French havc not Jet
nppeare<I, but [ think they will before e\'cning. I shall have
my hands very full of business fol' the next three or four
days 1,' They were to be fuller than was convenient, and partly
by his own fault.
On leaming that l\farmont and Dorsenne were at San l\luiio7.
with ovel' 50,000 mcn, '\'VCllillgtOll, if he had practised his
aCCllstomed caution, wonld have concentrated on Fllente Gui-
about 58,000 in all. By tile returns of the summer of 1811 the two
gURl'd-infantrydivisions had 15,000 men, Serras's (Thiebanlt's) 4JOOO men,
SOllham's nearly 8,000.
I Wellington to Charles St\l!lJ1:, from Fllente Gllinaldo, Selltemhcr 2:lnJ.
J)i~plllche8, viii. p. 299.
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llaldo, withdrawing the two divisions which lay close into
Ciudad Rodrigo, the Light Division at Martiago, the 31'd
Didsion on the heights by El Bodon and Pastores. It would
hal·c been sufficient to leave a cavalry screen as close to the
blockaded fortress as was practicable. But for once he showed
an unwonted tendency to take dangerous risks. He did not
wish to fall back unless he were pressed, and he thought it
extremely probable that the enemy had no further design than
to revictull.! ll.odrigo. Jlefllsing to give up valuable gronnd
unless he were forced to do so, he left Craufurd and Pictoll
in their advanced positions all through the 23rd and 24th of
September. He did not roll Graham and the 1st and 6th
Divisions ill from the left, where their present position on the
Az<'1.v8. co\'ered the mw. to Almeida and the valuable accumula-
liun of artillery stores at Villtt lla Ponre. Nor did he brillg
up the 7th Division to his hend qUllrtcrs at Fuente Guinutdo,
where he lay for these two days with the 4th Didsion alone.
The cavalry at the head of the l!~rench column appeared ill
~hc plain beyolld Ciudad Rodrigo on the 23rd, as Wellington
had e."'\peeted, and commlmicated with the place. It wns ill
no wa)' hindered, as the British cavalry fell back beyond the
AgueUa by order, and left the Salamanca road open. On the
!Hth n vCl'y large force was up-observers on the heights of
l'llStores saw a great mass of cavalry in the plain below them,
and four divisions of infantry, one of which was made out by
telescopes to belong to the Imperial Guard, from its high
plumes and bearskins I. It was presently discovered tha.t an even
larger mass was close behind, encamped 011 the Guadapero
strealll, beyond the low hills which lie east of Ciudad Rodrigo.
Dllt 011 thi.s day the enemy, though he had some 4,000 cavalry
in his front line, made no attempt to pnsh forward either
against Pictoll or against Craufurd. This quiescence on his
lllh'crsary\ pl\.rt evidently mnde iVellington conclude that he
Heed fear nothing, that the French had come merely to revietual
lheir garrison, not to take the offensive against the allied army.
Hc left his divisions ill the scattered posts which they were
occupying, with sixteen miles between Graham 011 the left and
I According to Mal"lllont (Mtfmoircll, iv, p. (3) oul)' olle dil'ision, TlJiC"-
bault's, acLulllly entered the town.
OlfAM, IV 0 0
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Craufunl on the right. And he neglected the fact that his
conccntration point at Fuente Guinaldo was only fifteen milcs
from Ciudad Uodrigo, where thc leading section of the 'French
army, over 20,000 strong as he had seen, was already encamped.
If it should march suddenly for;\'ard 011 the 25th, the 3rd
Division was only five miles from its outposts, 011 the heights
of l'astores and El Bodon, and there was no other division SU\'C
the 4th placed directly to cover Fuente Guinaldo. If the flank
divisions were called ill on nil alarm. Graham was tift:CCll miles
from Fuenre Guinaldo, Crullfurd eleven, on the other side of lL
ri\'er with few fords. And by the time that they could COil'
centrate, the :French van might be supported by the large
reserves which were known to be lying behind Ciudad Uodrigo.
It is Olle of' the best· known axioms of war that theconccnb'!ltioll
point of a scattered army must not be within one short murch
of the base from which the opponent cun strike.
"Vellingloll was so far right in his judgemenl of lhc clleIllJ'~
designs, that it was tl'llC that l\1armOllt had come forward
without any definite intention of forcing on a fight, or of
advancing far into Portugal. His subsequent offensi\'c mo\'c,
however, wus provoked by his discovery that the alliL'<.1 urmy
was quite close to him, but wholly unconcentrated, On till,!
mOl1ling of the ~5th it occurred to the Marshal that it would be
deflirable to find out by re(''Ollnaissance whether 'Vellington lUlll
been Illukiug any provision for a regular siege of Ciudnd UIXI·
rigo-whether he had been collecting fascines and gabiol1s ill the
neighboming villagefl. or had brought up hea\'y artillery close
to his blockading line 1. If'this should turn out to be dlC casc,
the knowledge of it would have a serious eflect 011 all the future
mo\'ements of the Army of Portugal. l?or a siege is a different
thing from a blockade, and, if Rodrigo were in danger of actual
leaguer, hi;; OWl1 army would have to canton il;;clf in regiolls
less remote from the Portuguese frontieJ' than those which it
had hitherto occupied.
Dorsenuc was persuaded to assist the ArIllY of Portugal ill
a great recollnaiti5aIlCe, which was to push buck Wcllinglou's
I TIlis rClISon for his great rcccmlllliSSllllceS or September 2;ith i~ the
only olle given by Marmollt (Mbmnre6, iI'. p. 63),
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cavulry ~crCCll and sce what lay behind it. III the lllorniug of
September :t5th the two c[walry brigades of the Army of the
North went out 011 the Carpio-Espeja roads to sweep the line of
the A:tava, with W'athier in commnnd. At the same time l\{olll~
brun took the bulk of the cav"alry at' Murmont, two brigade!:! of
dr~<roolls and two of light horse, and ru:lvlllll:ed along the
~Ollthenl ro..'uI, that which runs from Cindad Uodrigo past :El
BodOll towards Fuelltc Guinaldo. Only one infantry division,
lllUl of ThiebauH, the weakest. in the t.wo arlllies, wru; put under
arms to support the rovalry, and even thcsc 4,000 lllen did 1I0t
leavc the immediate vicinity of G'iudad nodrigo-they merely
crossed the Agueda and halted, The two reconnaissances
brought Oil two separate engagements, at a disW,IICC of tell milcs
from cach other, of which one had no importance, immediate ai'
ulterior, while the other led to sharp Iightillg and revealed to
the French the weakness of Wellington's position. The cavalry
ocrt'Cll of thc allied tmny Wt\i> formed us follows: 1\Iaddell\
l'ortuguese division lay along the line of the lower AgllCdu,
\rhich was not threatened this day. Anson's brigade held the
liue of the Azava, anll hly across the Carpio !'Oud. .Alten's
brigade wus strung out along the low hills from south of Curpio
to the upper Agueda near Pastores, and had one of its squadrous
detached with the Light Division beyond that ri\'cr, ill frout of
Martiago. Slade's and Dc Grcy's brigades were far to the rear,
behind Fuente Guinaldo, in Villar de Toro and other villages
along the Con river, and only came up to the front after midday
on the 25th.
Wathier's insignificant eng'a..t:>Clllent on the lower Al.llVll. lIIay
be deult with first. About eight ill the morniug the pickets of
the 14th Light Drl\,"OollS detected 1\ strong column ot' cavalry
coming out of Rodrigo, and were forced to retire from Carpio
and other posh! be>'ond the strcum. The ClICllly could Le
cOlllltL>(l from the hills above, and it was noled that they left.
six Sljuudrolls beside Carpio in reserve, and were advauciug with
tight more. These crosi!L'<1 the river and felt their way
cautiollsly towards the heights. They were coming straight
against the front of the 6th Division, and Graham seut out the
light colllpanies of Hulse's brigade to Hue lhc wood which
L'1)\·ered the position which he was holding. The two lll'itish
ooS
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cavalry regimCllD> (14th alld 16th Light Dmgoow;) ga\'c btlck to
the edge of the wood also, and formed up close to their infantry
supports. Misliking the look of the long belt of trees which
hid all from him, 'Vathier halted four squadrons more 011 the
flat ground just beyond the Azava, and moved the other four
towards Graham's unseen line. This advanced guard consisted
of the Lancers of Berg and the 26th Chasscurs. When they
were feeling theit· way up the slope their leading squadron II'HS
eharb"-od and driven back by a squadron of the 14th. The main
body, however, picked up the beaten unit and advanced IIgain:
when the)" had got close to the wood, the light companies of the
11 th, 61st, uml. 53rd fired a volley into them, and while thc)'
stood stagb~rcd by the unexpected salute foul' squadrons of thc
14th and 16th charged them, broke them, and chased thelll
for two miles down to and across the A:mva 1. Thel"rench
reserve left close to that stream retired at once, covering thc
bl'okclI squadrollS. The French lost one ofliccr nud teu lllCIJ
killed, and fh'e officers and thirty-two men taken, mostly
wounded. The British loss was very small-an officer and tell
llIen wounded llwl one man missing.
Vvuthiel' stayed in line at Carpio, without making n furthcr
advance, till evening, alld reported that the English were in
position with aU arms beyond the Azava, and not inclined to
ghe way. This was important news, for, if there wcre_ infillllr}'
so fur north, it was clear that 'Wellington had not yet COllccn·
trated his army on the Fuente Guinaldo line.
Montbnm's reconnaissance, along the Fuente Guinaldo ruad,
lurned out II much more lively tlnd important affSir. He startt'(l
out with a heavy column consisting of two brigades of his own
dmgoons and two of light cavalry 2, which came into touch with
t.he vedettes of Alt.en's brigade almost the moment that it had
crossed the Agueda, for the British outposts Jay within two
, 11lis was the first time 011 Wllich tile British c....valry fought lancers
(at Albuero it was only infantry which were charged h)' the 1'01Cl!).
TOlllkinson of tllC 14th reports (Diury, p. 115): "I1,cy look...>tl well ll1ld
fonnidable till the)' were broken alld closed with by our meu, ami (heu
their lances wcre all cllcumhrance.... MallY caught in the apl'0inUlICIlt!;
of other men, and pullcd them to tlle ground.'
~ That of J.,...nlOUc (1st aud 3rd Hussars, 15th al1l1 22ml Cha8reur~) aud
that of Founlicr (7th, 13th, 20th Oha88eur~).
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miles of Rodrigo. Dri\'illg straight bcfol'C him, Montbt'ulI
pierced the screen, and pressing up the slope found himself' in
the middle of the scattered fractions of the Brd Divi~ion, which
Wellington had only just begun to draw together when he saw
that the reconnaissance was being made by no less than ~,500
horse. There WllS not time to concentrate, because the posts of
l'icwn's battalion~ were too close to the enemy, and the position
was unsatisfactory. Grahalll, who hud surveyoo it a few weeks
lJefol'C, rcnmrks in his diary that it WllS ' by no means favourable
-extensive, yet very narrow, and the right thrown back across
the plain towards the ford by Pastores, where there is little
atlvRntaf,te of ground but a bank and a little water-run 1.'
At thc momcnt when l\fontbrun broke through the cavu1ry
,<;ereen, Picton's infantry was strung out on a front of six miles-
the 74th and three companies of the 5/60th were at Pastores, ncur
the Agueda, the remainder of Wallace's2 brigade (the 1/45th and
Ij88th) was three miles south-west of Pastores in the village of
El Bodon. Coh-iIIe's brigade and the Portuguese were equally
split up-the 1/5th and 77th, with the 21st Portuguese in
support, being on high ground across the road from Rodrigo
to !"uente Guinaldo, ill the centre, while the left section of the
front of the di\'ision (94th, ~/83rd and 9th Portuguese) was
onlowcr ground, two miles west of Colville, in the direction of
Cnmpillo. Altcu's cavalry brigadc, having sent n S<luadron of
the 11th Light Drngoons to watch Craufurd's front, beyond the
Agueda, and having strong pickets out to right aud left, had
only 500 sabres left as its main body. These five wcuk squadrons
(three of the 1st Hussars K.G.L., two of the 11th Light Drn·
goons) were across the high-road, near the 5th and 77th, and
with lhem the two Portuguese batteries under Major Al'ClIt·
schildt which fOl'med the divisional artillery of Picton.
Marmont, on discovering the scattered position of the AlJies,
could hardly belicve that they had nothing more in his front
than what he saw-fom groups of two or three battalions each,
with huge gaps between them. He suspected that Wellillgton
must have reserves close behind, not thinking it likely that he
I Graham's diary, in his Life by De1:l\'oyc, p. oH.
I Walbce of the 88th was commanding the brig:l.Ile vice i\Iackinnon, on
sick leave in EU.'l'laud.
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would have kept illfnlll.I'y 80 close to Cinuml Ro(higo unless he
wcre in t'orn:! to resist all attnck, He at'(:ordillgly rcsoh'erl not
to send for his infantry from the rear and eng~rrc in a serious
action, but to direct Montbrun to drive in olle section of the
hostile front with his heavy column of cfl\'nhy, and so to disco\'el'
the exact strength and position of the A Hies I, It was lueky
for Wellington that the l\lan:hal limited his ambitions to tllis
mouest scheme. l\1011tbrun resolved to break in UtC allied
centre, across the high-road, and advanced up it, leaving on llis
left the two fmctiom of 'Vallace's brign.de in l~AAtores and 'El
BodOll, If he could pierce the centl'C, this wiug would be in
!I. di~astrolls plight, being t'ut oft' from it~ line of retreat and
its power of rejoining ,~rellington at Fllente Guinaldo. Acoonl-
ingl)' the whole of the l''rench horse came up against the position
:\Cross the road, where Coh'i\Ie's two battalions and Arentschildt's
hatlcl'ies blocked the way, while Alten's uve squadrons we!"e
covel'ing their flank. The contest was of an abnormal sort,
~500 horse with onc battery attacking a smaller force of lIll
arms-I,OOO infantry, 500 sabres, and two batteries.\!,
It WtlS most important to '~lcl1ington that the dewchmcnl
across the rood shoulrlllOt be dri\'en ill, tlnd he gtl\-e orders that
it was to hold its ground to the last possible minute, in order
t.o allow the battalions in Pastor("S and El Bodol) time 10
escupc from their compromised position, and to fall into the
line of retl'C8.t behind the detaining force. His command was
well obeyed, and a most gallant struggle was kept up for more
lhan un hour, under the Commander-in-Chicf's own eyes,
Montbrun came on with three colulllns abreast, each formed
of a brigade, while a fourth brigade fonned his reserve. His
left (.'OlUlllll tried to turn the right of Alhm's cavalry, his eelltre
columll attncked its front, his right column, supported by 1\
1 'Comma la position lIes Auglais !ftait trel> domimlllte, je ne pou"ais
juger quelles forces Us aVllicnt en arricre: it etait possible que ses
Ilremieres troupes fUS8ent SQutellues II.'1r d'autres. Ne vonlant pas ri~qller
un engagement serieu:I:, en les faisant attaquer par la senle di,-ision
d'infanterie qui filt 11 portie [11Iie"b.'1ult]. je llris le parli Ile Il'employer il
I'attaque que de III clI"lllcrie et de l'artillerie. Si I'Cllncmi etait en force,
fOlle en serait qllitte llOur se retirer.' (,M-:ml'ireA, il', p. 04,)
2 Not counting the 21st Portuguese, whicll came \JP later, and \I'as nol
engaged ill the actual combat.
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horse-artillery battery, moved up against the Portuguese guns
ami their infantry supports. There was fierce fighting all
along the line: the allied horse, aided by thc steep slope in
their favour. made a wonderful fight against the superior
numbers of the enemy. who had to attack in each point on a
narrow front, since only parts of the hillside were open ground
suitable for cavalry movements. Each time UUlt the leading
French squadron neared the crest it was charged and thrown
back, The 11th and one squadron of the Gerlllan>; dealt with
the Rank attack, the rest of the legionary hussars with that in
the centre, The defence was lIlost despemte, consisting ill a
long senes of partial charges, in which onc or more of the
rlefending squadrons beat back the head of the hostile advance,
lUld then retired under cover of the others. Montbrull, having
~ix or seven regiments with him, was alWfl)'S able to launch a
Ilew attack up the hillside the moment thRt the last had been
foiled. The colonel of the German hussars wrote that from
fil'llt to last the enemy came on nearly forty times, yet ncver
WIlS allowed to reach the crest: the individual squadrons of his
regiment and of t.he 11 th had charged eight or nine time;;
cllch I.
Meanwhile, to the right of the plateau which the cavalry
dcfcnded so gallantly, the third French cllValry column had
attacked the Portuguese batteries whose fire was sweeping down
the road. A dragoon brigade, though suffering heavily from
the grape poured into it as the range grew close, succeeded
in making its way to the gUllS, and burst ill among them.
capturing four pieces; the a.rtillerymen hnd held their groullCl
to the last, and earned Wellington's praise for their steadiness.
But the piece;; were not lost; close in support of them was the
first battalion of the 5th regiment under Major Ridge, who,
when the hostile horsemen halted for a. moment around the
cllptured guns, attacked them without hesitation in line. The
battalion advanced firing, and with three volleys broke the
dragoons, who were blown with their char/:,>'e and in much
disorder. They recoiled down the hill in complete rout, flnd
I TIle best account of this fine 8kirmisll, carefully eOllstruclell from
Ilriginal authorlti~, is in Sclrl\'ertfcger's !Jis(ory of the Gennun Ugiol1,
i. 33i-!>,
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the Portuguese gunners were able to get their pieces in action
again and resume their very effective fire 1. This was a rare
example o,f a successful attack 011 cavalry by infantry in line:
it could 1I0t have been tried Itgainst intact sCJuadrons, for there
was 110 flank-support for the 5th, and an enemy in good order
would have turned the battalion and cut it up from the side.
But Ridge saw that the French were in complete disarray, lUld
unfit for the moment Lo man(Euvre, wherefore he was justified
in trying the dangerous-looking movement whieh had such
complete SllCCess.
The French at last gave up, their frontal attacks; it i.~ said
that whcn the trumpets blew fOl" one more advance, thc Allies
saw the regiment at the hend of the column refuse to move
forward. Montbrllll thereupon tried a move which he might
well have made half an hour earlier; he began to extenc1 his
hitherto concentrated bribrades, and thrust one of them into the
gap between the hill that hc could not force and the village of
El Bodon.
Wellington then gave back; Pieton and the two battalions
in El Bodon had by this time evacuated it, and were, as
ordered, on their way to the rcur. The sLiIl more compromised
detachment in Pastores had also got away, and was making for
Fuente Guinaldo by a very circuitoo;; road: it forded the
Agueda, went ten miles 011 its further side, whel"C no French
were as yet visible, and then rccrossed again Ilcar Uobledn,
joining the 4th Division at dusk.
The second period of the eombat of El Bodon-to gh'e its
t1s11alllame to the engagement-was less bloody than the first,
but quite as exciting. 'VellingWn's order of retreat was that
the two batteries of Arentschildt with a cavalry escort w(!nt
first, then the 21st !lortuguese, which had remained ill resel'l'(!
all through the earlier fighting, then the 5th and 77th in a
sblgle square 2, Rnd lastly two squadrons of the German hussars,
, Arentschildt"s gunners did llot suffer so much as might 11a,'e !leen
eXI,ccted, amlllrellillgtoll WR!J inaccurate when, in IJis dillpatch, he says
that tIley wcre cut down at their guns. '111e Portuguese returns sho,r
t1ll1t they logt only oue man killt'tl and four wounded.
~ 'Illey only made up 1,000 h.1yonets hetween them, and tile 77th,onl)'
450 strong, would have made 11 very small square hy itself.
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which remained on the position till the last moment. This
column, retreating along the high-road, had in front of it, and
ultimately caught up, the other fractions of the Srd Division,
Pidon's two battalions which lmd come ill from the right, and
the 94th, 2/S3rd, and 9th Portuguese, which had fallen into
the road from the left. But in the first hour of the retreat
these detachments had not yet been o\·erlaken.
Montbrun pressed on fiercely, the mOIll~nt that he saw that
the hill so long held against him had been abandoned, and beset
the retreating colu mn on an sides as it marched along the flat.
The hussars in the rear were driven in by overwhelming numbers,
1I1ld had to retire to the neighbourhood of the !21st Portnguese.
This left the square composed of the 5th and 77th exposed to
the full force of the enemy. Montbrun caused it to be cha"ged
Oil t11l-ee sides at once; but the British infantry showed no
disordcr, reserved thcir firc till the enemy was within thirty
paces, and then e..'eeut.ed such a regular and effective series of
volleys that the dragoons were beaten off with loss, and could
not close at uny point. The German squadrons then turued
back and charged thcm as they retired iu disorder.
TillS repulse checked the l'-'rench for half an hour, Imt
prescntly they were up again, not only hovering round the two
squares, that of the 5th and 77th and that of tlle ~lst Porlu-
guese, which Lrought up the real', but riding all down the side
of the division, which 1I0W formed one long column of march.
But they da.red not charge again: Jylontbrull merely brought lip
his hOl-se-nrtillel'y battery, find plied the enemy with fire from
several succcssi\-e positions. It was not ineffective, but the allied
infantry refused to be troubled with it, und continued to march
as hard as they could along the high-colld. '1"01' six miles
fLCroS.~ a perfect flat,' writes an eye-witness, 'without the
slightest protection from any incident of ground, without their
artillery. and almost without cavalry (for what were five squad-
rons against twenty or thirty?) did the Srd Division continue
its march. During the whole time the French c~walry never
quitted them: six guns were taking the division in flank and
rear, pouring in a shower of round shot, grape, ancI canister.
This WWI a trying and pitiable situation for troops to be placed
ill, but it in 110 wa.y shook their courage or confidcnce: so fnr
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from being dispirited or cast down the mcn were cheerful
and gay. The soldicl'il of my own corps, the 88th, lold lhcir
officers that if the French would only charge, cvery officer should
have a 1late horse to ride upon. General Picton conducted him-
self with his usual coolnels. He I'ode on the left flank of the
colulIlll, and repeatedly cautioned the diffhcnt oottaliol\s to
mind their quarter-distullC<l and the" tellings off." 'Vc had at
last got close to the entrenched camp at Fuente Guinaldo when
:\1ontbrun, impatient that we should escape from his grasl),
ordcred his troopers to bring up their right shoulders and incline
towards our marching column. The movement was not exactly
bringing his squadrons into line, but the next thing to it,
and they wcre within half pistol-shot of us. Pictoll took off his
hat, and holding it over his eyes as a shade from the SUll, looked
sternly but anxiously at the French. The clatter of the horscs
and the clanking of the sabre; was so great. when the right
squadrons moved up, that many thought it the preliminary to
a general charge. Some mouuted officer called out, "Had we
not better form square?" "No," replied PiCtOll, "it is anI)"
II ruse to frighten us, and it 7~!On't do." 1 '
Montbrun's bolt, indeed, was shot. For by this time troops
were coming out from Fuente Guinaldo to cover the retreating
(livision, De Grey's heavy dragoons, who had just come up
from tIle Coa, at the head of them. The French horse slackened
their pnce, and finally drew off. Half an hour later the retl"Cat-
ing column had taken up it." destined position in thc half-
completed entrenched CA.mp where the 4th Division wn,<;
awaiting it.
This long straggling fight eost the Allies only 149 casualties.
The cavalry had lost 70 men 2 in their long fight to hold the
hill, which they so 100lg guarded, on the flank. Of the infl\lltry
the l/5th and 77th had lost 4!! men, not by the sabres of the
cavalry whom they hnd driven off so serenely. but by the artillery
fire which followed. The other eight infantry battaJiolls of the
Srd Divisioll, British and Portuguese, had lost only S4 men in
all, mostly, it is to be presumed, by the cnnnonade during tllC
1 Memoirs of Grll.ttan of the 88th, pp. 116-17.
2 1st Hussars K.G. L. ;5 killed, 2 officers and 32 men wounded,5 men
missing j 11th Ligllt Dragoollil 8 killed, 2 officers and 14 men wounded.
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retreat. The Portugucsc gunners had ouly 5 men hurt-a light
loss eOllsidering that the enemy's dragoons had been among their
picces for five minutes.
Montbrun's loss is nowhere accurately stated, but was probably
about~ at the le!l.st. Thirteen officers had been hit in the
four brigades cngaged, and though cavalry was more heavily
oflicereil in proportion to it.. numbers than infantry, we call
hardly suppose that where 13 officers feU less than 190 rank and
file were killed or wounded I.
'Wellington was lucky to havc paid no greal:cr price fOI' his
rash maintenance of a position so dangerously close to the walls
of Ciudad Rodrigo, If l\1armollt had brought up infantry close
behind his great ctwlllry force, the 3rd Division 1V0uld ha ve suf~
fered far mor~; it might even have been destroyed. nut there
was, as we ha\'e seen, only one 'French il1fantry division Illldcl'
IIl'ms on the mOl'lliug of the g5tb, that of Thicbault. Three
morc were encamped beyond Rodrigo, the rcst wcre still some
miles to the rear, halting by the Guadapero river. Marmont
sent for Thiebault, when he had discovered the position and the
weakness of Picton's scattered brigade~. But, luckily for the
British, Dorsenllc hud also dispatched orders to this division,
wllieh formed part of his own Army of the North. He had
beeu alarmed at the strength of the Allies on the Al'.-ava, which
Wathier had discovcred, and had told Thieballlt to march to
hi.~ right and support the cavalry on the Carpio road. 'Vhcn
hrMl«j\-IasstnD's aidNle-camp arrived, to hurry up this infantry, it was
found to have goue oR' some miles to the north-west; and
though promptly recalled it did not reach the ground in front
of }?uente Guinaldo till late in the evening. Deprived of Thie-
bault's battalions by this chance-one of the mall)' results of
n divided command-Marmont summoned up the thrce divisions
which lay on the other side of Rodrigo. Not having been
lI'a1'lled for service 011 this day, they took some time to get
under arms, tUld more to file over the Ilarrow bridge o\'er the
Agueda. The)' only reached and joined the Marshal and Mont-
brull a short timl:! before Thiebault arrived. Thus all day
I According to ]l.lartilliell's illv:lluable lists, tlle 25tll ))ragoons lost
~ oflk-ers, the 22ml OhlliJlIell/NI 4, tl,c nth IlUll 15tl. J)rtIgoons :! each, till.!
8th awllOtll Dragoons 1 each.
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Mllrmont. had no infantry in hand, with which to support his
cavalry 1. But ut nightfall he had ~O,OOO bayonets at the front,
and the five rear divisions, left hitherto on the Guadapero, were
also coming up, and had reached and passed the Agueda. There
would be nearly 60,000 men at the front by noon on the ~6th,
"Velliuglou's position at Fuente Guilluldo was therefore vcry
hazardous. When night fell on the 25th he had only assembled
in the half-finished entrenchments the 3rd and 4th Divisions,
Pack's independent Portuguese brigade, and the cavalry of
.Alten, De Grey, and Slade, or about 15,000 men. He had sent
orders to the other fractions of his army to COIl<':Clltrate there,
but it was certain that some, and possible that others, of them
would not get up on the morning of the 26th. The concentra-
t.ion orders had gone ant too late. Graham was directed to
unite the 1st and 6th Divisions and McMahon's Portuguese at
Nava de Aver, abandoning the lower Al'.llva to a rearguard
composed of Anson's cavalry. He was, as he wrote to his
brother-iu.law Cathcart, •amazingly relie\'ed' to have permission
to draw in towards the centre 2; but the orders came late amI
did·lIot go far enough-at Nava de Aver, which he reached at
noon on the 26th, he had 13,000 men collected, but he was still
twelve miles from Fuente Gninaldo, and the road to that point
by Pucbla de Azava was not out of reach of molestation b)' the
I<'rcnch. It was onl), in the afternoon that he received a second
dispatch, telling him not to move ou Fuente Gllinaldo, but to
get behind the Villar Mayor stream, and march by l\ circuitous
route, through Villar Mayoi' and Bismula, to join the main aMll)'
at 11 point morc to the rear 3. The Commanuel··ill-Chief hacl
resolved to evacuate l<'llcntc Guinaldo.
Thus, by his own fault, 'Wellington was short of two division.~
and a brigade frum his left, in the perilous afternoon hours of
I :'olarmont, in his Mhnoires, iI'. p. 65, says that he sent for Thiebault's
,Iil·isioll WllCIl i\fontbrun was checked, hut < I'orllre, elwoye lenwrnent,
fut execute pins lentement encore,' and Thh!ooult only appeared at night-
fllll. ·1l1e gelleralllimself gin~!l the explanation (MGmoi/'l1.$, i\') : l!le French
right (i. e. the wing towards Carpio) seeming to be menaced, 'they sent me
off to (\ point where no enemy was to be found:
~ Grallam to Cathcart, ill his Life by Delaroye, p. 593.
S Graham's diary, i1lio.1., August 26.
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the Wth. And on his right also he was weak, owing to the
fu.ct that he had deliberately left Craufurd upon the Vodilla,
beyund the Amva, till the 25th. At the moment when the
combat of El Bodoll began, tardy directions were sent to Crau-
furd to move the Light Division to join the army, by the ford
of Carroo, near Robledn., high up the Aul.\'u. For it was no
IOllger possible for him to use the easy passage by the ford of
Zamorra., close under Pastures, since the :French had gained
possession of it whcn they thrust the Srd Division southward.
Craufurd, leaving only cavalry pickets along the Vudillo river,
retreated that night to Ccspedosa, n few miles south of his former
post at Martiago. But he refused to make a night march to
the foro of Carros, beeause the road was rough and difficult, and
he thought it likely that his column might get asLI'll.y and thl1t
wme or a1l of his baggage might be lost 1. Very possi.bly he
was right, but the result of his not starting from Cespl:ll1osa till
the dawn of the 26th was that, all through the 101lg" morning'
hours !Uld e!l.rly afternoon of that day, he was not ill liue at
Fllentc Gninaldo, where his chief wished to ha\'e him. Heonly
got there, after a fatiguing march of ]6 miles along the upper
Agueda and over the ford of Cafl'OS, ut four o'clock, when dusk
was drawing near 2, Meanwhile Marmont had been, for all the
da)', in a position to attack 'Wellington with very superior
lIumbers,
It has often Ueell remarked, especially b.y French critics, UlUl
Craufurd and his men were in grave dlUlger on the afternoon of
the 25th and the morning of the ~6th, since ifMarmont had sent
out a heavy column Oil the right bank of the Agueda, to llush
the Light Division, it would not have been ablc to use thc ford
I For notes 011 this point see the life of Craufurd by his grandson,
Rc,', Alex, Craufunl, pp, W-l-6, 'VcllingWll Will; vexed that the Light
Division had \lot done the niglLt nlarch, and, according to Larllent's JiJunUll
(I,.ll(i) Qbservcol to Crdufurd, with some usperity, < I am glad to see )·ou
safe.' The answer was,' Oh! I was in no danger, I assure you.' 'llut
I was, frolll your colldud; answered 'Velliugtoll. UpOIl which Craufurd
o!Jsen·ed., tHe's <\--d crusty to-day.'
~ The aCCQuut of the nmrcll of the Ligllt Dh'i~ioll Illl tllis day is Ijuitc
satisfactory. [llave Sir John Dell's note that the idea that Cl"aufurd
thought for a momeut of retreating by the Pnss of I'cralcs, hccallSC he
fcarOl1 beiug illtorceptCfI at Ilobleda, is 'nonsense.'
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Ileal' Uoblcda, amI must have fallen back into the rough country
at the sources of the A,b"lleda, whcre it might have been over·
taken, and have suUbred hcavily for want of fl, road that would
have served for its baggBo<Ye. The danger 11Ils been eXag'hT(lrated:
though the baggage might very probably have been lost, there
was nothing to prevent the troops from taking to the hill-path.s,
and getting to Payo or the passes of Gala by some circuitou:.
route. All tlmt a. hot pursuit could have done would have been
to make Craufllrd unable to reach 1!'uente GuillR.ldo, as he
actually did, upon the Q6th. This would, no doubt, have htCll
solllething of tLll oovuntagc to thc French. But Murmonl
would havc lost thc servjees of the force sent ill pnrsuit, which
would have had to be very strong, since no mere detadullcnt
would have been able to venture near the Light Division, 011
paiu of being brought lo lwtioll and defeated l.
It secms that fl.In.rmont's quiescence in front of' the IUllr-
occupied camp of ]'uente Guinaldo, during the perilons hours of
the morning and noon of September 26th, was caused by" l'eluc-
hUlce to tackle Wellington when he had taken up a positioll tlntl
WIl.s offering battle. He writes in his .ilfc!mmres that, 'as the day
wore on, I had 40,000 men assembled, within cannon-shot of
the English front. But the enemy WWl known to have collecte<l
if not all, u.t allY rate a very great part of his force, and was in
an entrenched position. Much tempted to take advantage of
the union of the Armies of Portugal and the North, and to
make a stroke for victory, I passed the day in studying the
English position. Attaeks made without careful prcpamtioll
during the recent cmnpuigns [i. e. BUSSllCO Md Fuentes de
Ofloro] had succeeded so badly that I was deterred from inOOll-
lliderate action. Moreover General Do~nne, who was only
under lily COlllmand accidentally and by his own consent, had no
wish fOl' a battle, and this rendered the enterprise more deli·
cate. Then, too, if we tried our luck and were successful, we
wcre lIot in a eouditioll to make profit of a suct,'cssful cngl\,"'"C-
, )Iarmont (NCIIWirf!8', h'. p. 65) is ver)' sure tliat he could 113"C' hlo!atcd,
turucd, awl enveloped' Cnlllfurd, and IlIl\'e destroyed Ilim. But it jg 1131'11
to see that 1,,~ could really h3'·C done more than drh'e him on to au
ccceulric line of retreat.
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lllCllt, by pursuing the English into Portugal if they were
beatell. So finally I h'1lye up the idea of forcing on a fight 1.'
There ill an amusing picture of Marmont's hesitation drawn
by General Thil~bault in his cle\Oer but malicious autobiography.
In this ll. \'ery different role is a.ttributed to the commAnder of
the Army of the North: <At nine o'clock the Marshal and
General Dorsenne rode to the front with their glittering lltafJ~.
The troops were put under arms at oncc. But the great men
descended from their horses and got out telescopes. with which
they bef:,rnn to study the English position, "Yes," began the
:Marshal, determined to see that which Wall Hot ... bible, as he
IK-'Crcd through the large glass baltlllCcd 011 the shoulder of OIlC
ot'his aides-de-camp, "Yes, my information was correct. The
right of the English line is Ranked by fLn inac{:el1-sible declivit),o"
General DOrllCllue and I had excellent telescopes, but we could
not sec Illl)' such precipicc. Dorsclllletold lhe'MIll'Shalns lIluch.
Taking no notice of his remark. Ml1rmollt continued, "The
whole camp is protected by closed redollbts." Dorscllne, after
e..xchunging some words with me, replied that he could ouly
muke out It few points at which earthworks had been thrown up.
The Marshal, ignoring the observations of his interlocutol', went
011, " And, just 11S I have been told, these closed redoubts are
arllled with heavy gUlls of position forwarded from Almeidlt.
Nothillg can be done 2," He forthwith adjourned his recoll-
noitring, and invited the generals to a heavy and sumptuOlJli
meal, served on silver plate in front of the line. After the feast
MOlltbrull remarked, "The English position is impregnable-
the thing that proves it so is that 'Vellillgton is ofJering us
battle upon it. WOe shall never make an end of him by rUllning
at him head down; that would have no good result." Marmont
soon after delivered his decision that llodrigo, luwing beCII
l-elicved, and the position of the English being too "trong, he
intended to ad\'ancc no further, and should retirc next day.'
If Thicbault's report of :Monlbrull's words ltlld l\{llrlllonl'll
attitude be l'orrcct, it is clear that 'Vellington had by mcre
• bluffing' brought the enemy to a standstill. He WllS using
1 '11Iicloault, N(iJllqj~8, j,0. JI. 00,
~ .\larmont, ,I!emoiru, i\"o 1'1" 313-14.
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thc reputation for caution which he had 6-rained ill his former
campaigns as a moral weapon. The syllogism, ";Ycllingtoll never
fights saye when he has his army in hand, and has fotllld l\ good
position; he offers to fight now; therefore he feels himself
safe Uoaainst any attack,' seemed a legitimate logical process to
Marmont and Montbrull, So the English gcneral had hoped;
but he did not know how entirely successful his dcmonstra-
tion had been; and thought that the reconnaissance followed
by a halt, which he had observed in the morning, meant that
thc enemy was going to bring up his lust rescn'cs before
nttucking. The rear di visions of the Army of Portugal were
seen to arrive in the French lines when the day WM far spent..
"'ellington Sllpposed that Marmont had been waiting for them,
alld would use them for a great combined attack on the fl7th.
He had no intcntion of awaiting it, even though the Light
Division hOO reached him, and instead of ordering the other
absent units of his army to elose in upon Fuentc Guinaldo,
seut orders to them all to place themselves in the second posi-
tion, nine miles to the rear, which he hud chosen as his real
butllc.growld.
The force at .l"uente Guinaldo decamped after dusk, leaving
the Light Division and the 1st Hussars K.G,L. to keep up the
bivouac fires ulong the whole line till midnight. Marching ill
two cohllunsl ouc by the dircct road by Casillus de l<'lorcs and
l'urcalhos, the other by It secondary path through Aldea da
Ponte, the whole reached the positions in front of Alfa)'lI.tes
where '''ellillgton was ready to make his real stand. On the
morning of the ~th the main body was joined by the 5th Divi-
SiOll, which came down from Payo in the Sierra de Gala, having
found no enemy threatening the passes in that direction. The
7lh Divisiollll.lso arrived from Albergaria. Meanwhile Graluull,
with thc 18t llnd 6th Divisions and MeMahon's Portuguese, had
arrived at Bismula and Rendo, a11d so was at last ill close touch
with the main body. The whole of V{ellington's 45,000 men
were concentrated, and, well knowing the strenhrth of the posi-
tion which he had now reached, his mind was tranquil. The
front was hidden by a strong cavalry screen, Alten's bri6rade
cO\'cring the right, De Grey's aml Shule\l the cenlrc, lmd AusolI's
lhe left, where Graham's divisions lay.
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~farmont was so far from guessing that his ad\'~rsary would
abandon the position of Fuente Guinaldo, that he had ordered
his own army to retreat towards Rodrigo, at the very moment
that the .Allies were absconding from his fmllt. During the
cnrly hams of the night of the 9!6th-!!7th, the two adn:~l'Snrics
were marching away from c'.lch other! Bnt at midnight Thie-
bault, who was in charge of the rearguard, noted that the
fires in Wellington's lines seemed few and flickering, and that
his sentries had got out of touch with those of the British. A
reconnaissance soon showed him that thcre was nothing left in
his front. Prompt information was sent to Marmont, and the
Marshal had to reconsider his position. He determined to
follow up the retreating enemy, not with the fixed intention
of bringing him to o.ctiOIl, but rather that he might be ready to
takc advantage ofallY unforeseen chance that might occur. But
the pursuit could not be rapid or effeclh'e, for during the night
the bulk of the Army of Portugal had been marching back
towards Ciudnd Rodrigo. l\1ontbrtm's and Wathier's cavalry
lI·crc still at the front, but only two infantry di\·isiolls, those
of Souham and Thieballlt, both belonging to the Army of the
North. The Marshal dared not press his enem)' too hard, lest
Welliugton should turn upon him, and find that only 11,000
inflUltry were up on the French side. While the countermarch
of the other seven divisions was in progress, the vanguard must
not commit itself unsupported to a general action.
Accordingly Welliuh,rl:on's retreat was not seriously incom~
mooed. Montbrull, fonowed by Souhum's division, took the road
by Casillas de Flores and Fnrcalhos: Wathier, with Thiebault's
infantry in support, that by Aldea da Ponte. Montbrull ran
about noon, against the Light and 5th Divisions and Alten's
horse, drawn np in po~ition in front of Alfayates, and considered
them too strongly placed to be meddled with. Wathier, on the
wcstern rand, was stopped in front of Aldca da Pontc by the
pickets of the 4th Division and of Slade's dragoons. This
village lay outside the intended line of battle of the allied aroly,
but so close in front of it that VYcllington had resolved not to
let it go till he was pushed by a strong force, since it wns the
meeting-plate of several roads and well placed for observation.
Wathicr halted facing Aldea da Ponte, till '1'hicbault came
o"~,,. 1~ }' P
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up and assumed the command, being senior to the caI'alry
gencrnl. Seeing toot the village was worth having, Thicbault
resolved to attack it, and drove out the light companies of the
Fusilier brigade by an advance of the three battalions of the
34th Leger, one of which eleared the village while the other
two turned it all each flank. Wellington, observing that the
enemy hud only a single division 011 the gl'Ound, refused to
allow Aldea.. da Ponte to be so lightly lost, and sent against the
French the whole Fusilier brigade in line, flanked by a Portu·
guese regiment in column. This advance forced 'l'hicbault's
first brigade back from the village, and thrust it northward
some way upon the road. Here the French rallied upon their
second brigade, and formed up with W'athier's horse in support.
'Vellington would not push them further, and contented him·
self with having recovered AIdea da Ponte and the junction of
the roads 1.
At dusk, however, Montbrllll and Souham came up and
joined Thiebault, with the column which had followed the
Furcalhos road. Souham determined to try again the attack
in which Thicbault had been checked, and assailed Aldea tla
Ponte just as the light was failing. 'fhe Fusiliers were driven
out of the village, and Wellington refused to reinforce them, or
to allow them to make a second counter-attack, because he did
not wish to get entangled in heavy fighting in the dark, or to
expend lIlany lives upon keeping a place which was outside his
line, and formed no es~ntial part of it. There had been much
skirmishing all through the afternoon between Slade's two
cavalry regiments and \Vathicr's cluu8C1.tr8, in which neither
party had allY appreciable losses, nor gained any marked
advantage.
The Anglo-Portuguese casualties in this rearguard action
were just lOO, of which 71 were in tile Fusilier brigade, 13 ill
the Portuguese battaliom which had covered its flank, nnd 10
in Slade's cavalry. Thiebault says that he lost 150 men, a "er)'
I Thiebault, in his elaborate account of the ~kirmish (Mhlloiru, iv.
pp. 522-li), sayg that he did not 10ge Alden da Ponte, but I l'refer to take
Wellington's definite statement tl13t )le diu, supported by those of Vere
(the Assistant-Quartermaster-General of the 4th Division) llllt! Lord
Londollderry-hoth eye-witnesses.
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probable estimate 1; he adds that the British lost 500, and
thnt he was engaged against 17,000 allied troops-which, COII-
sidering that he fought no onc save the three battalions of the
lo'usilier brigade, one regiment of !'ortngucsc, and Slade's horse
-8,gOO sabres and bayonets-seems sufficiently astounding.
It may serve as a fair example of his metho<1 of dealing with
figul'CS.
Next morning ,~rcllillgtoll'S line WM drawn back into the
position in which he had determined to fight, with the French
column at Aldea da Ponte lying two miles in his front, on the
lower ground. This position, which WM about sevell miles long,
was co\'ered on either flank by the ftlVine of the Coa, which here
makes n deep hook or cun'c, with the town of Subugal at its
point. The right wing was formed of the 5th Division, holding
the village of Aldea Velha on a steep hill by the source of the COll..
The right-tentre, which projected somewhat, was composed of
tllC 4th and Light Divisions rauged in front of the town of
Alfayntes, close by the convent of Sa.cnpnrte 2. FrOJ.ll that point
westward the line was taken up by Pack's and McMahon's Portu-
guese In'igndes on each side of the village of Nave. Finally,
U1C left consisted of the 1st and 6th Divisions under Graham,
reaching from near Rendo as far as the bridge of Rapolllla.
This WillS was covered in front by the ra\;ne of n tor.rent
flowing into the Con. The central reserve was formed of the Srd
and 7th Divisions with De Grey's and Slade's dragoons, drawn
up behind Alfayates. Alten's light cavalry brigade was with
the Light Division, its pickets thrown out on the Furcalhos
I Thirty killed and 120 wounded. l\Iartinien's lists show 7 casualties
lImollg officers of Thieballlt'g rcgimeuts (3 in the 34tll LCger, 3 ill the
regiment of Neuchlltel, 1 ill the 4th of the Vistula). This at the average
nLte of 20 or 22 offiecrs per lllall seems just right. Bya tiresome misprint
Thiebault speaks of himself as eomm:mding the 31st Leger ill many I,laces.
It WllS relllly the 34tiJ. TIle 31st was ill tlLC Army of l)ortugul, not ill
that of the North.
I Now tile cllrious misprillt in the first HUll of 1). 307 of IVdtillglrm
Di8patchu, vo1. viii, of Light DragOOll8 for Light IJiuikion. Unless the
misprint is noticed, tile reader will nsk wJIY 'Vcllington llns omitted
Cr:mfurd ill describing his order of battle. Napier, 1 knoll' !lot why, has
altogether neglected to cxplain the distribution of ULC llritislL lIrmy, in tile
short l'unlgraplL of \'01. iii. 11. 342 wllieh describes this day's operations.
Pp 2
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road; Anson's brigade was placed in front of Nave and Bismula,
with its advanced vedcLtcs watching thc French ill Aldea da
Ponte. The position was well marked, high-lying, and lll!\Sked
b)' woods and ravines. Us only fault was that the Con rail
round its rear, with only two bridges, those of Sabugal and
U.apoulla da Con, though there were at least six or seven fords
ill addition, and the stream was loll', and pnssablc almost cvcry-
wherc for infantry. A defeat, however, would probably ha\·c
meant mnch loss ofartillery and impedimenta, though Wellington
had sent great part of his baggage over the Coa, and detnclled
all his Portuguese horse and the Portuguese brigade of the 6th
Division to cover its retreat. No position is perfect, but Wel·
lington did not think he could L>ossibly be cvicted from this
one, which was as strong as nUSSfl.CO and not nearly so long.
'He wished to be attacked, being confident of success,' wrote
Grahum three days later I.
nut his adversaries would not oblige him. After coming up
to Aldea dn J'onte, and rebuking Thieballlt and Souham for
engaging in a profitless skirmish on the preceding day 2,
Marmont took a long survey of the position of the allied army,
und refused lo advance allY further. The reusons which he had
given for not attacking at Fllente Gllinaldo on the ~6th, when
he still had a good chance of accomplishing great things, were
doubly valid 011 the 28th. After reasserting to Dorsctllle und
the olher generals that \Vellillf,rton's army was concentrated
(which was now quitc true) and that his position was far too
strong to be meddled with, and adding that, even if there were
a successful action, he could not pursue 1Vellington into the
mountains for wallt of food, he gave his final orders for retreat
The main body of the army, which had not come further fOl'Wilrd
than Fuenle Guinaldo, began to retire that same night towards
Ciudad Rodrigo. The two infantry divisions at Aldea da Pontc
I Gralmm to 01l1Ulart, October 1, ill Dcll\\"oyc's Life rif LQrd I1J1'fflOCh,
p. 59ft
iI TIliclxmlt's fooliugg wcrc lllllch Imrt at ll11~ skirmish being called
a'scuffle.' 'Il se permit de dire que mon combat de la veille emit Ilne
lie1ll1uffource, Je ne nJ.llpclle le mot que llOur pcindrc l'urrognnt"C d'Ull
de ces hommes:l qui leur titre de Marechal difel1dait d'admettre aucun
mcrite Cll dehol"8l1'IJUX-tnCIllCS' (Miim!iirt;/l, b'. 528).
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and the cavalry of Montbrun and ''''athier brought up and
covered the rear. By the morning of the ~9th the crisis was
over, aud V1lellillgtOll was dictating orders for the breaking up
of his army and its distribution into cantonments.
After retil'jug to Ciudad Rodrigo Marmont and Dorsenne
parted company on October Ist, and each dispersed his troops
into cantonments. The Army of Porlugnl recrossed the Sierra
de Gntn., and wns distributed by divisions in the same regions
01' New Castile that it had occupied in September. On return-
ing to his head quarters at Talavera, J\'larmont received the
report of Foy, COIIIUl8.lUling the only section of his army which
had not taken part in the recent campaign. That general had
been ordered to demonstrate from Plasencia against 'Vellington's
rear during the revictualling of Ciudad Rodrigo. With six
battalions and It regiment of light cavalry, about ft,SOO mell,
he had takcn the directioll of the pass of Perales. He reaehcd
MOl'a1eja ILt the foot of the mountains, near Coria, on Septembcl'
Z7th, the day of the combat of Aldea da Ponte. Next morning
11e started to ascend the Sierra, and his advanct.'<1 guard gut to
Payo 011 the 29th. There it was discovered that :'I1ul'Illont and
Dorscnne had abandoned the offensive, and started 011 their
retreat for Ciudad Rodrigo on the 28th, so that no French
lrUQps were anywhere in the neighbourhood, while 'Wellington's
whule army was near .Alfayatcs, only fiftccn miles away. :Fear~
ing to be discovered and overwhelmed, Fay returned to Plaseneiu
by forced marches: his demonstration had been some days too
lute tu be of any use. If he had. appeared in thc Perales pass on
the 25th, while the 5th Dh·ision was still holding l'ayo, Wel-
lington would have had to keep that foroo detached to protect
his flank, and could not have withdrawn it to join the rest of
his army 011 thc Alfayates-Rcndo position. But Foy came up
only when the campaign was over, and his movements had no
effect whatever.
The best commentary on thia five dt\ys of mameuvring between
El Bodon and Aliayatcs is that of' the war-tried vetcrull Gl'aham.
'It was very pretty-but spun rather fine. Had the enemy
llchaved with common spirit "on the 26th, we should not have got
away so easily from Guinaldo. I should htl.\'e preferred, after it
was ascertained that the enemy's force (54,000 infantry and
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6,000 horse) was too formidable to be attneked bcJ'Olld the
Agucda, drawing hack our infantry to the ultimate position
(Aldea Velha, Alfayates, Rendo) which could have beeu made
infinitely stronger during the intervtU. There would have beClI
no risk whatever, nor any appearance to the troops of retreat.
The enemy, as you CUll see, might have amused us before FUClltc
Gnilluldo, and, by a night march from Ciudad Uodrigo, have
massed at San l~elices, and so have crossed the river ill force by
the plain of Fucntcs de OJ1oro. Then, pushing 011 rapidly by
Nuxa de Aver, he would have tumbled us buck ill confusion.
I thought this would have been his course, from his superiority
in royalry and artillery-all that collntry is like Newmarket
Heath for galloping across. However, all is well that ends
well l !'
Thc fact is t1mt 'VCllillgloll Oil the 25th made olle of his rurc
slips. He judged that Marmollt would not ad,'anC(! beyond
Ciuuad llodrigo, and so left his troops dispersed along a "8st
front. "Vhcn, contrary to his expectation, his enemy fell upon
the 3rtl Division, and pllShed it back to Fllell!;e Guinaldo, the
chosen oou<:cllb'atioll point of the Allied army, he wus for twenty.
four hours ill the gCU\'cst danger. For if Mal'mont had struck hard
again at noon all the ~6th, there was no mass of troops collected
to oppose him. Craufllrd and Graham would have been driven
off sideways on eccentric lines of retreat, and the Brd and 4th
Divisions must mrely have sufi'ered eonsidcrable loss ill the hast),
retreat to Alfayatcs which would have been forced upon them,
For 011 the 26th Mnrmont would not have been handicapped, us
he was on the 25th, by having no infantry at the front to assist
his numerous and daring cavalry, It may be added that, if the
army had failed to concentrate at Alfayates, Almeida would
havc been in danger, und what was still more important,
Dickson's great sicb'C~traill at Villa dn Ponte would have Uccu
exposed-unless indeed Graham, driven away from his proper
liue of movement, might have moved westward and covered it.
But speculations as to the merely possible are fruitlCi;S,
I Grallam to Catllcart, in Dela"oye's Life Q/ Lord Lyntdrx;h, I), S!l~l.
SECTION XXIX: CHAPTER IU
THE END OF WELLINGTON'S CAMPAIGNS OF 1811
THE moment that he had satisfied himself that the French
were all ill full retreat, and were clearly about to disperse to
their old garrisons and cantonments, ""VellillgtOIl also broke up
the army which had been lying on the Alfayates-Uendo position.
On the 29th September Graham received orders to retire with
the Ist and 6th Divisions to regular winter quarters in the
inlerior of Bcira, about Guarda, Cclol'ico, and Fl'cixudas. The
7th Division was sent southward to Penamacor. Dut the 3rd.
4th, and Light Divisions retnrued to the frontier of Spain, to
establish the same sort of distant blockade (or rather observa-
tioll) of Ciudnd Rodrigo, which they had bccn keeping up ill
August and September. The Light Division once more crossed
the Agueda, and occupied its old position at .i\fartiago and
Zil,lnOna. The 4th Division watched the Agueda from Gallegos
to Barba del Puerco 1; the Srd Di\'ision, in reserve behind the
other two, was cl1ntoned at Aldea da Ponte and Fucnte Guill~
aldo. The three light cavalry brigades of AnsOll, Alten, and
Slade took in turns the charge of covering the front of the
Light and 4th Divisions along the Agueda; the two brigades
not Oil duty were kept twenty miles to the rear, about l"reixadns.
Goveias, and CastelMendo. Dc Grey's heavy dragoons and the
hCl.ld quarters of the cavalry dil'ision were close behind, at
Alvcrca. Soon after the line of obserl'atioll along the Aguooa
had been taken up, Wellington found it possible to send cavalry
pickets forward to Tenebron and Santi Espiritus, on the other
side of the Agut't.1u., so as to block the road between Ciudad
Rodrigo and SalamanCil. Dut these were mcrc posts occupied
by half a troop-there was no intention of risking any serious
fon.-c ill such advanced positions. Meanwhile a more effective
I TIlere were changes in detail ill NOI'ember, for whicll see Vere':!
Marcllel r!f tile 4/h Divi8ion, p. 21.
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hillllru.nce to cOlDlllunication between Roddgo and Sulamal1ca
was provided. J lIlian Sanchez and his gncrrilleros were pushed
forward to their old haunts along the Yeltes, and o,'errau the
whole country-side. Carlos de Espm1a's Spanish infantry brigade
also recrossed the Agueda, and took up a forward position
facing Ledesmn.
Thus the posture of affairs on the frontiers of Lean was
restored to the same aspect that it had displayed in the early
autumn. It was clear that when Ciudnd Rodri!>"O again needed
to be rcviclunllcd, it ought to be ncccssary for the I"rench to make
another great effort, and la concentrate once morc all army of
50,000 men. Marmont had thrown i\ great convoy into the
place, but his calculations as to the time that these stores would
sufiice to feed the garrison had becn wrecked, by the fact that
his own army and that of Dorsenllc had lived on the magazines
of llodrigo for five days, and had consumed more than !!OO,OOO
rations. It had been intended that the convoy should feed
Rodrigo for six months, but only two months' food rcmained for
its gurrison of 9l,OOO mcu after this enormous deduction had
~n made.. Meanwhi~e Wellington thought that there Wll5
nothing to be accomplished in the north for some time. His
ultimate design was to make a serious blow at Ciudad Hodrigo,
when he should learn tlmt the disposition of the armies of
Dorsenlle and Marmont rendered such n. blow practicable. A;;
long 811 they lay so close together as to make their rapid con-
centration possible, he did not intend to press matters. But
two indispensable preliminaries for the regular leaguer of Rodri&'O
were being perfected. Dickson's great siege-train was being
completed at Villa da Ponte, und the repairs to the walls of
Almeida were at last finished. It was Wellington's intention
lo tnmsfer the :sieb'C·train to Almeida when that fortress was
absolutely seeure against an attack. Placed there, it would be
in a position to move up against Jtodrigo in two days, whcn UIC
time for action should come. But it was not till Novcmber was
far spent that the order to move forward reached Dickson;
meanwhile the roads between Villa cIa Pontc, Pillhel, and
Almeida were put in good order, by a corvee levied OIl the local
peasantry 1.
1 }'or nil this scc Dickson's Diary, edited by Major 1cslie, It.A.,
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Thc dispositions of the encmy remained the aU-important
factor in the situatioll, Elnd for the next two months 'Vellingtoll
was scrutinizing them with the greatest care. The Army of
Portu&rnl, after it had re<:rossed the Sierra de Gata, had been
distributed by divisions in much the same cantonments that it
had occupied in September, snve that no force 'I'M sent to the
distant southem post of 'l'ruxillo, to keep up commlmications
with Drouet in Estremadura. Foy's division, which had held
that town during the early autumn, was reduced to such a state
ofdilapidation, by its late march in the mountains, that MarmOllt
sent it to rest at Toledo, in comfortable cantonments. He
replaced it at JJlasencia, its later base, by the troops of Brennier.
The 2nd Division (Clause1) occupied Avila amI its province;
the I'Cmaining three divisions (Fcrey, Mauculle, Sal'fut) settk>d
down at Almnraz, Talavera, DejaI', Oropesa, and the inter-
mediate places. Montbnm's heavy cavalry remained near head
quarters at Talaveru; the light cavalry was placctl with
Brcllnicr, along the line of the AlIlgOll, to watch the frontier
uf central Portugal.
Dorsenlle meanwhile executed a similar dispeliSion of his
arm)'. He left at Salamanca only Thic!bault's di~·ision,
strengthened by some light cavalry, and onc brigade of
Souham'sl. The other troops that he had taken to Ciudnd
Rodrigo in September were sent back to Valladolid, Bena\"ente,
Palencia, and other posbi in the valley of the Douro. The Army
of the North cellSed to threaten either Portugal or Galicia: but
there was one task that it had to execnte in order to replace
itself in the position that it had held in the summer. Napoleon
had protested ut tile time against the eVllCuntioll of the central
Asturias and Oviedo by Bonnet's division, and had ordered that
this region should be reoccupied as soon IlS was possible. The
troops told oa' for ibi invasion were the same which had held it
during the last twelve months, the division of Bonnet. To
support their movement through the pass of Pajares, Dorsellne
took to Lean one of his two divisions of the Guard, placing the
lIP' 478-30J, 111C order to start the first sc<:lioll of the siego-train for
Almeida ~'3S only given on No\"embe~14. (DicksOll, p. 60/),)
1 Afterwards rcplaceu by oue brigndc of DUllIoustier's divisioll of the
hnverial Guard.
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other Ilt Vulladolid. Thicbault's amI Souhtun's divisions alone
were left in front line, fucing townrds l'ortuga,l and Galicin.
Bonnet's e.'Xpedition against the Asturias was executed with
complete success; indeed it met with hardly any opposition.
General Losada, who had occupied Oviedo after its evactUltion,
with the 1st Division of the Army of Galicia, judged himself
too weak to fight. Hc aoondoned the pass of Pajares after
a mere skirmish, and made hardly a greater effort to defend the
passage of the NaIon, withdrawing westward towards Galicin as
the l~rcnch advuncl.>tl. Bonnet occupied Ovicdo 011 the 6UI of
November without any lighting, and its port of Gijoll Oil the
7th. l"inding that Losada had retreated behind the Narcea,
he sent a brigade under Colonel Gauthier to pllrsue him. This
column reached Tineo 011 November 19tth, but 00011 had to
retire, fol," the Spaniards had scattered themselves iri small
bands among the mountains, and had turned back to attack
Gauthier's line of communication with Odedo, as well as that
between Oviedo and the pass of Pajares. Bonnet found that to
maintuin himself in the ccntrul .A.sturias was all that Wa!> in his
power. He could not at the same time provide garrisons for
Oviedo, GijOll, and the neighbouring places, and also put in thc!
field 1\ force strong enough to menace Galicia. In fact his
fine division of 8,000 men was practically immobilized in the
district that it had seized. It is more than doubtful whether
the Emperor was wise to direct that the centra.l Asturias should
be once more occupied. He deprived the Army of the North of
one of its five fighting divisions, and left the force holding Lean
and Old Castile too weak to restraiu 'Vdlin&rloll, when it had
lit the same time to contain the Army of' Gulicia and to hunt all
the Spanish irregular forces. Julian Sanchez ill the plains of
Lean, and Porlier and Longa in the mountains of Omtabria,
were enemies whom it was impossible to neglect. If left alone
the)' executed feats of great daring-it will be remembered that
the former had surprised and captured Saulauder iu August I,
and though his ventures in the autumn were less fortunate, they
kept man}' hostile columns busy. Sanchez, on October 15th,
executed a very ingenious coup de main. The garrison ofCiudnd
I Sec p. 472.
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Rodrigo possessoo u herd of cattle, which wa,:s habitually seut
under guard to grazen mile or two from the l'o.mparts. "liVatching
his oppOltllnity, on a day when the governor, llenaud, was in~
specting the beasts, he swooped down on him, and carried him
off with his escort and his cattle, though they were barely out
of cannon-shot of the fortress. 'l'hicbault, who (,'{)mmundcd ill
the province of Salamanca, had great difficulty in getting into
Ciudad Hodrigo General Banie, whom he chose as Uenaud's
successor (November 1st, 1811).
Dctwccn the 'l'agus, therefore, and the Bn.y of Biscay llHl.llers
hlld come once more to a deadlock after the short campaign of
September 24th-29th, 1811. For the following three months
neither the Allies nor the Frcllch made any serious movement,
with the exception of' Bonllet's invasion of the ceutral .t'u,:tul'ius.
The main armies on both sides wcrc dispersed. Wellington,
with his troops di!ltributed into cantonments, was waiting his
opportunity for another amI more effective blow ut Ciudad
llodrigo; Dorscnne was stri \'ing to put down the guel'l'illeros,
by hunting them ineffectually with many small columns-a
task which he found more difficult uow that he was deprived of
BOllllet's powerful division. Mo.rmont, with his troops dispersed
from 1'Iasencia to Toledo, was practically waiting on Welling-
ton's movements, and showed no signs of wishing to take the
OflcIlsive. His quicsccm:c was not ill the least affected by Ull
Imperial dispatch sent from Compicgnc on Septcmbel' 18th,
which reached him shortly after his retl\l'n to the valley of the
Tagus 1. In this document a most ambitious plan of opel'ationg
WWl proposed to him. Bcrthier explained that the Emperor
took it for granted that Ciudacl llodrigo would have been
rcvictnnlled for three months before Odober 1st, and that the
Army of Portugal would have received the CR\'alry drafts which
General Vlllldermacscll was brillgillg from the north 2. "liVhcll
these had arrived Marmont would have 41,000 meil present
with the colours. Let him march with this force into
I It lIlay be found ill HeImas, APIlClldix to vo!. i. PI'. 5M-U. Mal'llIont,
for reasons not ImTlI to dil'illc, does not Ilrint it among the many (IOCUlllCllt8
l"(lntaining his correspondence with the ElIllloCror whicb RI'pcar ill the
ApI\(Imlix to ILis Book XV, (Mbul1irt8, vol. h'.)
~ Sce I'. 546 above.
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Estremadura, pick up Drouet and the 5th Corps, which should
be placed under his orders, and lay siege to ElvBS. Soult
should be asked to find him 3,000 cavalry, and he would have
a force of 57,000 men, which would be more than 'Vc1lingtou
would be able to t"tu:e. For if the English general hurried to
5a\"C Elvas, a course which he was almost bound to take, he
would probably leave two divisions in front of Almeida to
• contain' DOl'Senne and the Army of the North. Though
he would pick up instead the eorps of Hill, which had so long
been lying in the Alemtejo, yet he would still have no more
than 45,000 men of all nations, even inclnding Castal1os's
Spanish levies. This would not be enough to cope with 57,000
French: if'Vcllington fought he would be beateu; if he did
1I0t, he would lose Elv1\s, thc most important fortre&; of
Portugal. •This is the only movemcnt, l\L le Mnrcehnl, which
can bring back honour to our arms, free us from the defensive
attitude ill which we lie, strike terror into the English, and
takc us u step forwurd to the end of the war.... The prospe<:t
of capturiug lL great fortress WIder the eyes of the English
army, of conquering a province of Portugal which covers our
Army of the South, of uniting to your forces ~5,000 men of that
army [the 5th Corps and the cavalry] should serve you ail
incentive; for glory und success.' Bcrthicr thcn granb that it
is just possible that Wellington may refuse to march to the
relief of ElvBS, and reply to the menace against that fortress
by invading Leon and falling upon Dorsenne, who would oc
too weak to face him. If he does this, the Army of the Korth
IlHly retire (jrst to Salamanca, then to Vulladolid, then even to
Burgos. At the latter point, having called in all it.~ detach-
ments, it would be 50,000 strong, and able to 'contain' the
allied forces, even if ""Vellington had bl'Ought forward ever)'
itVlLilnble. man. But l\:Iarmont might take it for granted that
his adversal'y would do nothing of the kind: he would hurry
south to save Elvas and coveI' his base at Lisbon. If he left 110
troops behind him on the Coa, DOtsCnllC should dispatch 15,000
men of the Army of the North to Estremadura, and bring up
the force before EIvas to a total of 62,000 men, a number
which 'Vellington eould not possibly resist. ElvBS must
infallibly fall. Only one caution was added to this scheme of
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campaign: Marmont must be sure that Wellington had not
a siege-train at Almeidlit or any other place near Ciudad
Hodrigo. For if he were to answer the French IllO\'ement on
Elvas by laying formal siege to Rodrigo, Dorsenne would not
be strong enough to prevent him from taking it, and the Army
of IJortugal would have to turn back to the rescue from its
distant position in the Alemtejo.
This last cautioll was, in effect, a fatuI block to the whole
plan. 1"01' Mm'montJ during the El Bodon campaign, had heard
of tIle existence of '''Vellington's siege-park at Villa da Ponte.
And he had also found in the cantonments of the Srd and 4th
Divisions a stock of gubions and fascines, whose prepal'atioll
could only mean that the British had been contcmplatillg
regular siege operations at some future date. The wood and
wickerwork had been burned" hut there was nothing to prevent
Wellington from replacing it at short notice.
Yet even if l\farmont had not been aware of the existence of
Dickson's guns, the plan proposed to him was not so tempting
ut a second as at a first glance. He was well aware that such
parts of it as depended on the loyal co-operation of his
colleaglles might not work out easily. Would not Soult find
some excuse for refusing to send the 3,000 cavalry from
Andalusia? Could Dorsenlle be trusted to dispatch 15,000
men to the Alemtejo, if he disco\'ered that Wellington had left
no serious force on the Coa? And even if he did show such an
unwonted self-abnegation as to detach two of his divisions to
sllch a distant destination, would they get up in time for the
crisis? For if W"ellington marched promptly with his whole
army, by Alfayates, Castello Branco. and the bridge of Villa
Velha., he would be at Eh'as mllny days before Dorsenne's
detachment, which would have to take 'the circuitous route by
Bcjar, the bridge of Almnraz, Truxillo, Meridu, and Badajoz.
Supposing that the whole allied army came down from the
north, and picked up Hill and Castailos, it would consist of well
over 60,000 men, and the Army of Portugal when joined by
Gimrd's corps would only make 57,000 men if Soult sent his
cnvalry, or 54,000 if (as was more likely) he fOllnd some excuse
1 The dcst.ructiOll of these slorC/l. is mentioned ill i\f11.rmont's Af6m(Jire8,
k.11. 00.
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for refusing his co-operation. Could 54,000 men lay siege w
a first-class fortress, and at the samc timc provide a covering
force strong enough to fend off 64,000 of the Allies? If they
tried to do so, would not the coverblg fOl'ce be beaten in all
probability? And it was probable that Wellington would
come to save Elvas with every available mall, for he knew that
Dorscnne was not able to make any serious irruption into
northern Portugal. The Army of the North could not colled
more than 27,000 men for field operations (as the late campaign
had shown) and such a force, destitute of stores and acting at
short notice, would not get far into the wildcl'llcss of tlm
devllstated Ueim, much less threaten Lisbon.
These argnments, in all probability, mnfll have oceurred to
Marmont, but we have no proof that he used them. In his
reply to Bcrthier. written at Talavera 011 October ~lst 1, he
takes lUlothcl'linc-he reports that the difficulties of supply are
so great that he has, after returning from the relief of Ciudnd
Rodrigo, dispersed his anny from Plasencia to Toledo. He is
beginning to collect great central magazines at Navall\Ioral,
near Almaraz, which will servc for his army when llext it is
massed either for offensive or defensive purposes. Meanwhile,
till the magar.ines are formed, he asks for the Emperor's leave
to wait with his troops in their present positions. 'Wellington,
he thinks, can do nothing serious for want of numbers, and the
dispersion of his army into cantonments has been caused by the
difficulty of feeding his men in the highlands, from which he has
just retired. If, nevertheless, he tries some forward movement
into Estremadura, the Army of Portugal is well placed for fall·
ing 011 him in the valley of the Gundian~. As for offensive
plans, nothing can be done till magazines are formed, but he
hope~ to submit a scheme of his own to the Emperor when leave
has been granted.
But meanwhilc Napoleon's mind had swerved away from the
scheme for an attack on Elvas and the Alemtejo, which had
been formulated in the Compiegne dispatch of September 18th.
Just a month later Berthier writes, by his ordcrs, from Amster-
dam, to lay down n wholly new plan. This dispatch of Octoher
I This may be found printed in Bel1ll3s, vol. i. Appendix, pp. SIl8-00.
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18th contains the germ of the great central error which was to
make possible Wellington's sudden oflcnsivc move of the follow-
ing midwinter, and the capture of Cindad Rodrigo-the exploit
which was to be the turning-point of the whole Peninsular ·War.
Sachet had now started upon his long-projected mal"CIl 011
Valencia, with which we shall deal in its proper place. He had
made l\ good commencement, but had been brought to lL stand
before the walls of SaguntnlTI. The Spllniards had begun to
reinforce their eastern armies, and the Emperor realized that
Sachet needed support. Therefore the army of \\rcllingtoll
ceased for a momept to be the (,'ClItral point on which his atten-
tion was fixed. 'Le principn.l objet aujourd'hui est Valence,'
writes Berthier in obedience to his master's changed opinion.
And he thereupon instructs l\iarmont that the Army of the
Centre will havc to stretch itself eastward to Cnenca, to support
Sllchet, and that in consequence the Army of Portugal will have
to ' facilitate the task of the King of Spain,' i. e. spare troops to
occupy those parts of New Castile from which Joseph must with·
draw men for the expedition to the Valencian border. This was
but the beginning of the scheme, which was to end by distract-
ing a great body of Marmont's host to the shore of the Mediter·
ranean, out of call of their commander. As we shall sec, the
Duke of Ragusa WAA finally ordered to make such a huge detach-
ment to aid Suchet, that Wellington at last got his opportunity
to strike, when the Army of Portugal was so lowered in numbers
that it could not hope to restrain him. The first hint came in
the above-cited orders of October 18th; in the second crucial
dispatch, that of November 21st 1, Marlllont is told not only
that he will have to 'facilitatc the task' of King Joseph, but
that he must select a body of 12,000 men to march at onCe
011 Valencia, and set aside 3,000 more to keep up the line of
communication with the expeditionary force. "Ve are informed,'
continues Berthier. 'that the English army ha.~ ~O,OOO sick 2,
I Printed in Appendix to Marmont's .JJemoires, vo1. iv. pp. 257-8.
2 The sick have grown Crom 19,000 to 20,OOOsillce the (]aybeCore, which
is the date oC a less important dispatch, in which l\lannont had been
warned to set aside G,ooo men only Cor the Valenci:1O e:llled.itioll, because
Wellington is ailsolutely unable to strike a blow.
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and barely 20,000 able-bodied men with the colours, so that
they cannot possibly tl'Y nny offensive enterprise.'
This is a typical result of the endeavour to conduct the
Peninsular'Var from Paris as head quarters. On the wholly
false hypothesis that 'Vellillgton's army is reduced to a skeleton,
Rnd. cun do nothing, the Emperor orders his lieutenant to detach
a third of the Army of Portugal beyond the reach of recalL
Dut the English, though indeed there were many sick, had not
20,000 but exactly 98,311 men with the colours at that moment,
not to speak of ~4,391 Portuguese, of whom the Emperor (as
usual) took no account in his calculations t. Wellington had
been patiently waiting for months for the moment when the
Army of Portugal shquld no longer be able to 'contain' him.
The Emperor was obliging enough to provide the opportunity
in December 1811, and when Montbrun had marched with two
divisions of foot and one of horse to the other side of the Penin-
sula, Wellington stmck, suddenly and successfully. 'The mOVl}-
menU; of Marmont's army towards Toledo, to aid Suchet as is
supposed, have induced us to make preparations for the siege of
Ciudad Rodrigo,' wrote 'Wellington on the 28th of that month I.
On the 9th of Janulll'y, ISa, the place was im·csted; on the
19th it fell; and then followed in rapid sllccession all the
triumphs of ISH!. There were other circumstances, to be
mentioned in their due place, which facilitated 'Vellington's
advance: but thc departure of Montbrun's 15,000 IIlcn for
Valencia, by the Emperor's direct command, was the mBin
governing fact. It is impossible to deny assent to Marmont's
bitter criticism on the orders that kept coming to him during
the autumn and early winter of 1811. 'Napoleon was at this
period living in a non-existent world, creatcd by his own
imagination. He built structures in the air, he took his
I To be exact, WellingWu's Retunl of November 22, tile day after
NR!)Qleoll dictated this diS!)."teh, Wll.'l:-
.BritiS!I. })resent, 38,311; Detached, 3,!l17 ; sick (prcsentlll1\1 absent),
10,000. .
Portuguese. Present, 24,3!llj DCl:3ched, 2,087; sick (prcscnl Rnd
absent), 6,000.
2 Memorandum, dated 28th December, 1811, at Freueda. (Di8pQlchu,
viii. pp. 518-1!).)
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desires for realities, and gave orders as if ignorant of the true
state of affairs, as if the actual facts had been pUl'posely
hidden from him 1,' It was no use to tell him that magazines
were non-existent, that numbers were low, that roads were
impracticable, that communications were intercepted, that he
bad undervalued the enemy's forces; he continued, with all
serenity, to ignore tiresome hindrances, and to issue orders
grounded on data many weeks· old, often on data which had
never been trne at any moment, but which it suited him to
believe. And so the catastrophe of 1812 came nearer.
Wc have now taken the operations of ¥lellingtoll and his
chief adversaries, Marmollt and Dorscllue, down to the winter
uf181l. But there still remains to be told the story of the
autumn months ill the secondary fields of operations ill soutbem
Spain. The doings of Soult ill Andalusia have been followed
no further than July and August, when, retul'lling from the
relief of Badajoz, he freed Seville from the menaces of Blake,
and forced the l\lurciall army to take refuge with undignified
hasLc within the boundaries of its own province 2. Nor has any~
thing been said about the operations of Hill in Estremnduro.,
where he lay opposite Drollet and the French 5th Corps from
Allgnst to December. 'Vith these subsidiary allalrs wc now
have to deal.
Soult's victorious campaign Oil the border of Murein, and the
flight of Freire's army homewards, had reaffirmed the French
domination ill eastern Andalusia, to the extent that the large
towns and the main lines of communication were again safe.
But the Alpujarras were still in arms, and Ballastcros was giving
much trouble from his uew base in the extreme south. Excited
by his presence, the Serrauos of the Sierra. de Uonda spread their
incursions on every side, as far as Osuna and Marbe1ln, in spite
of all the efforts of Godillot, who had been told off to crush
them. The strength of Ballasteros's position was that he had
behind him two secure places of refuge-the old Spanish lines in
front of Gibraltar, with the great fortress behind them, and,
thirty miles away, the newly-repailw stronghold of 'l'arifn,
which had been held since the la.te winter by a. detachment of
1 Note in Correspondence, Appendix of vo1. iv or J!emoirc" p. 260.
~ See pp. 471-82 above.
.q
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the Brit.ish garrison of Gibraltar. Avoiding seriollS combats,
and confining his ambition to the surprise of small posts ani!
'the cutting off of detachments, Ballastcros made himself such
a nuisance to the French that Soult at Inst prepared n great
combined scheme for surrounding him. Godinot's fOI"Ce, oper-
ating from the north, was to work in unison with two other
columns under Generals Barrois and SCmele, sent out by Victor
from the lines in front of Cadiz. The conceutric advance only
succeeded in driving Ballasteros southward, not in tmpping him,
He evacuated San Uoque and Algesirns, and went under the
protection of the cannon of Gibraltar, from which secure posi-
tion he defied the enemy (October 14th-15th). For a moment
10,000 French lay before the English fortress, but they had not
come prepared for n siege, and soon departed when their pro-
visions failed. Godillot then made a dash at the much weaker
walls of Tarifa, but was caught Oil the march along the seaside
roud-'thc only OIlC that ca.nnon could take-by a squadron of
British \\"arships, which did him so much damage that he drew
off' inland without even reaching his objective (October 18).
Meanwhile Ballasteros, slipping out from under the co\'er of
Gibraltar the moment that his enemy was gone, followed
SCmele's column, which was returning to the Cadiz lines by a
separate route, und snrprised it at Bomos (November 5). The
French (1,500 men of the 16th Leger) cut their way through the
enemy with the loss of only 100 men!; but a JUTamentatW
battalion which was accompanying them threw up the butts or its
mWikets and surrendered en musae or dispersed, and l\ howitzer
was captured.
Soull was incensed at the failure of his great combined lllo"e-
ment, and laid the blame on Godinot, who after a stormy inter-
view with his chief at Seville committed suicide. The chase of
Ballasteros began again, with a ncw set of hunters; but, as wc
shall sce in a later chapter, wns destined to prove fruilless. Nor
did a serious attempt to beleaguer Tarifa wit.h a heavy siege-
train come to any good. But its siege, though commenced in
the last days of the old year 1811, belongs rather to the cam-
I ;\Iartinien'8 invaluable lists shol\' only three officers IfOUIUled ill
the 16th.
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paign of 181~. and will be dealt with in the next \'olume of /'"
this work. /"
There remains only to be considered the state of affairs in
Estremadurll, where we left Hill with his two divisions, facing
Drouet and the 5th Corps, in July. Th£!ir forces were not
unequal', and each had been Kiven by his commander a defensive
rather than an offensive role. Soult had directed Drouet to see
that Badnjoz was not molested. to keep up communication, "in
Truxillo, with the Annies of Portugal and the Centre, and to
risk nothing. If the Allies detached more troops into the
Alemtejo, he was to make no attempt to face superior numbers,
but to roll without delay for help to his neighbour;;;, and to
retire on Merida or on Monasterio as seemed more suitable at
the moment. But it was judged unlikely that W'ellingtoll
would be able to make nny serious detachment southward, 80
long as he was 'eontainoo' by the Army of Portugal, which lay
ill the valley of the Tagu!>. ready to move towards Ciudad
Uodrigo on the one hand. or Badajoz on the other, 1\8 necessity
might dictate. Meanwhile here, as everywhere else in western
Spain. the }'rench had completely abandoned the offensive, and
their plans contemplated the parryiug of , Veilington's strokes,
ra.ther than the delivery of any blows of their own. The scheme
for an attack on the Alemtejo, which Napoleon had suggested to
Marmont 2, was never within any measurable uisUlntt of being
put iuto pradical opcratiou. By this time the only part of the
Peninsula in which the Imperial armies retained an oftEmsive
posture was the east coast. Suchet had started on that Valen-
cillll expedition which was to havc- such brilliant success in
itself, but wa.<; to indirectly destroy the )?rench hold on Spain,
by ca1liug away troops frolll opposite Welliub!'f:on at the critical
moment in the midwinter of' 1811-12.
I for Hill's force at tllis time sce ApI~ndix XXIIT. Hc had 5,800
Uritish illfalllry, 7,.roQ Portuguese infllntry, 1,800 .British e.-walry (includ-
ing Le :'IIarehaut's briga~e at Castello Branco), G50 l'Ol'tuR"ueso camlry,
RIlII about 000 artillery, &c.), about 16,000 ill all. Drouet hatl the Oth
Corps, now about 14,000 strong (it had been l'ccruited by the rotum to tl,o
ranks of tile cOllvale&:cllts of U'C 4,000 AlullCl'll. woulltllxl), alld six
regiments of cnvnlr}' frOm the Army of the South, bringing up his force
to much tliC SlUne figure.
I Sce above, pp. ,587-8.
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Hill's orders from Wellillgton corresponded vcr)' closely to
Drouel's orders from Soult. That is to SU)', Hill was to content
himself with' containing' the French force opposite him; to sec
that ElvM And Campo Mayor were covered, to make no attempt
on Badajoz, and to apply for aid to his chief in the event of an
increase of the hostile force 011 the Guadiallll.. The sUlllmingup
of the situation, in the original dispatch which Wellington \\Totc
to Hill when he left for the north, is simply that the force in
Estremadura mllst pair off' against Dronet. 'My wish is that
you should obscl'\'C the mo\'ements of the 5th Corps. If tlle
5th Corps should move off to cross the T80"'llS ut Almaraz, you
will thell march to cross the Tngus at Villa Velha, and proceed
all by Cnstcllo Branco to join this [the main] army. . . . If t]IC
5th Corps should, instead of crossing the Tagus, manrell\Te upon
you in Alemtejo, I request you to move upon Portalegrc, tUld
there either stand their !lttack or Hot, as you may think proper,
at'cordillg to your notion of their force us compared WiUl your
own. If you cannot stand their attack, you will retire b)'
Gaviiio towards Abran~ and thence across the Ze7..ere, taking
the line of the Tagus, with Santarem 011 your right 1.' It being
possible, though not likely, thl\t Marmont might make an advancc
agninst the celltrall'ortugucsc frontier north of the Tagus, f!'Om
the Zarl.A In Mayor and Coria district, Hill was directed to keep
one British and onc Portuguese brigade in the direction of
Castello Branco. as a nucleus on which troops coming frolllllorth
and south mightcollcentrate, for serious opposition to an ilWasioll.
This precautionary mo\'c was made in August, and the dct.n.eh-
ment remained north of the Tagus till Scptember, when fOY'A
removal from 'l'ruxiUo, nlld Mannont's march to the relief of
Ciudad Rodrigo, showed that there was no longer allY possible
danbrer ill this direction 2. Meanwhile the main b<xl)' of the
nllicd force in Estremaduro. lay about l'ortulegre, Villa Vic;osa,
and Santa Ollays., waiting for developments of the enemy's plans
which never came about. For Drouet kept ver)' quiet,generally
with his heau quarters at Zafra, anu a strong detachment at
Merida, as anxiously expectant of Hill's mO\'CIIlCnls us Hill
was of his.
I Wellillgtoll to Hill, August 8th. (Di8pulche8, "Hi. pp. 180-2.)
i See for tllt: recall the dispatch of October 4. (DUputchu, viii. 11. 321.)
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All this time the spa{."e to the north of Hill's cantonments
was occupied by the small remains of the Spanish Anuy of Estrc-
madura, still under Castafios. Since the Cuptain-Geneml hud
sent off CarIos de Espailll. to the borders of Leon, he remained
with the rest of his troops in the hilly region between the Gun-
diallil and the Tagus, with his head quarters at Valencia de
Alcunwra, and part of his infantry in Albuqucrquc, which for-
tress he was engaged ill repairing. His n.dvancc lay at Cru;ereSt
observing the l?rench garrison in '!'ruxillo, with which it often
bickered. But Castailos occasionally sent a flying column out
under Morillo or Peulle Villemur to beat lip the cantonments of
the 5th Corps south of the Tngus. They ranged as fnr as La
Sereull and the Sierra dell1edroso, and on one occasion got even
to Be~alca7.1l.r on the very border of Andalm;ia., whose garrison
Morillo surprised and captured 1. Such raids were profitable
for distracting the cnemy, and gave Dl'ouet much troublc. But
as Castm1os's wholc force did not amount to much morc than
600 horse and 3,000 foot, the menace was not a seriolls one.
In the thinly peopled region of northern Estremadura it was
illlpossible to get recruits to fill the old cadres, and the army
did 1I0t grow as the commander had hoped. rrhe regiments
remained mere skeletons.
The removal of Fay's division from 'l'ruxillo in September,
when Marmont drew him in to {''a-operate in the relief of Ciudnd
Hodrigo, had serious consequences in Estrcmadura. It will be
remembered that, when the campaign of El Rodon was over, the
Army of Portugal did not send back any detachment to reoceupy
'l'ruxillo-the connecting-point between the Armiesof Portugal
alId of the South. The responsibility for kecphIg touch was
thrown on to Drouet, who had alrea.dy quite enough ground to
cover with his 14,000 men. But he was forced to send a strong
detachment northward from Merida., or his communication with
Murmont would have been wholly intercepted by Morillo's
habitual raids. Accordingly Girarrl's division of the 5th Corps
was moved up to occupy the front between the Guadiann and
the 'l'agus, leaving the whole stretch from the Gllndicl.Ila SQuth-
I ,"'or COlliolls details see the Life of MQrilJo, by DOll AlItonio Villa,
pp. 47-55 (Madrid, unO).
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ward to the Sierra Morena held by only ol1e division, that of
Claparede 1, and two cavalry brigades.
Wellington, seeing the weakness of Drouet, and knowing that
Soult had crushed the Murcian arm)' in August, and therefore
could find some reinforcements for Estrcmadufll if he should
please, wns for some time under the belief that BiJI would see
new troops brought l1p against him from the south 2. He
reiterated his old orders: 'If you only had cavalry, you cer·
tainly have iurantr), in sufficient numbers to beat the 5th Corps
out of Estremndurn. ljut your cavalry is not sufficiently str'Oug.
I think, however, that )'011 MC abh to prevent the 5th Corps
from doillg anything, even though Soult should add to it
another division.... You must proceed with great caution,
and endeavour to have the best intelligence of the force Soult
brings with him.... Canton )'our troops (as soon as you fiud
the enemy are serious in their advance upon Blldajoz) llearly
on the ground which we occupied with the army in the end of
June and the beginning of July [the Cayn position].... If
you should find Soult collects ill too great force for you, retire
upon POI'tnlegre, and thence, if necessary, upon Guvino and
Ahrantes. It appear>; to me, however, scarcely possible for
Soult to bring such a force as to be able to attack you at
Campo IHayor, or to cut your communications at the same
time both with Elvas and with Portalcg1·e.... If SOIut
"hould bring a large anny into Estremadura, with the view to
enable the Army of Portugal to co-operate in the invasion of
Valencia, I shall reinforce your corps with some infantry and
nearly all ill)' cavalry-and I think we shall soon have buck
again the Army of Portugal. If Sol1lt comes only to thrall'
provisions into Badajoz, I am afraid we canllot prevent it under
existing circulllstances 3.'
1 At tllc bre.:l.king Ill' of tlle 9tll Corps in June, Claparede took over
Gazan's old division in the 5th Corps, and (;onroux: that of Huffin in the
ht Corps. But the DUI CorIJS battalions were not all redistributed into
their regiments till COllrOIL~ came back from Soult's campaigu against the
Murduus ill August
1 See Wellington to Hill, October 4 and October 10. (DispatcMl,l·tH.
}Jp. 321, ami 332--2.)
• Wellington to Hill, from Freneda, October 16. (DiI]Xllchu, viii.
pp. 333-4.)
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Soul~ however, Ileith!:!r came in pelrson to Estremlldurn with
alllrge force, nor even drafted another division into the province
to succour Drouet, who got no reinforcements during the
autumn. He was at this time wrapped up ill the internal
aWairs of Andalusia, and had no intentiou of sending troops
away, unless there was urgent necessity for it. Hill, therefore,
seeing that the 5th Corps had receiv~d no succours, and remained
spread out 011 the long front from the 'l'agllil to the Sierra
i\lOfClla, while its two divisions were not in supporting distance
of each other, n."ked for leave to mnke a blo..... at Girard, whose
po~ition was decidedly dangerous, because of his remoteness
from Drouct's main body (October 15). Wellington SilW the
opportunity and gave instant conscnt: 'I should approve of
adopting the measure, which should be effeetuol, and should
drive Girard from CS\et'CS over the Gnadiana, if you think you
can do it wiUlOutrisking the safety of Campo Mayor and Ouguela.
It appears to me you are too slrollg for Girard in evcry way,
if the other division of the 5th Corps has not crossed the
Guadiana 1.' .
Circumstances were at this moment very much ill HilI'g
favour, for Girard, seeking new regions to plundcr for food, and
angered by the raids of Castailos's detachments on the road from
l\lerida to Truxillo, bad just marched to drive the Spaniard~
back. Sweeping them before him, he had advanced as far lIS
~'Cres, tifty miles from his base at Merida, and was raising
contributions there. He had with him his own division oftwclve
battalions, a provisional brigade of cavalry under General BrOil 2,
and onc battery-in all about 5,000 foot and nearly 1,000 horse.
Hill could concentrate against him a much larger force, while
still leaving something in front of Drouet, who (as he had taken
pains 10 discover) was cantollcd llbout Zafra with the rest of
his eorps-Claparede's division, and thc bulk of the cavalry. He
was not in a position to accomplish anything against Campo
Mayor or Elvas, for his troops were scattered ovcr the country.
side, and he gllOWcd no signs of any intention to move.
On Odober 20th H ill wrote to Castaiios to say that he
I Smne to same, October 17, acknowledging Hill's l,rol}l)Stll Illaue ill
a letter of October 15.
2 Apparently 20th Drngoons, 27t11 (J/1II88eJlr8, 10th Hussars.
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relied on the help of Morillo's infantry and Villcmur's cavalt)·
for 11 blow at Giral'd. He himself would bring up Howaro's
and Wilson's (late Abercrombie's) brigades of the 2nd Division,
nine battalions of Portuguese I, and I.ong's cavalry brigade. The
column would consist of 3,000 British and 4,000 Portuguese
infantry, 900 horse Rnd two batteries. To this Castaiios could
add about ~,OOO infantry and 600 horse, so that a striking force
of 10,000 men would be collected. Mcanwhile there would be
left in J'ortugal, to make a front against Dronet, if he should
move, the remaining brigade (Byng's) of the flnd Division 2,
four battalions and two cavalry regiments of Portuguese 3, and
a British cavalry brigade wlder Le Marchant recently arrired
from home, which lay at CilStello Brallco, hut could be called
south if required.
The essential part of Hill's scheme was that Girard should
be attacked Ilnd brought to aclion before he was aware that
there WRS anything in his front save the Spaniards whom he had
jn;:;t hunted out of Cw;cres. If he were to discover that there
was a large Anglo-Portllguese force in his front, he would
probably retire by forced marches upon Merida. It was there-
fore ncccssary to concentrate the striking forec with suddellllcss,
and to move it with the greatest possible speed, On October !!~nd
the three infantry and one cavalry brigades were collected at
Portalegre. On the ~3rd they made a tremendous march, thirty
miles across the sh,.'ep Sierra de San l\iam{.'(\ to the Spanish
fortress of Albuquerque. Here Hill received uews from Casiafios
that Girard was still at Ca~ercs, and had sent out flying parties
to Aroyo del Puerco and other places, sweeping the country-
side for food. The allied column Ilt Albuquerque was as near
l\1erida as thc enc.my, and had every chance of intercepting him
if he continued quiescent. l\1orillo and renne VilIemur had
mo\'ed to Aliseda, twenty miles from Albuqnerque, and could
join the British force next day. On the !!4th Hill advanced to
14th and 10th Line (2 batt3. eacll) from Hamilton's division, 6th and
18111 I..illll (2 hatts. cacll) amI 6l!J Calf''\(lorC'l from Asllwortll'S Brigl:ule.
~ This was tlle brigade composed of the remnant. of Colborne's alul
Hoghton's old regiments, viz. Bulf!l,1/67th, 2f31!1t, 2/66tll.
~ The remainder of Hamilton's division, 2nd and 14tb Line, aod UIC
6th and 8th Camlry.
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c
Aliseda and Ca.sa de ~ntillana. and picked up the Spaniards.
Next morning Pcnnc Villcmllr's horse drove the French outposts
out of Arroyo del Puerco. When Girard's cavalry screen had
been driven in, Hill's whole column made a night march to
Malpartida, only eight miles from Cf1.9crcs, but loamt, UnCI"
some delays, on the morning of the !l!6th that Girard had left
Ca~res on the preceding afternoon by the Tonemocha road,
making a leisurely journey towards i\fetida. He had just
re<:ei\'cd vague rumours that Uterc was an Anglo~Portllgucsc
force coming from Portugal, and thought it well to draw near
to his base. Thus Hill's precautions had Dot been altogether
suc<.:essful. Girard's departure was tiresome to Hill, as the night-
march to Mnlpurtida had taken the allied columns loo far to
the north, and the enemy was now between them and his own
mlSc. But if it was too late to intercept him, there was still
time to pursue alld o\-ertakc him, unless he should Chllllce to
quicken his pace. Before dawn on the morning of the ~7th
Hill turned his flU:c southward, aod marched Oil TorTCmocha;
but when hc had reached the pass of Trasquillon he was informcd
by the peasantry that Girard had left Torremocha, marching for.
ATTOyO dos ],folinos on the other side of the Sierra de
MOlltnllchcs. The Gcneral called on his troops to makc n finnl
effort-if Girard halted at Arroyo dos Molinos it was possible to
Cllt him offby continuing the long march. The men responded
well to the appeal, and by nightfall on the ~7th thc two British
brigades were at Alcucsear, five miles south-west of the eamp of
the French, and the llortugllese and Spaniards close behind at
Don Antonio. Girard had only gone twelve miles that day-the
Allies 110 less than twenty-eight, in abominable weather, across
two rough mountain ranges. It is astonishing that the I"rench
general had not made more haste, and still more so that, with
thrC<l ca\'alry regimcnts for reconnoitring, he had not hit upon
the track of the Allies. Bron was evidently El. poor director of
cavalry-his 1,000 men should have sufficed to sweep the whole
country-side. But it is said that Girard WIlS convill(:OO that
Hill had gone to Ca9cres, and would listen to no warnings 1,
I Hill in !lis dis~tch 1ea)'5 that the peasantry gave Girard no news of
his approach. But ill Blakeney's iuteresting narrative of this campa.ign
there is a story toM tlmt two Af1'O./lCuad()8 wamed tlle Frenchman of
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At half-past two o'clock on tllC morning of the ~th the
weather was still tempestnolls, as it had been for the last twenty-
four hours, and Hill, covered by the driving rain, marched ill
the dark on Arroyo dos Motinos, and covered the five miles which
separated his comfortless bivouac from the French head qllal'ters
without meeting a single hostile vedette. He was able to
arrange his force within half a mile of the littlc town undis-
covered, and to make his provisions for blocking all the thr£!C
roads by whieh Girard might escape. Arroyo dos Molinos lies
lmdcr the shoulder of the precipitous Sierra de ]\fontanelles,
with no trnck going directly northwards from it, but with
country roads to Truxillo, Medellin, and Merida diverging
Ilorth-eastward, south-ca~tward,alld south-soutll-westward. Hill
directed "Vilson's brigade, supported by three Portuguese
battalions, to march round the town 011 its southward side, and
block the TruxiUo road, while the rest of the infantry should
attack the enemy in front, and the cavalry, both English and
Spanish, should form a central column which should seir.e the
Merida and Medellin roads and prevent the escape of Girard
southward.
Not a Prenchmsm was seen till Howard's blignde, leading the
advance of the main body, ran upon a picket half a mile outside
Arroyo, the men huddling together under trees with their faces
away from the driving rain and the approaching enemy. Most
of them were captnred, but some escaped to warn Girard, who
till this moment had no knowledge that a British column was
within shiking distance of him. As it chanced, U}C French
general had been preparing to start early, and Hemolld's
brigades (the 64th and 88th of the line), escorted by one cavalry
regiment, had marched Ull hour before 011 the Merida road, and
were now three miles away. Girard hud lIot, therefore, even
his whole force assembled, but only the six battalions of
Dombrouski's bri&t'8.de (34th and 40th of the line I), two cavalry
Hill's.approach, and that he refused to credit thcm. This was told to
Blakeney by his prisoner, Colonel the l'rince of Aremberg, commanding
the 27th ahall,elfl·~. See BIakeney, I'. 236.
I The regiments, Wllicli were incomplete in July (see Appendix XVIII),
had becujoincd before October by tlu~ battalion Wllich cad, lmd contributed
to tl,e garrison of Badajoz.
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regiments and half a battery with him-nol more than 4,000
men-while 10,000 of the Allies were converging upon him from
three separate qnarters. At the moment when the first ~hots
were heard on the Alcuescar road, his infantry was just getting
ready to march, his baggage and a rearguard of one battalion
were still ill the street of Anoyo dos Molinos, man)' of his
horsemen had not yet sn.ddled up, and he himself was breakfast·
ing ill the Alcaldc's house.
Within a few minutes of the first alarm the 7]st and 9Qnd,at
the hend of Howard's brigade, burst into the little lown, drove
Qut the battalion that was holding it, and captured the whole of
Girard's baggage and many prisoners. General Bran was taken
in the doorway of the house which he had been occupying, just
as he "'as about to mount. Hurrying out on the other side of
the place, the advancing British found Dombrollski's brigade
hastily forming up for the march: Girard had ordered an
instant retreat along the Merida road. The formation of his
troops was soon disordered bJ the fire of the advancing 71st,
(o]]O",ed by tha.t of three guns of Arriaga's battery, which
galloped out to the town end and opened on the nearest
regimcnt. '1'hc column, however, started off, and had gone
a little way, when it discovered the allied cavnlry advallcing
along the Merida road to meet it, Penne Villemur in front. Long
in support. Girard. seeing this road blocked, bade his chas8el~r8
and dragoom hold 00' the British and Spanish horse at all costs.
and turned the infantry column towards the 'l'ruxilto road, which
skirts the precipitolls foot of the Sien-a de l\1ontanches. His
cavalry became enga.:,fJ'Cd in a eonfused fight, first with Peulle
\'ilIcmur's Spaniards and then with the 9th Light Dragoons and
the ~ud Hussars of the King's Gennt\ll Legion. Being out-
numbered, they were soon broken, many were taken, and the rest
SCtlttcred and tried to get off in small parties.
The infantry, making the best speed that it could, but closely
pursueJ. by Howard's regiments and the Spanish brigade in
their rear, finally reached the spot where the Truxillo road
turns the corner of the sierrn, tl mile and a half outside
Arroyo dos Molinos. Dy this time the rain had ceased. and
the mists dispersing showed the Frenchmen Wilson's brigade
marching hard to cut them off, and less than half a mile
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away. Both parties started to run, and the three light com-
panies of the 28th, 34th, and 39th, who wcre wcll ahcnd of
thcir regiments, reached the road just as the leading French
battalion was pushing across their front. Only 200 men
wcrc up, but Blakclley (comlllandillg the 28th company) saw
that if the hostile column were closely nttl\cked in tlank,even by
a small body, its progress would bc stopped, and a few minutes'
delay would bring down both "Vilson's mill Hownrd's brigfldc.~
upon it. Accordingly he led in person the charge of some
scores of the men nearest him against the throat of the French
column 1; they were not extenninak>d (as might have been
expected), for Girnrd, who was present at the spot, told his men
not to stop to fight. bnt to escape by leaving the road and
dashing uphill along the rocks of the sierra above. He himself
with the leuding companies got clear, hitting on a place whcre
the side of the precipice was not too steep to climb, though the
officers had to turn loose their horses before they could start on
the scramble. 'l11e main body of the column was less lucky.
An absolutely impassable line of cliffs was above them, and after
reaching its foot a thousand men, in two or three disorderly
masses, had to halt and lay down their arms to the ellf,'Cr
pnrsueL's from both the British brigades, who were converging
lIpon them. A few got away by incredibly dangerous climbing,
and joined Girard on top of the sicrra. Meanwhile Morillo's
Spalli~h inftlntry had takcn an easier path up the heights, far to
the left, and started in pursuit of the remnants of the Prcnch.
They kept up the chase for eight leagues, and took or slew
many stragglers. But Girard, Dombrouski, and four or
five hundred men, bearing Willl thcm the eagles of the g'Uh and
40th, escaped eastward, and, after much wandering in the
mountains, crossed the Guadiana at Orellana, be)'ond Medellin,
und got back to join Drouct. Othcr small parties and many of
the camlry straggled in later, but Girard's force had practicnlly
, lllakeney's account ofllis olm exploit (PI). 22B-!J ofllis book) is borne
out by Hill's recommendatiou of him, though Ill' ti! not mentioned ill the
formnl dispa,tcll of October 30.
t 'Il,is HheinIJUllu prince lmu beell in great favour with Nllll'oleoll, and
marriell Stepl,anie Tascl1er, niece of the Empress Josephiue. He Illld
raised the 27t11 OIUJIJ8(.'UTf! at l1is own cost.
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been destroyed. Nearly 1,300 prisoners had bt.'Cn tukclI, in-
cluding Gelleral Broil, commanding lhe cavalry, the Prince of
Arcmhcrg, colonel of the fl7th C!uuscurs, the chef itetat major of
the 5th Corps, and more than thirty other officers. In addition
the French lost their three guns and a contribution of 5,000
dollars levied on Cal(eres a few days before. Hill's loss was
insignificant-seven men killed and seven oflit'Cl"S und fifty-seven
men wowldcd. Penile Villcmur's Spaniards, who had behnved
with e.-.;cellent spirit, had about thirty casualties.
After the fighting was over, Hill directed Long's cavalry, with
lhe Portuguese regiments, who had not bl.'C1l CllgRf,rOO, to JIlarch
all l\icrida, supporting them with Howard's brigade when it had
rested. It was hoped that Uemond's colunm, which had escaped
the disaster of Arroyo dos Motinos by its early march, might be
caught up. But the French brif,radier had a long enough sturt
to render this impossible: warned by fugitive cavulry of the
fate of his chief, hc llllU'chcd through l\icrido. without halting,
and retired towards Drouet by way of Almendralejo.
Hill, after following his vanguard to Merida on the 9l9th amI
stopping there two days, returned by Wellington':! orders to his old
cantonments at l'ortalegre, which he reached on November 31'£1.
<It would have been useless; wrote We1liugton, ' for him to push
ou his operations beyoud the Guadianll.-for Drouet would
simply have retired before him,-an£1 equally so to l"cmain at
i\lerida.' B)' Ulis somewhat cryptic phrase the British com~
mander-in-chief meant that if he had chosen to direct Hill,
idler his success at Arroyo dos Molinos, to march a::.rain~t
Drouet's lImiu body, there cun be no doubt that he might
have driven it into the Sierra .Morena. This would have
caused Soult to come to its aid with all the available troops
that could be collected in Alldalusill.. The reasou why no
slIch orders were issued was that the British. general did not
wish to provoke Soult to concentrate. Hill could do nothing
agaiust the Army of t~c South if it came against him in force.
But if it continued disseminated through all the four kingdoms
of Andalusia, l18 it was at present, with one mass of troops
opposite Cadiz, another at Granada, alld the small available field
force busily ellgaf,rt.-'(\ in hunting Ballasteros, it WAS not to be
fcarl.-d. As to the uselessness of stopping at Merida, Wellington
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meant that Hill, if posted there, would havc becnliable to be cut
off from Elvas if Soult should come up in haste from Andalusia
to reiufor<:e Drouet-as was extremely likely. \Vellingtoll was
contented with ha\'ing brokcn up a French division, and cut the
communication between the Armies of the South and of Portugal
for a time. For when Girard was driven out of the space
between the Tagus and the Guatliana, Soull could no longer
communicate with Mal'mont.
Napoleon rccaJled GiJ'al'd in disgrace, which he well deserved
for his reckless want of caution: his maltreated division was
gh'cn to General Danois. But he WllS afterwards pardoned,
and survived to die, still a general of division, doing good sen'ice
at the battle of Ligny.
In the first moment of alarm, after hearing of Ginw'ij
disaster, Sonlt had expected to be pressed, had rent 4,000
infantry to reinfon:e Drouet, and had begun to collect other
troops at Seville. But finding that Hill had no further inten-
tion of sb:ikiIlg at the 5th Corps, rmd that Badajoz was not evcn
threatened, he revl,'rted to his earlier plans, left Estremooura
alone, and contiuued to hunt Ballasteros. and to make prepara-
tion for his lIext important move-the siege of 'l'arifa. Drouct,
for his part, having recovered from the dismay into which
Girard's defeat had thrown him, once more began to move his
troops northward with caution. On December 5th he reoccupied
Almendralejo, on the 18th he pushed Dombrouski with a bligadc
to Mcrida, and OJl(,~ more opened up communication with the
Army of Portugal by way of 'l'ruxillo. But the road was not to
be long open. ,rllSt before the year 1811 was out (December ~7th)
Hill was sent forth a se(:ond time against the 5th Corps, with
far more serious intentions than in Oclober, for this expedition
wa.~ part of Wellington's preliminary movements for the siege
of Ciudad Jlodribro. It will be dealt with in its proper
place.
l~or all intents and purposes the march to Arroyo dos Molinos
forms the last episode of the campaign of 1811. Its main
interest was that it showed Wellington in offensive mood, rendy
to take advantage of' the scattered condition of his enemy. It
also made it clear that in Hill he had an executive officer of the
highest merit-but this )V85 known before to all \\Iho had studied
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the career of that much-loved and well-served general, fOl' whom
the fZnd Division would do anything. There wus no more
popular promotion during the whole war than that which mo.dc
him a Knight of the Bath in reward for his little campaign.
December had !lOW arrived-the fatal detachment of ]5,000 of
Marmonl's men to Valencia had been ordered by the Emperor.
Wellington wus ready for his long-projected blow at Ciudad
Hodrigo. How sharply it was delivered will be told in another
volume.
APPENDICES
I
THE FHENCI-[ ARMY IN l'ORTUGAL, JAN. 1, 1811
[FROM A Rh'TURN IN THE AR(flllVES NATlONAJ.ES, PARIS]
2nd CORPS. ItEYXIER. At and about Santarem :
PrIMel1t IlI/ricr
An1l8. JJet,wlwd. Sick. Total.
Ojficeu. Mm.
1st Infantry Division, MerIe 154 4,214 150 1,54!) 0,007
2nd Infantry Dhisioll,
Heurlelet • IflG 5,622 451 2,rn6 8,785
Cavalry Brigade, Pierre Soult '8 1,048
"'"
231 1,000
,\ rlillery. Train, &c. ~, 1,251 52
"
1,425
Etat-l\tajor 65
"
Corps Tula! M6 12,035 l,liG 4,486 18,242
6th CoRPS. Nl:Y. Head quarters, Thomar:
'"
Infantry Division,
J\Iarchand 192 4,805
'"
1,121 6,6.'l7
2nd Infantr}' Dil"ision,Mermet 212 6,040 743 1,077 8,072
ard Infantry Division, Loisoll 174 4,415 1,037 1 3,201 8,!)l7
Cal'alry Brigade, Lamotte '3 604 r"", 117 1,432
Artillery, TraiD, &c. 3. 1,731> 47 165 1,081
~:t[l.t-Major • 77 77
Corps Total 727 17,5:)!) 3,OW .5,771 27,116
8th CORJ'S. JUNor. Head quarters, Tones Novas:
ht Infanlry Division, Clausel 185 3,822 4'" 3,mJ9 8/J80
2ndJIlfantry Divisioll,Soligllac 236 4,761 1,058'1 3,537 10,4V2
Cavalry Brigade 86
'"
6:)8 238 1,017
~rtillery, Train, &c. . 23 1,O© 24 3!)2 1,522
~tllt-i\f{LjOr . 50
"-Corps Total 080 10,561 3,164 8,156 22,480
Including 5/8:.?nd. 1;2$ strong. at Ahneida.
'I Including -I./lStb and 3/8ljtb, 1,'i.:>1 strong. at Ciudad RodrigO.
lUll) THE FHJ>NCH AllMY IN j'OII'l'UGAL (jUt!
Det(lchcd. Sick. Toll/I.
1,486 1 178 4,633
2]!) 283 2,090
107
66
PrclWllt «Ildcr
Arms.
QtJicert. Alen.
Il.eserve CavalrYJ l\fontI.rUIi 140 2,120
Artillery Heserve, Genie, &c. . 42 ],546
Genllarmeric, . . . 7 100
General Etat-Major of the Army 66
Total. ,2,127 44,000 D,064 18,873 74,724
Totn! Vrcscnt unllcr arllJS of all ranks, 46,787 (Pririoll gives only 45,131].
N,B.-TIlC 1),()(l·l detached include 2,854 mell left. at Rodrigo ,IlHI
Almei(la, and 6,210 mell left behind in Spain at Salamallc.1 aDd elsewhere,
Note the terrible vrovortioll of siek ill the raw IljvisioliS of JUlLOt and
Loison, as compared with the lower percentage in the old divisions of
Ney's &Uu Heynier's Corps.
~th CUIIPS. DJlOU.;T 1J'F.IlL01". Head quarters approuc!ting Leiria. :
lot Division of In£1ntrr,
Claparede (at GUllrda) 2-:(0 7,017 3'" 482 8,7142mI Division of Illfantr}',
Collrou~ (near Leiria) 22J 7,3(31 447 1,2!)!) 0,338
C:II'alry Brigade,Follmier (at
the rear) . 71 ],627 00 114 1,872
I\rtillery, Train, &0. 13 1lb7 72 742
Etat-)Iajor. • 6G 66
Corps Total 621 17,208 BiG ] ,007 20,732
Duly Conrou~'s division being with tile main army, its 7,592 effectil'e
men alonc ll:we t.o Oc added to MassCna's force, making a graull total of
54,116 for the available strength of the Marshal on Jan. 1,1911.
On March 15tll the total of 46,7B7 effeetive~ in the old Army of
Portugal Imd gone down to 44,407 (according to tllc return in thc Paris
Arehives-Fririoll says to only 40,751), though 1,662 drafts were brought
up to tllC front by Foy Oil Feb. 5. This sholVs:l shrinkagc of 4,242 lllen
effective since Jail, 1. But the loss in the sick is terrible-on Jan. 1
tllCrc were '18,873; 011 i\lareh 15 ollly :l!.lOut 6,000 (5,424 ill the tlll"oo
army corps; no ligures preserved for artillery, train, engineers, gendar-
merie, &e,). Allparently multitudes must have l'erislH~d in hospital
during these eleveu weeks.
Conroux's division IHld noo(lt 6,400 cffectivcs 011 i\larel. IS, wllicl.
lI"ouhl make Masst!lla's effective lighting foree on that day l'iO,BOi.
<':lap:mide's lli\'isioll (at Guanla and Cclorico) was on Marcll 15 about
6,000 strollg,
I Including fivc squadrons. 815 strong, left between Ciudad Rodrigo lInd
Almeida.
Q.Ull. 1\'
'"
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On April 1 tile total of 44,4Q7 elfecth'es of tIle old army OD l\larch 16
h;ul gone 110wn to 30,005 preoont witll the colours, uot inulllllillg Conroux
and ClaparCde.
On April Hi (the retreat having ended 011 April 5) the total of efl"edi"e;;
was 30,!Hu, lIOt including Couroux and Claparede.
The states of May 1 (Pari.~ Arcllh'es) will be found under the 'fable
(No. XII) e.ntitled" TIle Frenell Army at Fllcntcs de Onoro.'
II
SOUL'rS ARMY IN HIS
INVASION OF ESTIlEMADURA (JAN.-MAllCH 1811)
0,77,;
07'
1,460
1,332
40':;
"'"',2(i1
l3!:m
~113
2;)
. 22
Officers fmd
Me".
Ii,U3fi
nth COIU>S. Marshal MOllTll:n :
1st Infantry Divi~iol1 (Girard):
:HUl, 40tll, 64th, 86th Line (three batts. cacll)
2nl1 Infantry Division (GaZiln) :
21stauu 26t11 I..eger, lootl. and l03rd l.ine (tl.roo batls. cadl)
Corps-Cavalry (Bridlc), 21st Chasseufl>, 10th Hlls;;ars
"rom 1st CouPS:
63rd "ille (three balts.)
.Itll, \.iU., 2Gtll I)rngoolls
2ud Hussars •
From 4th ConI's: 2ith 1.1laS6curs il (:llc\'31
Artillcry alld Train.
Jo:ngincers ami Sapperi'
4th Spanisll ChuS5curs KCllcval
Gendanncric. .
Etat-:\Iajor-GclJcrnl .
Gcneral Total • l!),OlO
1II
GAlUUSO" m' BADAJOZ. MAllCH 4,I81I
(A) OltIGINAL t;i\HRlSON OF THE I'LACE
QffiCCf8. JfCll.
2nd of Majorca. (two baUs,) 4:3 <lOO
lsl of R'\f]ajoll (one balt.). 20 :376
J'rovincial de Truxillo (one halt.) 27 6!).l
Provincial de Plasencia (one 1I3tt.) 20 G8i
Dismounted Ca\'alry, organized ill battaliolls 20 i81
Artiller)', arlllllctachmCllts lent to tile artillery hy
\'arious corps 45 97!l
Sal,perS . (; 167
Total 100 4,11;0
ISII} GAIUUSON OF DADAJU~ III J
(8) ME~D1ZA.HAL'SARMY 01<' SUl,;(;OUn.
Mrll.
4,920
3,361
[will! 2,5t/5
horses]
137
387
337
282
[Present with the Coloul1!, Peu. 1, 1811J
0.#«'"fanguard Dh'i~ion, Urigadier-Gelleral Carl06 de ";Spai'la :
I'rincipe (three t.tts.). lst and 2nd of Catalonia,
GerGDa, Vittoria (one batt. each)
I;;t Dil'isioll, Major--Gelleral Garcia :
Leon (three batt5.), Regimiento del (;enera! (three
batlil.), La Union (two batts.), 1st of Uarcelona,
VolulltariO'> Cntalallt'S, o..U1l3. 7....frl', Valladolitl,
La Serena (oue bau. each), 2nd of Se\'iIle (two
batts,)
2111IUi\,ilri(Nl. Major-Gelleral \'irues:
Itey (two bAtts.), !'rillCcsa (two hat~), lobei'll
(three battli.), Toledo (two batts.), Zamora (two
batls.), J-1ilJerllia (tlI'O batts.), fermmtlo 70 (two
hatli<.), 'l'iradorC8 ue Castilla, \'olulltarios de
Navarra, 1st of l:lel·iIle (onc oott. each)
CII"a]ry, i\I11jOI'-Gcucrnl Butron:
CaraLineros Ilealcs, llcill3, lufallte, Uorlxlll, i\I.
i;nrl'c, SnJ;uIIW, Lusitauia, HU9i;arC8 de ~:"lrc­
mauura, I'erseguidores de Allualusia, Jmperial~
de Toledo, Gralluderos ue LlerclllI, Vruuda de
Albuquerque [mall)' regiments "ery weak].
M1il1ery,llil'isioual, four batteries [Jlot. including llIell
in HauajOl]
Total 1,18"2 lG,!)"2!)
K.H.-'I'bii total foree of 18,1l1mell did 1I0t appear before Badaj(l7; with
.\Ielldi:abal on February 5th. Fernando 7°, lIith 800 meu, 11'," garri50uiug
.\Ibuqut'"lue. 'll1e 800 dismounted cal'alry lI'ere at '-alencia de Aleall·
tara. their depOt. 2nd of Se,·ille. witl. :J.I officers and 582 mell, had
been thrown into B.W.ajoz ill JanUllr)'. About 400 cavalry were tlctaehed
'Vitll Uallasteros. Two battalions were garrilJoniltK Campo Mayor. It
seems that the actual anny of suel:Qnr cOlisistelt of about 2,600 men of
Carlos de Espalla'a divisioll, 8,500 from thOlle of Garcia and Virues, 2,500
of Hutron's clH'alry and 460 artillery; al50 960 Portuguese dragoons under
.\Ilulllen.
Osulla, lAifrl, Vallallolid, anti La $crena, with 132 officers Ilml 2,51;9
men, wero dranl.'ll into the garrison of lJ:ul~ljOll lJcfol'6 the baltlc of tho
Gebora, in which they did liOt take l'llrt. The total force VI'cscnt at that
fill;ht II'ns about 0,000 infantry and 2,000 SI~l11isll hone, he~illesMadden's
000 l'ortuguese ur..goous,
I( r 2
.,.
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IV
GRAHAM'S Alli\lY AT llARHOSA, AN D ITS LOSSES
O.D'- Men. Kit/ed. IVQullded.
t'fJ71J. O. M. O. M. Total,
Dilkcs's Brigadc:
1st Guards, 2nd batt. 24 687 1 33 a 177 21!l
Coldstream Guards, 2nd
UatL (2 comps.). . . 7 204 1 • 2 47 "3rd Gnards, 2nd Batt, (3
comps.). . . , , • '1' 1 I' 2 05 10"22 COlilll!l. 2/95tl. RiflllS • 11 200 6 2B 31
Total of Brigade be 1,311 • 61 12 337 413
Wheatler's nr(fde :
1/28th Foot acomps.), 2. 437 6 lJO Ill)
2/G7th Foot , , ' . 23 ,.. 1. • '1 "2/87th .Foot , . . , 32 66' 1 44 , 124 H3
-
Tolal of Brigade 7' 1,00,) 1 60
"
236 304
Hrowne's Flank Battalion
(2 camps. each of l/lJth,
1/2l:1tll, 2/82I1d). . . . 22 51' - 25 11 200 236
Baruartl's :I-lank Battalion
(4 comps, 3/95th miles, 2
COlll!'S. 2/47th) . . 29 615 2 33 5 '7 137
nauk ComlJanies, 2QtiJ ]'or-
tUguCSll , 16 316
"
, 42 OIl
Cavalry, 2 squadrollS 2nd
Hussars K.G.L, 1. W3 2 32
'"Artillcry 2. 342 G 8 •• 5l
Hoyal Enginoors • be 1 2 •
Staff Corpl:! 2 OS 1 1
Total of Army 2:'6 '! ,!)Ill 6 19.5 'I lI8G 1,238
Total of force was: Jnfantry, 4,633; Ca\"alry, 206; Artillef}·, 302 j
EUJo;inoors, &c" 00 = Grand TOlal, 5,217.
N.R-Of these troops 011 the field, Dilkes's brigade millUIJ tllC 211 (;0\11-
streamers, but piUt 200 of the 2/G7tlL and llrowne's flank battalion, formed
the right oolumu, while Wheatley's brigade, mimu one wing of tile 2/Gith,
but pl11.8 the two Coldstream companies ami Uarnard's fhmk l>attalion, was
011 tile left. All tile guus were with the laUer column. Thus Ditke->'g
command must !lave been about 1,050 strong, Wheatley's about 2,Il83,
The ca\'alry were absent with WhiUillgham 011 the coast-road tilt near!)'
the cnd of tlLe ellgngcmeul.
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V
VIC'l'Oll'S AllM Y AT DARllOSA, AND ITS LOSSES
(1) THOOt'S EKGAGED AGAINST THE BRITISH
Prc8CIlI.
Offi- Men.
ceNt.
Killed.
O. M,
Wounded.
O. J[,
Milsillg.
O. M. TI)/a/.
DII'ISiOS RU.·~I.'I :
2/0th Uger, . • . 15 SSI 1 14 4 70 1 13 100
1/24th all(1 2/24th
LigllC. , 37 1,156 2 33 7 214 3 21 280
l/OOth Ligue . • • 26 73U 2 30 6 IW 2 1 249
:2 provisional bntts. of
Grelladicl'l! • • . see note I 1 20 r, IaG 1 /i9 222
323
3 42
52
22 1,104
- scenote t
2ll.
f,22 1!l 72G
.JA 3 55
",0
301
31 1
I2
20 10
00 21
2 6
16 3
G..1 11
7
19 530
43 1,42:> 11
27 G83 1
42 ] ,281 3
131 3,010 15
21 377
8 lGl 1
? :2
DivisiOlla! Toml 78 2,0175 6 lOO 22 610 7 W 81i!}
DII'I810.'l I,A\'A1,:
1/8th and 2/8t11 Ligne
1/45t11 Ligllc . . .
1/54.th and 2/54.t11
Ligne. • • • •
Grenadier companies
of the 3ni OOtl.ll. of
the 8th, 45th, 54th,
24t11, 96th LigtlC,
lllu! 9th fAJgcr
Divisiolla! TolIi!
C,l.VAT,RY, 1st Dragoons.
ARTILLERY, 2 b.'lttcries.
ETAT.i\Luol~ •
Genera! Total 238 0,932 24 220 64 1,630 10 12-1 2,002
I These two battalions were formed of the fourteen grenadier companies of
the 1st and 2nd battalions of all the seven regiments of La\'llI's and Ruffin's
divl8lons,!ncluding those of the 16th Ll!ger. absent from the l'OrpS. The
men are therefore all l'ounted Illready in their battalions, save those of the
16th Leger, whieh would probably give 7 officers and 17() men to be added to
the above total of 7,170. That these companies of the 16th were present is
shown by the faet that two casualUes of officers of the regiment are recorded
in Martinien's lists at Barrosa.
I Losses of these six companies are included among those of Ule oilier
grenadiers in ilie return. They were little engage<!, and probably lost only
20 or 30 men.
61< r'\ PPF.7\l)ICES {"'''Reil
(2) TROOPS ENGAGED AGAINST THE SI'ANL"UDS, IN Tm~
COMBAT BV 'nU; 'J'OItRE REHUF..JA
Pmenf.
Killed. WoulIlud. Miuing.Offi- Trill,l.
~". Men. O. M. O. M. O. M.
DiV/SION VII,I,AT'!'R:
1/27t11 and 3/27th
IAfger. . 43 !lB2 1 2Q 7 150 2 21 201
I/DUh Liglle 16
""
1
"
3
'"
62
2/0Mh and 3/9.5th
Ligne. . 30 ],026 1 32 1
"CAI'AI,'IS, 211(1 Dmgoons
'"
270 3 12 4
"AUTJI.M:J1V, I kltter)' 3
"EUT.i\lAJOIl ? ? 1
-
110 2,681 2 33 11 243 2 2G SI]
N.n.-There were absellt from tlleir divisiolls:
(I) l\'ith (;a3,llIg11e at Medina Sidonia-the 2/2ith, 3j04th, 2/ootll, 1/95th,
and a battalion of ,;(l/ligell" comp:mies (rom the 3rd l),'l.ttalion of the Stl"
2·Hh, 45th, 64th, 96th, ;lmf6th Uger; also the 6th Chasseurs aCliCI"al.
(2) l.eft ill garriSOll ill t11e Carliz lines-the 1/9t11 r-eger, 2/.Jl'>th mul
2j941h 1,igne.
(3) Taken away by SoU\t-tJIC G3ra Ligne and lGth Uger.
VI
D111nSH LOSSES DURING THE COMBATS
11TH-15TH MARCH, 1811
KiIJed. WOUllded. Misflil'g. TO/(ll.
Officers. Mm. Officers. }Jell. Officers. Ne".
PO:'llBAl., Marell 1ltll:
1/9.5tll Foot 1 1 4 G
~rol QUilU]orcs . TO I 20 31
Total 11 2
"
37
REDINHA, March 12th:
Light Division:
J/4~rd ]·'oot r. r.
1/.52nd .1o'00t 2 3 21 2G
1/95tll Foot I 24 1 26
3ru Dil'isioll :
2/tith }'oot . 3 1 •
,
1/45tll I<'oot 1
"
7
6/GOt.11 Foot Tr. 4 14
1811 ] BRITISH LOSSES, MARCH ISH GUi
Kilkd. 1V00mdcrl. Jfi8nng. 'fo/flt.
Officer... Men. Office". "fm. Offi~r8" Men.
l/Sflth .'oot 1 3 4
1/9Uh I<'oot 2 1 13 16
2j83nl Foot 1 1
4th Division:
2/21th Foot 3 3
1/4Oth I<'oot • •91th Foot 1 G 7
Cavalry:
lstRo)'Rl Dmgoons 2 2
4th Dragoons 1 1
Horse Artiller)' . 3 3
Portuguese: 1<'rom
1st, 3nl, 4th, and
Gth Ca'i'adores • 3 "
lG 73
Tot..1l 17 11 103 15 200
CAZAL NOVO, and other skirmishes of March 14th:
Ught Divison :
1/43rd Foot 3 11 14
1/621111 I<'oot 1 • 3 '2 1 GS1/95tll Foot 3 2 lG 15
3rd Division:
2/lith Foot 8 •1/45th I<'oot 1 • 1 11!.i/OOlh I."oot 3 1 ,
14th Foot 4 5
2/83nl .'oot .1 1
1/88th Foot 2 1 3
1jll4th Fool 4 4
l'Oftugnese 2 1 21 24
Total 1 14 11 12.'; 4
'"FOZ DO AROUCE, i\larch lIith :
Light Didsioll :
1/~2I1d Io"oot 2 3 ,
1/1)5tll Foot 2 17 10
3rd Div~ioll :
2/6t1L Foot 7 •1/45th Io'oot 1 1
6/llOth Foot 3 8 12
74th Foot 3 3
jfB3nl Foot 1 1
IjBOth Foot 1 1 2
1/!J4th "·oot. 6 I;
6lG Al'PENDICES [AI'Mrr.
J,,·iI/~/. WllImtled. Miuing. TO/al.Offietrt. Mm. OjJiurt. Nell. Officer,. Men.
ht Dh'ision :
l/i9t.h Foot 1 • ;2J24tll Foot 2 2
2j42nd foot 3 ,
Portugue>le 2 2
Tot."l 2 ; 2 GO 11
VII
DJUTISIl LOSSES AT SABUGAL, APRIL 3,", 1811
Killed.
Officerl. AleIl.
Wormtlw. Nij//j"g.
QQietrl. Alen. Officer'. Nnl.
TfJtal.
l.igM DiI'ifiion :
1/43rd 1<'oot 1
1/62ml Foot
1/9lith .lo'oot 1
2/96tll Foot
::1nl Divi8ion :
2/6th Foot
1/46th I<"oot
l'ij6Oth .t'oot
2/&'31'11 }'oot
1j88th ""oot
2f88lh }'oot
If94th Foot
Royal J-1orseArtillery
1st HlWars K.G.L.
Portugtle.;e
Total 2
7
,
1
1
2
1
I'
, 67
2 10
~ 12
2
2 •
2
2
1
2
3
2
1
1
o
11 128
1 '
1
1
1
1
1
,
IlO
"17,
8
,
,
2
2
3
2
2
11
N.n.-Note lilal of all tlUl 59~ ca.~llaltill!l in action during the period of
JlassClI.'s retreat all but (ill were ill the Light WIt! 3n1 DiI·isious. All
tlle officetB killed or wounded belonged Ut tllose divisions, eJl:cept tll"O in
the 4th and 6th I'ortuguese Cai\adore8 wounded at &-dillha.
I This officer, Colonel Waters, of the Portuguese Staff, was taken prisoner
on the Coa many miles from the battlefield, by the outposts of the llrcnch
(lth Corps,
1811] fil7
VllI
FRENCH LOSSES AT SABUGAL, APRIL 3,.0, ISH
(,"'ltOJI A RETURN IN THE i\IINISTERE Dt-: LA GUERRE, PARIS]
I{i/l~l. IVOll1ldlld. Nil8ing. Tofu/.
Officer'. Men. Officer8. Alel/. Officer8. •mm.
2nd CORPS. i\hRI.•;'S Dh'isioll :
211(1 Ugcr , 7 , 00 3 \, 91
3Ol11 Ligue . 1 8 r, 63 J
'"
00
4th Leger 1 J ,
"
J 19 1J.I
IhulJlo;l,~:r'S DiI'ision :
17t11 Uger 3 13 12 JJ6 3J 177
iOth Lignc 6 ,
"
122 00 244
31st Ugcr , 2 G 10
4ith LigllC 1 G U
Cal'alry (l'u;nJu: SOVI.T):
]st HU!l&'1rs. 7 4 12
8th Dragoons J I
26th Dragoolls 3 3
22nd Chassenrs 4 JJ 10
Clltl-<sellrs
Hanovriens 2
"
6
Artillery J J J 7 10
17
"
36 464 6 100 iGO
N.H.-Thc l!isproportionate number of wounded to killed among rank
and file, 46-1 to 55, or one to eight, while the Ilomml prollortion was
about Due to nl'e, suggests that some of the numerous' missing' were reall)'
killed. Note tIle e"ceAAive lo!'.!'; among officers, G1 to GjJO mnk :Illtl file,
one to eleven instead of the usual one to twent)'.
'nlere is some rea.'101l to 8UPJlOSe that tIle figures are ineolllll!et.c, as
i\lartinieu's Li,te du officier8 tutll et ble"t, give<l19 killed and 46 wounded
b.'1llame. 'l'e find in these tallIes tiJe 1st I-IU!;.01lrs with an ollicer killed
:lml three WOlllldt-'t1, llud tlte iOth Ligue with seven kilIco.l and thirt(.'t:lI
wOllnded, &c.
6JR APPEND1CES
IX
FORCE OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ARMY A'l'
FUlliYl'ES DE ONOJlO
[FROM THE RETURN OF MAY 1]
CAVALRY
Total Camlry. 109
glade. fist Dragoons .
·1t4th Light Dragoons
Arentschildtl16th Dragoons ,
1st Hussars K.G.L.
Portuguese 11 L.. 4t] me
Hr.gade, IOU] Line
B:aroo.yell:l
Brigodicr. Regimenl8. Offi-cer,.
24
25
30
30
Seryl!lmll/, Brigllde
drummer" &gi- Total r!f
rmet 1'llllk ,:jClIiul FJfee-
IIlldfile. Tolal. live,.
364 3Il81
''''3.13 373
332 3621 77G""4 414
104 l04f 312 1208 208
1,74.'. ],854 l,aM
INFAKTRY
]st Dh'ision, Lieut.-General Sill. UR.:~T SPH~'C~:R :
131'f1 Guards, 1st hatt. . 24 03'" 3591Stopford · Coldstrenm G., 1st. batL 31 903 3'"f 1,IWI1 coml). v/60th I<'oot . 2 4~
"r'" Foot, 2nd batt. 22 343 371
1N' If I 42ml" ""
26 410 445 1,774
, 19 I Illga e -9th 1 39 lJ8.'l !.I22I " 8t"
1 comp. 6/6Oth I<'oot 1
"'
:J(lr"' Foot, hi ..It. 46 ,-, 591),.
Ilow:lT1.1 7ht " " " 42 465
'"') 1,!l:H· !)211d" " " 41 723 7G4
3j!).5th Foot, 1 comp. 3 73
'"ct Lln. ",It. K.G. L. 27 4S5 5]2
2nd" " 30 464 ~::lUiwe. · otl)" " 23 393 1,914
7th" " 21
"""
410,
2 Light <':omps. " , 81 80
Total 1st Division .808 7,177 7,$5 .7,505
) These Portuguese flgures include the officers.
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:Ii'd DiI·L'lion. Major-General T. !'lCro:.· :
1
4601 ).·oot, Istl.lIIolt. 24
. 74th Itegiment. 24
MaclmlllOIl. ss, ,. ,. d'·· 30t I 00,.11 utltI.
3 compl!. 6/00th Poot G
1
6th ).·ool, 211d bott 28
Coll'ilIe MI'd"" 33
• 88th "" ~8
9-Ith Regiment 31
"'pwer's 19th Line, 2 battl;.
ortuguese "
Brigade _1st.. "
Brigadier. Ilrgime,.18. Ol'·
=.
&rgeant8,
drumrruJr8,
und "mk
an4}iIt.
.84
461
667
177
47.
427
'30
50S
910 1
740 I
Rtyi-
memol
Total.
El
'83
:1
""536
9101''''
Brigndl'l
Tolalof
J1lf~
tilJt8.
1,863
1.007
1,G.50
Total 3nI Division • 20-1 5,27G !i,480
1,7(H
1,62-&
1,7,0
5th Di\'isioll. MajoMkllcral SIR W. ).;M>IK11't::
1
18lFOOl' 3rd bott. . 3!l 633
H 9th .. 1st" . 28 500
'r • 38th" 21ld.. . 21 381
1 wmp. Brull91Vick Dels 3 66
1
401 ).·oot, ht hlltl. . 3-1 !ii8
D I 30th" 2nd.. . 23 4&1un op
• 44th .. 3nl" . 27 410
1 comp. UruM1'I'ick Oeb 3 f»
Spr)"s 13n1 Line, 2 I.-Us. 724 I
l'ormguege 16th.." .sw'
Bripde 8th Cap&dores, I balt. 484 1
.
"}(;27
""69
61'1"'.4~
124
1".'84
Total 6th DiI'i$oll 178 4,980 5,158 .5,1!>8
6th Dil'isioll. i\IlIjor-GCllcral Al.t:x. CllllPlIP.l.l.:
1
11th Foot, 1st batt. 49 138
H , 63nl" 2nd" 21 438
11 ;;e . • (Hilt .. lEt" 31 GG6
t cump. 6/00th foot 2 46
12nl\ fool 30 528Burnt!. · 36th ,,1st hatt. 3! 482
Madden's 1 .I' , 8th LllIe, 2 batts. !)1o 1
or uguer;e 1"t1 1 ""91Hrignde - 1 U " ,M __
E~} 2,O·H
'8
·''''l514 1,Oi2
01612,1:171,222
T()!t11 Gth Di\'i.~ion . lr~5 .~,085 5,250 o,21i0
, These Portuguese figures include the officers.
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sergeallts, Regi- Brigade
Rrigmlier. Regimen/I/.
Off'- drllmmen,
mtlltal Tomlof
cer8. IIndNwk Total. 'Jf~ana file. (jur,.
7th Division. Mnjor-Gcneral HOl1STO~ :
fiT 8t Foot, 2nd batt. .
'"
551
5°°lJlllilh Foot. • . 22 3"" :SOlltag . CllasseurI! llrit:umiques . 31 !lOO 2,400lBrulIswickOcls,8conll)S. 32 661
Do,l.',Q""{ I '" 0 h 713\ 113l' lr' 7t I ,I ne, _ atli.Go illS s) 19th" , 1,026 I 1,026 2,lBl
Portu Ues6 '
u. f 2ur\ Ca'i1'dores, 1 IJ.'llt. 442' 4-12
rlga{ e
Toml 7th Division • 12<1 4,4GC 4,000 4,SOO
Light Division. i\Iajor-General It. CRAUFURD :
(~rd Foot, 1st lmtt. . 27 727
"'IHeekwith 'l05lh" 1st ,,(4camps.) 13 341
""r 1,184!)5t!1" 2nd" (L camp.) , 72 7G
rZtJ{1 Foot, 1st !.mtt. . 32 00' B851Drummond. 5211(1 " 21\d" . 32 51. ~:; 1,73'"9bth " 4th .. (4camps.) I' 343
I' {1st Ca'ladores '''' ' ''''I U07ortugllese 3 I 447 I
"7f( "
Total Light Division ]22 3,093 3,815 3,815
A",,"o""', {"" L" 0 "'tls !l1l6'
"""l
• IIIIC,_,
lortuguese 18th 1,130 1 1,130 2,53"J
13"1 ""rlgllt e, 6th C 'nUores 423 1 423
IInattached IUf
ARTILLERY
English B.A. (Hnll's and !toss's troops) 10 157 167l
"
Fieltl (Lawson's and Tholllll-
""son's Comllliuies . I. 260 270
Portuguese (4 batteries) 560 L ".
ENGINEERS 10 30 ,. ,.
TRA1N 1. 211 226 226
1 These Portuguese figures include the officers,
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TOTAL
1,8.54
7,565
!iJ 4RO
5,158
5,250
4,500
3,81(;
2,530
.B74.
220
3i,504
Cal"lllry
1st Dh'isioll
3rd "
Stla "
(ltiJ .,
7t11 "
J.ight "
Asllworth's PortugucSIJ
Artillery .
l<:ngilleers.
Train
Gnmd Totul
[fotal of Illflllltrr, 34.,3Oi.]
~'.ll.-Pack's Portuguese Brigade and the 2ud regiment from tlle (iU,
Di"isioll were absent, ill ellarge of the blockade of Almcida.
APPENDICES
X
BRITISH LOSSES AT FUE~TES DE ON-ORO
lo"lIlS'T DAY, ;\IAY 3RIl, 1811
KNhd. IVmullwl. Mi#iRf·
Off;-
..V,II, ~M~II. O;f,- .lInt, TotaL1st OI\'SlOl". Spencer: _. ,~.
Nigb~·.li r~th Foot. '?nd balt. , ,
Brig e; ~'1rMl. I' •• .. I I 6 9
,9th .. 1st.. . •
, 18
"{30th lo'oot., 1st baU. . , 3 ,Howa"fs 1151.. ., . 7 • 33 , .illBrigade 9ind.. " . I 9 IU
3JD.ith Foot. I <'OUlp•• I 9 10
{"" U~ boIL ".G.t. I •
Lowe's !?od •• .. I I
Brigade 3th .. .. • I7th ., .• 3 3
Ughlcomps. ., 3 , 11
Divisiooal Total . . . ,
" "
103 1
""
:.1nl 011'1::110)(. Pictoo ,!~lh l"oot, 1st btu. . , ,Madonnon'. 74th.. .. • 9 IU
Brigade 88th.. •• . •
,
!ijfiOth lo'oot, 3 comps. 3 , 9 ,
"{'th t·"",. "'" bott. • •ColviUe's 83rd " .. 9 3
"Brigade 89th " .. 6 69~th .. 3 ,
Di\i.sional Total . •
, ..
" "
C,W.U.IlY:
SI,d,', l"1 Dmgoo", . . . ,
Brigade ]·lth Light Dragoons.
An::nL6childt's ltilh Liglll Dra~n5. ;Brigade 1st Hussars K..L.. 1 •
British General Total ,
'" "
1.i3
" '"
.
Porlllguese 108!l (nearly all in 6th .~~8doresof Ashworth's Brigade). . 1·1 6
"
General Total of Allied Loss , :.n ~l 186
"
e39
1811] 623
XI
1l111'l'ISH LOSSES AT FUENTES DE oNono
8ECO~l> DAY, MAY 5m, Hm
J{jUe,l. lVollndold. ~Miuill.'l.
1st DIVIS10~. Spencer:
0Ji- ;}le'l- Offi- Me". 0Ji- i1len. Tolal.(:6,.#. cer8. CI:rIi.
Sto~ford's {1st ColdstrealU Guards. , • .. I ; 6:1Brigade 1st Scots ¥usiher Guards ,
"
I
"
72
KIglttingale's r~th 1"00t, 'hid batt. . . , " I
.,
'"Brigade 4.nd..""..
,
'"
2.'>
19th .. 1st" •
"'
, Uti
"'
256
;}QUI Foot, 1st bait. •
" "
\H
H0','l'ud's { ,1st.. " . , 11 ., 71 , :J, 1'!7
BrIgade 9lnd" .. . , I
"'
'1
3/9:.th Foot. I COlllp. J , , 'Ict U"' ""tt. K.G.L. , I "LOwe's i'nd" .. , , 11 , 17Sth" ., S
"
11
Brigade 1th.. " l
, , ,
Light comps. " , ,
,
Divisional Total • . , 61
'"
.1i.!6 , W6 li81"I
ard DI\·lSIO~·. Pkton:
j'l-Sth Foot. 1st batt. . , I ,
Maekinnon's 74oth" " • 2 , ,H
"Brigade 88th .. " ' I
,
" "S/60lh Foot, :.I (.'Q111ps. I J3
"islh Foot, 2nd batt.
" "Coll·me·s &Ii'd" ., ,
'" '"Brigade 88th" .. , ,94th Foot ,
Divisional Total 3 11 7 J,';Q , Jj7
{;th DI\·lSIO~. Erskine :
liar's {1st Foot. Srd bat~. , ,DUI.. Isl .. , ,Brigade Sllth" gnd ..
Dunlop's {4th Fool, 1st batt. ., .,SOth.. :rnd ..Brigade
...nh .. " ..
, ,
Divisional Tohd •
" "
AI'l'E~DICES
}{ilted.
0;;'-
(;tT'. Men.6lh OIVlSlOS. Campbell:
No Iosseli whatever
1th DIVJSlOS, How;tou:
{
Sist Foot, ?od batL • •
Sonbtg's 85th., " .•
Brigade ChasseuJs Britanniques .
Brunswick Oeh . • .
Divisional Total • ••
I 1'2
30
I
.,
,
3 ,.
• 11
I 6
8 61
I 6
.. ..
1 "10 18
61 111
.>0 -7 151
9 196 37 9S9
11 230 ,8 1169
7
,~
6
7
11
6
..
:1 38
I ",~
. '"
1 :Ill 180-1
,
",
1 236 1266
9
7
6l'
•
..
1
•
"
,~ I 36
:1 .5 21
1 (t 16
, • 39
16 10 lI8
I I
5 3 18
,
9 loUi 50 838
L1GIIT DIVISlos. Cl'llufurd:
Bednrith's {43rd Foot, 1st batt••
Brigade l/9.5th Foot, • comps.
Drummond's l&%d l"ool, 1st batL .
Brigade &~d,,!tnd...
i/93lh Fool, 4. cornps.
Divisional Total.. .
CAVAr.~Y. Stapleton Cotton:
Slade's lIst Dragoons • , .
Brigade I,~th Light Dragoons.
An:ntsehlldt's 16th Light Dragoons,
Brigude 1st H\lSSIlrs K.G.L.•
Cavalry Total •
A~TII.I.l':~\·. Howarth:
Horse •
Field • • _ •
GIOII't: ...... r. Sr...,,,. • .
British General Total of May Sth .
Portuguese losses (mainly in the ind and
3rd Cas':adores. and 6th and ~Ist Line)
Allied GellCraI Total of May 5th • •
Total of botb days, May Srd and Sth.
1811]
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FRENCH ARMY NI' FUEN'l'ES DE O&ORO,
MAY 3-5, 1811
A. ARMY 010' PORTUGAL, STATE Olo' .\lAY 1ST
2nd COllIo;;. Rwa'u;n.
Dh'ision Merle : Officert.
Brigade 12ml LCJo(cr (ht, 2nd, 3rd batts.). !i!i
Sarrllt 36th Ligne (1st, 2nd, 3rd hatts,). 55
4th Legcr (ht, 2nd, 3rd battll.) 01
171
Men.
1,812
1:,505
1,313
4,720
,
.To/Ill.
4,B91
Divi~ion Ifeudelet :
Brigade {17th LegeI' (1st, 2nd, Srd batts,) .\8 1,166
Godard 10th Ligne (ht, 2nd, 3rd b.,tts.)
"
J,OZO
Brigade {31st LegeI' (1st, 2nd, 3rd hatts.)
"
1,520
AnlllUd 47th Ligne (1st, 2nd, 3rd baits.) /JO 1,646
225 5J 200 5,491
Cavalry Brigade:
ht HUSlillI'S ,
"221ld Cha~\lrs 27
"'"Rth Drag()l)n~
"
203
4D (;33 082
10'01' ;\rtillery, s.'ppers, Traill, &c., see Total of Army.
1'0[.,1 of Corlls 11,064
6th CouPS. [.(1190:".
Division Marehanrl :
Brigade {6th LegeI' (ht, 2nd, 4th hatts.) .
"
1,202
~Iaucwle 69th Ligne (1st, 2nd, 4t11 hatts.) . 54 1,&37
Urignde {39th Lignc (ht, 2nd, 4t1l hatts.) . 53 1,2BO
L:hemineau 76th Ligne (1st, 2ud, 4th batts.) •
"'
1,63.'l
--
214 5,G58 5,B72
Division Mermet:
Brigade r5th UgcI' (1st, 2nd, 4th hatts.) • 01 1,800
•\!Cnard 27th Ligne (1st, 2nll, 4th hatts.) •
"
1,763
Brigatl" {60th Liglle (ht, 2]](1, 41h hatts.) . 5' 1,350
Taupill 59th Liglle (1st, 2nd, 4th lIatts.) . 53 1,649
234 O,40B 0,702
,nu". ".
"
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Division Ferey : Officert. Men. TO/nl.
fGth Ligne (4th, 6th, Gth balts.)
"
'08
Ugioll du IIlidi (1 batt.) .
"
36'
Legion Hanovrieune (1 haU.) 19 4[2
{66th Ligno (4th, 6th, 6th batts.) GO 1,307
82nd Ligno (4th, Oth batts. 1). 44 UB7 4,232
199 4,033
Light Camlry Brig-due L'lllloltc :
3rd HU!l8ars 12 152
15th CIHlSI:!CUrs 13 16'
-
25 399 33'
For Artillery, Sappers, Train, &e., see Total of Army.
Total of Corps 17,l40
8th CORPS. JUNOT. [Clause!'s Division absent, guarding
Communications.J
Solignac's Division:
pSth Ligno (ht, 2nd, 3rd bRits.')
100th Ligna (1st, 2nd, 3rd balts.)
{65th Ligna (1st, 2nd, 4th blltts.~)
l!tegiment lrlalldai.s (1 balt.) •
56 1,200
60 l,w>
51 ],512
18 372
18<1 4,630 -1,714
For Artillery, Train, Sappers, &0., see Total of Army.
9th Co~PS. Dl\out:T.
Clnparcde's Divisioll :
r4th Ligne (1 batt.) H 270
21st Leg-er "
"
m3
28th Ugcr " 17 451
(40th Ligne
"
10 500
lG3rd Ligne
"
19 .00
fIRth Ligne
" " ""f4th Ligne
"
20 5~
lootll J.igllll
"
15 .00
l03ru Ligne
"
19 524
1.'}6 4,5f.O 4,716
I The .Sth bntmlioll of the SlInd WIlS in gllrrison Ilt Almcidll.
~ One battalion of the I5U, Ligne• .'>85 strong, and one b"ttalion of the 63th,
'lli!> strong. and the Regiment de Prusse. bllG strong, were left in garrison lit
CiudRd Hodrigo. The cavlllry brigade of the corps, eomposed of lh~ pro-
visionlll regiments of dr"goons, was guarding L'OlIllnUnielltiOlls.
1811) FRENCH ARMY AT FUENTES DE ONORO 6~7
Cl)nroux's Division: OjJicer8, Mm. T(I/(1/.
rGth Leger (1 batt.) 10 .'i!J3
nth Leger '" 21 '39
27th IAfger " 10 64'
fth Ligne
"
17
'''''24th Ligno
"
17 625
45th Ligne
"
10 427
r·Hh Ligllo
"
18 678
95th J'.iglle
"
20 50·1
OOth Liglle
"
18 02J
IG4 5,424 5,588
Fournier's Cavalry Brigade:
7th CllllSSOllrs • 12 270
13th Chaggeurs 2. 250
20th Chl\SSOllrs 10 220
41l 74G
'"For Artillery, Sappers, Trnin, &c., see Total of Army.
Toml of Corps II ,008
l\IontbrulI's Reser\'e Cavalry:
Cavrois's Brigade:
3rd Dragoons 12 0'
10th Dragoolls 12 12G
15tJI Dragoons 11 219
Onlllilo's Brigade:
6th Dr~ns 2J 30'
lUll Dragoollll 11 J67
25th Dragoolls 22 200
""
1,008
Total Reserve ],187
ARTfLI.IlRY.
Twelve batteries with 31 officers :II\(I !l31 men apI)Car ill tlte stllte of
~Ia}' 1 AA totally Ilestitute of Ilol'SCfj, amI were evidently left in canton-
ments. Fil"e batteries were taken into the field, with 20 officers, 4]0 mOll,
and 425 horses.
J<::-"CINElms, SAPPERS, TRAIN, EQUIP.\GF.:li l\!II.lTAIRFJl.
111e total strength of the Engineers and Sappers was 34 officers,I,418 men.
or tlll! Trnill. . . . • 17 officers,], 175 men.
Of the Equipages Militaires , . 6 officers, 361 men.
How IMny oftllese were taken into the field it is impossihle to !lilY, hnt
if lI'e take the same proportion as in tlle artillery, viz. about 30 per cent.,
the total lI'ouhl he llLollt 17 officers lImI B80 melL,
<;:-< 2
Total
Total Ami)' of Portugal:
2nd Corps, infantry and cllvalry .
GUl Corps, infantry :llld c.wfllry
8th Corps, infantry
9t1l Corps, infantry alvl cavalry
Itegernl Cavalry.
Artillery
s.'\PPCI"3, Train, &c.
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Vffi«!r8, Mffl.
445 10,610
672 10,468
16. 4,714
368 10,730
'"
1,6!lll
2<l .10
17 ll80
1,705 44,919
B. AHi\IY 01<' THI:': NOlfl'n, l\IARSHAL BESSJERES
Lepic's Brigade of Guard-Camlry:
Lancers
Chas~eurs .
i'lJamelllkes .
Grenadiers it alleynl
"'nthier's Ligllt Cul'ulry Briglllle:
11th Chasseurs
12th Clul8!Ieurs
24th <Jhasseurs
51h Hussnrs
Onc lo.'\ltery of Artillery
Total Ami}' of the Nortlt
Total AmI)' of l'ortugal .
General '1'01:11
Officerll. Mf'Jl.
30 34Q
13 222
10 69
12 I'"
65 816
11 220
"
I"'
'"7 1!13
7 165
34 750
3 70
Officers. .Men. Ofalf RlIn~·k.
102 1,G3(l
1,795 44,919
l,8D7 40,5fi5 48,462
N. B.-In I':;och's Life of ,l[auellll there is a table purporting to be the
strength of the AmlY of l'ortugal at Fucntes, and making it out 10 be
only about 40,00Cl, e~dll(ling gunners, ellgineers, train, &11., or pre-
snmablr under 42,000 with them. This is 110t the May 1st returll of the
Imperial muster-roll at the Archi~e.s NalirJlwlu, and I do not knoll' what
authority it Ims. The figures given above are those of the official return.
13 11 ]
XIIl
MASSENA'S ORDERS ~'OR ~'UENTES DE ONORO
DISPOSITIONS POUR LA JOURNEE DU ,')
Le G"'~ Corps se mettra ell Illouvelllent demain it 2 heures du mnlill,
it I'u.xcel'tion de la 3mo division, qui restera tlans la position flll'cl1e occllllC :
les deux autresdidsions, l~ et 2d~, se remueront an soir, en de.;;" dugrallu
mamelon de Navatle Aver, et ell {n.::e de PlYl.7.0 1k1l0, lmes scrOllt Ilretes
il.mareher perpelldiculairement lOur la ligne de l'ennellli; les deux di\'isiolls
lI11roulleur IIrtilleric avec e1les, et se porteronta la !letitc poinle dujour, elL
colonne par divisions, sur le \,mage de Pozzo Bello, pour nUaquer l'ellnemi
flans la position l(lI'il oc.::npc, La tih'ision Fercy, qui OC'::U!IC llllC l~lrtic
dll village de Fllentes d'Onoro, fera ses dispositions COlllllle si dIe de\'rait
att.'\qller l'ennemi sur cc point, sau{ CCIICllflanl ricn IlasnnJcr,
Le 8me Corps se portera sur jes hauteurs de Fuelltes, ct suivra la
tde division du Gwe COrl)!!, pour cOlllbattre dans le mCllle ordre fllte cc
corps; iI aura avec lui toute son artillerie,
Le 2"'0 Corlls observem par g,'l droite l'ill1l'ort.'l.llt r1ebollc1le d'Alamc,I;.
llui conduil au forl de la Conception: il {era cependnnt, ponr scconder
l'altaljl1e de l'armee, uue demonstration genernle sur la ligne; it ~uivra
I'ellnemidans tons ses mouvemeuts, c'est-a-dire que si les fon:es qu 'i I a devaut
lui se porteraienl au secours rlu grOl> de rarmee ellllcmie, qui esl lJaUS la
llirectiou de fnentes d'Onoro, it le suivrait dans sa m~ln:he, IloUI' le
preudre pal' sa gauche: tandis que le gros de I'armee. 'Ini l'aU!'1lit
attaquc Imr Pozzo Bello, le preudrait pur sn i1roite, Le Gelll(ml RC)'lIier
fera eelairer, s'i1lejnge llecessaire, IJar la cavalerie la roule tlu Fort dc la
Conception. S'il urrivail, .::c qui ll'cst pns I1 preSllmCr, (11I0 1'"UlujUC de
l'ozzo Bello n'n pas tonlle succes que l'OIl attelld, et qll'elle ftlt I'eponssee, le
Gelllirlllltoyllicr{craitsarelraitesurGallcgos, LcGellcn,1 Cll cllC{, lllli se
troul'era sur aa gauche, l'ell femit prcI'enir : mais .::e serait toUjOlHS 8111'
Gallcgos, dims le cas Oil il II'C)) rccevrail 1~t.S d'onlre, el a(lr;'s s'etre hicll
assure que le gros de l'armee serail ell pleine retraite.
Le 9w~ Corps sera remlu :want le jour del'allt «'uelltes d'Onol'o, Oil iI se
mcttra. en bataille sur deu.\: !ignes, jaissant ulle graude distance par regi-
ment, pour donller;, croil'c ,il'ellllerni que le GUl~ COI'pS occnpe loujours la
meme positiou,
L'annce est prevcnlle (Iue le I'rillcc Glhlfiral en cllef se trolll'era au
8,ne Corps,
M, le General i\Ionlbrllll, a}'ant sous ses ordres la resen'e de dragons, la
briguuc Foumier, Ilt la ilrigRtle \\'athier, se placera " la gauclle dll 6"'0
Corps, pour loul'llcr les positions de l'ellllcllli cl le prendre rar la lll'oite,
La Game hllptlriale, qui eslarrivcc cc soir, coul,cm demaill i. lons les
lllouI'ernentl! de I'amlt~e.
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FHENCH LOSSES AT FUENTES DE ONORO
N. B.-I hal'e beell unable to finrl any .Ietailcd table by regimcnts in tlH,l
Archire$ de kl GlIerrtJ, or the Archivu NatiQ1Wia at l'aris, and cau ouly gil'e
the subjoined t.,hle of 10SSCl\ by corps.
CO,VOAT OF j\Lw 3110.
Kilied. WQlmdtd. .Mi,/Jiug. Total.
Offi· Mell. Offi- MCII. Offi· Mell.
cerl!. cerll. t"Crl!.
6th CorllS (Dil'isiolls Fereyanl!
i\larcl'aud) 7 (jl) 17 3D2 3 '6< lili2
RA'ITU: (It' i\!A\· 5TH.
2ml COfJlf; (all ill 31st Uger) 3 3 ·lfi -".,-
6th Corps (l)i\,jSiOllS Ferey, ~lRr-
cl'Rnd, i\'lerruet) 12 !)5
"
7ft7 33 flH
l)lh (;ott'S (Di\'ision oolignflc) :.: 2
fllh C01'jJS (J)jl'isioJls Comollx
ami L1RIlRrct!e) 15 103 '9 (i{iU 1l:J,'i
i\lnnlbrull's Cavalry 1 3il 25 2&1 I 13 359
Total 35 30U HO 2)47 4 210 2,ll4:l
!So far as this return ca)) be teste(l by i\lartiuicu's Lio'le del! Officiert IUlf~
ct b!c<iI/,Jllj!C1II111II11.c.IJ ('lIcrn" ,le 1'};lIIpiN,~, it al,pcan,l to toe very fairly ;ICCll-
I'ate; Martinien accounts for 171 casualties, the return for 170. III detail
tl'e figures compare as follow;;:-
Killed. W"umled. Kifkv/. WOlwded. Mil!l!illg.
2nd Corps, .\Jartinien 0 4 In return 0 :3
(jth Corps, :'tlartinien 22 f03 III return l!l G4 3
9th Co'1'S, :'tlartinien 14 41 In return 1.5 43
Val'alr)", i\fartiniell 1 26 In retum 1 25
Totals 37 134 140 4
1811J 631
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IlEHESl"OllD'S A Hl\IY AT ALBUEltA, Ar-;'JJ ITS LOSSES
I. lUUTISH TItOOl'S
Pru6lll, Killed. WQUtlded. l1~riJlg,
Ojfi- Mell Ojfi- M 0fI'- Olft- Tof(ll~nd DI\'ISION (WilIillm Stcwart) : ~erz, . C/ff8. en. et,.,. J1l811, cerl!. Men. [,rnl.fi'M "001. 21 '''' , '" " "" , 111 HJColborllc's 2f.{lst Foot W 398
"
1 119
."IIrigade S/4Slh Foot
"
m , 44 10 86 , .90 :u.:~
S/66th Foot
"
<11 ,
" "
10' 19' 'lH
---
Total of Brigade '90 1,966 11 3:l7
"
M3 11 ''is 1,4-1:1
---
!l It . {29th Foot . 'I
'"
,
" "
233 11 3:31i
O!i Ion SI/48th lo'oot 3:l .1-6,~ ,
" " '"
, ,.,
Ilngllde l/Snh Foot 31 "6 , 81
"
'IS 4-2H
---
-Total of Btign.de .
"
1,,';,56 19 .,. ... ".I 17 1.tJ.14
---
Abet- j2/2Sth Foot 26 ·~'Jl 27 6 131 161,
cl'Ol'Ilbie's (2/lJl.th Foot 26 litiS ,
""
,
"
126
IItigade Z(J9th Foot 3:J ·"19 I
"
., 17 ,
"---Total of Brigade
"
l,t.OS ., n I·'
'"
9 suo
---
Di"i~iollal Lig?t :l'rool:, : , I" ,
"
.1 eornllS. "/60I.h oot.
"---TOUlI 2nd Division 26' 5,17il
"
ti:1li 1O.j. 1,6lJa 11 487 g,81;8
---
---
.Jth DIVISION (Cole):
)~crs's {I/rth Fusiliers . . . "
'51
'" "
277 :t,''t7
rigude Z/rth Fusiliers . • . "
loW ,
" '"
981 :H!J
1/23rd R. W. Fusiliers.
"
69' ,
"
11 211.1 6 3:l9
--- -
TOUll of Brigade , .
'"
I,[ll!l
•• "6 39 810 , I ,Ok;
---
Kcmmis's Brigade, detachment of
OIle compan~ each of 2/27th.
81/40th, 97th ~oot, , • ' . .
'"
, ,., W
---
Total 4th Division . I.' il,016 .I 191 39 8" 6 1,005
---
Alien's Independent B~ade:
1st Light Batt. K. .L. • 39
'"
, ,
.19 , 69
!hid ditto. . . • . 19 "'I I 3 I
"
I 37
---
-
-
Total of Brigade . .. 1,0.56 , , 90
"
H)li
63_ AIJP.I::NDICES (iIl.IV
PrtltHI. KWed. lVol(lldtd. "'~ill!J.
'Offi- ' Olll- 0lll- OjJi. . TlltlU
CA\'A[JlY (Lumlcy): fe' .... ,\lAn, c,r•. Mm. un. ,11tH, un. .lIe". Lo."
De Grz" fSrd Dragoon Guards
'"
35' , 9 9 ,
Bri~ 4th Dragoons. • . >l 35' 3 •
,.
• • '"13th 19ht DTllgoons • • • .
'"
380 ,
",
Total Cavalry •
"
',088
" •
OS • 3
--
~
AntLLElr:
Briti5h (BAtteries of Lefebure and
H""ker). . , • "6 8 1 lO 1
"K.G.L. (IJatterie5 of CIeeves andSympbcr) . , , , ,. OS,
" '"
..
SUIT • , , , , , •
,
•
Grand Total of British . ---
'"
9,9'20 33 .19 1~9 2,-'>140
" ""
4,159
H. POIlTGGUES.to; TnOOPS .
Offi«~ Kil~l. WOIIl'1d.m. 'UWillg. ,...,
"... OJli- M. 0lll- ' c~! M,p/. 1_,Nim. Yrr• • fn. ar•. M<t1L
H",oy', 1"'" Hogl, C'''''tt>,) J, lIil • • , ,
"llrigude '?ll'd Reg!. (~battll.) I,W] 8 1 ", 19(40th Divl· 1st Rnlt. L.L.L. (I
~iun) batt.). . . . 5n 6G , 89 10 111j"''' Lt", C' oott>,), 1,'i65 3 , •Hamilloll'" 11th Line (2 batts.) ','" , ,Division ~th Line (2 batts.) • 1,271 • SO .,10th Line (2 batts.) I,ll!) 11 11
CoI.Iins's fth Line (2 batts.).
""
10 , 36 10 .,
Brigade 5th Ca~adores (I 81batt.) . • • . 400 ,
"rlilt Regt.. . . . 32i
Ca'l'alr)" 7tl1 Regt.. " " • :m. •
,
(Ot"'ay) 15th Regt. (I squad.) ,..
8th negt. do. 1..
ArtiUelt (batteries of Arriaga
"
and raun). " • , ,
." • •
Staff ' , ,
,
, ,
Grand Total of Portuguese lO,ilOl , '00 It> .16
" ""
GnAND TOTAL OF 8BR&'5FORD'~ .>\RMY
Infantry. British, 8.73S; PortU1,'1lese. 9,131 .. r;.869
Cllvll.lry • nritish,l.16~; l'ortuguese. ~9 - !l,OIS
Artiller)·. British, ~; Portuguese. !l21 =~
Grand Total • . . . . . . ~,3.:08 of Ill! DnIlS.
General ToW of Losses: British, .... 'Ml; Portuguese,389 _ -1.,548.
11111] BEllESFOllD'S ARMY AT ALBUEJtA
Ill. SJ'AKI$I-I TltOOPfP
706 IS,m 9 U9 72 I,OCJl'J 1,368
17tunl. KiUtd. TVmlllrkd.
01-- Nt,.. O§'- ~Mtll. r"",.~n. tXr...tl/lH. Loa.
'07 ~,!i91 • ,)9 IS
'"
98'
1» 3.:.171 , ..
"
'93 iib
'"
4-,68.)
- 106
'"
.., 681'
., 1,012 , , 31 -10
7
"
, 7 ,
, 1 ,
" "---I;"R lI,M,:;
"
OS,
"
99,; 1,:1()7
- - ---
,,7 1,721 -
61
"
711
11@l -
"'-
87
•
,..
(I) DLAKE'S ARMY
VASl'I:.UD D"'I5.los (Lanlizabal),
)Jurcia (2 baUs.). Canarias, !!nd of Lmn,
Campo Mayor. . . . . . . . •
:1nl. DI\"lDOY (BaJJa.stcros);
1sl:ofCaWonla, Barbastro. Pravia, Lena,
Castropol, Callps de 'TIneo, Infiesto •
4th DI.....zo:ll' (Zayu);
~d and 4-th Spani!.h Guards, JrlllIlda,
Patrifl, Toledo, Leaion Estranjera, 4th
WaUoon Guards, Ciudad Real • • •
CA"AI.KY (Loy) ,
Sunlia~,.'(), HUSlU'l:8 de (Astilla,Gramlderos,
FJiCuadron de Ifl8trucioll
AKTILI.UY (1 battery) . .
8'1',,1·.... , •• , , ••
Total of make'" troops
(~) CASTMtos's AltMY
CarlOfi de Espaila's In'Alo"'TBY,
3 hilts.. Hey, 7..amorll., Voluntarios de
Navarra, 1 company Sappers . . .
Penne ViIleulllr's C"\'AU1"'
Delachmentll of Xl'en regiments, none
ol'cr 1 llIl1lllrlroll drong. . • .
Anll.un (I boIUery)
ToW of Castailo6's Troops
Gr.Uld Total of 5pe.niards • .
GIlAKll TOTAL OF TilE ALLIEU ARMY
British
Portuguese .
Spaniards .
Present of all arms, 1O.4-l!l
" 1O,'lO1
" " 14,631
Losses, ·1.1[;9
:J89
.. 1,368
Total :.,916
I The return of losses is confused, there being mixtures of units. and some erroMl
between officers nnd I'I\lIk IInd file. It seems unlikel)' that Za)·a.s's division had 'it;
ofti<:er.s wounded and none killed. I hllve endclI\'Oured to reconstruct ltellls as fn.
as po6sible. For the (,'Onfused table see Artechc, vol. x. p. .)U.
• OftMs 681 no 1es3 than 98 killed and &17 wounded are In the four buttaliollS
of the Spanish Guards and Irlanda, which fought so long ugllillst Gimrd's di\"i$ion.
The other five bnttalions only lost 66 men between them,
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SOULT'S ARMY AT ALBUERA, AND ITS LOSSES
[The strcn/.,,'tl, (roll) a ~turJ1 o( May 1st, Iilc,l under ,'UIIC ht, ill the Archires
Nl.ltionl.l/u. The losses from a return ill the .Archi~'t'i dl! tf! Gllcrre, dated July Hlth.J
INFANTRYl PrU8nl. Kil~l. WQurnml. Jlrl#iJly.
5th (;QRffi. Offi- 1Iftn OjJi-. JltH. O.ffi~ J1j OjJi- Mm. ToW
1st Dil'ision (Girard): Cllt'8. • cera. cera. SOl• Ct<Ts. /mw.
;lIth Line ~2nd and Srd balts.).
"
9:.w 4 IO,~'i 13 298 '~19
·wth Line 1st and Snd batts.l. . 35 778 4 35 , 226 I
"
3~
6-l.th Line (1st. 2nd. and 3rd batts.)
'"
1,589 ;
"
18 361 168 6.'>1
88th Line {2nd and 3rd batts.). 'I 878 ; \!S3 , UI' ,w,;
2nd Division (Gar.an) :
\lIst J..el,rer (ll11d and 3rd balts.) 1S ,., 3 IH 11 l!i,~ ,
"
'"
.~
tOoth Line (1st am] 2'lId batts.) . 33 7Wi 4
'"
8 152 , 'I %7
'18Ul LegeI' (I st, 2ud, and 3rd hatts.)
"
1,:Kl.'; 7
"'
10 313 I 11<
'"l03rd Line (1st. 2nd. and Srd batts.) 38 1,9b\! ., 48 10 1·18 3
"
'81
---
Total 5th Corps :W5 8.132 31 <;0 8' 1,90/;
"
61a 3.118
---
Wcrl~'s Brigade;
12th LCgcr(lst, 2nd. and3rd batts.) 62' 2.109 3 108 1< 511 13\! 16'
.•,;th Line (lilt, 2'lld, Hllll :II'd l11ltt~.) .;g 1,757 ., 68
" ""
,~ :lJI
J8lh Line (1st, 21ld. amI Srd hatts.) !i[, 1,581
"
Tj I' 2.';8 , 2,j, ..
---
-
Brigade Total 115 ,',,4--16 13 19' 35 I,OO-~ 3 19~ 1,4-18
Godinofs Brigade:
16th Uger (1st. 2nd. !lnd Srdbatts.) ·19 l,li2·l , 39 7 321
"
381
'>Ist Line (1st. 2nd, and 3rd hatts.)
"
2,186 , I 3
- --
Brigude Tolal . ,I< 3,810 , 41 1 ",
"
,,,
3",.
(,'rBtlfldiQra Rbmill of <l!iLh, 6:lrd, (19
95UI Line, of 1st Corps, and ,uh offi<.'Crs
Poles of of-th Corps (11 comps.) '. 33 1,000 Only gross latal of losst's p;iven. and 36i!
~")
Total Infantry •
'"
18,388 .. 690 1i!6 3,930 18
'" '''''
1 Thc If-Hth, 3/4Oth, 1/88th, 1/lllst UgCI', 3/100th were separated from their regiments.
and p;Rrrisoned Badajoz.
~ Thc 34th regiment returned, as is clear, all its missing as killed.
3 The 88th regi1l1ent reLurncfl, us is clellr, ail its killed as missing.
• This osscmblage o( Grenadier companies can be identified, as to its units, by the fact
that in Martinien's lists of killed !lnd wounded, we find names of oflkers of the 4lith, 63rd.
95th, and 4th Poles, none of which were present at Albuera. He accounts from thC$C
regiments for,J. offieers killed and 9 wounded (45tb 5 officers, 63rd 2 officers, 95th lotlicer,
}'olcs 5 officers).
HlllJ SOUL'l"S AHMY AT ALllUEHA ()g5
]Jraenl, Kilu/l, Wuuud8d. ,1li.l1silly.
'l"tal
Offi- Jlfm. Offi- .'!let/. Offi- Men. Offi- ,llen, Losee,.
-,. cers. cere. e/f1'6.
G.\.\·ALRY (Latour.MauOOurg),
I3riche's Brigade:
!?rid Hussars , !IS 2Si! .. 3 ," ,
'"10th Hussars ..
""
3 ., '1 :1
"'2ist Chasscurs . '1 i!35 , , 19 25
Bron's Brigllde ,
4th Dragoons . '1
'"
,
'"
1
'"
1 10
gmh Dmgoons .
"
.., 1 6 3 10 .. .,
2tith Dragoons . .,
'"
1 , • I' 1 "Bouvier des lklats's Brigade,
14th Dragoon.~ . 17
""
, 1 17 ..
17th Dragoons. 17 29. 12
"
29 1 ,15
nth Dragoons . H
'"
2 , 11
"
19
Unattached Ca\"alry:
'"
Lancers of the
Vistula.
" '"
·11 9 78 130
<nth Chasseu".
"
-lOO 7 , 11 , ,.
4th Spanish Chasseurs H 1S1 , ..
"
Ca\"alry Total . 2;;0 3,762 8 118
"
:Kl7
"
21; ·Im,
AKTlLI.ER\" GiYI£ TRAIY:
Of .'>th CotTns . IS '90 1 19
" "
!:IS
Of other nits . ., 600 No returns whatm·cr. ,
f.:TAT MAJOR ? , , J"
-
-~
Total ofArIllY. !WO 23,S\'() 00 8" 171 3,6\0 21 87J b,!r.:lti
Heturn of casualtics is sigllcd Mocqucry, 19 Juillet 1811.
Total present, 2-~,2GO, Total losses, 5,936,
"
"
"'"
26'
,"' lit. ],(f.,rti-
",01 1uell.
14th Dragoons 1 1
17th Dragoons 3 ti
21th Dragoons:1 .'>
1st LII1l<:crs • 11 H
2ith Chno<;..<;eufS ~ 3
4th Spanish
Chasseurs •
Artiller)'
Gl:nie Train 4
7,
IJ
12
"
S
4,
"
,
&ult. il(,.,,·/i-
1l.e1l.
10 14-
23 ..
9 17
10 13
4 ,
55Ul, , .
58th. . .
16th Ll!ger
Grenadiers
2ud HuSSl\-rs •
I(ltll Hussnrs.
21st Chasseurs
4th Dragoons
20th Drllgoons
26th Drag<>ons
JS
17
14
2:l
IJ
11;
14
IS
17
IS
N .B.-'1'he lossc.s canllot be quite complete. Not only is the return for artillery
'uKl engineers, &c., for nil units exc-'eJlt the Mh Corps missing. but :\111rtillieu's lisl.<;,
which are absolutely se<,ure evidcllI'e. sin.:e tlICy gi\'e the name and re;-iment of
el'cry officer hit, show much larger totals than this report, 362 casualties Instead 01'
'HI. This enormous difference of 121 casualties amonA' officers. reported in the
l'e\pmcntallists, but ignored b)' Soult. cannot be explained a\l!lIy b)' adding the ill
pnsoners to his total of 241, grsnting that all the prisoners wcre wOllndell. 'This
stillleaveg a balance of 100 unaccounted for. The details of difference and of total
casualties are ,-
SQlllt. M,~rli­
1nen.
.,
"2:l
26
"
"
'"30
IS
"
S"'.34-th.
""".(lUh.
88th. . .
21st L:ger
looth . .
28th UtrCr
l03rd LlgnC
12th Uger
Carry forward 161 213 Carry forward 237 3iH
Sce noW; in text aOOI'C, p. 395.
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THE SPANISH ARMIES IN 1811
:!,892 = ;>,000
"
2,006 = :!,O5;>
"
4,U;)3 = .5,15V
"
3,220 = 3,220
"
3,U40 = 3/iU....'
"472= m
"218 = 228
"
22,244 = 22,008
"
1,!.I4:4= 1,!.I9'J
"
By the kindness of Commandant Figueras of tllC Department of Archives
in tile \\'ar Ministry at Madrid, r alii nlJIc to give the following lieU! of
figures for the annies ill tile summer campaign of 1811. Unfortunately
tllCre is 1I0llC for t111l Army of Catalouia (' ht Army' or 'Army of the
Itight ') wllOse main hod}' was destroyed at Tarragona ill July. 111C
otlJerll work out as follows :-
;!,"IJ A1'~1 V. Ol~ Atu.v O~' V"I.I-:"I;''''. OCllcral Ch"rJcs O'Dolllloll.
Officenl. Mell.
1st Division: :'oIajor-Geueral
,rose Miramla lOt ol,8G3 = S,ij;j5 present under arms.
2nd Dil"ision: )Iajor.Gellerat
Comic de ){omre 100
3rd Division: .Major-General
Luis Bassecourt 47
4th Division: Major-General
Jose Obispo 2~G
Ji1.ying Column of the Empe-
ciuudu
Reserve (new lel·jes): Major-
General B. ACUU;l aV
Artillery 22
Enginccrs 10
J llllC 1st, Field Army. Tolal 064
Garrisons of Saguntum, Oro-
pe3a, l'eniscola, 5fj
N, B,-TIle cavalry regiments were not hrigaded, hut distributed amOllg
the divisions, each having one regiment, sa,I'C Miranda's dil"isioli, which
had two, Total awut 2,5% sabres,
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3RIJ AIlMY, OR ARMY 01' l\IVRCIA, General Manuel Freire.
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Office",. M/!11.
1st Division: Brigadier-Geu.
A. La Cuad-ra 168 3,852 ... 4,OUi prescut under arolS.
2nd Dh'isioll: Brigadier-Gell.
Juan Creag" 166 4,27G = 4,442
"3rd Division: Brigadier-Gen,
Antonio Sanz 140 3,074 = 3,220
"1st Cal'alry Division: Briga-
dier-Gen. M, IAdron 129 885_ 1,014.
"2nd ditto: Brigadier-Gen. V.
Osorio 80 G29 .., 709
"Artillery 30 751 = 700
"EnginecN 22 24.5= 267
"
June 1st, Tot"!l Jo'ield Army 741 13,712 = 14,453
"Garrison of <':artagena 116 2,064.= 2,180
"
5TH ARMY, OR ARNY Ol' ESTlU:lu.nUR,I. General Francisoo Xavier
Castni'ios.
Qt/lcerll. MM,
1st Division: Brigadier-Geu,
Carlos (le ESlllliln 143 3,333 = ~,476 present under arms.
(;al'slry Brigade: Coude d.
Penne Villemur 70 618= 897
"Art,illery 20 448= 468
"Engineers 2 08~ 100
"
.fune !st, Tota} Field Army 244 4,497 = 4,741
"Garrisons of Albuquerque,
Valcllciadc Aleantara, &.
'"
2,688 = 2,853
"
f"1T1l ARMY, Oil :\IUIY OF GAI,le).... General Sautocildes, vice
Genenll Abudiu.
1st Divisiou: Major-General LosaiIII (Asturiulls) 5,450 prcsellt limIer arm~.
2nd Dh'ision : Major-General Taboada 3,904 "
:.Ird Dil'isioll: Major-Geueral CllLrcra. 2,567 "
Hesern' at Lugo 2,654"
Cavalr}'. 631 "
15,305
No ngures for gnrri!lOns of Fcrrol, Vigo, and CaI'IlIlIlIl, hut tlley lire
beliel'ed to have amounted to about 5,500 men.
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XVIII
THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN, JULY 15, 1811
[J<'rom the returns in tbe Archive' Natirmule8, Paris.]
1. ARMY OF THE SOUTH. M...nsnAl, SoUI,T.
5,006 present
"
"
"
"
"
"
0,133
5,802
1,016
1ST CORPS. MaNilal Victor (including battalions of Otll Corps incorporated
on June 28).
Division (;onrolLx: 9th Uger (4 hatts.), 24th, 96th Ligne
(3 hatts. encIJ)
Division Godinat: 3th Lignc (4 hatts.), 16th Legel', 46th,
Mth Ligna (3 halts. Moh) •
Di\'ision Villatte: 27th U,:rer, 63rd, !l4th, O.5th Lignc
(3 1~'1tts. c<'l.ch)
I'erreymoud's Light Cavalry: 2nd Hussars, 5th Chasseurs
Latour-Mnubollrg's Dmgoolls: 1st, 2nd, 4t11, !ltll, 14th,
20th regiments .
Artillory alltl Enginoors, ,'::,0••
1\larilles and sailors of Cadiz Lines flotilla
27,201
Gross total of Corps with sick and detached added is 35,!JW.
10,9.(7 present
4,!JHI "
"
"
"
1,;j95
2,41U
ea,
4TH eoRl's. General Sebastiani (inclUlling battalions incorporated from
9th Corps).
Division Ligier-Belair: 12th I..eger (3 bntts.), 32nd, 43rd,
58th Ligne (4 batts. each) .
Division DemhOllski: 4t11, 7th, I)t11 Poles (2 batts. e1ch).
Ormancey's Light Cawalrr: 10th Cllasseurs. 1st Lancers
of tIle VisluL'l.
:\Iilhalld's Dragoons: 5th, 12th, IGth, 20th, 2ht regiments
Artillcry amI EugillOOrs .
20,830
Gross total of Corps with sick l\l\d uctachetl alldcd is 22,88ll.
1811] THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN mJ9
4,253 present
"
"
"
"
51'
OHI
2,887
4,183
;m.l CORPI;. Count Drouet D'Erlon (includin~ battalions incorporated
from Ut}. Corps),
Division Girnrd: 34th, 40th Ligue (2 batts, each), 64tll,
88th Ligne (3 batl:.!!. each) .
Division Claparede: 21st, 28th Uger, lOOtp, 103rd Lignc
(3 batts. ca.ch)
INot including 1 batt. each of 34th, 40th, 38th, l00th
Liglle, and 21st Ugcr ill gnrrisoll at Badajoz.]
Briche's Light Ca"alry: 10th Hussars, 21st Ch~eurs •
Artillery and Engineers [lIot incllldillg BauajO'L gllrriscm]
Garrison of Badajoz (5 battalions and detachments of
~rtiJIery,&:.)
12,456
Gross toml of COrItS with sick 111111 uetached aUlled is 22,200.
N. B.-This enormous proportion of ahseutees is largely due to tl.e
Albllera. wouuued, who hnd not )'et rejoined.
'I'rool>s not includeu in the three Corps:
Brignde in the Kingdom of Cl?rdova: 51st, 55th Lignc
(3 batts. each). 5,017 present
Unattached Cavalry: 17th, 27th Dragoons, 27th ClJas-
seurs, 4t1. Sl'.'luisll Clu.sseurs . I,D;l2 "
Unattached ArtilleIJ', J<:ngilleers, Train, &c, 1,381 "
Total Arm)' 'of the South, 68,827 preseut under arms.
Gross total, incluuing sick and detaelled, 00,180.
"
"
"
"
"
"
4,214
11. ARMY OF THE CEKTRE. Kl~G JOSt:l'H.
2,500 present
0,060 "
(;63
2,213
1,2G8
4,013
23,13!)
Gross total of Army, witll sick and detached, 25,S3i.
The King's French Guards, no figures Iofiven, but about .
Spanisll Division Hugo (IQ battalions, 3 S(jlllulrolls)
Brigade Dessollcs: 76th Liguc (3 batts.), 28th Lignc
(2~ b.'tU.c;.) .
Gcnnan Vi"isioll : 2nd Nassau and fudeD (2 bath!. each),
Frankrort (1 batt.), 123nl Ligue (late Dulel. 2nd regt.) I
'I'reillard's Light Horse: Westphalian allu Nassau Chas-
seurs .
Lal,Olt'l;lllre'S Dragoons: 13th, HIll" Wtl" 2211t1 rcgts. .
Artilleryalld Englueers, &c..
Draft,; fur Armies of SOUtll /lnll Portugal at ),Iadritl, &c.
J{egiment of Hcssc-Dllrmstadt aoout 1,000 lm)'oncts ;)) dclm::hcd, on its
war to join the Badajoz garrison.
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5,Ml present
6,601
"
5,072
"
4,!J22
"
5,O·HI
"
5,332
"
613
"701
"
,,,
"
1,463
"2,075
"
7,GB!) present
7,aZG
"
G,:18O
"
4,433
"
4,8!J2
"
1,008
"
1,076
"
111. ARMY OF PORTUGAL.J lILlltSHAL MARJ1QNT, DliKF. m' nAquS"'.
Division Foy: 6tll Uger, 39tll, 69th, 76th Ligna (3 batts.
eacl1) .
Division ClauseJ: 25th Ltiger, 27tll, 50th, 59th Ligno
(3 batts. each)
Div;Aion Ferey: 31st Legor, 47th, 70tll J.igne (3 h."UA.
each), 26th (2 batts.) .
Division Sarrnt: 2nd alld 4t1t J.e"ger, 30th Lignc (3 baits.
each) .
Division i\raucullC: 1(itlt, 66th, 8211d, 86th Lignc (3 batt<!.
eadl) .
Division Brcllnier: 17th LCgcr (3 llatts.), 22ud Lignc
(4 batts.), 65th LigllC (3 batts.), Irlandais and Regiment
de l'rUSile (1 batt. each)
Lamotte's Light Cal'al'1': lst and ant Hussars, 15th and
22nd ChRSilCUrs •
~'Ollrllior's Light Ca.'alry: 7th, 17th, 20th C1I!lSSCur1!
\Vathier's Light Cal'alry: 11th and 24th Chasseurs, 5th
Hussn.rs
MontlJmn's Dragoons-: 3rd, Gth, aUr, 10th, 11th, 16th,
26t11 regis. •
Artillery, Train, Engineers, &c.
Total 38,ll33
Grosg Total of Army, with sick (12,669) and dei.acllC!.I, 5i,!}.!!).
IV. ARMY OF ARAGON. ~r.msIlAI, Suc,mt:r.
Division l\Jusnier: 1st Uger, 114th ltl1d 121st Ligne
(3 batts. each), 1st Vistula (2 batts.) .
Division l-rcrc: 14th and 42ntl LignQ (3 batts. each),
]]5th (4 batts.), 2nd Vistula (2 batts.)
Division Harispe: ith Ligne (4 batts.), II6th (3 hatts.),
44th, and :1rcl Vistula (2 batts. each) .
Division Habert: Sth Leger (2 batts.), 16t1l nnd IIith
LiA"ne (3 b,,,tts. each) .
It.'llian DiI'isioll I'eyri: 1st and 2nd Leger, 4th, 5th, and
Gth Line (2 hatts. each), Dragons Napoleon, Clla~urs
RoyaulC (2 squadrons each) .
Neapolitan Brigade COnllk!re: 1st and 2nd I,igne, 1st
Leger (1 batt. each), and 2 squadrons of CIJa.'!Seurs
BouSSllrd's Clwnlry Brig:ule; 13tlt Cuira88ierll, 4t1,
Hussars, 24th Dragoons
, Garrison of Rodrigo (1 batt. each of g6lh, 65t!1, 66th, L~gion du Midi.
and Regiment de Prussc, nlaking 1,997 men) is included under the divisional
f1g'Ur<'S aOO\·c.
11l11J TUE l'HENCH .-\HMY IN SPAIN G4I
..htill('ry, F.ngineers. Train, &".
Garrisons
Drafts 011 the mnrcll
:1,G.J5 [II'CScnt
:t,z.w "
~,9911 "
Total 4:1,783
Gross Total of Ann}' with sick aud detached, 51,008.
V. ARMY 01:0' THE NORTH. Ge.'<I::R.H. DORsR"NI::.
('I) Imperial Guar,l, Didsious Dumoustier and lloguet,
4. regiments orVoltigeurs, 4 or Tirailleurs, ] of Chaa.-
seUl'S, I of l~lIsilier&-Cllassellrf;,11.atuitlrm tk murchp,
Lepie's Guaro Cln'alry
Cavalrj' attached (Lancers of llerg)
Gnard Artillery, &e.
(h) Navarre, Division Reille, 10th, 21st, B]st LigTIe (4
butts. each), OOth Lignc (3 hatts.)
Na\·arre, over and above Reille, garrisons, and rlrafts .
Ki!'lClly, Division Caffarelli: 10th Ugcr (4. batts.), !lth
I.£ger, 31"(1, 52ml, lo.'}th Lignc (3 batts. cm,lL) .
Bi!'lClly, over alltl above Catrarelli, 13mh Ugcr (3 batts.),
allll drafts, &e.
Burgos, Dh'ision Souhalll: 1st, 62nd, 10Ist Ligne (4
batts. eacll), 23rrl Legel' (2 hatt'>.)
llurgos, over and above oouham, llro\'isional battaliOILS,
garrillODs, and drafts
Valllldolid aDd Salamauca, Division Serrl\s: 113th Lignc
(2 hatts.), 12th Uger, 2ml and 4th Swiss, Garde de
Paris (1 batt. each), and cavalry, &c..
Valladolid aud Salamanca, over and above ~erras, 34th
J.iglle (3 hilUS.), 4th Vistulll (2 harts.), Neuclmte[
(1 hatt.), G lKltaifloulI de lIlareht, and cavalry attaehed
A~tllriall, Dh'isiou BOllnet: 118th, IHlth, ]22nu Ligne
(3 harts. each), 120th Ligue (4 hatts.)
i\rtillery, Engineers, &c., in the five government!;
named above .
Italian Division Se\'ero1i (destined for Sncllet's Amly):
htand 2nd Leger, 4th and 6th Ligne (1 hatt. each),
1st and 7th Ligne (3 hatts. eacll)
ltaliau Artillery, Engineer, and Cavalry Drafts with
f.;everoli •
1.5, IGG presen t
],]89
"
"'" ".,.
"
8,221
"1,023
"
7,5~
"
.J,:140
"
7,f17l
"
1l,7H
"
a,OG.'l
"
0,100
"
i,ilG2
"
2,367
"
i,GGI
"
IJ().'
"
Total 88,442
Gross Total of Army, illdurling !lick ami rletaehe.I, t)'J,442.
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5,411 present
3,890
"
4,389
"
2,416
"
3,72f>
"
1,429
"471
"
1,429
"824
"
VI. AIB1Y 0'" CATALONIA. M"RSIl.U. i\f..cDo:-;AW.
Divis.ion Maurice Mathiell: 5th Ligne (3 b.1tts.), 18th
l..eger, 23rd nud o56t11 Lignc (1 batt. each), 1st of
Na-~u (2 halts.).
Dilisioll QUCSllel : 79th Ligllc (3 IJatts.), 23rd Leger (2
batts.), !l3rd Li~ne(l batt.}, 29th Chasseurs(3 gquadrolls)
Division !>]lIUZOIIIIC: 3rt! Leger (4 hatls.), 11th Ugne (3
batts.), 32nd Leger (1 batt.)
Brigade Petit: 67th Ligne (4 hatts.), 16th and 81st Ligne
(1 bau. each)
Driglule Lcfebvre: 8tl, Ugcr, 37tll lUlIl 6011, Ligne (I
batt. eacll), regiment of Westphalia, and 3 »nlvisional
lmttltlions .
Garrison of i\Jontlouis: Wlirzburg lInd 21111 Swiss (1 hatt.
eRcll) .
Garrison of Hosas .
Garrison of Gerona: l02ud I.igllc (2 balts.), Berg aod
Valais (1 batt. each)
Artillery, Ellgillcers, &1.\.
Total 23,590
Gross Total of Army, including sick and detached, 30,259.
G1VJfI' TeJ!a!.
9O,18G
26,637
1i7,94fl
61,088
il9,442
.30,269
GENERAL TOTAL OF }o'IU~NCH AIUIY IN SI)AI:\,
Pre.rent fJ.nder
Arm"
68,827
23,13!.l
38,633
48,733
88,442
23,600
Army of the South .
Army of the Centre.
Army of Portugal
Army of AMLgOIl
Army of the North
Army of Catalonia
291,414 aM,4{il
Not including General Monthion's (Resenre of the Army of Spain' 31
Bayonlll;l, witll 251 officers :mJ 8,047 mell.
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XIX
THE FRENCH AND SPA-NISH FORCES AT THE
SIEGE OF TARHAGONA
I. SUCHETS ARi\IY
4,R2J present
GAOl
"
3,080
"
3,0~7
"
18,127'rotal Infantry
KJ3.-The divisional and brigade organization is provisional; compare
for thcorcticnl organization, IJ. MU.
"rero's Dh·isioll : 1st Ugcr (3 J.o;ltts,), 1st of tlu~ Vistuln
(2 batts,), Hth Ligne (1 batt,), 42nd Ligne (3 batts.) .
Harisj.le's Divisiou; 7tb :llIU IUtl1 LiKlIC (3 batts, e!Lch),
Italian 2ud Ugerand 4th, Stll, 6th Ligne (2 batts. each)
HlIiM~rt's Dil'ision; ,~th U~r, 116th lLml 117t11 Ligu6
(2 batts, each)
Abbe's Brig>l{lc (llrrived ill JUIlC): 114th, llMh, 12lst
Ligue (2 batts. eacll) .
Boumrd's Cal'alry: 24th Dragoons, 13th Cuirassiers
(:l squadrons each), 4th Hussar:o, Italian Dragons (le
Napoleon (2 squadrons each)
Artillery and Artillery Train
EngineeJ'li and Truin
General Total
1,447
1,3.52
706
21,6;l4
"
"
"
IJ. TA"-; SPANISH GARRISON
'nlere are unfortutHLwl}' 110 figures forthcoming at Madri.1 for the Army
ofCatalollia between December 10th, 181O,and August 1811, all apparently
having l>eell lost or destroyed at the siege of Tarragona. In December
the Army of CatAlonia had consisted of-Sarsfield's Division, 6,402 men
preSClIt; Courten'l'I, 4,79\ men present; Eroles's, 2,,'.i38 men present;
garrisons (Tortosa, Tarragona, Seu d'Urgel, &C.), 13,040 = Total 25,6.'H.
Of these there seem to llal'e been present in Tarragolla, in May and
June, the whole of Courteu'g di1'ision, pre!!umably still somewhat under
5,000 men (regiments of Americ.", Granada, Almam'~'" and Almeria,
9 battB.), 8 !!euentAry garrison cOIll~etl \If (l battalions of the new Catalall
'sections' or local line and a few otller troops, and tile A"reater part of
Sarsfie1d'g di,'ision, sent ill by Cllmpovenle on June 10th, with some Sllmll
i'llc.:onrfi i'ent from Valencia and elsewhere. '111e wllOle must hR'·e. made
1111 some 16,000 men, thoug!l such :L Humber was not Ilr~llt at :m,\' tine
'I' t ~
(1-1-4 [S}:n.
1,9311
'"j!)3
'"
time \\'ithiu the walls, According to Suchet's sm'l'ClUler-roll of the prrirou
(see Belmas, iii. ("Ill) there wel'c still n,OOfi IllI'Il ~Iln'i\'ing al tile mOll1ellt
of the storlll, ./une 20th, 1011, ,'h... ;-
COllrten's Division: :-iedenla.rr GarriSOll:
lunerica , :151 Catalan'Sections'
Almall~ ~ li13 T~lrragona
Almeria "rH Artillery.
Granada • 365 Sappers and Engin~rs
1,703
Otller Troops (mninlr from Snrsfield's Division):
3,O'lO
i:):Ulta Fe .
2nd of ~"l.\'oia
1liheria .
Sar''KOS8:1
GeroJla
l~t of Sa"oi<l
C:ellcral Total
343
li55
",0
200
241
50t
xx
Cazadores de Valencia 6lH
C:renalliers llH
i\liscellancous detachments
HIIII isolttu.'<.I offiuers 70
Camlry IGG
:1,45;1
1l,2GCi,
400
372
3i7
41'
344
373
WELIJNGTON'S ARMY ON THE BEIRA FRONTlEH
[to'ROM THE RETURN 0.'" SI';p'r"';~JHER 16, 1811.]
BIUTISH CAVALRY (STAPr••~ox C!>TTux)
Sla(le's Brigade (ht UOylll Dragoons112th Ligllt Dragoons
Alteu's Brigade{11th Light D~goons
lfit HuS&'\rs K.G,J...
Anson's Brigadel14tll Light Dragoons
16th Ligllt Dmgoons
DeGre)"s Brig-ade' f3rd DDragoon Gllard~
l4tll ragoons .
Total British t::walry, 16] officers, 2,851 men = 3,Ol~.
De Grey's brigade properly belonged to Erskinc's!?rld Cavalry Dh'isioll.
/luscut with Hill in I3:stremadurll, But Wellington had clllled it up to the
main army whcn Le Marehllnfs hC8v,)' dragoons arrh'ed at Lisbon. and sent
the lattcr to Castello Uranco. as part of Hill's corps.
HUI] WELLlNGTON'S AUMY IN St:P'l'EMDEH 64,1
HRITISH INFANTllY
hT Dn"810s. Lieut.-General Sir 'I'11O:UAS Gn.IIIA)I,
". CalUI'locll's jlst ColtlSh:ca~l.Gu~rus
Bri.£j3de 1st SeoL> hlSlhcr (.uard~
I comp, .5/00th Foot .
2/24th }'oot .
{
1/26th Foot
8topforu's Brigallc 2/42111} Foot ,
1/7mh Foot .
t comp. a/60th Foot
jIst Linc hattalioll K.G,L,Uiwe's Brigadc 2nd llitto
6th ditto
Total 1st Division = 4,!:l2G,
3HIl 01\'1810/>', Major-Gclleral T, I'(()TO".
, "{l/45th Foot . .\\ aIIace s (VICC 74th Foot. , '
i\fackiunon) l/83th Foot . .
Brigade 3 COnll!lllli~ i'i/OOLl, Foot
{
2/5tlt Foot.
C 1"'11' 8,'i-,1 77th Fout .o l cs !'\,.... C 2/33rd Foot
9.Jtlr Foot, ,. .
Total ani Division, 207 olth;el'l;, ;l,iUl men"" 3,lJHH,
o1Tll UI\'ISIO/<o', Major-Gencml r...""IIV Cor.l':.
{
3/:mJI Foot .
}' ., It' I l/o1Ot1l Font •
'll'llrr1l8 S I"!r" c Uith Foot. .
1 comp. v/60th Foot
{
l/ith Fusilicrs '
1'.lkcnham's l/23rd 11.\\T. Fusiliers
llrigade 1/48t11 :Foot •
1 comp. Brunswick Oels
Total 4th Divi.ion, 155 officers. 3,3;16 mell = 3.601.
5TII Dn'ISIOs. Brigadier-General DUNI.(IP ({or LF.ITU),
{
3/1st Foot .
Hay's Brigade l/9th Foot.
2/38th Foot
1 camp. Brunswick Ocls
Il/4th Foot. , .D I • B' d 2/30thFoot . •un oil ~ rIg\' e 2/44t1\ Foot . ,1 comp, Brunswick Del:!
Total iJth Di\isioll j 162 officers j 2,32tlmcll '"- ~j991.
3ij
"""48
300
oa8
$8
374-
3ll
saa
GB2
626
263
63
'"388
392
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6TH 1JJvJSJOl<. Major-Gcncral A. C ....\II'III:J.I~
II/llU, Foot .,. 2/53rd Foot .Hulscs BrlgaUc liGht Foot .1 comp. 5jOOth Foot
1
2nd Foot .
Burne's Hl·jgade 1/3211\1 Fool
Ij3Gth Foot
Total6t11 Division, un officers, 3,437 mell = 3,616.
7TH DlI·I~I01". .\lnjor.Gellenll80I>T.... G.
1
18l Light Ball. K.G.L.
V. Altcll's Brill,"3de 2nd ditto
BrUllswick Oets (9 COllljlS.)
IOlst Foot. . .S . 1I I 68th I'oot. .ulllag II ngm e 0"1 ,. « )o I uot ... cuml"" .C/laBJ;eu.rl Britullni'lue$ .
Total 7th Division, IGI officers, 3,116 men = 3,2';9.
G(l2
filG
"":w.J
479
166
r.il
LWJ!'I' Drl"lswl<. i\flljOJ'-GclJcml It. CIUUI'UlIll.
. .,00:'
317
"'2'J7
jlj43nl Foot .Harllard's Hrig-,Illc 4 comP"'. l/mith .I coml'. 2j05UI
detachmcnt 3/!J;jth
j l/fi21ld Foot .211\1 Brigade 2/5211d Foot .
l4 comp<111ies 1/95U,
Total Light Dil'isio1J, 146 officers, 3/Y.)<J lJlell = 3,247,
AItTIL1.Elty':
British: null's, Itoss's, and .l\Iacdol1ald's Troops Ill-I.A.,
LaWSOll'S and Bredill's companies RA. (including dril'el'l;) 4G4
Gennan : S)'mpher's company K.G. I,. 77
ENGINEERS I 143
WAGGON TRAIN' 136
I Theartillery and engineer returns, both British and Portuguesc, are given
in bulk for the whole army, Including Hill's force In EstrcmaduM and units
left at Lisbon. Distriblltillg Ihe numbers proportionately, thc abofC figures
\Voult! resull; lht!)I cannot be fat wrong.
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TOTAL HIUTl8H AItMV
(;a\'alry
Il!t J)ivillioll
:Jrd UiYilliol1 _
4th f)h·is.ioJl .
.•til Dh·is.ioll .
nUl f)h-isioll .
3,012
4,926
3J U8l.1
3,501
2,001
3,m8
7th DhislOU .
I.igllt Divisioll
Artillery
fo;lIginccl'8
Waggon Train
3,279
3,24,
5011
1-13
13(;
Total Z'J,aa".!
I'QItTUGUESI<: (ofliccrg Illld mcn togethcr)
3rd Division: Palmeirim's Brigade (9thllnd 21st l.illc)
-Ith Division: ColJins's Brigade(lltll and 2ard Line, 7th ~adore!l)
,jth Division: Spry's Brigade (3nl and I:)U, tinll, 8ll, C~ora).
6th Divisioll: :\laddeu's Brigade (uth and 12th Line) _
ilh Dh-isiull: ColenuUI'll Brigade(ith lllld If»], Lille, 21101 ~adores)
Light Division: 1st and 3rd Gaoyadora
PlIck'll IUdUJl.cllllellt Brigade (lst Ilwl 10th l,iIlU, 4lh Car;-atlorcs) _
.\lcMaholl'll lndepelllleut Brigade (l3th lIlld 22nd Liue, ,jlh (;nrya-
t1urCil)
Madden's GIlI'alry (ht, 3rd, 4tb, 7th regimclIt8)
Artillcrr, r, LllttcriCli
Total
Total Allied Army ... 4G,731.
I,28!)
2,.')82
2,01".
2,06.')
1,823
!Jr,:l
2,4Utl
1,014
,,10
[7,:..I4U
(8y.1'f.
82
1
ij
"I
IV
I 1
, 2:\
"
24
,
"1
22 HI
,
14
I'
"
5
2
4
•
,
27
!llld
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COMBAT 01' EL BODON. SEPTEMBEll ~5, 1811
1U1ITIsn LOSSES
f'Wed. WOlllldffl. _lfiuiIlO.
Q? J!ell. QIfi- Me/!. QIJi- MM. Tolul.
~-erll. t"t:ril. «r~.
U 2 14 24
l'urluguCilc (Artillery
21st Line) I
Tolal Allied loss, 14U.
011 the SIlllle da)" there look IlIacI: lhe IiCl,aralc comuat of Carpio, ill
wlliclt the British loss Il'a~-
14lh Light Dragoons ~
16th Lil;ht Dragoons . u
Tutal, 12 killell, wouw.letl, 1l1l<11Ili",;ing.
11th I.ight DrllKOolls .
1st I'IllSliaTS, King'A German
IA!gioll
~/iith Foot.
1/45th 1·'oot
i7t1J Foot .
2jll3rd Foot
1/881h Foot
94th Foot •
XXII
CO.'IBAT OJ:' ALDEA DA 1'O:\'1'E
SEJYl'EMBEH. Q8, 1811
IlHI'I'I~H LOSSI!lS
0 , 2'J
2 2 13
I 7
1
1 3
Roral Horse Artillery
Ist Royal Dragoons
] 2t11 l,iKht Dragoons
l/7th Fusiliers •
J/23rd FUlliliers .
1/48th Foot
li/GOUI
Hrunswick Qcls
KiII~d.
c.J.di~
Cet,. Men.
WO«luJcd.
UjJi- ilfen.
cera.
I
3
2
NiJI,illg.
OjJi- Mell. Tolul.
cer,.
1
J ,
, "
42
19
2 10
1
4
12 tI Si
{'orlogllesc IJOSScs 1 11
TO\;lll~ of t1l0 Allied Army = 100.
8
J
1811J
XXlII
HILL'S FORCE IN ES'l'REMADURA
SEPTEMBEU-OCTOBEU 1811
2nd Di\'i~ioll : QlficeriJ.
Byug's Brigade: Ij3rdJ 1/6ith, 2/31st, ~j66th 'I
Ilowanl's Brigade: l/5Oth, Jj71st, 1/92nd • 306
Wilson's .Brigade: Ij28th, Ij34thJ l/39tll ,
Hatnilton's Portuguese Division:
2nd, 4th, 10th, 14th Line (2 batls, cadl) 224
Ashwortll's POrblgUese Brigarlc:
6th and 18th Line ant! Vtll Carrat!ores (6 batts,) , 81
CAVALRY, Major-Goneral Sir W. ERSKE'o"r.:
Long's Cavalry Brigade: 9th and 13th Light
Dragoons, 2nd Hus;;.a.nl K.G. L, 50
Le Marcllant's Brigade: 3n! Dragoons, 4th
Dragoon Guards 3U
Brigat!e of Portuguese Cavalry (5th and nth regts.) Si
I Artillery, Uritish: J..efebure's Troop R,H.A.,
Hawker'saTld.Meadoll's's Compauies JlA., about 20
, Artillcr)', l'ortllgncse: 2 I:OIllIKllliCfl (A rritJg>l :tIlt!
Br<iun), about ](J
I EIIIl"illCCrs amI Tmill, ah...nt la
Mell.
!i,MS
4,rum
2,338
B03
929
SfJl
320
:!:W
BO
To/ul.
0,082
2,41!J
853
005
648
General T... tal i!)i 15,(;8i lU,434
, For figures of Artillery, Engineers, &c., See note to jlre\'iolls Appendix,
~o. )LX,
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XXIV
BRITISH AND PORTUGUESE ARTILLERY II' 'I'm;
CAMPAIGN OF 1811
Major J. H. Lcslie, ItA., the C(litor of tile' Dio;ksou ,\latlm;t;ripts,'
ha.~ been good ellough to l.:olllpile and annotate the following list of the
Artillery unit!! Wllich served in tIle "arioul; campaigns of the year 1811.
J. HOY AL [lOUSE ARTILLERY
'A' .BatWI'Y, RH.A.
'V' Battery, It.H.A.1
't;' Battery, R.H.A.
'I' Untte]')', R.H.A.
fhuler Ihe cm1/1IIulII], 11'.
Captain 11. D. Hos;;
Captain G. Lefelmre
Captain R. Macdonaltl
Capt1in R. null
A
o
The following Troops were serving in the Peninsula in 1011 :-
Arriwd ill
l'ellill$'thI.
July IBO'J
!'Ilareh IBlO
August JBll
August HlOfl
T'1'OQp.
'A' and' J' Troop~ ,<:en'cd with \f'elliugtoll'll AI'lIly during :o.rm;;;cml's
retreat in the spring of 1811, and in the campaign of :Fucnles de Quoro.
In 11mt battle' A' Trool' wag wit], t1l(~ left wing, llnd .Iid not comc into
action, but' I ' Troop was hotly engaged, and it was whilst in cllarge of
two guns of the 1'rooll that 2nd Capulill HT, Norman Ramsay pcrformetl
his celebrated exploit.
'D' Troop w,,,, with Beresford's Army and present at AItJUern, Mar Hi,
, E' Troop ,lid lIot arrive from EnglamInlltil tlu!: autumn, alllI wa.~ then
aUad,(.,d to the it" Oivisioll of ti,e Army.
11. ItOyAL (.FOO'l1 AlrI'lLLElt\'
18th U,lttel')', It. F.k
;!ith U.1tterr, It.F.A,
De8ignati01I ill 1011.
2ud Battery, It:F.A,
72 COmpallr, n.G.A.
8ith Battery, R. F.A.
Reduced iD 181!).
i\lafeh ]UO~
,\ ngust HlOfl
ith
Jlth
The 14 cOlllpanies shown in the followilJg tables were ;;erl'iug in the
l'eninsuL'\ in IBIl.
NO'J'J,;.-1111811 there were 10 OOttaliOll8 of Royal (.Foot) Artillery, the
companies of whieh "'ere always designated by the !lalllCS of the com-
manding officer, whether he wll.<; actually present witll his company or not.
Rllt- Arrived in
taliQ/!. Under the command qf. Peni118utu.
1st Capt'\ill J, "lay March 1809
4th Captain (Brevet "Iajor) Octoher HIlO
.r. Hawkl~t'
Captain G. '111ompson
Ca}It.'\ill (BrCI'et MiljOr)
A. Bredin
8111 Cartain K. l..:Lwson August 1808
8th Captain I'. Meadow$ Octobef 1810
, D troop was reduced in 1816, llolid re-formed in 1900, under i1.5 present
dcsig!lation,
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'11101ll1ISl.m'S alld l..Inl·sun's COlllllllllics ~rI'cd willl \\'cllillglon's Army
duriug ,\lassena's retreat into Spain in the spring of lOll, and ill tile
C:llnl':tign of Fnentes de Oiioro.
Later ill the year-August-TllOmpson's ComlJall}' was withdrawn from
the front, owillg to continued sickness, antll'epl:tccd by Bl'cdin's COlllpllll)',
Hall'ker's Company served with Bere:£ford's Army. It was prcscnt at
the battlo of Albllorn, ;1l1,] at the two Il11SIlCt:~S6flll siege! uf R:ulajoz
(Mar-Jullc 1811).
i\le.·uJOII'S'S COlllllany 1I'0nt to tho front boo ill tllC yenI', I'cl'l:,cillg'
<.;Iee,'es's Company of the King's German Legion,
May's ComlliulY (untieI' the COlllmlllul of 2nd Captaill H. Ba)'llcs, Ma)"
being employed on tile :Staff) accompanied the Army, in charge of the
Reserve Ammunition.
Tile other eight companies did 1I0t join the Arllly lit tile front, excol)t
ltaynsfortl'li for a l'l,ort IlCriot.l.
Bat-
'(llioll.
6th
Gtll
3th
5th
9th
l()th
10th
IOUl
Umler the ~'QIIJ1Il(llld qf.
Cll!ltain F. Glubb
Captain H. F, Holcombe
Captaiu R, T. Haynsfortl
Captain H. Qwen
Cllptaill I', J. Hughe~
(;.'\1't:lil1 W. Jtoberts
Cnpt<lin .-\. Uickson l
c..:aptain W. H. Sheulc)'
Arrived ill
PliIli118111a.
MarchlSOO
April um
April ]81]
January 1010
,January 1810
March uno
AJlril1310
April 1010
.IkJrigllutiQll ill ]91 1.
oUl COlllll<,\ny, R..G,A.
102 <';ompally, ItG.,\,
ill Company, n..a.A,
GO COlllllany, RG,A.
Hct.lucetl in 1819
G3 Company, H.G.A.
21 COltlllauy, It.G.A.
11 <':olllllany, H.G.A.
(;}ubb's :md Holco1l1he'll COlllllo'\l1iCi! WC1'e atl;lcll~I,lnl'ing tl'e latter 1'''l't
of UJll to the siege-train, which WIIS loeing Cllllil'ped 011 the Douro IJ)'
l\hljor A. Dicksoll, for the pl'oposedlOiege or Ciudad Hodrigo.
Haynsford's <';OlllIIlUJy took part ill the secont! siege of nadltjo~-l\In,.ao
to June 10.
The otller live cOllllmuie;; II'CI'C statioBcd ill C"diz aBd tl,c bla uc I.coB.
Ill, KING'S GERMAN LEGION ARTILLERY
Two of the three companies of the Legion Foot Artillery (Nos. 2 and 4,
commanded by Calltains Andrew Cleevcs and Frederick Sympller), Wllicll
had been in the }JeniDsula for tlte last two ycars, accompanied Heresford
on bis Estremaduran expetlitionJ :md were prcscntat the Mttle of Albuera.
Cleeves's was so cut up that it lI'as sent to the rcar ill .1une, Meadows's
British Company t.'\king its Illace at the front. 1110 third company, that
of Gcscnills, WIIS lcrt at Lisbon.
l This company was actually CQmmanded by Captain It. H. Bin·h. as
Dh:kson 11'115 serl'ing in the PurtuKucsc Artillery.
APrE~UlCI;~S
IV. PORTUGUESE ART1.LLEIlY
[t811
(The details are taken from Captain Tei:.:eira Botelho's Subsidi/W,)
(1L) Five Portuguese lield-lJattorilli; 3C(:ompallicd Wellington in his
IIUl'Suit of i\1as;;cna amI in the Fuentes de OfJoro ClllIlpaigll.
Two of these I.mlteries, hrig:ulllll together under ~rlljor V. VOIl Arent-
$t:hildt, came from the 2nd regiment and were attached to j'ictou'&
Uivisioll; they were eOlnlllamle\l hy Lieut.ell;Luls of. C. de Seqlleira an,l
2nd Lieut. J. t:. Rosado.
A third, also from the 2nd regimcnt, under the t:OIlHWUld of Cupt."\ill
F. t:. Pinto, was atbclled to Pack's Portuguese bri/{ade,
Que battcr}' frolU tlte 1st regiment, under tlLe COtllllllLlll1 of Captaiu
.1. da Cunha ['reto, was attached to the 5tll Division ill tlLcse campaigns.
Another batter}' uf tllC SllDle regiment (ClllJtlliu Pcdro de ~ierres) was
attached to the 6th Division.
(b) Two battories, brigaded Llllder Major Alexallllcr Dicksoll, 1U;COlil-
pallied Beresford's Army to Estremadura and fought at Albuera, viz. onc
from the 2ud regiment uuder Captaiu 'V. Braull, and one from tllC
1st regiment under Capt."\iu S, J. de Arriaga.
(c) For the two sieges or Badajoz ill May alI.(I June, the :!ud regiment
snpplied a half-eompany under Captain ~'. A. tie Sl..'fllleira; the 1st regi-
ment a colllpany uuder Cuptain F, ['edrosa Barreto; ami the 3rd regiment
three companies, the C:l1,taing' names of which are lIot pre;:ened, s,·we
one, Jose de Sampayo.
(d) 'l1,c -lU, rcgime"t SUP1,licd 8il\",~ir;o with twu lJ;LtlcritJS under ULI,t>Lill'
F. ,1. de Mariz ami D. O. Ferreri, which were engaged ill his combat.
\\'itl, CJl\IJarL~le ill tl'e carly !lIn·t of the year.
(e) The ha.lf-eompally whit:h defended CamlJO Mayor ill :\lareh c;o.mc
frulIl the :jnt re~ll11'nt allll Wllfol wlIllml,u!L..1 10)' LiI:lI1. J .•1. l...cl.!
.\Iorteira.
INDEX
Abadia, Franc~o Xavier, general,
~upcrscdesSantocildcs,4U!l; retires
before Dorsenne's advance, 470,
473.
AbM, general, at si~e of Tortosa,
230, 2&5, 246; at SIcg6 of Tarnl-
goua, In 1 ; at storm of Montserrat,
533.
Ahmlltes, Duke of, gee JUIlOt.
AlllclJa, iIInjor-Gencrnl J.illi, ComIc
lie, go\'crnor of TortoslI} 232;
capitulates, 237; tried and COII-
demned by Junta, 240.
_<\lhuera, 'l'ellillgton's u110icll of tlw
position, 280; bnttle of, 372-94.
.4.lbuquerlJ.ue, disgraceful surrender
of,256.
.'\.lcantBra, orders of NallOlooll con-
cerning ita hritlgtl, 644.
Alcilllt, Commissary, his plot to
seize l\Jolljuich, 244; shot, 245.
1\ Icob.1~a, monaster,. of, wrecked by
Frellcll,135.
AMen dlt Poute, combut of, S78-!J.
Alfayates, Wellington's chosen posi_
tion at, 200, 409, ';;57,579.
..\Imada, Lilies of, construcled by
Wellington, 73.
Almara<:, bridge of, fortified by
1Ilarmont, 543.
Aimei,ia, ))rouet at, J8; enclllll-
gcroo by Mass,sIl\i'S ret~at, llnj
blockaded hy Wellill~on, 201;
defell~ of, by Brenmer, 288-9;
III:L'>Ilerm fails to relieve, 342; hlowlI
up and ovacuatetl by BrCllnicr,
361-6; dei>troyed a 8et;oml time
by l)aek, 437; repaired and re-
garrisoned, 550, 584.
AIlllCrlllTn, .Jose Hervlls, Marquis
of, King JoseI'll's envoy to Paris,
215.
.'l.lmeria, el'acuated by the l~rellell,
477; Rlakc 11111I18 at, 478; re-
occlIpietl by 80nlt, 48~.
Alten, .'Iajor-Uellerdl V., defend.'!
Allmera l'ill~, ;Jj8, :Ulli.
AII'll, river, 'Vollington forces the
liue of the, 163-0.
Andalusia, Soult's po.'litioll ill, 26-
31; troubles in, during his absence,
57-8; Graham's and L~ ])eiJa'll
cltlll)>Iign iu ,90-125; Soult retuTlls
to, l~O; invaded by .Blake, 475;
Soult drives the MureiallS from,
480-4; insurrections in, during
tllO autumn, 593-4.
Ang)oIlR,l'rinee of, ill Tarifa cX)It.'tIi-
tion, WL HY.?A]].<;OIl, lieorg"e, major-genera), 8;
opemlious of Irif' e:walrr, 439, 4f10,
463,672,680.
Aragon, operations in, by Suchet'll
lieutenants, 246, 400, 507,636.
i\relllherg,PrOl»Jer, Prmce of,OIJ.er:,-
tions of in ./\lldnlusill., 277-8; taken
IlriSOllcr at Arroyo dos .\loIiIlOS,
005.
Arroyo dos :'.lolirLOll, Rill f<uTIlris~
Girard lit, 003-5.
ArtiUery, table of the British in
the Peniusula ill 18ll, 8U page:!
GM-I.
i\storgu, dLwoyed Il.IHI cl'l1tmatt.'t1
by the French, 466; reoccupied,
471.
A.sturiaf<, OlJerations in, 210-11;
evacuated hy Bolluet(J rlllc),466-6;
rL-'Qct.:u)Jictl by HOlJnet (~oYcmber),
585-6.
Haccel11r, :'.lllrllrel, geucr:ll, eOIlJ-
nllUltler of Portugucsc forces ill the
north, HI, 20, 211.
Badajo<:, besieged br 8oult, 38-.56;
surrenders, 61; "'ellington's re-
marks on, 249; first siege of, hy
.Beresford, 274-9, 2117 ; ~OUtl
Britisll siege of, 40+-31 ; relief of,
hy Marmont, 44(; ; regarrisonetl by
Drouct, 467.
B.tlagucr, Sail Fclipc tie, .'lCizetl hy
the French, 242; Campol'ertle r.1.ils
to recover it, 24,';.
G!H INDEX
n:\lIastero~, Fl':\llcisco, 24; ~II­
counters Mortier, 33; dri\'cn b),
Ga:G.11l into I'ortugal, 33, :J4, !)3;
defeats I{emollll Oll tile !tiu '!'into,
58, ]28; and at La l'alma, ]2!.l;
IlllrSue(1 by Maransin, 277-8; in-
forms Bcn..-aford of Soult's move 011
Hadllj~, 36U; lltAlbuera, 377-04;
with lllake, 475; retires before
Conroux,47G j Ilis successes against
GoclillOt, 4liS; SlIst"ins tlllJ revolt
in Southern Andalusia, ./>93-4,
Baraguay d'Hillie1'8, Achille, com-
mands Freneh force in Kortllem
Cut>llonia, 484, 4tl3-6, 638,
Barba del J'uerco, Hrenuier's skir-
mish at, 353-4.
H.1rceIOIm, ('..ollspiracy in, 244-/,.
.Barnsnl, Andrew, colonel, at Har-
1'()Sfl., 11 L
Harrosa, Victor defeated at, by
(;ra113111, IOG-2ii.
Batalha, monaster)', wrecked b),
french,135,
Dll.lIll, operations of Soult against
tile i\Il1rcinu arm! Ilco.r, 48Q-1.
Heckwith, Colone S., his exploits
at Sabu~al,HH.
Uegllilles, general, joins Tarifi~ c,~­
!Iedition, U5, U8nQte, 101, 107, no,
117,124, ]27.
13elpllig, C<llllured hy the Catalans,
an.
Bc1veder, Conde (le, forced. out of
the pass of i\lallllaual by Dorsenlle,
470.
Benalcazllr, thrcu.tellCtl by Col-
borne, 234; captnred by Morillo,
5U7.
Ikresford, lVilliam Can, marshal,
takes commulltl of dctaclmd forces
1Je\'ond the Tagus, 5; sent to
the relief of Dal1ajoz, GO, B9; ill
pursuit of M:l~lIa, 86 ; lends ex·
(Iedition into Estremadunl, 160,
:/48; marches 011 Campo Mayor,
2&2; at combat of Campo Mayor,
26.3, 204; llllfvrtulIate delay in
crossing Gllluliaul1, 265-70; invests
Badajoz, 279; raise~ siege, 267;
prepares for Soult's advallce, 309;
wins Ilattle of AIhllera, 372-9'1;
gives UII coulIllaud of Estrclluulurllll
army, 41;';,
Bessicres, Jean llaptiste, Duke of
Il'ltria, marshal, appoiuterl he.....lof
the' Army of tile Nortll', 2011 ;
ill 01.1 C:lstile, 200; 11il> rCllOrts 10
I'llpoleoll, 209; quarrels with
;\Iasscna, 303; joins Mass€ml. at
Cimlad Rodri~o, 304 ; at FlIellU$
de Ollol'O, 329-48; tries to k~p
Marmont from joining Soult, 434 ;
tak~ over the c1mrge of frolltier
of won, 434,461-4,466,467 j re-
called by Napoleon, 468,
Denl.n, colonel, misfortunes of at
Almeida, 353, 350.
Blake, Joachim, geucral, joins
llallasteros in Estremadura, 279;
with BeresfoI'fl before Albllera,
371 j at battJe of AI1Jllerll, 372-!.l8;
Wellillglou'S strictures on, 3!)!);
ill pursuit of Soult, 411 ; mo,'es to
tllr.~atell Sc\'illc, 444, 47;;; retire>
before Conroux, 476 ; joins Arm)'
of Alurcia, 476, 482,
lllakelley, Hollert, his accoullt of
Barrosa, 110, 113, 114, ll(j; lIt
ATToyo dos ;Uolinos, 6OiI,
lllakclIey, J., colonel of 7th !,'w;i·
licril, describes AHlller..., 3!.l1, 39'2.
Bluut, general, cOlilmands at
l'eniche, 7, 22.
nOullet, p;eneral, in Asturias, 211,
402; ordered to fu.llback to Lcoll,
4(;,'); opposed b)' SalltoeildeJl, 468 ;
in Loon, 469, 473; recollquers tlle
Asturias, liH.5-fi.
Bomos, combat of, 594,.
Hrellnier,Antoine fo'raw;ois,gellcral,
A'0vernor of Almcida, 288; evacu-
ates Almeida, 351-4; promoted
by Napoleon, 367; reeeil'cs cow·
malld of a division, 361.
BrOil, general, defcated at USlgTC,
413-14; clLpturetl at Arro)'o dos
MolillOS, 60<$.
Hrowne, Johll lo'rederick, colonel,
his exploits at 111.TTosa, 100-10,
112.
Bllshe, colonel, commands J'ortu·
guese at llarrosa, 111-17; mol"
tally wOllude(l, 118,
Cabrera, general, itl GaUcia, 213,
'66.
CatH", 0llcratiolls rOlllltl, \)3-125.
Ca/flLrcl i, Louis MlIrie, gCJl~ral,
comnJaIl(ls di\'ision in Army of the
North, 225, 474.
Cagigal, ilJajor-Gelleral Jo~c, his
di~ceful surrellder of :\1111I-
tplerquc, ~i'i(;.
INDEX
CamerOD, colonel of 79th, killed at
!"uentes tie OiiOTO, 3.%.
Call1l'bell, gcucral, OOlllllllllltlillg lit
Gibraltar, sends troops to Graham,
94,95.
CampLell, Alex., genoral, takes
commallll ofl)ortuguese blockading
Almeida, 351 ; allows Breuuier to
escape, 353-6.
Cam})() Mayor, siege of, 2':)4, 255;
combat of, 258-64.
l:ampo\'erde, Marquis of, captain.
general of Catalall aITllf' 240, 243 ;
fails to snrprise MOIIJuich, 245 ;
his unfortunate 0llCratiOllS round
fignoms, 4!H-49.5; returns to
TarragonaJ 501; leanffl it, S05;
his feeble attempts to relieve it,
60j-ll; resigns Ilis comm:lJlIl,
~2fl.
Carpio, combat of, 563.
C'AlAAI Novo, Mm});,t of, 151.
CaSII8 Viejns, 8kirmish of, 101.
Cassagm', general, holds .\fedilla
Sidollia, 101, lOb; operations of,
125-6.
Castanon, general, in Galieia, M>(i-
i; forced out of pass of }'ueuce-
badou,470.
Castaiios, Xavier, general, succeeds
La RomlllH\ as C31,tain-geneMII,
46,212; l,romises tolliol Beresforol,
272, 281; retires before Soult's
a(hance, 369; co-operate!! at Al-
hllera, 371; opemtions of, ill Estre-
madura,09i.
(;alrtillejos, combat of, 34.
Catalonia, campaigns in, 227-46,
484-541.
Ca)"l, 'Vellington's llOSition on tile,
JUlle-Jul)' 1811, 443-60.
Celorico, operations arollud, during
l\Iassena's retreat, 167, li3.
CerV8rtl, captnred lly l.acy, 541.
Cilldad Rodrigo, blockaded b)"
Wellington, .'>47-8; relie\'ed b)"
l'larmontand Dorsenue,liGO; again
blocklllled, 583; its gO\'crnor cap-
tured by .TlIli~lIl &IIlCIIC'I., 587.
(;Iaparede, general, commands
division under Drouet, 17 ; ronts
Silveira, 21 ; at Fuentes, 333.
ClauspJ, Bertrand, general, wm-
lll<llldillg a division of tile 8th
Corps, 8, ]3; COIlUlIllUllillg 1\ ,Jjvi-
sion under i1Jannont, 361.
Cochrane, Colonel Basil, Ms rash
chal'ge at the hridge of Barba del
I'uerco, 364-0.
Codrington, llritisll commodorc,
co-operates in defence of 'l'arra.
golla, 501, 51.5, 519--20; shillS off
a Vahmcian division, .520-30.
C~rdeJ'os, combat of, 467.
COlmbra, l\Iassell3 fails to 8ei~e, 140,
]49.
Colborne, John, colonel, 0llenltious
of, ill Estremlldura, 284; at
Albuera, 376; heavy losses of his
brigade, 384.
Cole, Lowry, general, sent to join
Ann)' of Estremadura, ]61, li2;
with Beresford in .Estremadura,
257, 200, 273; at IJaUle of
Alhuera, 372; le:lds c1lflrgc of
Fusilier Brigude, 38()...-] ; !Jis sharc
in the "ictory, 401-3.
Condcixa, 'l'ellingtOll andi\Iasscna's
opCf'dtiona round, 14i--ii.
COllroUX, NiCQlas, gencral, with
Drouet's 9th Corps, 17; at
Fuentes,333; pursues make, 47G.
COlltrel';\S, Juan Senen, general,
go\'ernor of TlIrrugOUlI, 506-7 ; ili.•
efforts to defend the place, 509-lO;
his quarrel with Campoverde, InC ;
wounded and taken Ilrisoner, 524;
escapes from FnUICC, 627.
Cooke, general, takes over <:om-
mand of the troops at Cadi:-; from
Grnlmm, 130.
Copons, Francisco, gellCr-dJ, at
Cadiz, 93, !).l.
COlljligny, IHarquis, supersedes La
l'en3,130.
Collrten, !(Cneral, tries to surprise
Monjuicb, 246; defends TlIrrn-
~olla, 406; taken prisoner, .524.
L:raufurd, Robert, general, on le31'e
in England, 136; his return to
the I'cninsulu, 2a9; comll1audB
the Light Divisioll at Fuelltes,
320, 324, 337; hig operatio/ls
round Ciudad Rodrigo, 572-3.
Cristobal, San, FOl1. at Jladajoz, 38;
Beresford \'ainly attacks, 28&-6;
disastrous attempts' to storm,
421-7.
Crllz MllrgOOll, general, rnistl.kcs
of, lit IJmrosa, 107-9, 117.
Uaricau, general, gol'ernor of
Se\'ille, !i7 ; joins Hemonil against.
(jr,(i INDEX
Ilallnsteros, lZB, 120 ; d3llgen; of,
ill Seville, 300; threatcncrl by
Hla.ke,475.
Dicksoll, Majol' Alexander, com·
ma.nds PortllgnesEl artillery at
siege of Olivellla, 272 j collects
siege-train for Ha.dajoz, 273-6;
at siege of 8adajo~, 284-7;
at second siege, 419, 422; ooll-
ducb WellingOOn'll siege-train to
Villa da Ponte, 049-50; and to
Alllleida, 584.
, Dic-hards', the, 5ith regimcnt,
at Albuera, 886.
Dilkes, general, at Darrosa, 111.
Dornhrollski, general, escapet'l from
ll.rroyo iloo lHolinoll, 602, 604 j
at .\Ierida, 606.
Donenne, General Count, com-
mauding at BllrgOR, 467, 41J11; !lUll-
ceCfls llessicres, 468; invades
GaJicia, 460-71; lielJ?-~ l\Iarmont
to relieve Ciuda(t tlodrll';O, fi58-GO ;
at "'Ileuw Guinahlo, 57;1; 0pe".-
tions of, in the late llutUJllll,
505....{i.
DO}'le, General Charles, Dl'itis.h
Commiss.iollcr in CaULlultia, 5HI.
IJrouet, .Iean Balltiste, Colllte
(l'Erloll, leads 9th Corps to join
Army of ])ortugal, 17-20; meets
.\fIlSSCUlt, 21; at I.,drill, 22, 63;
detaclled by Mass.enll. and sent w
Spanish frontier, 139, 178; reports
Oil sUi.te of Ahneil.!:l, 181, 202, 301;
at J.'llcntl':!' de Oiioro, 31O-4R;
/Well to Andalusia, 407; joins
Soult, 441; left with 5tll c.:orp's
under l\larmont, 4M;-6; f1Wes [1111
in tlle late autumn, 606-7 j O!lern-
tions of, in Oecembel', 606.
IJrummond, colonel, operations of
his brigade at &11)\\8".l.I, 194.
UUlllou!rtier, gcneral, OOnlllUlllds
dilisioll in Arilly of the NortlJ,
463, 467,469.
l)unClllI, major, oommands artillery
at Barrosa, 112-17, 11{).
lJ'Urban, Sir .Benjamin, his notes
on tlle PortuA"uese commissariat,
70; on Wellington's plan for
attacking MassClla, 83 note;
appreciation of Tallly", 256; on
crossinK the Guadiana, 260; at
Albuera, 372 ; rilmarks on lrecoud
siege of 8adajO'/', 418; 011 Soult's
inaction, 454 j liml/fre pllRirim.
l':h16, Je."II1Il.:Jpti~te,g-ener:ll, buihh
britlge C{luilmge at l'uuILet.e, 16.
El Modon, COlllhat of, 5GS-it
El Medico (Dr. Juan Palarea),
guel"Tillero cllief, 213.
EmpecillaUo, tILe, guerrillero chief,
213,246.
Eroles, B.1.ron, cOlllmauusatlivision
in CataJonia, 403-4, 511, 620, 04(1;
defea'ted at Montserrat, 632.
Enkine, Sir "'illiam, general,
cOlllmandsLigllt Division ill
CTBllfllrd'S absence, 135; at l'om·
bal, 139; at comhat of (Jasal Novo,
151,152; atl<'o-/' do Arouce, 15G-B;
his mistakes at Sabugal, 10HJ,
200; fails to intercept (XlU\'ors
for llodrigo, 200, 200, 2'Jl); at
I<'uentes. (le Oiioro, 311; fails to
intcrccI,tJ."rcne11 lell\"ing Almcida,
352--6; transferred to a cal'alry
division, 4.53.
J.~SJ.laiia, Carlos de, general, sen'es
near Abnl11te8, HI, 17 ; 1I10\"l~ to
"~stremadura, 43; at Hadajoz, 48,
40 ; escapes after battle of Gebora,
!i4; at lmttle of Albuem, 372;
Ilis rnids ill Leon, 553, 584.
Estremadura, J:)oult's expedition
into,23-61; Beresford's campaign
in, 246-87; Sonlt'sseeoml i1l\'38ion
of, 363-0il; Wellingwn's first
campaign in, 404--56; HilI's
operations in, 50J,-6O(;.
Ellgcllio, gencn,l ()n;atelli), rle-
fented allll sl..iu at PI", 243.
Fanc, captain It.N., his disastro\l~
raid on P!OlaTn~, 241.
Fcnwick, major, mortaUy wOlluded
at Obidos, 7.
Ferey, I;eneral, !lis useless expe-
11ition beyond tlle 7.er.ere, 16; at
Fucnt.cs de Onoro, 313-48; COlll-
roands One of .\1armOllt's divisions,
361.
J.'igucTBI!, sU1'(>l'i~'l.I by Rovira and
the rniqueleta, 491-2; figIltillg
round,404.-.-5 ; gallant defence of,
by MartillP;l, .';3.';--7 j itll I;urrenller,
538.
Flet:eher, Riell"rd, colonel, Will'
roanding engineer at the siege of
lladajo~, 282, 284, 287; at second
siege, 417, 432.
J.'oute CuoortlL, i\l,,,-'<SClla'i; ,ulven·
ture at, 141.
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Habert, general, commands a
dil'isioll uuder Suchet, 241, 487,
490, 600; leads the stormers at
Tarragona, 522.
Hamilton, general, cOlllmands a
PortuguL'8e division, 4, 5; lit
Albuera, 370.
Hardinge, ColOllel Henry, urKes
Cole to charge at Albuera, 390,
3!.ll.
Harispe, general, commands a
(}jvislon under Sllchet, 487, 497,
r,00, IilG.
Herck, i\!ll1llllll, go,'ernor of Oli-
VClIZll, his disgraceful surrender,
36,37.
Heudelet, general, at Santarem,
8~; at Sabujl;lll, IllS.
Hill, Lieut.-Col. J., C&lltured at
I<'uentes de Onoro, 328.
Hill, ){owlallll, general, commlltld,s
2nd J)i\'isioll, 4, {;; iovalided by
U 1I
"'7.' Muximiliell, general, sent by
1> a.ssen3 to Napoleon, 10, 28,
206; his return with dispatches
to Massena, 75; again sent to
Pans, 177; his tcl)(Jtt to the
Emperor, 295; carrIes letter of
recall to Massena, 357 j his esti-
mateof l\Iannont, 359-00; receives
command of a division, 361 ; his
diversion during tile }<:I Motion
clImpaign, MU.
FOll,]o ArQllt-e, comll1lt of, 1,j!j-B.
t'reire, Manuel, genel'lll, commands
Army of Mureia, advances against
French, 477; joined by Ulake,
478 j rctrenlf; heforc SOllll'~
advance, oWl.
Fririon, lo'rant;ois, chief of the stalf'
to lHasselln, lli" evidence citeel, 10,
17, il, 147, 148, H17, 1i2, HO,
197,343-8.
Fuente Guinaldo, Wellingtoll'!:!
position at, itll dangers, 672-6,
F tlcutes de O;;OfO, po>'ition of,
307-10; battle, 31Q-48.
Galicia, state of, in the SIlting of
11311, 212; opcr:ltiotls Oil the
borders of, 465-72; Ann)' of,
under Santocild(!l!, 465-8; and
Ahadia, 40.')-71; Wellington's
vicws on, 202~3, 473--4.
Gasea, colonel, hill cireuitous retreat
to Valencia, 531.
Gazan, Bonore, general, his pursuit
of BallllS"tcros, 33, 34, 93 j at
Badajo:t,41 ; returns to Andlllushl
with Soult, 129; at Albuera, 380.
Geoora, battle of tlle, 51-5.
Goorge 1tI, political results of the
insanity of, 66.
George, Prince Regent, continue!!
!'erceval ministry, 60.
Gibraltar, threatened hy the
French,594.
Gijon, occnpied by the French, 210,
....
Cirard, Jean Ibpti8le, general,
operntiollil of, 35-9, 48-60 j at
Albuera, 37!)-4Q2; surprised by
Hill at Arroyn dos Molinos, 601-6.
Godinot, general, his operations
at AlbuCTa, a71:1, 389; sent
ag><inst Blake, 454, 478; defeat'!
J. O'Donllcll at Zujar, 480: chases
Bal1aster06, 593; his failure,
commitil suicide, 59~.
I)""". IT
Golegio, .i\1ass~na's conference at,
77-80.
Gor, tile Muroian anny at, 479;
driven (rom tile position, 480.
Gough, Hugh, major, leads Irisl,
Fusiliers at Darrosa, 120.
Graham, 'rhOlllllil, general, IItCadi·t,
93; his pllln for an attack 011
Victor, 04, 9Ii; his career ami
character, 00, lli; at Barr()l;3,
107-27; his contrOl"eriiY witll I~~
"dill, 12'J-3O; trllllsfcrn'(l tn
Army of Portugal, 130 j commands
Welliu,lI'lon'S left wing, 052-63,
572, r,7!l; criticism of, on tlw
September campaign, 6ll1-2.
Granada, iusurrections in the king-
dom of, 478, 43,1-4.
Grnnt, colonel, 0l'lCmtions of lib;
irrcKular forcc, 75.
Grattan, William, of the Ball"
describes devastation of Portugal
by French, 13fi--(); i\Ias.~ena's
retreat, 171; Fucntcs de Oiioro,
333.
Guadiana, the, Heresford's clifficlllt
passage of, 207-]0.
Guarda, MasseIHl retreats Oll, 179 :
combat of, ]8,';) 186.
Gllerrilleros, importance of tlu.'
operations of, 200-7, 210, 213,
463-4,472,483.
Guingret, captain, his authoritr
quoted) 12.
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feyer, 6; returns alltl takes CQlll~
ffialld o(two divisiorul,416, 467-9 j
his autumn operations ill Estre-
madura, 1)05-7; routs Gimnl at
Arroyo dos Molinos, 605.
Hop;hton, general, his cllarge at
Albuera f\lld deatb,385-7 ; Ileavy
losses of his brigade, 387} 388.
Houston, general, at Fuentes de
Oiioro, 317-20; at Badajoz, 424.
Imaz, Geueral J~, succeeds
Menacllo as gorerllor of HadajozJ
fiG; surrenders, 58--G1; Welling-
toll'S remarks Oll, 249, 250.
lremonger, colonel, his blunders at
Almeida, 352.
[stria, Duke of, tee Bessihes.
Jaca, Suchet opens route to France
by, 488.
Joaumenhll, lJriUKCiI constructed at,
267,233.
Joseph Bonalltlrte, Kin~ of Spain,
quarrels with lleE!icreB, 210;
his Army of tllO Centre, 213 j
Napoleon's intention to deprive
him of Catalonia and ghe llim
l~ortugal, 2Hi; proposes to abcli-
elite, 217; travels to Paris, 2UI;
Ms complaints against Bessieres,
468,
Jourdan, .100n Uaptiste, mllrsllnl,
returns to Madrid, 2Hl,
Jnuot, Andochc, general, Duke of
Abrantes, Ms position north of
Santarem, 9, 13; at skirmish of
Rio l\1ayor, 75; at council of
Golegfio,78; movements of,during-
MllllS6na's retreat, 131, 132, HU,
179, 180; at .Belmontc, 186;
reaches Sabugal,. 187, 202; at
Fuentes de Oiioro, 311-48; re-
turns to France, 360.
Lacy, Geueral Luis, takes command
of the Catalan army, 531; his
difficulties, 539; makes head
against Muedonald, 641.
La Carrera, Martin, general, at
Badajoz;, 54,
La Cuadra, general, c11ased by
Soult, 4i7, 479, 481,
LahoUSilll}'6, general, operations
of,214.
La PClia, Manuel, general, com-
mands rrarifa e;<.pedition, 95, 99 ;
his failure to help liraham at
Harrosa, 124; retires on Cadiz,
127; his controversy with Graham,
129; deprived of his command,
130.
La Romana,Jose Caro, Marquis of,
sen'es under 'VelHngton in Por-
tugal, 24, 32; dcnth of, 44; Ilia
charal,,'ter and career, 45-6.
Lardizabal, Mannel, general, ill
Tarifa CXIlooitioll, 99, 101; at
Barrosa, 107; with make joins
BaIlasteros, Z'{8, 279; at Albuera,
377 ; joins Army of Murcin, 478.
tas Vertielltcs, combllt of, 481.
Latour-':\laubourg, Mane Charles,
in Estremadura, 32; at siege of
U.,dajoo, 46--7, 49, 51; summon~
and takes Albuquerque, 266; at
combat of Campo Mayor, 256-64;
sllcceedsi\fortier in command,2G8;
rlltire>;from Jo::sLrcmMura, 276, 2i7,
284; joins Soult in marching to
relie"e Badajoz, 200, 363,300; at
Albllera, 403; at eombnt of
Usagrc, 412-16; at combat near
Elvas, 447; routs the i\1urdan
annr, 401,
Leal, J, C., Portuguese artillery-
ml!J.l, his good service at Coimbra,
149.
Leiria, Drouet at, 22, 64; burnt
b}' tIle Freudl, 136.
Leite, general, goverllor of Elvas,
273,4.';6.
Leon, operatiollS of Bessieres and
Dorsenne in, 466-71,
Leval, Jean f.'ram;ois, genernl, at
Cadiz, 105, 106; at Barros/l,
108-25; takCli command of the
4tll Corps, 477; retires hefore
I<'reire's advllnce, 478, 479.
LiIli, major-general, Collde de
Alacba, governor of TortoBa, 'I!f!
Alacha,
Liver~l, Robert Jellkillsoll, .Barl
of, Ius correspondence with Wel-
lington, G.'i-9,
Loison, Louiil Hcnri, general, com-
mands division at Santarem, 8, 14,
146; supersedes Ner in command,
177; retreats from GU:lrda, 185 ;
at combat of SabugnI, 190-6, 202,
34!J; returns to France, 360,
Long, R. 13., general, at combat of
Campo J\1ayOl', 25f)....6Z; retires
before Soult's IId,'uuce on BadajO'~,
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X!.I; retreats too: hastily, 312 ;
blarnoo by \\rellillgton for 'c.avlllry
llisaster near I<;I\,a8, 447,448,460;
takes command of :!Ild Cavalr)'
Division, 458.
Longa, gucrrillero chief, 201,
210, 211, 463, 4l18, 4(l!.l, 474,
Losada, gener,ll, cOllllllandillg Arm)'
of ABturias, 46:J, 506.
Lumley, ROll. \V., gelleral, COlll-
mauds ca\·alrr lit Albucm, 372,
403 ; at combat of Usagre, 412-15 ;
goes home on sick leave, 458.
Lusit'lniaJl Legion, at AlIJUcr:I,
300-1.
:lbcdonald, Eticune, marshal, Duke
of Tarentum, on the lower Ebro,
229, 241; I,is llIarch 011 l..cridll,
242; checked at Pia, 243 ; his
rnareh from Lerida to Barcelona,
485-6; blockades Figueras, 406;
!tis long lli~c of tllllt place, 535-0 ;
returns to France, 541.
"'Iadden, briga(tier-genel'al, leads
Portuguese clwalry to relief of
Badajoz, 43-0; 1lis dis.'lSler at tlle
Gebora,053.
Mah)', Nicolas, eaptaiu-general of
Gabcian army, recalled, 212,
:\ranrll!lo'l., takeu and burnt by Mac-
dOllald,486.
l\Iarallllin, ,Jeau PierI'll, gener"I,
pursues Ballasteros, 27i, 278.
Marbot, .\farcelliu, colonel, his
autllOrity l!lloted or doubteti, 12,
141, 153, 1057, 304, 34B.
Mareband, Jcau Gal.wiel, comlllands
rearguard ill Massena's retreat,
162; escorts convo)" to Jtodrigo,
:!98, 290; with Mll.8SClIa'a adl'lInce
ou l<"UCllles, 305; at FllcnleS, 314.
MarCQA"llet, general, his skil1l1ish
with 1Vilsoll at Bspillhal, 7; ell-
COtlutCI'!l Dl'onct's 1IJVll11C(,'{1 gwu'd,
17.
:\[anuont, Augubte .Frblerlc, mar-
shal, Duke of llagusa, replaces
Mo.~m~ all cOllllllam]Cl' uf Army
uf Portugal, Z05, 357; his can.-er
and character,358-60; rcorganizes
the Army of Portugal, 360-2,404,
·132; marches goutll~.433; meets
Soult, 4.J,'i; re!iel'Cs lladajoz, 446 ;
returns to the I'alley of the 'I'agus,
457; hisqullnelswith KillgJoseph,
5H-5; marches to relieve Ciudad
Itodrigo, 5.59; his eampaigu a;;-ainst
Wellingtoll, Sept. lRII, 561-fl();
hesitatefi toattack '-ucutcGui ualdu,
575; retires to cantonments, 585;
his cOL·respondence with Napoleon,
587-9.
i'lJasscna, AlIflrl!, marshal,Prince
of Essliug, his llositiou about Sall-
tarem, 1-57; receh·es orders from
Na)lOleon b)" General Foy, 75, 76 ;
holds a conference at Golcg>10,
77-80; retreats from Sal]l:8rcm,
82, 131-97; !Urllrised at .Fonte
Cuberta, 147; quarrels \11th Ne,.,
148 ; rctrcata towanls Plasen-
cia, 162; his difficultics, 173-6;
sll].erscdcs Kc)", 176-8; abandons
his plau of going to Plasencia,
Hll ; trosses tIle COli, 18i ; retrcata
011 CiudlU.l Roddgo, 1fl7; caUSC!! of
his failure, 203-5; recalled by
Napoleon, 295; reor/0;'3.llizes his
army, 301; tjulI,l'rels witJI Bessieres,
303; dcfeated at l<'uentes de Ouoro,
310-48; withdraws garrison from
Almeida, 349-64 ; receives his re-
call,357.
Mastersoll, sergeant, captures all
eagle at HarrOSll, 12l.
Mathieu, Maurice, governor of
Uarcelolla, defeats attempt of
C,"fllpovenlc to surprise Monjuicll,
245.
Medina Sidonia, combats at, 98,
121,
l\Icllllcho, H.afalll, general, goveruor
of.BadlljO'J;, 40; his gullalltllefcnce,
55; his death, 56.
i\Iendiz.a.bal, general, retreats Oil
&dajoz, 32; garris()lls Olivenza,
3S ; ,11101 B;ldlljOl" 40 ; lemls
a. force to relieve Badaj01., 4:3-4;
his failul'e, 4i-!l; routed at the
Gebor:I,53.
Mer]e, Pierre lIuguc>;, b'"ClICI~l1, at
combat of Subugal, lOS?,
i\Iermet, Julicn, his cugagelllellts
during MlISSl!lla·s retreat from
Portugnl, l38-!l, 142, t'H; at
Fuentes OC 01101'0, 316, 3W, :J22.
ilElla, Francisco, guerrillero chief
ill Navarre, 20i ; joins Lollga and
Vorlier, 4G8.
Miot dc Mrilito, Andr':, courtier of
King Joseph, 217-18.
ilIirallda, Jose, general, lands ill
Cllt'l.lollia to SU]lport Canlplwerdc,
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507; his feeble actinll~, .'>17; ill-
sist,o; on returning to Va1elll:ia, 6:l8 ;
embarks, 330.
Monjlliell, fortre~s of, failure of
Clunpovcrde to surllrisc, t45.
i\lontbrull, Louis Pierre, Keller:ti,
5.5; at l'ombal, 131 ; fails to seize
Coimbra, 140, 149; on the Alva,
163; at El Boootl, 19B; with
Mass~naJ 302; at t'UClltes tie
OOoro, 315-48; with i\larmont's
atl\'allce on Badajo7., 437, 4'lG;
operations of, iu front of EhllS,
446; comma.llds at the combat of
El Bodoll, 56f.-70.
Montijo, Conde de, his irregular
warfare ill Granada, 471H'l2.
Montserrat, stormed by Suchet,
633-4 ; recol'cred by the Spaniards,
0541.
Morillo, l'al.!lo, general, exploiti!
of, 697.
j'lIortier, F..dollard, marshal, ill the
cxpeditioll to F.strCJllIwurn, 30;
sknmisllCS \Vith Ballasteros, 33; at
&d'/'01:, 48, OZ, 54:; left in com-
IUllm at Bailajoz by Soult, 02, 247 ;
marches agaiust and takes Caml)()
.\layor, 263-6; rescues Latour·
Maubonrg after comlnt of Campo
:'tb.yor, 263, 264 ; l'cenlled to 1'1ms,
268.
i\lurcia, Army of, its unsuccessful
canl[l:lign against Soult,4i7--8L
Myers's .Fusili~r Brigade, exploits
of. at Albuera, and death of its
comlnander,300-3.
Nal'ie/', Sir \\'illiam, lib strictures
on the J'erceval (.;al)inet, Ui ; 011
Wellington at Hcdillha, 143; ou
cavalry pursuit at CamJlO Maror,
:W4; (lescri1.Jcs doings of tILe Light
Division at FuclItes ae Onoro, 32(;;
criticism of Welliu/!'tOu's action at
Fuentes de onoro,3~; on tol»-
gral,hy of AlhuCI';t, 37~ ; on l~.ttle
of Albuera, 386, 38G, 398, 401 ;
his remarks 011 Solllt's strateg)' ill
8ellwmoor, 45,"1; 011 Dorscllne's
advance iuto Galicia, +i1 ; Otl COIl-
trems's conduct at TatTBgoua, 610,
513.
Napoleon, I'';mperor, his orders to
Drouet, 18, 1U; to Soult, 22; his
failure to understand situatioll of
affain; in Spain autl l'ortugal, 22--
8, !l>3, 04, ~04, 205; approves of
Masseua's supersedin~ Ner, 178;
estahlis]les a single military COnl-
1I1lUl.ler ill :\'orthertt 8118ill, tOj;
threatens to antle~ Spain, 2Hi-16 j
refuses Joseph command ol'er the
troops ill Spain, 219-20; super-
SCl.!t16 Ma.ssena, 295, 357 ; his criti-
cism of Be>JS.iCrt'S, ;.l()(j; hi~ orders
to Scult, 363-5; Ms criticism 011
l\Iarmollt, 435; Ilis orders to
8uchet for 1,110 COllqUe6t of Ca!.'L-
louia, 48S; orders the reconquest
of the Asturia~,685; directs Mar-
mOllt to invade tile Alemtejo, 581-
8; his projC<.lU> {or the couquest !If
Valencia, 591-2,
Ney, Michel, mar811al, Duke of
~;]chillgen, cOlllmaruls nUl Corpo;,
It, [I; his advice to l\IlWena at
council of Golegao, 78 ; retreats
from Leiria, 131, 132, 134; corn-
m~Ulds rearguard at l'olllbal, 138;
at Redinha, 142, li:3; at COil'
debi:a, 146; his (!narrcl with Mas-
sena, 148; at 10'0"1, do Arouce, 155-
8; 011 the Ah11, J{l4, Ij] ; llullrrcl~
with MlISSl!lla and is removed from
command,17G-8.
Niehla, t11e Cou.-lado of (W. AIl.-la-
lusia), operations ill, 30, 34, 68,
128; iJlI'Irned or llIake, 444,
474-6.
O'Donnell, Charles, general, scl'l'es
under La Romalla, 43; t'OffinUlnds
ill Valencia, 46; sends succours
to Tllrr-a!Olla, 507.
O'Dollncl, Hellry, gCllcml, retires
from command ill l:atRlonia, 240,
O'DOllIlCll, Joseph, general, de-
feated bv GOtlillOt, ·100; retire~
before 8oult's IldvRllce, 4131.
Oliven1.a, fortress, taken by Soult,
35, 30; besieged ,\U\1 taken br
Rercsford, 271-3; evaeuatel) hl'
Welliugtou, 44U; bluwn u!, b)'
Godinot, 454.
Olil'o, FOI't, at Tarl'agolla, storm of,
503.
Orbigo, combats Oll the, 46j.
O'Ronan, colonel, leads the attack
on Fort Olil'O, 50.'5.
Ouguelh, fortress, ill 'Vcllington'~
positioll on the Caya, 44!J,
Oviedo, evacuated br Bonnet, 4GG;
reCaIJtured by llim, 5llG.
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Pack, l)et1i~, general, commantl-
in~ a Portuguese brigaUc, a;
skirmishes with JUlIot at Hio
Mal"OT, i5; pursUell JUlI01, 86, 1:33;
at I cdilllta, 14.2; Casal Novo, );j!;
on the MOlldego, 19'J; blockadin~
Almeitla, 200 ; gives up command
to CamplJcll, :J,51 ; pursues llren-
nier, 363; blows Ill' fortifications
at Almeida, 437.
Palacio, Marquis of, commamlillg
in Valencia, 4,7!).
l'lllamos, surprised lJr lauding' partr
from British frig'.. tes, 2\11.
Pelot, Jean Jacjues, colonel, his
evidence as to 1\ n.s.<ina's o.:amJl<Lign
quoted, HO, 147, 174, 177, 338,
3-!7.
I'eniche, fortress of, its ilnportallcC,
,.
l'cllllc VilIClllur, (;OUllt, Sllauish
ca\'lilry general, 272, 276, 37i,
412,597.
Pcrcoval, SllClIccr, I,rime minister,
his correspontlelH.:c with 'Velling--
ton 65-9.
I'hU(ipoll, ArnUIllU, general,
~O\'crllor of Iladajo7" 2,'i3, 270,
279; defends the toWll against
Heresford, 285-7, 363, 307, 416;
against WeltinRWn, 427-3Q; siege
raised, 431 ; relieved by Manuunt,
446; J"C(;CiVC8 new garri80n, 467.
l'ietOIl, Thomas, p;-eneruI, com-
mandillg 3rd Division, 3; his
d~riI)tion of tile devastation of
Portugal, 135; at POlnb<'.I, 138;
at Redinlu" 142; at Casal Novo,
161; «'oz do ArOllee, lM-ll; at
Guarda, 18-1-6; at combat of
&hngal, lOQ-G; at Fueutes de
Oiloro, ;}3(l; at Badajo>\, ·108,
410; at Campo i\I,.y,)l', 449; Ilis
manll.gemcnt of the 3rd Dit'i~ion
at El HodOll, am'~70.
Pia, combat of, 243.
Polisl1 Lancers, 1st, dlal'gc of ll,e,
at Albuem, 383-4.
I'ombal, combat of, 136, 137, 138.
PorHer, Juan Diall,guerritlero chief,
207,210,21\,463, 4f,s, 469; storms
Santamler, 472, 474.
PlnO Bello, figllUng at, \hll'ill!{. t!le
batUe of Fuelltes de Onoro,
317-18.
I'llllhetc, French bridge alltI dock·
YllN at, 1(;; burnt by LoiS()n, ms.
Quinlanill" de Valle, combat of,
467.
Ham.say, !'!ormall, call~ill, his ex-
plOit ut "ucutes dc Oiioro, 327.
Hediuha, combat of, 139-43.
Hegeuq, tIle Spanish, deprives La
Peiia of his command, 130.
Hcille, Hunure Charles, general,
enters Spain with reinforcements,
223.
Hemulld, gelleraI, dcfcolted, hr
HallllStel'O!! on the Rio 'finto, 58,
128; and at 14 ['ahna, 129 ; op-
IlOI;cd by the Comic de :\IOlltijo,
483.
Henllud, General, gO"emOl of
Ciudad ltodrigQ, captured by
Julian Sauchcz, 587.
HeyDier, .Tcall Louis fi;bcllCl',cr,
general, command;! dh'ision at
Salltarem, 9, 13; at council of
Goleg:.io,7a-m; hislineofretrcat,
131, 132; rejoilL~ l\r~llaJ ]53;
addse.s M~lla. not to march
on I'lasencia, 180; at Sabugal,
Hl2, 1!lO~6, 202; at Fuentes de
Oiloru, 311-48; with i\I11rmont,
440.
Itidge; major, cUlllluandlllg 5th
FusilieN, his ex!)loit at El Hodon,
567.
Riu :\layor, skirmisll lit, 7fj.
Hio 'Jillto, Hallasteros defeats
lWmond 011 the, 68, 128.
Hogniat, general, Suchet's chief
engineer,40fl.
Itogllet, gcneMll, CUlllllHlllusdi"isioll
in Hessicres' Army of the North,
462,463; $Cut on iuto Galieia br
DorseulIc, 4U9.
Itmnalla, I"" :\far'l"is uf, 1'(,.~Ir"
Curo, ¥et! Lu IlQlllallu.
Rouget, gelleral, driven from
&ntander by l'orlier, 472.
HO"ira, doctor, miqueleto chief,
'184; organiws the surl,rist: of
FigUlll-as, 4Ul-3; his uI)Crntiulls,
494, 4!)6; seeks help at Cadiz,
533; returns to Catalonia, 537.
Rllffill, gelleral, defeated 111111 nwI"
tally wOllndOlI at Ha.rrQS.1., 110-16.
Sahugal, combat of, 180-96.
Saint-Cyr.Nugues, colonel, his llart
in the surrender of Torlus;" 2:17.
::iallc!ll;ljl, J uliall, chief uf gucHil.
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.Ieros, his raiils near Sal:uIHuu:Il,
::01, 207, ~13, 280; at Fuclltcs
de Onoro, 31(;,318; Lefore Ciutlau
ItoUrigo, 4i:!, 474; Co'lIJturcs it.;;
governor, 587.
Santa Fe, l\h.riano, Ihke of, his
'frllitlCS!; emlJassy to Paris, 215.
oolltalldcr, Wlrl1lcd by Pudicr,
472.
SantarOlIl, .\Iassella at, 1-22; CI"aCll-
atcd by Ma&;Clm, fJ7, 8::; ocelll/iell
by \Vellington, 88.
&mtocildes, Jose, general, interim
C01l11u:llIllcr-ill-.:hief in Galicill,
212, 203; his m:til'ity, 465;
opposes Bonnet, 467, 468, 474.
:S..m,lield, general, defeats French
at combat of PIu, 243, 240 ; opera·
tions of, round .Figueras, 4U4-S ;
enlers 'I'arragouR, 50(;; lea\'es it,
;'12-13; opposes cI'aenation of
Catalonia, 52!).
8ebastialli, Horace, general, at
Granada, 30, 31.
Serras, general, COllllllillUls division
at Benal'cllte, 46:j; checked by
Cabrera, 467; b)' Santocildes,
-IGS_
Seville, we;lkuCSll of, 31, 3U8;
threatened by llallasteros, 51-8 ;
threatened by Blake, 444, 475-6.
~ih-cira, FranciS(:o, general, at
TroIlCOSO, 19; routetl by CllI(laredc,
21; ill Tras...()S-Molltes, 40J.
Skerret, colonel, his fruiLless e:rqK1-
ditioll to 'l'arrugOl1ll, fiI9-21.
Slatle, general, cB.,·alry OPCTll.tiOllS
of, 106, 187,437,430, 4SO.
OO1l11am, JUSCllh, gellcr<ll, joill!s
Army of Portugal, :?t5; lClIlls re-
inforccmcnts toArlllJ' Qfthc 1\unh,
464; at Hllrg~, 460; ellg~ ill
combat of Ali:lea da I'onte, 5/7-8_
&lult, Nicolas, m'll"$lml, Ullkc of
DlIlmatul, cOllllllllmls ArlllY of
Andalusia, U; his e.~Jletlitioll into
Estt'emadllra, 23, Ul, 92; takffi
OliveJl7.a, 3;;-7 ; besieges "lItll<lkcs
lJadajO'<~, 38-(H ; returns to Seville,
62, 129, 247; marches to relicve
lJatlajcrt, 2U6; his onler8 from
NapoleulI, 3(13-,';; ad"auces aud
fi$ht9 at AlbueTll., 37i-U4; his
dlspatcll to l\""apoleon, 395-0;
retreats, 397, 410 j meets Mar-
IJJOllt, 445; rclitlvCS Rad;ljo~, 440 ;
marches for :)el-mC, 46[;; dri\'l~s
l31ake from the COlldado de Niebla~
475, ·ur.; disperses Murciau army,
481; 1JU:i OJlerations against the
illSlIrgelll;; of Audalusia, 593-4.
~oult, Pierre, geller~l.. at combat of
Sabugal, Ul3-G; lmTSues Freire's
army, 481.
SOU8:I, Jose Anlollio, melll!Jer of
the Portuguese Regency, Wel-
1h1b'1:01l's SUSllicious of 71.
:Spencel', General Sir UrcHt, com·
IlllUUls troops bctwecu tllll AguClla
and Coa, 2Ui; at Fueutes de
Oiioro, a30 j in eharA"e of northeru
fronlicr of Portugal, his instrllc-
tiolls from "'ellillgWu, 4.08; re-
tires before JIarmont's advance,
436,437; SUI)(lrsedetl by Grahalll,
Ilis chnractcr, 551-2.
Squire, captain, engineer officer
with Bcresford, 266; at Qlivellu,
272-
Stcwart, \\'illiam, general, ii; takes
over Hill's command, 5 j super.
seded by Bercsford, 3, 16; his
111uIlder at Alhuera, 37(',-400.
:Suchet, Louis Gabriel, marshal,
commands il} Aragoll, 226; be-
siCA'es and takes Tortosa, 230-40;
ordered to take 'l'arragoua by
Napoleoll,485 j his march thither,
487; lIesieges the place, 4flr-S12;
captures the lower cit}', 613; and
the upper city, ,526; marches to
&rceloua, 530; captures ~loul­
serrat, 531; ordered to eubdue
Valencia, 591.
Tahoada, g-clleral, commands a
dh-ision of tlle Army of Galicia,
466-7.
Tagus river, the, Ney's ami Hey-
nier's plaus for pas~ilJl!", 15, 78-80;
'Vellington's IlTec.lutions to llre-
"cut a vassagc, 73-4.
Talaya, Major Jo3C JOalluim, com-
mauder of ClIlnpo )Ia,ror, 254 ; his
gallant defence, 250-(_
'l'arifll, held by tl,c IJritisll, nB, 593,
iiU4.
Tarragoua, lJcsi~d 10)' ~lJchet,
4!lr-525; fall of the lower eity,
513-14; of the uPllCr cit)', .523-.5.
Teruel, beset by the Valeueian
army, 507; by the Aragonese in-
~1lrj{eulE, 53-i.
Thicbault, I'aul (;h~II"!Ci!, gcucml,
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governor of Salllmall~a, fails to
catch Julian Sanchez, 201; SIlIt"
plies reinforcements to l\Iassena K
army, 300; his views on Mar_
mont, 36!); conurumds lL division
in the El &dOll campaign, 563,
67]; accuses i\lannont of weak_
lIe!lil, 576; figlits t)ll) cOl1l1~lt of
Altlea tlnl"ollte, ;Jj7-'J.
Thornar, operations around, 66-8.
Tillet, Alldre, carries l\IAA8<!Il:1,'~
tlisp<ltch to Ahllllidn, 360.
Tortosa, importall(:e of, 227, 228;
siege of, by Suchct, 230-8; capitn-
latioll of.. 238---'10.
'1'rancoso, combat of.. 21.
'frant, Nicholas, colonel, commands
militia brigatle at Coimbra, 7, 19,
133; defcuds Coimbrn agninst
Montbrun, 140-1; operations of,
161, 10!); attacks Clapanide Ileal'
Almcilla, 199.
Truxillo, occupied I,y I.ahous""yl',
214; by foy, 642.
Usagre, combat of, 412-16.
\'ala~e, engineel' colonel, at (;oim-
bra bridge, 137.
Valencia.. the Armyof,22·7-6;B1ake
in commatld of, 478--9; Suchet's
precautiolliJ ag'uillst, 486; sends
succours to TarragOlla, 607.
Valencia, kingdom of, Napoleon's
designs against.. 539, 591-2.
Valencia de Alcaota.r.... el'ncuated
by Spaniards, taken by Lo.\tour~
:lllIuoourg, 2.56; head quarters of I
(;astanoll, Ml7.
Valladoli(l, attacked b,. 1J.'"\rtidas,
467.
Vallcmux, briguo.licr, o.lcfentcd nud
slain at combat of Cogorderos, 4f">u,
407.
Velaseo, general, second in com-
maud at TltrrngoulI, 512; his
escape, .524; I'otes to abandon
Catalonia, 52il.
Viooor, Claude Perrill, marshal,
Duke of Bellnno, at Cadiz, 30;
forced to supply reillforcomCllts to
Soult, !ill; learns of the ad,·ance
of the allied forces near Cadiz,
103; defeated at Da.rrosa, 108-2.5;
rctitcll bcllind t},c Saltillo, ]26;
sonds troops to SOult, ~7.
Vigo..Roussillon ,colollol,ll is RCCOUllt
of llarrosa.. 118--20.
Villacampa, general, commands
Aragonese insurgents.. 246, 635.
Villa ua POllte, comhRt of, 21;
Wellington's Lattering.train at,
550, 684.
VillllllllCl'll do Sitjes, C'l(ltul'l.'d L~'
Suchet, 628.
Villatte, geuerdl, opposes thl'
Spaniards at the LattJe of Harms,a,
lO,'i-7.
Villa Vcllm, bridgc of, its impor-
tance in "'ellington's communica-
lions, 406, 438-!J.
n'atllier, gelleral, lit Fucutes ue
Oiioro, 316, 322; at combat of
Carpio.. 563; at Aldca da Poutl',
577-8·
Wellesley, Hon. Hemy, Amoossa-
dor at (;adiz.. correspondl'nce with,
129,184.. &0.
'Vellington, Arthllr, ViSCOUllt, ,Ii,,·
position of his forces ill l>ortugtIJ,
I-G; corra~pondencc with Lord
Liverpool 011 the cost of the war.
(;6-9; his plllll for llttackillg Mas-
sena, B3; occupies Sllntarcm, 86;
his letter to Graham after the
battle of Barrosa, 125; his plan
for pursuing Massella, 131-6; at
skirmish of Uedinha, 143; at F01.
do Arouce, 155-8; crosses the
Alva, 16.5; his tactics, 169-72;
on the Coa, 18!); blockades AI-
meida, 201 ; relllllrks 011 tiJo sur-
r('nder of lladajoz, 240; 011 combat
of Campo Mayor, 265; directs in-
vestment of nadajo~,279 ;at FJl'as..
2!)G; !u'C}):lres for MAASCna's ad-
vauce, 305; Lnttle of Fllentcs Ull
Otloro, 310-48; criticism on, 343-
S; his anger at Brennier's escaping
from Almoida, 356-6; llis remarks
on Albuera, 39!l; goes to besiege
Badajo.,;, 40.5; roises siege, 431 ;
eXl'eoti i\Jarmout's advance, 435,
436; his position ou the Caya,
442-53; retires witll his army into
tIle Deira, 457 ; Ilis plans for the
autumn, 546-8; blockades Ciutlau
Rodrigo, 551-3; raises the block-
ade, 561 ; liurprised by MarmOllt
at El llodoll, 565; retires to
Fueute GUlnllldo, Iijl ; IHlll to .'\1-
(ayat('j.. 577; his erroh in thi~
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campaign, 581-2 j I'ti;Unlelil the
blookmde of Rodrign, 583; his
planl for the ,,-inter, 684, ;501.
Wbeatler. colonel, at Barrosa, Ill.
Whip, their factious opJIOIition to
tlle J'eninsular lVat, 00-
\\'bittingham, Samuel, l:oI0Ile1, in
Tari(. expeditioll, 9!J j at HtIrror;a,
106-9,117,123.
,rilsoll, Joltn, general, romm:lIltl;;
militia br~.It1e at tApiuhal, 6, i ;
driven back bl' i\Ian:<lguet, 20; on
the i\Iolll.lpgo, 101 j on the (;0:1"
16!); south Ilf the IlollrtJ, 46 I.
Yrauzo, general, refnSf!ll COmmand
of the c.talan arm)'. 2-lO.
YriarUl, briltadier-general, second
in cOInmaniY at Tortosa, 232, 23S;
ha gallant defence, 238, 239.
7"y38, Joee, genenll, at Cadix, 103;
attacks Villatte, 107, 124; at Ilio
TillW, 2i7 ; joinli Hallasteros, 278,
279 j at .-Ubuera, 377-400; :l.t
l'\ielJlll, 4j.'i; join!! Ami)' of )Iurcia,
478.
Zeure, river, Frf!nch rai,blnlol1g ih
mlllkq, 15.
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